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The Non-Believing Jew: A Historical Survey of Judaism’s Engagement with Atheism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-04-03 Daniel R. Langton
How important is atheism for Jewish history and Jews for the history of atheism? Modern Jewish histories have tended to focus on Jewish secularization rather than atheism, and historical surveys of atheism in the West have tended to neglect the Jewish experience which is subsumed in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It is possible to make the case that the secularization narrative privileges social change
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The Debasing Demon Resurrected International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Mikael Janvid
The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other better-known
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Hegel’s Criticism of Pyrrhonism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Joris Spigt
This paper presents Hegel’s criticism of two central ideas of Pyrrhonism: the importance of stating only how things appear and Pyrrhonism as a way of life. After providing a sketch of the main features of Pyrrhonism, the paper lays out and critically evaluates Hegel’s largely unexamined argument against Pyrrhonism in his early 1802 essay on skepticism. Hegel claims that the Pyrrhonist’s appeal to appearance
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Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-27 Michael Veber
In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First,
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Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Branden Fitelson
In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (pbs) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.
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Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Jonathan Matheson
In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is
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The Case for Spirit Realism: A Reply to Fales International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2024-02-09 Hans Van Eyghen
In this article, I respond to some criticisms raised in Evan Fales’ review of my book The Epistemology of Spirit Beliefs that was published in this journal. The points I will address are the following: (i) Fales’ complaint about unclarity in my epistemological position, (ii) his complaint about my insufficient presentation of alternative explanations, and (iii) his complaint about my use of the terms
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Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-11-25 John Pittard
This paper summarizes Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. The book’s central question is whether confident (ir)religious commitment can be rationally maintained in the face of systematic religious disagreement. Part i develops an account of the epistemic significance of disagreement and considers the implications of this account for religious belief. This part argues against the commitment
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Rational Insight and Partisan Justification: Responding to Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-11-25 John Pittard
This paper discusses responses to Disagreement, Deference, and Rational Commitment from Bogardus and Burton, Thurow, and Kvanvig. Each of these responses objects to the rationalist account of “partisan justification” defended in the book. After explaining partisan justification and its significance, I first take up Bogardus and Burton’s argument for a more restrictive account of partisan justification
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Pyrrho and Vagueness: A Fregean Analysis International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-10-27 Refik Güremen
Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations
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Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-07-13 Michael Bergmann
In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that
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Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-07-13 Michael Bergmann
These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism
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Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-06-20 Mark Satta
Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a
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Explaining Rationalist Weak Conciliationism: A Challenge International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Joshua C. Thurow
In his book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, John Pittard presents and critiques what he calls the “master argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism.” This argument purports to show, using only higher-order reasoning and facts about religious disagreement, that nobody’s religious outlook is justified (at least, nobody aware of the argument). The master argument presupposes
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Skepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-03-08 Christos Kyriacou
I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally
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Some Reluctant Skepticism about Rational Insight International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-03-08 Tomas Bogardus, Michael Burton
There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of
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Confusion, Understanding and Success International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-02-16 Miloud Belkoniene
The present paper examines a type of sceptical hypothesis put forward by Adam Carter that specifically targets understanding—the Confusion Hypothesis. After clarifying the nature and scope of that hypothesis, it discusses Carter’s favoured virtue perspectivist answer to the challenge it raises. It is argued that this answer is ultimately unsatisfying as it is unable to explain how a subject can obtain
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Skepticism Is Wrong for General Reasons International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2023-01-16 Elijah Chudnoff
According to Michael Bergmann’s “intuitionist particularism,” our position with respect to skeptical arguments is much the same as it was with respect to Zeno’s paradoxes of motion prior to our developing sophisticated theories of the continuum. We observed ourselves move, and that closed the case in favor of the ability to move, even if we had no general theory about that ability. We observe ourselves
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-24 Mark Walker
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multi-proposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically
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Is There a Problem of Demarcation for Hinges? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-15 Jakob Ohlhorst
Hinge epistemology is sometimes taken to be exempt from many of the issues bedevilling regular epistemology because of its pre-epistemic status. That is, hinges are taken to operate beyond epistemic evaluation. In this paper, I go through different non-epistemicist interpretations of what hinge epistemology is and in what sense hinges may precede epistemic evaluation. I argue that all these non-epistemicist
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Ciceronian Skeptical Fideism in the Octavius of Minucius Felix International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-14 Brian Ribeiro
The dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix is a point of reception in the legacy of Ciceronian skeptical fideism, and as such it deserves its place in the history of skeptical fideism. Drawing on his Ciceronian model, Minucius depicts a skeptical fideist—Caecilius—struggling to hold on to his religious traditions in the face of the challenges posed by the new religion of Christianity. But Minucius himself
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Why We Are Not Living in a Computer Simulation International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-11 Abraham Lim
Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are living in one of them is high or at least nonzero. I present arguments to refute the claim that we are or might be in any one of them.
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Seemings and the Response to Radical Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-10-05 Noah Lemos
I begin by making some brief remarks about commonsense particularism. Commonsense particularists hold that we know pretty much what we think we know and hold that some of these beliefs are more reasonable than competing skeptical principles. However, commonsense philosophers often differ about what justifies these particular beliefs. Michael Bergmann holds that that our commonsense epistemic beliefs
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Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-09-13 Kevin McCain
In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There
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Pittard on Religious Disagreement International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-09-02 Jonathan L. Kvanvig
This paper focuses on Pittard’s path to rationalism. It begins from the master argument Pittard identifies against rational disagreement among epistemic peers. It raises an issue for Pittard’s endorsement of the first premise of that argument, but focuses primarily on the third premise. It suggests a way of denying the third premise beyond the possibilities Pittard identifies, and then questions the
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Précis of Austin’s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-08-09 Mark Kaplan
Austin wrote as if what we say as epistemologists needs to accord faithfully with what we say, and are committed to saying, in ordinary life. The consensus has long been that Austin wrote this way because he simply didn’t understand the nature of the epistemologist’s project. Austin’s Way with Skepticism explains why the consensus is mistaken. The book shows that, far from reflecting a failure on Austin’s
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Austin’s Way with Skepticism Revisited International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-05-20 Mark Kaplan
In “Other Minds,” Austin maintained that, unless there is a special reason to suspect the bird he saw is stuffed, he does not need to do enough to show it is not stuffed in order to be credited with knowing what he has just claimed to know: that the bird he saw is a goldfinch. But suppose Austin were presented with the following argument: You don’t know the bird is not a stuffed goldfinch. If you don’t
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ACTing as a Pyrrhonist International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-04-19 Josef Mattes
Parallels between the ancient Hellenistic philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureans, on the one hand, and modern cognitive psychotherapy, on the other, are well known and a topic of current discussion. The present article argues that there are also important parallels between Pyrrhonism, the third of the major Hellenistic philosophies, and the currently state-of-the-art “3rd wave” cognitive-behavioral
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Sceptical Agnosticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-04-18 Francis Jonbäck
Agnostics as well as theists should answer evidential arguments from evil, at least when confronted with them. In this paper, I answer such an argument by appealing to sceptical agnosticism. A sceptical agnostic is not only undecided about the existence of a perfectly good and omnipotent God, but also believes that we cannot make any judgement about whether or not seemingly gratuitous evil probably
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Justin Clarke-Doane, Morality and Mathematics International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-03-24 Hallvard Lillehammer
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Nuno Venturinha, Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-03-24 Robin McKenna
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Kaplan’s Way with Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-03-22 Michael Williams
Austin is not much in fashion these days. In Austin’s Way with Skepticism, Mark Kaplan swims against the current, arguing that Austin still has much to teach us about how to do epistemology. Methodologically, Austin’s insistence on fidelity to ordinary ways of talking about knowledge is a non-negotiable constraint on epistemological theorizing. Substantively, Austin has important things to say about
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What Is Negative Disjunctivism? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-03-21 David de Bruijn
Negative disjunctivists like Mike Martin and Bill Fish understand hallucinations in purely epistemic terms, and do not attribute phenomenal character to these visual misfires. However, the approaches by Martin and Fish are importantly different, and there has been little systematic work on how negative disjunctivism is motivated. In this paper, I argue for a version of negative disjunctivism that centers
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Concessive Knowledge Attributions Cannot Be Explained Pragmatically International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2022-03-10 Gregory Stoutenburg
“I know that p but it is possible that not-p” sounds contradictory. Some philosophers, notably David , have taken this as evidence that knowledge requires infallibility. Others have attempted to undermine that inference by arguing that there is a plausible pragmatic explanation of why such sentences sound odd, and thus do not undermine fallibilism. I argue that the proffered pragmatic explanations
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A. C. Mukerji on the Problem of Skepticism and Its Resolution in Neo-Vedānta International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Jay L. Garfield
This paper examines the work of the unsung modern Indian Philosopher A. C. Mukerji, in his major works Self, Thought and Reality (1933) and The Nature of Self (1938). Mukerji constructs a skeptical challenge that emerges from the union of ideas drawn from early modern Europe, neo-Hegelian philosophy, and classical Buddhism and Vedānta. Mukerji’s worries about skepticism are important in part because
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Introduction: Skepticism in India International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Ethan Mills, Matthew Dasti
Introduces the topic of skepticism in Indian philosophy as well as the contents of a special issue of the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism: “Skepticism in India.”
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The Madhyamaka Contribution to Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Georges Dreyfus, Jay L. Garfield
This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental
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Nyāya’s Response to Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti
The classical Indian school called Nyāya (literally “logic” or “right reasoning”), is arguably the leading anti-skeptical tradition within all of Indian philosophy. Defending a realist metaphysics and an epistemology of “knowledge sources” (pramāṇa), its responses to skepticism are often appropriated by other schools of thought. This paper examines its responses to skeptical arguments from dreams,
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Three Formulations of Cognitive Skepticism: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrīharṣa International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Pradeep P. Gokhale
This paper provides a study of the three most famous skeptical thinkers of classical India, examining both their commonalities and unique differences. Adepts of the controversial debate methodology called vitaṇḍā, “negative debate,” these thinkers manage to challenge the very possibility of knowledge, while espousing (at least nominal) allegiance to distinct schools of thought. They also pass negative
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Three Skepticisms in Cārvāka Epistemology: The Problem of Induction, Purandara’s Fallibilism, and Jayarāśi’s Skepticism about Philosophy International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-12-23 Ethan Mills
The classical Indian Cārvāka (“Materialist”) tradition contains three branches with regard to the means of knowledge (pramāṇas). First, the standard Cārvākas accept a single means of knowledge, perception, supporting this view with a critique of the reliability and coherence of inference (anumāna). Second, the “more educated” Cārvākas as well as Purandara endorse a form of inference limited to empirical
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Knowing of Not-Knowing: the Outlines of a Critical Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-06-21 Christoph Binkelmann
Sextus Empiricus’ definition of skepticism as a search for truth still poses great problems for research today. Perhaps the most urgent of these is: How can we reasonably assert the possibility of knowledge and at the same time deny its reality? The paper tries to solve this question by drawing attention to a hitherto neglected variant of skepticism: the so-called critical skepticism. In confrontation
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How Not to Know the Principle of Induction International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-06-07 Howard Sankey
In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be
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Epistemology’s Prime Evils International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-26 Patrick Bondy
This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon; and Schaffer’s Debasing Demon. These demons threaten the epistemic statuses of our beliefs—in particular, the statuses of knowledge and justification—and
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Revisiting Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Argument in “Proof of an External World” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-13 Christopher Stratman
This paper argues that we should reject G. E. Moore’s anti-skeptical argument as it is presented in “Proof of an External World.” However, the reason I offer is different from traditional objections. A proper understanding of Moore’s “proof” requires paying attention to an important distinction between two forms of skepticism. I call these Ontological Skepticism and Epistemic Skepticism. The former
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Peter Baumann, Epistemic Contextualism: A Defence International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-11 Roger Clarke
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The Structure of Thoreau’s Epistemology, with Continual Reference to Descartes International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2021-05-03 Tim Black
We can find in Henry David Thoreau’s work a response to Cartesian skepticism. Thoreau takes this skepticism to get its start in us only when we are not attuned to the world, that is, only when we lose sight of our being integrated with the world in the way we quite naturally are. Thoreau posits for human beings a natural and unshakeable integration with the world. This develops into an attunement with
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René Lefebvre (trad.), Sextus Empiricus: Contre les Logiciens International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-30 Stéphane Marchand
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Are There Mathematical Hinges? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Annalisa Coliva
In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like “2 × 2 = 4” or “12 × 12 = 144,” much like G. E. Moore’s truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical
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Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος and Its Relation to Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Richard Bett
The paper examines whether Gorgias’ On What Is Not should be considered an instance of skepticism. It begins with an analysis of the work as reported by the two sources, Sextus Empiricus and the anonymous author of On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias. It is then argued that the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not regard On What Is Not as skeptical. Nonetheless, it is possible to read the work as offering counter-arguments
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Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Bryan Frances
Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy
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Isabelle de Charrière and Skepticism in the Literary Life International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 John Christian Laursen
This article explores some senses in which Isabelle de Charrière (1740–1805) may be understood as a skeptic in her personal life and in her literary life, although the two cannot really be separated since she lived the literary life. She called herself a skeptic a number of times, and also showed some knowledge of the Academic or Socratic and especially of the Pyrrhonian traditions of skepticism in
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Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5 International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Gail Fine
One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms. Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the
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Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Olle Risberg, Folke Tersman
A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focus on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe them to ...
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On Religious Skepticism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 J.L. Schellenberg
I seek to promote a fuller understanding of religious skepticism by defending five theses. These concern, respectively: its breadth, discussed in relation to theism on the one hand and naturalism on the other; why it should be distinguished from a general metaphysical skepticism; how it is supported by the consequences of recent cultural evolution, which at the same time enable new and stronger arguments
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Scepticism and Self-Detachment International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Casey Perin
This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard
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Skepticism and Inquiry International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-11-17 Sanford C. Goldberg
In this paper, I am interested in skepticism’s downstream effects on further inquiry. To account for these downstream effects, we need to distinguish (i) the (skepticism-supporting) reasons for doubting whether p, (ii) one’s other background beliefs bearing on the prospects that further inquiry would improve one’s epistemic position on p, and (iii) the value one assigns to determining whether p. I
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Descartes sceptique malgré lui? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 François-Xavier de Peretti
Résumé Descartes a adopté envers le scepticisme une attitude que d’aucuns parmi ses adversaires ont jugée ambiguë voire coupable. Il a recouru à des arguments sceptiques pour mettre en œuvre son célèbre doute qu’il concevait néanmoins comme l’acte inaugural d’une philosophie en quête de certitude scientifique. Descartes rejetait ainsi la fin poursuivie par les sceptiques et entendait user du doute
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Is Modern Science a Problem for Living as a Pyrrhonist Today? A Discussion of Richard Bett’s “Can We Be Ancient Sceptics?” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-10-15 Ryan E. McCoy
In the final chapter of his recent book How to Be a Pyrrhonist: The Practice and Significance of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, Richard Bett discusses the possibility of living as a Pyrrhonian skeptic today. Chief among his concerns is the scope of the skeptic’s suspension of judgment and whether or not the skeptic could maintain suspension of judgment in light of the results of modern science. For example
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Kevin McCain and Ted Poston’s Best Explanations International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 Frank Cabrera
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The School of Doubt: Skepticism, History and Politics in Cicero’s, written by Orazio Cappello International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Pub Date : 2020-06-12 Raphael Woolf