Abstract Failures to replicate high-profile priming effects have raised questions about the reliability of so-called “social priming” phenomena. However, not only are many of the relevant studies not particularly social in nature, but other robust priming effects that are clearly social in nature do not count as social priming. Most importantly, the focus on the supposedly social aspect of the work

(2021). Defiant Denial is Self-Defeating. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 12-16.

(2021). A Train Wreck by Any Other Name. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 17-23.

(2021). Priming Effects on Behavior and Priming Behavioral Concepts: A Commentary on Sherman and Rivers (2020) Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 24-28.

(2021). All Aboard! ‘Social’ and Nonsocial Priming are the Same Thing* Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 29-34.

(2021). What’s on Your Mind? Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 35-37.

(2021). The Role of Intentionality in Priming. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 38-40.

(2021). “Social Priming” Through the Lens of Sociology of Science: Fuzzy Boundary, Personal Experience, and Broader Atmosphere. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 41-44.

(2021). We Are in It Together. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 45-48.

Abstract We identify the main themes raised in the commentaries and respond. To summarize: Yes, there were problems with social priming (and most other psychological) research; yes, the definition of social priming matters; no, cherry-picking specific studies to replicate does not amount to a systematic examination of the relevant research; yes, within-subjects social priming studies are robust; yes

Abstract The applied social science literature using factor and network models continues to grow rapidly. Most work reads like an exercise in model fitting, and falls short of theory building and testing in three ways. First, statistical and theoretical models are conflated, leading to invalid inferences such as the existence of psychological constructs based on factor models, or recommendations for

(2020). To Wish Impossible Things: On the Ontological Status of Latent Variables and the Prospects for Theory in Psychology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 289-296.

(2020). How to Build a Strong Theoretical Foundation. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 297-301.

(2020). The Struggle Is Real: Challenges and Solutions in Theory Building. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 302-309.

(2020). Building Theories on Top of, and Not Independent of, Statistical Models: The Case of the p-factor. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 310-320.

(2020). Theory Development Requires an Epistemological Sea Change. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 321-325.

(2020). Implicit Realism Impedes Progress in Psychology: Comment on Fried (2020) Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 326-333.

(2020). Theory, in Practice. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 334-335.

(2020). Theories and Models: What They Are, What They Are for, and What They Are About. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 336-344.

Abstract We are in the midst of a global transition in which digital “screens” are no longer simply entertainment devices and distractions; rather, adolescents are currently living in a hybrid reality that links digital spaces to offline contexts. Yet, psychological scientists studying the mental health impact of digital experiences largely focus on correlations with “screen time,” leading to oversimplified

(2020). Narrative Identity in a Digital Age: What are the Human Risks? Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 224-228.

(2020). Adolescent Development in the Digital Media Context. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 229-234.

(2020). Only Holistic and Iterative Change Will Fix Digital Technology Research. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 235-241.

(2020). Video Games During the Time of the Plague. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 242-246.

(2020). Self-Identity as a Cognitive Model of the Self: Commentary on Granic, Morita, & Scholten (2020) Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 247-249.

(2020). Socioemotional Development in the Digital Age. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 250-257.

Abstract The current response article began by situating this journal volume in the current COVID-19 pandemic context which has driven young people into digital spaces for far longer periods of time than ever. Many scholars, policy makers, and the public at large are recognizing that these social digital spaces may be the only outlet by which youth and their families can remain safe (at least physically)

(2020). Correction. Psychological Inquiry. Ahead of Print.

Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common wisdom

(2020). Moving from Humanities to Sciences: A New Model of Wisdom Fortified by Sciences of Neurobiology, Medicine, and Evolution. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 134-143.

(2020). The Important Difference Between Psychologists’ Labs and Real Life: Evaluating the Validity of Models of Wisdom. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 144-150.

(2020). Only Half the Story. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 151-152.

(2020). The Missing Links: Comments on “The Science of Wisdom in a Polarized World”. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 153-159.

(2020). Self-Transcendent Awe as a Moral Grounding of Wisdom. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 160-163.

(2020). Meta-Cognition with a Heart: Mindfulness, Therapy, and the Cultivation of Wisdom. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 164-167.

(2020). “A Theory of Wisdom Needs Theory of Mind”. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 168-173.

(2020). Leveraging the Common Model to Inform the Research Agenda on Aging and Wisdom. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 174-181.

(2020). Using the PMC Model to Advance Research on Wisdom: A Focus on Coping with Adversity. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 182-184.

We have introduced a common wisdom model to establish a shared language, clarify underlying theoretical assumptions, advance assessment tools, and foster evidence-based interventions for stimulating wisdom during challenging societal times. The common wisdom model synthesizes the views of numerous contemporary scientists working on wisdom and includes two components: perspectival meta-cognition and

(2020). Without Contraries is no Progression. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 94-101.

(2020). Unjustified Generalization: An Overlooked Consequence of Ideological Bias. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 90-93.

(2020). An Optimistic Take on Avoiding Liberal (and Other Sources) of Bias. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 88-89.

(2020). Gauging the Politicization of Research Programs. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 86-87.

(2020). A Model of Political Bias in Social Science Research. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 73-85.

(2020). Breaking Groupthink: Why Scientific Identity and Norms Mitigate Ideological Epistemology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 66-72.

(2020). Not So Simple: Science is in the Details. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 61-65.

(2020). Belief Bias and Its Significance for Modern Social Science. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 57-60.

(2020). Tribalism, Forbidden Baserates, and the Telos of Social Science. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 53-56.

(2020). The Paradox of the Tribal Equalitarian. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 48-52.

(2020). Ordinary Claims Require Ordinary Evidence: A Lack of Direct Support for Equalitarian Bias in the Social Sciences. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 42-47.

(2020). The Tribe Has Spoken: Evidence for the Impact of Tribal Differences in Social Science Is Equivocal. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 35-41.

(2020). Ideological Asymmetries in Social Psychological Research: Rethinking the Impact of Political Context on Ideological Epistemology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 29-34.

(2020). Knowledge is Shared. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 26-28.

(2020). Sexual Selection, History, and the Evolution of Tribalism. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-25.

We argue that because of a long history of intergroup conflict and competition, humans evolved to be tribal creatures. Tribalism is not inherently bad, but it can lead to ideological thinking and sacred values that distort cognitive processing of putatively objective information in ways that affirm and strengthen the views and well-being of one’s ingroup (and that increase one’s own standing within

Causal inference and generalizability both matter. Historically, systematic designs emphasize causal inference, while representative designs focus on generalizability. Here, we suggest a transformative synthesis – Systematic Representative Design (SRD) – concurrently enhancing both causal inference and “built-in” generalizability by leveraging today’s intelligent agent, virtual environments, and other

(2019). Reducing the Noise of Reality. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 203-210.

(2019). Reflections on a Proposal Designed to Enhance the Internal and Internal Validity of Research in Psychology. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 211-215.

(2019). Systematic Representative Design: Panacea? Not really. Useful? Probably. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 216-219.

(2019). Establishing Generalizable Mechanisms. Psychological Inquiry: Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 220-230.