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Three Concepts of Actual Causation Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Enno Fischer
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Boris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin, Robert L. Winkler
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Responsibility and Perception J. Philos. Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Benjamin Henke
I argue that beliefs based on irresponsibly formed experiences—whose causes were not appropriately regulated by the subject—are doxastically unjustified. Only this position, I claim, accounts for the higher epistemic standard required of perceptual experts. Section I defends this standard and applies it to a pair of cases in which either an expert umpire or a complete novice judge a force play in baseball
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Optimization and Beyond J. Philos. Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Akshath Jitendranath
This paper will be concerned with hard choices—that is, choice situations where an agent cannot make a rationally justified choice. Specifically, this paper asks: if an agent cannot optimize in a given situation, are they facing a hard choice? A pair of claims are defended in light of this question. First, situations where an agent cannot optimize because of incompleteness of the binary preference
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Notes on Contributors Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 448-448, April 2024.
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Jeff Sebo, Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves: Why Animals Matter for Pandemics, Climate Change, and Other Catastrophes Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Heather Browning, Walter Veit
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 443-447, April 2024.
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Tamar Schapiro, Feeling Like It: A Theory of Inclination and Will Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Nomy Arpaly
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 438-443, April 2024.
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Michael J Robillard and Bradley J Strawser, Outsourcing Duty: The Moral Exploitation of the American Soldier Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 George Lucas
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 436-438, April 2024.
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Hichem Naar, The Rationality of Love Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Troy Jollimore
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 431-435, April 2024.
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Berislav Marušić, On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Oded Na’aman
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 426-431, April 2024.
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Artūrs Logins, Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 John Brunero
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 420-425, April 2024.
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Thomas Kelly, Bias: A Philosophical Study Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Endre Begby
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 416-420, April 2024.
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John Kekes, Moderate Conservatism: Reclaiming the Center Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Jason Brennan
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 411-416, April 2024.
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Owen Flanagan, How to Do Things with Emotions: The Morality of Anger and Shame across Cultures Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Maria Heim
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 407-411, April 2024.
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Tom Dougherty, The Scope of Consent Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Elise Woodard
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 402-407, April 2024.
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Cooperative Activity, Shared Intention, and Exploitation Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Olle Blomberg, Erik Malmqvist
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 387-401, April 2024.
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Strict Moral Answerability Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Maximilian Kiener
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 360-386, April 2024.
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What’s Unjust about Structural Injustice? Ethics (IF 10.8) Pub Date : 2024-03-11 David Estlund
Ethics, Volume 134, Issue 3, Page 333-359, April 2024.
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The semantics of deadnames Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Taylor Koles
Longstanding philosophical debate over the semantics of proper names has yet to examine the distinctive behavior of deadnames, names that have been rejected by their former bearers. The use of these names to deadname individuals is derogatory, but deadnaming derogates differently than other kinds of derogatory speech. This paper examines different accounts of this behavior, illustrates what going views
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Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Mikayla Kelley
Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one’s belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful
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Policing, undercover policing and ‘dirty hands’: the case of state entrapment Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Daniel J. Hill, Stephen K. McLeod, Attila Tanyi
Under a ‘dirty hands’ model of undercover policing, it inevitably involves situations where whatever the state agent does is morally problematic. Christopher Nathan argues against this model. Nathan’s criticism of the model is predicated on the contention that it entails the view, which he considers objectionable, that morally wrongful acts are central to undercover policing. We address this criticism
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The new evil demon problem at 40 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Peter J. Graham
1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1 Here are two facts: FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted. FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route
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Avowing the Avowal View Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Elizabeth Schechter
This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that...
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Experimental Artefacts Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Carl F. Craver, Talia Dan-Cohen
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Serious Actualism and Nonexistence Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Christopher James Masterman
Serious actualism is the view that it is metaphysically impossible for an entity to have a property, or stand in a relation, and not exist. Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that t...
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Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Alec Hinshelwood
We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...
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Relevant entailment and logical ground Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-03-04 Pierre Saint-Germier, Peter Verdée, Pilar Terrés Villalonga
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Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-03-03 Adam Bradley
Are we acquainted with the self in experience? It may seem so. After all, we tend to be confident in our own existence. A natural explanation for this confidence is that the self somehow shows up i...
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Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-02-29 Yunus Prasetya
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-02-27 Uriah Kriegel
Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate
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Why Is Oppression Wrong? Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Serene J. Khader
It is often argued that oppression reduces freedom. I argue against the view that oppression is wrong because it reduces freedom. Conceiving oppression as wrong because it reduces freedom is at odds with recognizing structural cases of oppression, because (a) many cases of oppression, including many structural ones, do not reduce agents’ freedom, and (b) the type of freedom reduction involved in many
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Can Moral Anti-Realists Theorize? Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Michael Zhao
Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency,...
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Constraining the Compression: Thermodynamic Depth and Composition Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Majid D Beni
This paper examines Bird's account of restricted compositionality in terms of compression of information. Additionally, this paper proposes an alternative perspective (to Bird's) that links compositionality to the Free Energy Principle and the minimisation of collective entropy. Emphasising functional integration, this criterion provides a more focused and relatively more objective (patternist) account
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Inquiry and trust: An epistemic balancing act Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-20 Heather Rabenberg
It might initially appear impossible to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p. At the very least, it might appear that doing so would be irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that things are not as they appear. Not only is it possible for a person to inquire into whether p while trusting someone that p, it is very often rational. Indeed, combining inquiry and trust in this way is
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The Grounds of a Critique of Pure Reason Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-20 Joe Stratmann
For the realist metaphysician, certain notions in metaphysics are objectively theory-guiding. But what makes them so? Echoing others, Dasgupta (2018) suggests that the realist metaphysician faces t...
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Ambiguity Tests, Polysemy, and Copredication Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-19 David Liebesman, Ofra Magidor
A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomeno...
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The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-19 Benj Hellie
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-17
Abstract We consider the questions of whether or not large language models (LLMs) have beliefs, and, if they do, how we might measure them. First, we consider whether or not we should expect LLMs to have something like beliefs in the first place. We consider some recent arguments aiming to show that LLMs cannot have beliefs. We show that these arguments are misguided. We provide a more productive framing
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Amphibians and the Particular-Universal Distinction Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Chiao-Li Ou
I defend a new conception of the particular-universal distinction based on considerations about what David Lewis calls ‘amphibians’. I argue, first, that given the possibility of amphibians, two re...
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Bad Beliefs: Why they Happen to Good People Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 David Coady
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2024)
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The Cautionary Account of Supererogation Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Seyyed Mohsen Eslami, Alfred Archer
The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in
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‘Just The Facts’: Thick Concepts and Hermeneutical Misfit Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Rowan Bell
Oppressive ideology regularly misrepresents features of structural injustice as normal or appropriate. I argue that resisting such injustice therefore requires critical examination of the evaluative judgments encoded in shared concepts. I diagnose a mechanism of ideological misevaluation, which I call hermeneutical misfit. Hermeneutical misfit occurs when thick concepts, or concepts which both describe
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Engineering Human Beauty with More Caution Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Xinkan Zhao
Ravasio (2023) recently presents an interesting discussion of strategies to deal with lookism. He categorizes strategies into revisionary and redistributive ones and argues for a case against the f...
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Sharing Pain: A Hybrid Expressivist Account Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Jada Wiggleton-Little
When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many senten...
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The Reasons to Follow Conventional Practices Australasian Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-15 C. M. Melenovsky
This article challenges a reductive analysis of social practices by distinguishing five kinds of reason for following the rules of conventional practices. Depending on one’s preferred intellectual ...
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Scepticism, evidential holism and the logic of demonic deception Noûs Pub Date : 2024-02-14 Samir Okasha
Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination-based and closure-based. However, both sorts
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Why Perceptual Experiences cannot be Probabilistic Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Matteo Colombo, Nir Fresco
Perceptual Confidence is the thesis that perceptual experiences can be probabilistic. This thesis has been defended and criticised based on a variety of phenomenological, epistemological, and explanatory arguments. One gap in these arguments is that they neglect the question of whether perceptual experiences satisfy the formal conditions that define the notion of probability to which Perceptual Confidence
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Contingentism and paraphrase Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-14 Jonas Werner
One important challenge for contingentists is that they seem to be unable to account for the meaning of some apparently meaningful modal discourse that is perfectly intelligible for necessitists. This worry is particularly pressing for higher-order contingentists, contingentists who hold that it is not only contingent which objects there are, but also contingent which semantic values there are for
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Two-step approaches to healthcare allocation: how helpful is parity in selecting eligible options? Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-12
Abstract Priority setting in healthcare is a highly contentious area of public decision making, in which different values often support incompatible policy options and compromise can be elusive. One promising approach to resolving priority-setting conflicts divides the decision-making process into two steps. In the first, a set of eligible options is identified; in the second, one of those options
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Pitcovski’s explanation-based account of harm Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-09 Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, Olle Risberg
In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski’s account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain
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Proportionality and combat trauma Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-09
Abstract The principle of proportionality demands that a war (or action in war) achieve more goods than bads. In the philosophical literature there has been a wealth of work examining precisely which goods and bads may count toward this evaluation. However, in all of these discussions there is no mention of one of the most certain bads of war, namely the psychological harm(s) likely to be suffered
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-02-08
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 74, Issue 4, December 2023.
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The Evolution of Denial Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Luca Incurvati, Giorgio Sbardolini
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Thomas Blanchard, Andreas Hüttemann
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non-causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non-causal
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Two Sources of Normativity in Enthusiastic Accounts of Kinds Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Riana J. Betzler
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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The Problem of Molecular Structure Just Is the Measurement Problem Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Alexander Franklin, Vanessa A. Seifert
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Smelling things Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Giulia Martina, Matthew Nudds
In this paper, we outline and defend a view on which in olfactory experience we can, and often do, smell ordinary things of various kinds—for instance, cookies, coffee, and cake burnings—and the olfactory properties they have. A challenge to this view are cases of smelling in the absence of the source of a smell, such as when a fishy smell lingers after the fish is gone. Such cases, many philosophers
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Pleasure, Pain, and Pluralism about Well-Being Philos. Q. Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Eden Lin
Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory