Abstract Globally, women are underrepresented in politics. We propose developmental psychology offers an important, yet underused, theoretical lens for understanding and counteracting the gender gap in political leadership. In making this proposal, we harness insight from research on women’s underrepresentation in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM), where developmental psychology

(2021). Gender and the Development of Leadership Stereotypes. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 72-76.

(2021). Roots, Barriers, and Scaffolds: Integrating Developmental and Structural Insights to Understand Gender Disparities in Political Leadership. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 77-82.

(2021). The Importance of Political Science for Understanding the Developmental Roots of Gender Gaps in Politics. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 83-88.

(2021). Hidden in Plain Sight: The Inconsistent Gender Gaps in STEM and Leadership. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 89-95.

(2021). Evolution and Sex Differences in Political Engagement. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 96-104.

(2021). Uncovering and Challenging the Binary Framework. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 105-106.

(2021). Built on Uneven Ground: How Masculine Defaults Disadvantage Women in Political Leadership. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 107-116.

(2021). Taking A Social-Relational (and Developmental) Perspective on the Roots of Gender Gaps in Political Leadership. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 117-123.

(2021). Early Sociopolitical Development Matters for Inequality: SDO and the Gender Gap in Leadership. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 124-130.

(2021). Engendering Success in Politics: A Pipeline Problem Requires a Pipeline Solution. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 131-136.

Abstract Gender inequities in politics persist around the world. Research in political science and social psychology underscores how gender gaps in politics are fueled by societal messages that politics is a masculine domain. Developmental psychology offers a complementary, yet underappreciated, perspective on how gender inequities in politics are created and maintained. At first glance, children and

Abstract Failures to replicate high-profile priming effects have raised questions about the reliability of so-called “social priming” phenomena. However, not only are many of the relevant studies not particularly social in nature, but other robust priming effects that are clearly social in nature do not count as social priming. Most importantly, the focus on the supposedly social aspect of the work

(2021). Defiant Denial is Self-Defeating. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 12-16.

(2021). A Train Wreck by Any Other Name. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 17-23.

(2021). Priming Effects on Behavior and Priming Behavioral Concepts: A Commentary on Sherman and Rivers (2020) Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 24-28.

(2021). All Aboard! ‘Social’ and Nonsocial Priming are the Same Thing* Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 29-34.

(2021). What’s on Your Mind? Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 35-37.

(2021). The Role of Intentionality in Priming. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 38-40.

(2021). “Social Priming” Through the Lens of Sociology of Science: Fuzzy Boundary, Personal Experience, and Broader Atmosphere. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 41-44.

(2021). We Are in It Together. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 45-48.

Abstract We identify the main themes raised in the commentaries and respond. To summarize: Yes, there were problems with social priming (and most other psychological) research; yes, the definition of social priming matters; no, cherry-picking specific studies to replicate does not amount to a systematic examination of the relevant research; yes, within-subjects social priming studies are robust; yes

(2020). To Wish Impossible Things: On the Ontological Status of Latent Variables and the Prospects for Theory in Psychology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 289-296.

(2020). How to Build a Strong Theoretical Foundation. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 297-301.

(2020). The Struggle Is Real: Challenges and Solutions in Theory Building. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 302-309.

(2020). Building Theories on Top of, and Not Independent of, Statistical Models: The Case of the p-factor. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 310-320.

(2020). Theory Development Requires an Epistemological Sea Change. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 321-325.

(2020). Implicit Realism Impedes Progress in Psychology: Comment on Fried (2020) Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 326-333.

(2020). Theory, in Practice. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 334-335.

(2020). Theories and Models: What They Are, What They Are for, and What They Are About. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 336-344.

Abstract The applied social science literature using factor and network models continues to grow rapidly. Most work reads like an exercise in model fitting, and falls short of theory building and testing in three ways. First, statistical and theoretical models are conflated, leading to invalid inferences such as the existence of psychological constructs based on factor models, or recommendations for

(2021). Correction. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 153-153.

Abstract We are in the midst of a global transition in which digital “screens” are no longer simply entertainment devices and distractions; rather, adolescents are currently living in a hybrid reality that links digital spaces to offline contexts. Yet, psychological scientists studying the mental health impact of digital experiences largely focus on correlations with “screen time,” leading to oversimplified

I am writing this article during the COVID-19 outbreak while working remotely at home. Despite my role as dean of the college and faculty member in the Psychology Department, I have not had a face-...

Digital media has increasingly become a central feature in the lives of adolescents, yet its impact on youths’ development and mental health remains poorly understood. Granic et al. (this issue) co...

The study of digital technologies and how they influence adolescents is flourishing, informed by a steady stream of empirical studies, evidence reviews and meta-analyses (Dickson et al., 2018; Orbe...

In their timely essay, Granic and colleagues (this issue) posit digital media as interwoven with real-life experience and an important and nuanced part of adolescent development. When they were wri...

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Psychological Inquiry article by Granic, Morita, and Scholten (2020). We agree with the authors that developing a self-identity is one of the most im...

At the time of this writing, we are in the midst of a global coronavirus pandemic with large swaths of the population staying at home or “social distancing.” Schools are closed, sports are canceled...

Abstract The current response article began by situating this journal volume in the current COVID-19 pandemic context which has driven young people into digital spaces for far longer periods of time than ever. Many scholars, policy makers, and the public at large are recognizing that these social digital spaces may be the only outlet by which youth and their families can remain safe (at least physically)

Abstract Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common

“A man is not called wise because he talks and talks again; but if he is peaceful, loving and fearless then he is in truth called wise.” ― The Dhammapada: The Sayings of the Buddha (translated by C...

Having studied wisdom for over twenty years now, I think I have learned quite a bit from my own research. If someone describes a difficult life problem to me, I can produce a response that would pr...

Wisdom is a broad construct that has multiple facets. As many have pointed out, not only the Greeks, but wisdom traditions cross-culturally, have generally identified two major approaches, phronesis and sophia (e.g., Curnow, 1999). Grossman et al.’s (this issue) Perspectival Metacognition (PMC) model is solidly within the phronesis tradition, that is, deliberation on practical choices, or qualities

Grossmann et al. (this issue) have proposed a common wisdom model with four major components: (1) balance of viewpoints, (2) epistemic humility, (3) context adaptability, and (4) multiple perspectives. Except for what I consider to be four crucial missing elements, I believe this is a very useful and important model. I should think that, as the model appears to be largely consistent with my own balance

Since humans have been thinking about the human condition, “What is wisdom?” and “How might we attain it?” have been central questions we ask about our lives. The target article of Grossman and col...

This definition is laudable in many waysit casts a distinctively social lens upon wisdom, arguing that to be wise is to consider and at balance the common good against selfinterest. It requires that such consideration be excellent, which presumably allows for measurable, “gold standard” processes and outcomes. It also proposes that metacognition is a hallmark of wise reasoning (perspectival meta-cognition

The Common Wisdom Model (Grossmann et al., this issue) represents a significant synthesis and advancement of our scientific understanding of wisdom. By arguing that moral aspirations and perspectiv...

For millennia, the question of wisdom, its precursors and correlates, and its implications for informing a ‘good life’ has fascinated philosophers and social scientists alike (Sternberg & Gl€ uck, 2019). The gerontological literature in particular has a rich research tradition exploring this concept (Staudinger & Gl€ uck, 2011), but there is an ongoing tension: Laypeople’s aging expectations (e.g.

The enormous amount of information on wisdom gathered and synthesized in the target article provides a strong base for future research on wisdom, and new or refined lines of inquiry will surely fol...

Abstract We have introduced a common wisdom model to establish a shared language, clarify underlying theoretical assumptions, advance assessment tools, and foster evidence-based interventions for stimulating wisdom during challenging societal times. The common wisdom model synthesizes the views of numerous contemporary scientists working on wisdom and includes two components: perspectival meta-cognition

Abstract We argue that because of a long history of intergroup conflict and competition, humans evolved to be tribal creatures. Tribalism is not inherently bad, but it can lead to ideological thinking and sacred values that distort cognitive processing of putatively objective information in ways that affirm and strengthen the views and well-being of one’s ingroup (and that increase one’s own standing

Clark and Winegard (This issue; hereafter CW) propose that the evolutionary incentives faced by our ancestors often led them to promote their own group’s welfare at the expense of finding and disseminating facts. In other words, humans evolved to prioritize tribalism over truth seeking. In our modern world, this proclivity represents an inherited glitch in our collective psyche, with major ramifications

Human beings have a remarkable penchant for believing things that are not true. This has always been the case. Ancients believed in nature deities, bloodletting was thought to cure disease for many...

“…we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.”(Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe, December 27, 1820)In the target...

In the target article, Clark and Winegard (this issue) attempt to make the case that, in the context of the recent American political system, liberals and conservatives are equally “tribal.” They then use this argument to assert that the preponderance of liberals in social science makes it very likely that the research literature is systematically biased in favor of liberal ideas and perspectives and

In science, theoretical claims are cheap. Evidence is hard. Even highly plausible claims based on a strong nomological net of indirect evidence can fall apart when well-designed studies directly test a claim’s predictions. In research on intergroup bias, for example, people may report ideological or prejudicial biases but fail to discriminate anyway due to systemic or psychological forces that constrain

As Clark and Winegard (this issue) comprehensively demonstrate, tribal psychology is universal. It knows no ideological boundaries. Yes, tribalism-based epistemological group biases occur for conservatives and religious persons; but these same biases also occur for liberals and atheists. The statement hardly seems controversial, and yet the idea that liberals show group biases does not appear (to us)

In January 2011, I gave a talk at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology titled “The Bright Future of Post-Partisan Social Psychology.” I made the case that the field of social psychology had become a politically homogeneous “tribal moral community.” I drew on Phil Tetlock’s work on the Sacred Value Protection Model (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) to

Clark and Winegard (This issue; hereafter CW) mount a thought-provoking case for the evolutionary progeny and influence of tribalist ideology on social science. I wish to make two points that, in m...