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On the non-propositional content of our ordinary intentions Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2024-02-19 Xavier Castellà
It is a widely-held thesis that the content of intentions can be characterized in terms of the truth of a proposition. In this paper I try to reject this idea. First, I argue that, at least for ord...
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Comparing deterministic agents: A new argument for compatibilism Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2024-01-27 Marcela Herdova
This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilis...
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A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’ Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Tom Frankfort
Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and...
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An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Víctor Fernández Castro
In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604...
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Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-07-25 Harold Langsam
The sensory colors that figure in visual perceptual experience are either properties of the object of consciousness (naïve realism, sense-data theory), or properties of the subject of consciousness...
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Unavoidable actions Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-07-19 Justin A. Capes
It’s often assumed, especially in discussions of free will and moral responsibility, that unavoidable actions are possible. In recent years, however, several philosophers have questioned that assum...
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Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-07-17 Ali Hossein Khani
A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgmen...
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Functional systems as explanatory tools in psychiatry Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-07-12 M. Salcedo-Gómez, Claudia-Lorena García
Here we defend the view that one ought to categorize and classify at least some mental disorders as clusters of interrelated dysfunctions of (usually, several) cognitive capacities – that is, the k...
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A moral freedom to which we might aspire Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-06-23 Andrew Eshleman
Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we hav...
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From causation to conscious control Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-06-11 Lieke Joske Franci Asma
ABSTRACT Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the nature of conscious control. As a result, experiments suggesting that we lack conscious control over our actions cannot be properly evaluated. Joshua [Shepherd, J. 2015. “Conscious Control Over Action.” Mind & Language 30 (3): 320–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12082; Shepherd, J. 2021. The Shape of Agency: Control, Action, Skill, Knowledge
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Fixing internalism about perceptual content Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-05-12 Gregory Bochner
ABSTRACT Suppose that Paul, while looking at a tree, sees that that thing over there is a red bird. Paul is having what we may call a ‘singular’ perceptual experience. How should we characterise the representational content of his perceptual experience? I will sketch an original answer to this question, building on the internalist accounts propounded by Searle (1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University
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Towards a theory of offense Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-05-05 Andrew Sneddon
ABSTRACT We are all familiar with claims about being offended. There is reason to think that taking offense is particularly characteristic of the moral psychology of our times. When someone claims offense, others are supposed to take notice. This suffices to make offense a topic of philosophical and practical interest. However, we lack a persuasive account of the nature of offense. The present partial
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Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-05-01 Jonathan J. Hall
ABSTRACT A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called ‘the agency problem of compatibilism’ (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily
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Editorial: self-illness ambiguity and narrative identity Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-04-28 Roy Dings, Léon C. De Bruin
Published in Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2023)
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What do my problems say about me? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-04-28 Sanneke de Haan
ABSTRACT ‘If I experience X, is it because of the illness, the medication, or is it ‘just me’?’ (Karp 2009) [Is it me or my Meds? Living with Antidepressants. Harvard University Press]. This issue is known as self-illness ambiguity (SIA) (Sadler 2007) ["The Psychiatric Significance of the Personal Self." Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 70 (2): 113–129]. In her paper Know Thyself:
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Dimensions of self-illness ambiguity – a clinical and conceptual approach Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-04-16 Gerrit Glas
ABSTRACT The article investigates the concept of self-illness ambiguity (SIA), which was recently re-introduced in the philosophy of psychiatry literature. SIA refers to situations in which patients are uncertain about whether features (symptoms, signs) of their illness should be attributed to their illness or to their ‘selves’. Identification of these features belongs to a more encompassing process
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Empirical imperatives in understanding self-related changes Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-03-10 Fredric Gilbert, Joel Smith
ABSTRACT Bluhm and Cabrera advance that Sadler’s ‘Archimedean point’ is an example of integration of sub-perspectives by an overall self, as such a self who may be reconciled and understood to be caused by DBS systems. Although this suggests great avenues to explore, we stress that the Archimedean viewpoint is strictly bound to a metaphorical domain. We argue that what is needed to help (prospective)
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Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-03-07 Hadeel Naeem
ABSTRACT Virtue reliabilists argue that an agent can only gain knowledge if she responsibly employs a reliable belief-forming process. This in turn demands that she is either aware that her process is reliable or is sensitive to her process’s reliability in some other way. According to a recent argument in the philosophy of mind, sometimes a cognitive mechanism (i.e. precision estimation) can ensure
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What is the relationship between grief and narrative? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-28 Regina E. Fabry
ABSTRACT In a recent article, Ratcliffe and Byrne (2022) propose a multifactorial phenomenological account of the influence of narrative on grief. Specifically, they argue that certain kinds of narrative can help navigate and negotiate the phenomenological disturbance of practical identity associated with bereavement. In this critical note, I identify and discuss two problems of their account. First
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On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-27 Víctor M. Verdejo
ABSTRACT Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for
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Motivating reasons, responses and the Taking Condition Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-10 Jean Moritz Müller
ABSTRACT Many metaethicists endorse a cognitive constraint which links the reasons for which we act or hold attitudes (motivating reasons) to normative reasons (reasons that speak in favour of an action or attitude). As traditionally formulated, this constraint (known as the Taking Condition) requires that an agent’s motivating reasons are mentally represented by her as corresponding normative reasons
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Self-illness ambiguity and anorexia nervosa Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2023-02-03 Anna Drożdżowicz
ABSTRACT Self-illness ambiguity is a difficulty to distinguish the ‘self’ or ‘who one is’ from one's mental disorder or diagnosis. Although self-illness ambiguity in a psychiatric context is often deemed to be a negative phenomenon, it may occasionally have a positive role too. This paper investigates whether and in what sense self-illness ambiguity could have a positive role in the process of recovery
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Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-12-28 Tsung-Hsing Ho
ABSTRACT To explain why we should be structurally rational – or mentally coherent – is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena – positive illusions – are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists
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On the immediate mental antecedent of action Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-12-28 Michael Omoge
ABSTRACT What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to
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How to overcome self-illness ambiguity in addiction: making sense of one’s addiction rather than just rejecting it. A reply to McConnell and Golova Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-27 Anke Snoek
ABSTRACT McConnell and Golova [2022. “Narrative, Addiction, and Three Aspects of Self-Ambiguity.” Philosophical Explorations. doi:10.1080/13869795.2022.2115532] argue that people with addiction often struggle to recover because there is a conflict between their self-narrative of ‘hopeless addict’ and their evaluative judgment that they value recovery. They add ‘narrative ambiguity’ as a third source
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Know thyself: bipolar disorder and self-concept Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-21 Sidney Carls-Diamante
ABSTRACT This paper addresses an important yet neglected existential issue sometimes faced by persons with bipolar disorder (BD): confusion about the extent to which what one is like is influenced by BD. Although such confusion is common in psychiatric illnesses, BD raises idiosyncratic difficulties due to its intricate interactions with personality, cognition and behavior. The fluctuating mood phases
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‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-19 Louise Braddock
ABSTRACT Projection does not reliably serve cognition; it all too often contributes to failures of knowledge. Our projecting not only imaginatively misrepresents the world by attributing a feature of ourself to it. In doing so it can misrepresent us as lacking that feature. It is an act of the imagination which re-locates unwanted attributes into a motivated misrepresentation which distorts our grasp
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Grief, alienation, and the absolute alterity of death Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-10-31 Emily Hughes
ABSTRACT Disturbances to one's sense of self, the feeling that one has ‘lost a part of oneself’ or that one ‘no longer feels like oneself,’ are frequently recounted throughout the bereavement literature. Engaging Allan Køster's important contribution to this issue, this article reinforces his suggestion that, by rupturing the existential texture of self-familiarity, bereavement can result in experiences
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Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-10-19 Kael McCormack
ABSTRACT According to the guise of the good, a desire for P represents P as good in some respect. ‘Perceptualism’ further claims that desires involve an awareness of value analogous to perception. Perceptualism explains why desires justify actions and how desires can end the regress of practical justification. However, perception paradigmatically represents the actual environment, while desires paradigmatically
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Are emotions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement (and what would it tell us)? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-11 Daniel Eggers
ABSTRACT The eighteenth century debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists has seen a striking renaissance in the past decades, not least because of research into the nature of moral judgement conducted by empirical scientists such as social and developmental psychologists and neuroscientists. A claim that is often made in the current discussion is that the evidence made available
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Narrative, addiction, and three aspects of self-ambiguity Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-04 Doug McConnell, Anna Golova
ABSTRACT ‘Self-ambiguity’, we suggest, is best understood as an uncertainty about how strongly a given feature reflects who one truly is. When this understanding of self-ambiguity is applied to a view of the self as having both essential and shapable components, self-ambiguity can be seen to have two aspects: (1) uncertainty about one's essential or relatively unchangeable characteristics, e.g. one's
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Psychiatric fictionalism and narratives of responsibility Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 Sam Wilkinson
ABSTRACT I explore the relationship between psychiatric fictionalism and the attribution of moral responsibility. My central claim is as follows. If one is a psychiatric fictionalist, one should also strongly consider being a fictionalist about responsibility. This results in the ‘intrinsic view’, namely, the view that mental illness does not just happen to interfere with moral responsibility: that
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Extending knowledge-how Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-09-02 Gloria Andrada
ABSTRACT This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-25 Cory Davia
ABSTRACT According to the moral encroachment thesis, moral features of a situation can affect not just what we’re practically justified in doing but also what we’re epistemically justified in believing. This paper offers a new rationale for that thesis, drawing on observations about the role of reflection in agency.
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The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-19 Juliette Vazard
ABSTRACT Incessant checking is undeniably problematic from a practical point of view. But what is epistemically wrong with checking again (and again)? The starting assumption for this paper is that establishing what goes wrong when individuals check their stove ten times in a row requires understanding the nature of the doxastic attitude that compulsive re-checkers are in, as they go back to perform
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On the importance of breaks: transformative experiences and the process of narration Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-08-04 Line Ryberg Ingerslev
ABSTRACT In this comment, I argue that transformative experiences such as experiences of grief often imply a break in one's coherent, non-fictional and biographical narratives and practical identities. The nature of these breaks is of a certain kind, as they interrupt even the process of narration. To insist that the process of narration as well as the narratives themselves belong to one and the same
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Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’ Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-27 Anna Bortolan
ABSTRACT This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in
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Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-22 Alva Stråge
ABSTRACT Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the ‘exclusion argument’. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies
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My Illness, My Self, and I: when self-narratives and illness-narratives clash Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-11 Şerife Tekin
ABSTRACT In a compelling and provocative paper, ‘Solving the Self-Illness Ambiguity: The Case for Construction Over Discovery,’ Sofia M.I. Jeppsson distinguishes two ways of addressing the self-illness ambiguty problem. The first is the Realist Solution, which postulates a pre-existing border between the self and the illness and frames the goal of treatment in psychiatry as helping the patient ‘discover’
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Self-illness ambiguity, affectivity, and affordances Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-07-01 Michelle Maiese
ABSTRACT Self-illness ambiguity involves difficulty distinguishing between patterns of thought, feeling, and action that are the ‘products’ of one's illness and those that are genuinely one's own. Bortolan maintains that the values, cares, and preferences that define someone’s personal identity are rooted in intentional emotions and non-intentional affects (i.e., existential feelings and moods). The
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Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-12 Niels de Haan
ABSTRACT Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own
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Authoritatively avowing your imaginings by self-ascriptively expressing them Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-12 Benjamin Winokur
ABSTRACT Neo-expressivism is the view that avowals – first-personal, present tense self-ascriptions of mental states—ordinarily express the very mental states that they semantically represent, such that they carry a strong presumption of truth and are immune to requests for epistemic support. Peter Langland-Hassan (2015. “Self-Knowledge and Imagination.” Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 226–245)
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Comment on ‘What’s special about “not feeling like oneself”?’ Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-06-10 Marya Schechtman
Published in Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action (Vol. 25, No. 3, 2022)
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Grief, self and narrative Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-05-11 Matthew Ratcliffe, Eleanor A. Byrne
ABSTRACT Various claims have been made concerning the role of narrative in grief. In this paper, we emphasize the need for a discerning approach, which acknowledges that narratives of different kinds relate to grief in different ways. We focus specifically on the positive contributions that narrative can make to sustaining, restoring and revising a sense of who one is. We argue that, although it is
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Self-implant ambiguity? Understanding self-related changes in deep brain stimulation Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-04-27 Robyn Bluhm, Laura Y. Cabrera
ABSTRACT Deep brain stimulation (DBS) uses electrodes implanted in the brain to modulate dysregulated brain activity related to a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. A number of people who use DBS have reported changes that affect their sense of self. In the neuroethics literature, there has been significant debate over the exact nature of these changes. More recently, there have been
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Self-alienation through the loss of heteronomy: the case of bereavement Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-23 Allan Køster
ABSTRACT Losing an intimate other to death belongs to the most uprooting experiences in human life. Not only is it accompanied by a range of negative emotions such as sorrow, longing, anger etc., but profound grief is a limit experience that causes a rupture in the sense of self of the bereaved. This experience is often expressed in identity statements such as ‘I no longer feel like myself’ or ‘I am
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What’s special about ‘not feeling like oneself’? A deflationary account of self(-illness) ambiguity Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-22 Roy Dings, Leon C. de Bruin
ABSTRACT The article provides a conceptualization of self(-illness) ambiguity and investigates to what extent self(-illness) ambiguity is ‘special’. First, we draw on empirical findings to argue that self-ambiguity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We suggest that these findings are best explained by a multidimensional account, according to which selves consist of various dimensions that mutually affect
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How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-17 Olof Leffler
ABSTRACT In recent discussions of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM), several authors – not to mention other philosophers around the proverbial water cooler – have appealed to the simplicity of the theory to defend it. But the argument from simplicity has rarely been explicated or received much critical attention – until now. I begin by reconstructing the argument and then argue that it suffers
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Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-17 Sofia M. I. Jeppsson
ABSTRACT Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing
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Difficulty & quality of will: implications for moral ignorance Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-03-10 Anna Hartford
ABSTRACT Difficulty is often treated as blame-mitigating, and even exculpating. But on some occasions difficulty seems to have little or no bearing on our assessments of moral responsibility, and can even exacerbate it. In this paper, I argue that the relevance (and irrelevance) of difficulty with regard to assessments of moral responsibility is best understood via Quality of Will accounts. I look
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Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (β) Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-28 Pedro Merlussi
ABSTRACT In debates concerning the consequence argument, it has long been claimed that [McKay, T. J., and D. Johnson. 1996. “A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113–122] demonstrated the invalidity of rule (β). Here, I argue that their result is not as robust as we might like to think. First, I argue that McKay and Johnson's counterexample is successful
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Then again, what is manipulation? A broader view of a much-maligned concept Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-27 Alexander Fischer
ABSTRACT We influence each other constantly and in diverse ways. At times ethically, as when we convince others via arguments founded in good reason. At times problematically, as when we coerce others to act in a certain way. Other forms of influence, such as manipulation, lie in between these poles, as when we influence others not primarily rationally but also not coercing someone, but indirectly
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Can realists reason with reasons? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-27 Christian Kietzmann
ABSTRACT I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain
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How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority? Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-17 Nicole Rathgeb
ABSTRACT In the last decade, various analyses of beliefs in terms of dispositions have been advanced. One principled objection against dispositional accounts of belief is that they cannot accommodate first-person authority. While people can infallibly state their beliefs without the need for any kind of evidence, their assertions about their dispositions are fallible and in need of evidential support
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Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-02-10 E. J. Coffman
ABSTRACT Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘DPIT’), each practical decision is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. DPIT is entailed by the following widely endorsed thesis that I’ll call the ‘General
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Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-01-07 Hagit Benbaji
ABSTRACT Are kind properties (e.g. being a eucalyptus tree) presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: (1) Kind properties are not presented in the content of visual experience, (2) the application of kind concepts affects the phenomenology of experience. The conjunction of these claims seems puzzling only given the uniformity
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On the fittingness of agential evaluations Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-12-17 Roberto Keller
ABSTRACT According to a leading view, emotions such as admiration, contempt, pride, and shame are important vehicles of agential development. Through admiration and contempt, we establish models and countermodels against which to shape our character; through pride and shame, we get a sense of how we measure up to them. Critics of this view object that these emotions always deliver uncompromising evaluations:
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Skepticism about reasons for emotions Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-10-19 Hichem Naar
ABSTRACT According to a popular view, emotions are perceptual experiences of some kind. A common objection to this view is that, by contrast with perception, emotions are subject to normative reasons. In response, perceptualists have typically maintained that the fact that emotions can be justified does not prevent them from being perception-like in some fundamental way. Given the problems that this
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Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-10-14 Alfonso Anaya
ABSTRACT There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracchi has argued that her Competence View (CoV) of perception has the resources to strike a double feat: to provide an alternative to current representationalist hegemony while avoiding endorsing relationalism
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Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2021-09-24 Elia Haemmerli
ABSTRACT Intentional explanations are explanations of actions that specify the motive for which the action was done. A central question is whether causality plays a role in such explanations. Causalists insist that it does. One of the most pressing problems for Causalism is often taken to be the possibility that what an agent does is caused by her motive despite the agent not acting intentionally.