Abstract
Cooperative (co-op) advertising is an arrangement between manufacturer and retailer, where two members initiate their respective advertising to help develop brand, motivate sales, and other purposes. This paper focuses on cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. As two basic elements of a supply chain, the channel power structure and information structure affect the firm’s pricing and advertising decisions. We attempt to investigate how they optimally decide their marginal returns and advertising investments. Utilizing the Stackelberg game theory, we derive the equilibrium of five scenarios in two different cases, i.e., (1) either the manufacturer or the retailer is acting as the Stackelberg leader and (2) whether the Stackelberg leader knows the advertising investment of his follower. Then we make a comparison and obtain some managerial implications as follows: (1) the supply chain power structure and the relative advertising effectiveness coefficient exert great influence on the optimal supply chain decisions, (2) the supply chain members’ profit is not parallel to their corresponding power structure, if the retailer’s advertising effectiveness is greater than the manufacturer’s, the Manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game is a win–win strategy, and vice versa, (3) the dominant member can improve his and the overall performance of the supply chain by having the advertising information of the other.
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Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the Department Editor, the Senior Editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are also thankful for Dr. Chang Fang’ advice on how to revise the paper. This paper would like to acknowledge the support by the National Natural Science Foundation of Anhui Province under Grant 1608085MG152.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Setting the first derivation \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{s} /\partial u_{s} = 0,\partial \prod\nolimits_{s} /\partial a = 0,\partial \prod\nolimits_{s} /\partial A = 0 \),we get \( u_{s} = M_{c} /2 \), \( \sqrt a = k_{r} /8M_{c}^{2} \), \( \sqrt A = k_{m} M_{c}^{2} /8 \)
The Hesse matrix of \( \prod\nolimits_{s} \) is
One easy proves that if \( u_{s} = M_{c} /2 \), then
We set \( {{\partial \pi_{s} } \mathord{\left/ {\vphantom {{\partial \pi_{s} } {\partial u_{s} }}} \right. \kern-0pt} {\partial u_{s} }} = k_{r} M_{c} (\sqrt a + \sqrt k \sqrt A ) - 2k_{r} (\sqrt a + \sqrt k \sqrt A )u_{s} = 0 \)
To set simultaneous equations, we get
Proof of Proposition 2.2
It’s easy to differentiate
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Because \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Ms} /\partial A^{Ms} = u_{m}^{Ms} k_{m} (M_{c} - u_{m}^{Ms} )/4\beta \sqrt A - 1 \) and
we utilize the first-order condition with respect to \( u_{m}^{Ms} \) and obtain the Eq. (A1)
The solution (A1) is \( u_{m}^{Ms} = \Theta_{ \pm }^{MS} (k) \cdot M_{c} \) where \( \Theta_{ \pm }^{Ms} (k) = \frac{{(5 - 2k) \pm \sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} }}{8(1 - k)} \). According to (A1), then \( u_{m}^{Ms} \) must satisfy \( M_{c} /4 < u_{m}^{Ms} < M_{c} /2 \), that is to say \( 1/4 < \Theta_{ \pm }^{Ms} (k) < 1/2 \). Because of \( \Theta_{ + }^{Ms} (k) - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{{(1 + 2k) + \sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} }}{8(1 - k)} \) and \( \Theta_{ + }^{Ms} (k) - \frac{1}{4} = \frac{{3 + \sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} }}{8(1 - k)} \), we can easily prove that \( \Theta_{ + }^{Ms} (k) > 1/2 \) or \( \Theta_{ + }^{Ms} (k) < 1/4 \). So \( \Theta_{ + }^{Ms} (k) \) isn’t the result of (A1).
Due to
so \( \Theta_{ - }^{Ms} (k) \) is the result of the Eq. (A1).
The Hesse matrix of \( \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Ms} \) is
It is easy to prove that \( \left| {H_{1} } \right| < 0,\left| {H_{2} } \right| > 0 \) when \( u_{m} = \theta^{Ms} M_{c} ,\sqrt A = k_{m} \theta^{Ms} (1 - \theta^{Ms} )M_{c}^{2} /4 \). That is to say, \( \Theta_{ - }^{Ms} (k) \) is the optimal solution for \( \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Ms} \).The equilibrium solution (Ms) can easily be found based on \( u_{m}^{Ms} = \theta^{Ms} M_{c} \) .
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Because \( \frac{{\partial \theta^{Ms} }}{\partial k} = \frac{{4[\sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} - (2k - 1)]}}{{[5 - 2k + \sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} ]^{2} \sqrt {(2k - 1)^{2} + 8} }} \), we have \( \partial \theta^{Ms} /\partial k > 0 \). Based on this property, it is easy to prove that \( \partial u_{m}^{Ms} /\partial k > 0,\partial u_{r}^{Ms} /\partial k < 0 \) and \( \partial A^{Ms} /\partial k > 0,\partial a^{Ms} /\partial k < 0 \).
From Proposition 2.3, we have
where
It is easy to prove \( 27 - 12k + 18k^{2} + 4k^{3} > 0 \) for \( k \ge 0 \).
If \( k < 1 \), because \( h_{1} (k) > 2(1 - k)(27 - 12k + 18k^{2} + 4k^{3} ) \), then
Since \( \partial ( - 94k^{3} + 16k^{4} + 8k^{5} )/\partial k = 2k^{2} ( - 141 + 32k + 20k^{2} ) < 0 \), we have \( - 94k^{3} + 16k^{4} + 8k^{5} > - 70 \) and \( h_{1} (k) + h_{2} (k) > 65 - 217k + 200k^{2} \), therefore \( h_{1} (k) + h_{2} (k) > 0 \).
If \( k \ge 1 \), we have \( h_{1} (k) < 0 \).
Since \( \partial h_{2} (k)/\partial k > 141k - 198k^{2} + 96k^{3} + 40k^{4} > 0 \), so \( h_{2} (k) > h_{2} (1) = 48 > 0 \).
Because \( [h_{2} (k)]^{2} - [h_{1} (k)]^{2} = 8k( - 81 + 299k - 95k^{2} + 113k^{3} + 48k^{4} + 4k^{5} ) > 0 \), we can prove that \( h_{1} (k) + h_{2} (k) > 0 \) for \( k \ge 1 \).
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Substitute the Eqs. (A2) and (A3) into A4, we have
Thus, under the condition \( M_{c} - u_{m}^{Mst} > 0 \), we have \( M_{c} /3 < u_{m}^{Mst} < M_{c} /2 \).
Solving the Eq. (A5), we have \( u_{m}^{Mst} = \Theta_{ \pm }^{Mst} (k)M_{c} \), where \( \Theta_{ \pm }^{Mst} = \frac{{4k \pm \sqrt {16k^{2} + 16k + 9} }}{(9 + 16k)} \).
Since \( \Theta_{ - }^{Mst} (k) = \frac{ - 16k - 9}{{(9 + 16k)(4k + \sqrt {16k^{2} + 16k + 9} )}} < 0 \), \( \Theta_{ - }^{Mst} (k) \) isn’t feasible solution of the Eq. (A5).
Because
so \( 1/3 < \Theta_{ + }^{Mst} < 1/2 \).
We denote \( \theta^{Mst} \) as \( \Theta_{ + }^{Mst} (k) \), and can get \( 1 - t = (5\theta^{Mst} - 1)/(1 + 3\theta^{Mst} ),\quad u_{m} = \theta^{Mst} M_{c} ,\quad\sqrt A = k_{m} \theta^{Mst} (1 - \theta^{Mst} )M_{c}^{2} /4 \).
The Hesse matrix of \( \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Mst} \) is
When \( 1 - t = (5\theta - 1)/(1 + 3\theta ),u_{m} = \theta M_{c} ,\sqrt A = k_{m} \theta (1 - \theta )M_{c}^{2} /4 \),we have
In the interval \( 1/3 \le \theta \le 1/2 \), it is easy to derive that \( 1 + 2\theta - 3\theta^{2} > 0,1 - 6\theta + 6\theta^{2} < 0,1 + 18\theta - 27\theta^{2} > 0 \), and \( - 1 + 7\theta - 12\theta^{2} + 6\theta^{3} > 0 \),
Therefore, \( \left| {H_{1} } \right| < 0,\left| {H_{2} } \right| > 0,\left| {H_{3} } \right| < 0 \).
Since \( \frac{{\partial t^{Mst} }}{{\partial \theta^{Mst} }} = - 8/(1 + 3\theta^{Mst} )^{2} < 0 \) and \( 1/3 \le \theta^{Mst} \le 1/2 \), we can get \( 2/5 < t^{Mst} < 2/3 \).
Proof of Proposition 2.6
For \( 1/3 < \theta^{Mst} < 1/2 \), because \( \partial \theta^{Mst} /\partial k = \frac{20}{{\sqrt {16k^{2} + 16k + 9} \cdot (18 - 4k + 9\sqrt {16k^{2} + 16k + 9} )}} \), we have \( \partial \theta^{{Ms{\text{t}}}} /\partial k > 0 \). Based on this property, it is easy to prove that:\( \partial u_{m}^{Mst} /\partial k > 0,\partial u_{r}^{Mst} /\partial k < 0 \), \( \partial A^{Mst} /\partial k > 0,\partial a^{Mst} /\partial k < 0, \)\( \partial (1 - t^{Mst} )/\partial k < 0 \).
Through a complex algebraic operation, we have
Proof of Proposition 2.7
According to the retailer’s profit, it is easy to get
Set \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rs} /\partial a^{Rs} = 0,\partial \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rs} /\partial u_{r}^{Rs} = 0 \), we have
So we can obtain \( u_{r}^{Rs} = \Theta_{ \pm }^{Rs} (k)M_{c} \), where \( \Theta_{ \pm }^{Rs} (k) = \frac{{(5k - 2) \pm \sqrt {9k^{2} - 4k + 4} }}{8(k - 1)} \).
If \( k > 1 \), \( \Theta_{ + }^{Rs} (k) > \frac{5k - 2 + 3k - 2}{8(k - 1)} > 1 \); if \( k < 1 \), \( \Theta_{ + }^{Rs} (k) = \frac{{(5k - 2) + \sqrt {(5k - 2)^{2} - 16(k - 1)k} }}{8(k - 1)} < 0 \), thus \( u_{r}^{Rs} = \Theta_{ + }^{Rs} (k)M_{c} \) isn’t feasible solution.
Because
thus \( 1/4 \le \Theta_{ - }^{Rs} (k) \le 1/2 \).
The Hesse matrix of \( \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rs} \) is
In the interval \( 1/4 \le \theta \le 1/2 \), it is easy to derive that \( 1 - 6\theta + 6\theta^{2} < 0 \) and \( \left| {H_{1} } \right| < 0,\left| {H_{2} } \right| > 0 \).
Therefore \( \Theta_{ - }^{Rs} (k) \) is optimal solution for \( \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rs} \). We denote \( \theta^{Rs} \) as \( \Theta_{ - }^{Rs} (k) \). The equilibrium solution (Rs) can easily be derived based on \( u_{r}^{Rs} = \theta_{{}}^{Rs} (k)M_{c} \) .
Proof of Proposition 2.10
Because \( \partial \theta^{Rs} /\partial k = - \frac{{4( - 2 + k + \sqrt {4 - 4k + 9k^{2} } )}}{{\sqrt {4 - 4k + 9k^{2} } ( - 2 + 5k + \sqrt {4 - 4k + 9k^{2} } )^{2} }} \), we have \( \partial \theta^{Rs} /\partial k > 0 \) and \( 1/4 \le \theta^{Rs} \le 1/2 \).Based on this property, it is easy to prove that : \( \partial u_{r}^{Rs} /\partial k < 0,\partial u_{m}^{Rs} /\partial k > 0 \), \( \partial a^{Rs} /\partial k < 0,\partial A^{Rs} /\partial k > 0. \) We can get
where \( h_{3} (k) = h_{31} (k) + h_{32} (k) \) and \( h_{31} (k) = (k - 1)\sqrt {4 - 4k + 9k^{2} } (4 + 18k - 12k^{2} + 27k^{3} ) \), \( h_{32} (k) = (8 + 24k - 66k^{2} + 140k^{3} - 139k^{4} + 81k^{5} ) \).
Since \( (3k - 2) + \sqrt {(3k - 2)^{2} + 8k} > 0 \), the sign of \( \partial \psi^{Rs} /\partial k \) is same as \( h_{3} (k) \). Because \( \partial h_{32} (k)/\partial k = 24 - 132k + 200k^{2} + k^{2} (220 - 556k + 405k^{2} ) \), so \( \partial h_{32} (k)/\partial k > 0 \). Therefore \( h_{32} (k) \ge h_{32} (0) > 0 \). Similarly, we have \( 18 - 12k + 27k^{2} \ge 0 \), that means \( \sqrt {4 - 4k + 9k^{2} } (4 + 18k - 12k^{2} + 27k^{3} ) \ge 0 \). If \( k \ge 1 \), \( h_{31} (k) \ge 0 \), so that \( h_{3} (k) \ge 0 \). If \( 0 \le k < 1 \), because \( [h_{32} (k)]^{2} - [h_{31} (k)]^{2} = - 8k^{4} ( - 4 - 48k - 113k^{2} + 95k^{3} - 299k^{4} + 81k^{5} ) \ge 0 \), so that \( h_{3} (k) \ge 0 \).With the above results, \( \partial \psi^{Rs} /\partial k \ge 0 \).
Proof of Proposition 2.11
Since \( \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Rst} = u_{m}^{Rst} D^{Rst} /\beta - t^{Rst} A^{Rst} ,\prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rst} = u_{r}^{Rst} D^{Rst} /\beta - (1 - t^{Rst} )A^{Rst} - a^{Rst} \),
The manufacture’s optimal profits are given by the following equations:
So \( \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rst} = k_{r} u_{r}^{Rst} \frac{{(M_{c} - u_{r}^{Rst} )}}{2\beta }\sqrt {a^{Rst} } - a^{Rst} + k_{m}^{2} \frac{{(M_{c} - u_{r}^{Rst} )^{3} (M_{c} + 3u_{r}^{Rst} )}}{{64\beta^{2} t^{Rst} }} - k_{m}^{2} \frac{{(M_{c} - u_{r}^{Rst} )^{4} }}{{64\beta^{2} t^{Rst} t^{Rst} }} \).
Solving equation \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rst} /\partial a^{Rst} = 0 \), \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rst} /\partial t^{Rst} = 0 \), we have \( \sqrt {a^{Rst} } = k_{r} u_{r}^{Rst} (M_{c} - u_{r}^{Rst} )/(4\beta ) \), \( t^{Rst} = 2(M_{c} - u_{r}^{Rst} )/(M_{c} + 3u_{r}^{Rst} ) \). Substitute it into \( \partial \prod\nolimits_{r}^{Rst} /\partial u_{r}^{Rst} = 0 \), we have that
So we have \( u_{r}^{Rst} = \Theta_{ \pm }^{Rst} (k)M_{c} \), \( \Theta_{ \pm }^{Rst} (k) = \frac{{4 \pm \sqrt {16 + k(9k + 16)} }}{(9k + 16)} \). Since \( u_{r}^{Rst} > 0 \), \( u_{r}^{Rs} = \Theta_{ - }^{Rst} (k)M_{c} \) isn’t feasible solution.
Since
so \( u_{r}^{Rst} = \Theta_{ + }^{Rst} (k)M_{c} \) is optimal solution and \( 1/3 \le \Theta_{ - }^{Rst} (k) \le 1/2 \). We denote \( \theta^{Rst} \) as \( \Theta_{ - }^{Rst} (k) \).
The Hesse matrix of \( \prod\nolimits_{m}^{Rst} \) is
and
Because in the interval \( 1/3 \le \theta \le 1/2 \), then \( 1 - 6\theta + 6\theta^{2} < 0, - 1 - 18\theta + 27\theta^{2} < 0 \).It is easy to prove that \( \left| {H_{1} } \right| < 0,\left| {H_{2} } \right| > 0,\left| {H_{3} } \right| < 0 \). Therefore, \( u_{r} = \theta^{Rst} M_{c} ,\sqrt a = k_{r} M_{c}^{2} \frac{\theta (1 - \theta )}{4},t = 2\frac{1 - \theta }{1 + 3\theta } \) is optimal decision for the retailer.
Since \( \frac{{\partial t^{Rst} }}{{\partial \theta^{Rst} }} = - 8/(1 + 3\theta^{Rst} )^{2} < 0 \) and \( 1/3 \le \theta^{Rst} \le 1/2 \), we can get \( 2/5 < t^{Rst} < 2/3 \).
Proof of Proposition 2.12
Because \( \frac{{\partial \theta^{Rst} }}{\partial k} = \frac{{144k - 72\sqrt {16 + k(9k + 16)} - 32}}{{2(9k + 16)^{2} \sqrt {16 + k(9k + 16)} }} \), we have \( \partial \theta^{Rst} /\partial k < 0 \) and \( 1/3 \le \theta^{Rst} \le 1/2 \).Based on this property, it is easy to prove that \( \partial u_{r}^{Rst} /\partial k < 0,\partial u_{m}^{Rst} /\partial k > 0,\quad \partial a^{Rst} /\partial k < 0,\partial A^{Rst} /\partial k > 0,\quad \partial (1 - t^{Rst} )/\partial k < 0. \)
Through a complex algebraic operation, we have
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Zhang, T., Guo, X., Hu, J. et al. Cooperative advertising models under different channel power structure. Ann Oper Res 291, 1103–1125 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03257-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03257-4