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Effects of Officials’ Cross-Regional Redeployment on Regional Environmental Quality in China

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Abstract

Cross-regional redeployment (or relocation) of government officials has a significant effect on the local economic development and environmental protection. Based on the panel data of 31 provinces (municipalities) in China from 2001 to 2016 and the environmental pollution index obtained by Entropy method, the dynamic panel regression model was applied to verify the relationship between the officials’ cross-regional redeployment and environmental pollution. The results show that environmental pollution was positively correlated with officials’ relocation and their tenure after the redeployment. As the officials’ tenure increases to the critical value, the positive correlation between the official’s tenure and environmental pollution would change. By measuring this threshold, we find that the average critical value for China was 5.14 years, which were the same as the average tenure of Chinese officials. Moreover, the result also illustrates the difference between central eastern China and western China, with the average threshold being 4.01 years and 5.89 years, respectively. In addition, the impact of officials’ cross-regional redeployment on the environment would also be affected by the initial condition of the region. According to the result, the environmental governance within the central eastern regions was better than that in the western region. In the last part of this paper, we proposed measures and suggestions, such as changing the incentive policies of officials, perfecting the local policies and the cultivate and exchange system of cadres, as well as strengthen the power of social supervision, for the sake of facilitating the healthy and green development of the regional economy.

Highlights

  • We examined the significant effects of the relationship between the officials’ cross-regional redeployment and environmental pollution.

  • We found that environmental pollution was positively correlated with officials’ relocation and their tenure after the redeployment.

  • We found that the average critical value for China was 5.14 years, which were the same as the average tenure of Chinese officials.

  • The impact of officials’ cross-regional redeployment on the environment would also be affected by the initial condition of the region.

  • We proposed measures and suggestions for facilitating the healthy and green development of the regional economy.

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Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Chongqing Social Sciences Planning (2017ZDYY33), Natural Science Foundation of China (41471116), Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province (2016A030313547), and special thanks go to the Youth Innovation Promotion Association CAS (2016181).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Business School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, 401120, Chongqing, China

    Bing Zhou & Shengzhong Huang

  2. Research Center for Economy of Upper Reaches of the Yangtse River, Chongqing Technology and Business University, 400067, Chongqing, China

    Bing Zhou, Yumeng Li & Xiaoli Lu

  3. Key Lab of Pollution Ecology and Environmental Engineering, Institute of Applied Ecology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 110016, Shenyang, China

    Bing Xue

  4. Key Lab for Environmental Computation and Sustainability of Liaoning Province, Institute of Applied Ecology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 110016, Shenyang, China

    Bing Xue

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  1. Bing Zhou
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  4. Shengzhong Huang
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Zhou, B., Li, Y., Lu, X. et al. Effects of Officials’ Cross-Regional Redeployment on Regional Environmental Quality in China. Environmental Management 64, 757–771 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-019-01216-0

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