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Habitually breaking habits: Agency, awareness, and decision-making in musical improvisation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-03-14
Abstract In this paper, I explore the question of agency in spontaneous action via a phenomenology of musical improvisation, drawing on fieldwork conducted with large contemporary improvising ensembles. I argue that musical improvisation is a form of ‘participatory sense-making’ in which musical decisions unfold via a feedback process with the evolving musical situation itself. I describe how musicians’
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Experiences of silent reading Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-03-04
Abstract In The Performance of Reading, Peter Kivy introduces, on a purely phenomenological basis, an interesting and potentially fruitful analogy between the experience of silently reading literary texts and the experience of silently reading musical scores. In Kivy’s view, both mental experiences involve a critical element of auditory mental imagery, consisting in having a performance “in the head”
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Making sense of doing science: on some pragmatic motifs guiding the enactive approach to science Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-28
Abstract In this article, I will explore the enactive approach to science and the pragmatic motifs that guide it. In particular, in the first half of the article, I will discuss to what extent enactivism can be seen as a philosophy of nature, and by comparing it with Sellars’s interpretation of the conflict between the manifest and the scientific image of humans in the world, I will focus on the view
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Dialectics of addiction: a psychopathologically-enriched comprehension of the clinical care of the addicted person Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27
Abstract The problem of addiction to psychoactive substances, such as alcohol and other drugs, has been addressed in psychiatry traditionally from the perspective of a mechanistic-reductionist epistemological model, whose main focus in clinical care is to avoid or suppress the use of these substances, rather than understanding the meaning of a treatment and the meaning of the alterations of consciousness
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Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27
Abstract The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of the distributed emotion framework and to conceptualize collective emotions within that framework. According to the presented account, dynamics of mutual affecting and being affected might couple individuals such that macro-level self-organization of a distributed cognitive system emerges. The paper suggests calling a distributed
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How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-27
Abstract Husserl characterizes sleep with the idea of “the relaxation of the will.” One finds a similar approach in the work of Maine de Biran, who explains sleep as “the suspension of the will.” More recently, Brian O’Shaughnessy and Matthew Soteriou have argued that mental actions constitute wakeful consciousness. In clinical practice, patients with disorders of consciousness who show “purposeful”
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Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26 Georg Northoff, Steven S. Gouveia
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The irreducibility of subjectivity: exploring the intersubjective dialectic of body-subject and body-object in anorexia nervosa Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26
Abstract This paper delves into the complex and conflicting relationship between the body-subject and body-object, as well as the self and the other, within the context of anorexia nervosa. Within the field of phenomenology of medicine and health, the emphasis tends to be on the dimension of the lived body, with limited attention given to the physical dimension of the body. Recognizing the work of
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What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-26
Abstract The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological
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Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Catherine Legg, André Sant’Anna
This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(3), 461–475
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Embodiment and intelligence, a levinasian perspective Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-19 James Mensch
Blake Lemoine, a software engineer, recently came into prominence by claiming that the Google chatbox set of applications, LaMDA–was sentient. Dismissed by Google for publishing his conversations with LaMDA online, Lemoine sent a message to a 200-person Google mailing list on machine learning with the subject “LaMDA is sentient.” What does it mean to be sentient? This was the question Lemoine asked
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AI-informed acting: an Arendtian perspective Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-09
Abstract In this paper, I will investigate the possible impact of weak artificial intelligence (more specifically, I will concentrate on deep learning) on human capability of action. For this goal, I will first address Arendt’s philosophy of action, which seeks to emphasize the distinguishing elements of action that set it apart from other forms of human activity. According to Arendt, action should
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Pain, suffering, and the time of life: a buddhist philosophical analysis Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-02-08 Sean M. Smith
In this paper, I explore how our experience of pain and suffering structure our experience over time. I argue that pain and suffering are not as easily dissociable, in living and in conceptual analysis, as philosophers have tended to think. Specifically, I do not think that there is only a contingent connection between physical pain and psychological suffering. Rather, physical pain is partially constitutive
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Searching in an unfamiliar environment: a phenomenologically informed experiment Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-30
Abstract Wayfinding is generally understood as the process of purposefully navigating to distant and non-visible destinations. Within this broad framework, uninformed searching entails finding one’s way to a target destination, in an unfamiliar environment, with no knowledge of its location. Although a variety of search strategies have been previously reported, this research was largely conducted in
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Enactive psychiatry and social integration: beyond dyadic interactions Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-23
Abstract Enactive approaches to psychiatry have recently argued for an understanding of psychiatric conditions based within relational interactions between individuals and their environments. A central motivation for these enactive approaches is the goal of social integration: the integration of a naturalistic approach to psychiatric conditions with their broader sociocultural dimensions. One possible
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Facing life: the messy bodies of enactive cognitive science Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Marek McGann
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Enlanguaged experience. Pragmatist contributions to the continuity between experience and language Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-17 Roberta Dreon
In this paper, I present the idea of “enlanguaged experience” as a radicalization of the Pragmatists’ approach to the continuity between language and experience in the human world as a concept that can provide a significant contribution to the current debate within Enactivism. The first part of the paper explores some new conceptual tools recently developed by enactivist scholarship, namely linguistic
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Writing as an extended cognitive system Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-16 Karenleigh A. Overmann
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Mourning a death foretold: memory and mental time travel in anticipatory grief Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-12
Abstract Grief is a complex emotional experience or process, which is typically felt in response to the death of a loved one, most typically a family member, child, or partner. Yet the way in which grief manifests is much more complex than this. The things we grieve over are multiple and diverse. We may grieve for a former partner after the breakup of a relationship; parents sometimes report experiencing
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Intentionality and performance: the phenomenology of gait initiation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-01-10 Patrick Grüneberg
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Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-08 István Fazakas, Mathilde Bois, Tudi Gozé
Contemporary phenomenological psychopathology has raised questions concerning selfhood and its possible alterations in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although the notion of the self is central to several accounts of anomalies, it remains a question how exactly the radically minimal experiential features of selfhood can be altered. Indeed, the risk is to reduce the notion of selfhood so drastically
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The genesis of the minimal mind: elements of a phenomenological and functional account Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Bence Peter Marosan
In this article, we endeavour to lay the theoretical fundaments of a phenomenologically based project regarding the origins of conscious experience in the natural world. We assume that a phenomenological analysis (based upon Edmund Husserl’s philosophy) of first-person experience could substantially contribute to related empirical research. In this regard, two phenomenological conceptions provided
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Enactivist social ontology Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Joshua Rust
This paper is an investigation into the possibility of institutional agency and proceeds via the elaboration of two, nested claims. First, if genuine agency is attributable to certain social institutions, it would not be the full-blown, intentional agency that characterizes human activity, but would rather fall under a minimal modality of agency. Moreover, since enactivists aim to articulate minimal
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Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-12-04 Pierre Steiner
Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration (with the exception of Hutto & Myin’s radical enactivism). That does not exclude the benefits of pragmatist readings of enactivism, and of enactivist readings of pragmatism. After having sketched those readings, this paper focuses on the philosophical concept
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Review of Guilherme Messas’ ‘The Existential structure of substance misuse: A psychopathological study’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-11 Filippo Besana
Guilherme Messas is a Brazilian psychiatrist, founding member of the Brazilian Society for Phenomeno-Structural Psychopathology and author of many peer-reviewed articles in the field of psychopathology. His book entitled 'The Existential Structure of Substance Misuse' is an important and comprehensive phenomenological analysis of psychoactive substance abuse behaviour, considering a field still partially
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Social phenomena as a challenge to the scaling-up problem Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-11 Enrico Petracca
The “scaling-up” problem concerns radical embodied cognition’s (REC) supposed inability to extend its explanatory reach beyond simple cognitive phenomena. This paper questions the problem’s main assumption, that is, the possibility of sorting phenomena according to their inherent cognitive complexity or representation-hunger. To do so, I focus on a class of phenomena whose degree of representation-hunger
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Grief as self-model updating Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-08 J. M. Araya
Philosophical discussion tends to converge on the view that narratives are at the center of the emotion of grief. In this article, I expand on this kind of view. On the one hand, I argue that key strands of phenomenological and neuroscientific studies suggest that grief consists in a complex emotional process of disconfirmation-and-updating of the narrative self-model. By heuristically drawing on an
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Art and linguistic bodies: a transformative view Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-09 Ståle Finke, Thomas Netland, Mattias Solli
This article takes its point of departure from the second (embodied) linguistic turn represented by the enactivist notion of humans as linguistic bodies, using resources from Hans Georg Gadamer in order to propose a view of the relation between art and everyday experience as one of symbolic transformation. Conceiving art as a form of linguistic phenomenon wherein one can engage in original situations
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Psychedelic phenomenology and the role of affect in psychological transformation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-11-06 Christopher Kochevar
In this paper, I explore scientific attempts to articulate a unified theory of the serotonin system and to explain the effects of psychedelic substances. I consider how certain accounts of psychedelic action have focused primarily on cognitive states, and I propose some phenomenological insights to supplement these models and inform work on psychedelics as therapeutic agents. Specifically, I argue
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“Where lies the grail? AI, common sense, and human practical intelligence” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-31 William Hasselberger, Micah Lott
The creation of machines with intelligence comparable to human beings—so-called "human-level” and “general” intelligence—is often regarded as the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. However, many prominent discussions of AI lean heavily on the notion of human-level intelligence to frame AI research, but then rely on conceptions of human cognitive capacities, including “common sense
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Animal navigation without mental representation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-07 Bas van Woerkum
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Anticipating and enacting worlds: moods, illness and psychobehavioral adaptation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-02 Matthew Crippen
Predictive processing theorists have claimed PTSD and depression are maladaptive and epistemically distorting because they entail undesirably wide gaps between top-down models and bottom-up information inflows. Without denying this is sometimes so, the “maladaptive” label carries questionable normative assumptions. For instance, trauma survivors facing significant risk of subsequent attacks may overestimate
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An analysis of conceptual ambiguities in the debate on the format of concepts Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-29 Renato Raia
There is a debate in philosophy and cognitive science over whether concepts – the building blocks of thought—are couched in a perceptual modality or are amodally represented. The empirical evidence so far collected seems not to have adjudicated this question yet, as reinterpretation of the same set of evidence by both supporters of modalism and amodalism have been provided. I offer a critique of such
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Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-28 Morten Overgaard
The contrasts between so-called objective and subjective measures of consciousness have been a dominating topic of discussion for decades. The debate has classically been dominated by two positions – that subjective measures may be completely or partially reduced to objective measures, and, alternatively that they must exist in parallel. I argue that many problems relate to subjective reports as they
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The pre-intentional, existential feelings, and existential dispositions Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-25 Devin Fitzpatrick
The “pre-intentional” is a proposed category of mental states that conditions a subject’s experience of what is possible for them by, for example, modifying the motivational efficacy or experienced quality of intentional states, like beliefs or desires, without necessarily modifying their propositional content. Matthew Ratcliffe, who has coined the term, identifies the pre-intentional with existential
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Gesture, meaning, and intentionality: from radical to pragmatist enactive theory of language Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-23 Guido Baggio
The article argues in favour of a pragmatist enactive interpretation of the emergence of the symbolic and contentful mind from a basic form of social communicative interaction in which basic cognitive capacities are involved. Through a critical overview of Radical Enactivists (RECers)’ view about language, the article focuses on Mead’s pragmatist behavioural theory of meaning that refers to the gestural
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Mental measurement and the introspective privilege Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-18 Michael Pauen
According to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits. We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require
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Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-08 Enara García
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Anger and uptake Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-08-19 Shiloh Whitney
One of the narratives of anger as a pandemic emotion is not diagnostic, but celebratory: anger at racial injustice made a social and political breakthrough during the pandemic. What this breakthrough narrative celebrates is that people who had previously been moved only to alarmed scrutiny of the anger itself and the project of quelling it began instead, not merely to approve of this anger, but to
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Emotions of the pandemic: phenomenological perspectives Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-08-09 Luna Dolezal, Matthew Ratcliffe
This article provides an introduction to the special issue “Emotions of the Pandemic: Phenomenological Perspectives”. We begin by outlining how phenomenological research can illuminate various forms of emotional experience associated with the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, we propose that a consideration of pandemic experience, in all its complexity and diversity,
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Introduction to the special issue ‘The phenomenology of joint action’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-07-19 Franz Knappik, Nivedita Gangopadhyay
The contributions collected in this special issue explore the phenomenology of joint action from a broad range of different disciplinary and methodological angles, including philosophical investigation (both in the analytic and the phenomenological tradition), computational modeling, experimental study, game theory, and developmental psychology. They also vastly expand the range of discussed cases
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Being one of us: we-identities and self-categorization theory Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-07-17 Felipe León
One way to theorize about we-identities—the identities that individual subjects have as ‘one of us’—is in terms of the uniformity, interchangeability, and prototypicality of group members. The social-psychological theory of self-categorization epitomizes this approach, which has strongly influenced contemporary phenomenological research on the we. This paper argues that this approach has one important
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Tasks in cognitive science: mechanistic and nonmechanistic perspectives Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-07-13 Samuel D. Taylor
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Can’t stop, won’t stop – an enactivist model of Tarantism Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-07-05 Christian Kronsted
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Towards a phenomenological approach to psychopharmacology: drug-centered model and epistemic empowerment Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-30 Marcelo Vieira Lopes, Guilherme Messas
The long-standing tradition of phenomenological psychopathology has been historically concerned with the nature of mental disorders, with a special focus on their basic experiential core. In the same way, much of the recent phenomenologically-inspired work in psychopathology consists in providing precise and refined tools for diagnosis, classification, and nosology of mental disorders. What is striking
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Emotional abilities and art experience in autism spectrum disorder Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-27 Sara Coelho, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, Achim Stephan
In contrast to mainstream accounts which explain the aesthetic experience of people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in terms of cognitive abilities, this paper suggests as an alternative explanation the “emotional abilities approach”. We present an example of a person with ASD who is able to exercise a variety of emotional abilities in aesthetic contexts but who has difficulties exhibiting their
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There is an epistemic problem in animal consciousness research Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-21 Aida Roige
Which non-human animals are phenomenally conscious? In this paper I argue that the distribution of phenomenal consciousness in the animal world is ultimately an unsolvable issue, because of an underlying problem inherent in the field: what I call the Kinda Hard Problem. The Kinda Hard Problem arises because the grounds on which we base our consciousness attributions to humans third-personally are either
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Moral foundations theory and the narrative self: towards an improved concept of moral selfhood for the empirical study of morality Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-08 Tom Gerardus Constantijn van den Berg, Luigi Dennis Alessandro Corrias
Within the empirical study of moral decision making, people’s morality is often identified by measuring general moral values through a questionnaire, such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire provided by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). However, the success of these moral values in predicting people’s behaviour has been disappointing. The general and context-free manner in which such approaches measure
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Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-06 Takuya Niikawa
Naïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides
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From tech to tact: emotion dysregulation in online communication during the COVID-19 pandemic Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-06-01 Mark James, Natalia Koshkina, Tom Froese
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The intentional structure of generative models Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-05-26 Majid D. Beni
There are various philosophical interpretations of the account of consciousness associated with the temporal depth of generative models under the Free Energy Principle. This paper strives to develop a new philosophical interpretation of the free energy account of consciousness along the lines of intentionalism.
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Natralization without associationist reduction: a brief rebuttal to Yoshimi Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-04-24 Jesse Lopes
Yoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that such details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep
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Imagination, endogenous attention, and mental agency Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-04-21 Tom Cochrane
This paper develops a mechanistic account of basic mental agency by identifying similarities between two of its major exemplars: endogenous attention and imagination. Five key similarities are identified: (i) that both capacities are driven by currently prioritised goals that are either person-level or apt to become person-level. (ii) that both deliver their outputs to the working memory (iii) that
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The interoceptive underpinnings of the feeling of being alive. Damasio’s insights at work Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-04-15 Emilia Barile
The feeling of being alive still constitutes a major blind spot of contemporary affective sciences research. The mainstream view accepts it as an ‘umbrella notion’ comprising different states, such as M. Ratcliffe’s «feelings of being», T. Fuchs’s «feeling of being alive», E.M. Engelen’s «Gefühl des Lebendigseins», etc. In contrast, I argue for an account of the feeling of being alive as a unique feeling
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Back to the technologies themselves: phenomenological turn within postphenomenology Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-04-12 Dmytro Mykhailov, Nicola Liberati
This paper revives phenomenological elements to have a better framework for addressing the implications of technologies on society. For this reason, we introduce the motto “back to the technologies themselves” to show how some phenomenological elements, which have not been highlighted in the philosophy of technology so far, can be fruitfully integrated within the postphenomenological analysis. In particular
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Donald Davidson as an Analytic Phenomenologist: Husserl and Davidson on Anomalous Monism and Action Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Daniel Wagnon
This paper puts the theories of Donald Davidson into conversation with those of Edmund Husserl, arguing that their work can be read as representing different species of a singular kind, with both defending: (1) versions of anomalous monism, and (2) the legitimacy of event explanation by way of intentionality, rationality, and talk of agentive action. Through these they provide an account of the mental
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Struggling for a tomorrow: lived time in social anxiety disorder Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-24 Martin Vestergaard Kristiansen
In this paper, I develop a phenomenological account of social anxiety disorder (SAD) as a disturbance of lived time through an analysis of first-person accounts informed by Minkowski’s notion of disordered temporality. The core psychopathology of the patient, I argue, is a constricted sense of relational time. Instead of the ordinary sense of a taken-for-granted shared future, the patient experiences
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Tools and peripersonal space: an enactive account of bodily space Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-18 John J. Sykes
Peripersonal space (PPS) is frequently defined as a plastic, pragmatic and goal-directed multisensory buffer that connects the brain-body with its immediate environment. While such characterisations indicate that peripersonal spatiality is profoundly embodied and enactive, comparatively few attempts have aimed to systematically synthesise PPS literature with compatible phenomenological accounts of
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The constraints of habit: craft, repetition, and creativity Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-03-17 Wendy Ross, Vlad Glăveanu