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Decoupling Topological Explanations from Mechanisms Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-28 Daniel Kostic,Kareem Khalifa
We provide three innovations to recent debates about whether topological or “network” explanations are a species of mechanistic explanation. First, we more precisely characterize the requirement that all topological explanations are mechanistic explanations and show scientific practice to belie such a requirement. Second, we provide an account that unifies mechanistic and non-mechanistic topological
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A Chemostat Model for Evolution by Persistence: Clade Selection and its Explanatory Autonomy Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-25 Celso Neto,W. Ford Doolittle
Abstract Many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology admit that selection occurs at any level of the biological hierarchy at which entities showing heritable variation in fitness are found, while insisting that fitness at any level entails differential reproduction, not differential persistence. Those who allow that persistence can be selected doubt that selection on non-reproducing entities
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Why Average When You Can Stack? Better Methods for Generating Accurate Group Credences Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-25 David Kinney
Abstract Formal and social epistemologists have devoted significant attention to the question of how to aggregate the credences of a group of agents who disagree about the probabilities of events. Moss (2011) and Pettigrew (2019) argue that group credences be a linear mean of the credences of each individual in the group. By contrast, I argue that if the epistemic value of a credence function is determined
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Empathy and the Evolutionary Emergence of Guilt Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-25 Grant Ramsey,Michael J. Deem
Abstract Guilt poses a unique evolutionary problem. Unlike other dysphoric emotions, it is not immediately clear what its adaptive significance is. One can imagine thriving despite or even because of a lack of guilt. In this paper, we review solutions offered by Scott James, Richard Joyce, and Robert Frank and show that, although their solutions have merit, none adequately solves the puzzle. We offer
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The Unconscious Mind Worry: A Mechanistic-Explanatory Strategy Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 Beate Krickel
Abstract Recent findings in different areas of psychology and cognitive science have brought the unconscious mind back to centre stage. However, the unconscious mind worry remains: What renders unconscious phenomena mental? I suggest a new strategy for answering this question, which rests on the idea that categorizing unconscious phenomena as “mental” should be scientifically useful relative to the
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The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 Vanessa A. Seifert
Abstract There is a persisting debate about what chemical bonds are and whether they exist. I argue that chemical bonds are real patterns of interactions between subatomic particles. This proposal resolves the problems raised in the context of existing understandings of the chemical bond and provides a novel way to defend the reality of chemical bonds.
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Thomas Kuhn, Hyperbole, and the Ashtray: Evidence of Morris’ Faulty Memory Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 K. Brad Wray
Abstract Errol Morris has claimed that Kuhn threw an ashtray at him during a dispute about some matter in the history of science. Morris also claims that Kuhn threw him out of the graduate program at Princeton for disagreeing with him. I argue that Morris’ attack on Kuhn contains some degree of hyperbole. Further, I present evidence that shows that Morris is mistaken about key events during this period
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Λ and the limits of effective field theory Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 Adam Koberinski,Chris Smeenk
Abstract The cosmological constant problem stems from treating quantum field theory and general relativity as an effective field theory (EFT). We argue that the problem is a reductio ad absurdum, and that one should reject the assumption that general relativity can generically be treated as an EFT. This marks a failure of naturalness, and an internal signal that EFT methods do not apply in all spacetime
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Backward causation: harder than it looks Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-22 Athamos Stradis
Abstract According to Albert, there are certain situations where we can cause past events. In response to a well-known objection that we never observe backward causation, he argues that there are good reasons why we can’t tell when it obtains. However, I identify a new difficulty with Albert’s view: at face value, it has the unattractive consequence that backward causation is not just possible but
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Review of George E. Smith and Raghav Seth’s Brownian Motion and Molecular Reality: A Study in Theory-Mediated Measurement - George E. Smith, and Raghav Seth, Brownian Motion and Molecular Reality: A Study in Theory-Mediated Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020), 468 pp., $99.00 (hardcover; also available as an e-book). Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-01 Alan F. Chalmers
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Review of Elizabeth Hannon and Tim Lewens’s Why We Disagree About Human Nature - Elizabeth Hannon, and Tim Lewens (eds.), Why We Disagree About Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018), 240 pp., $44.95 (hardcover; also available as an e-book). Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-04-01 Ron Mallon
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Distention for Sets of Probabilities Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-03-04 Rush T. Stewart,Michael Nielsen
Abstract Bayesians often appeal to “merging of opinions” to rebut charges of excessive subjectivity. But what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the limit. Seidenfeld and coauthors use this observation as motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run phenomenon of dilation since, they allege, dilation is “the opposite” of asymptotic merging of opinions
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How to be Humean about idealisation laws Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-03-04 Toby Friend
Abstract If one has Humean inclinations, what account should one provide for idealisation laws? I introduce the most currently popular Humean approach to laws of nature: the Best Systems Account, along with some basic requirements for how to be the Humean. I then show why idealisation laws are unlikely to be accommodated within this account of laws. Finally, I offer an alternative approach, which takes
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Reckoning with Continuum Idealizations: Some Lessons from Soil Hydrology Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Travis Holmes
AbstractIn scientific modeling, continuum idealizations bridge scales but at the cost of fundamentally misrepresenting the microstructure of the system. This engenders a mystery. If continuum idealizations are dispensable in principle, this de-problematizes their representational inaccuracy, since continuum properties reduce to lower-scale properties, but the mystery of how this reduction could be
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Postscript to Richard Jeffrey’s Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Carl G. Wagner
ABSTRACT Richard Jeffrey’s Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability is one of the foundational documents of probability kinematics. However, the section entitled Successive Updating contains a subtle error involving updating by so-called relevance quotients in order to ensure the commutativity of successive probability kinematical revisions. Upon becoming aware of this error Jeffrey formulated
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Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Will Fleisher,Dunja Šešelja
Abstract Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action
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On internal structure, categorical structure, and representation Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Neil Dewar
Abstract If categorical equivalence is a good criterion of theoretical equivalence, then it would seem that if some class of mathematical structures is represented as a category, then any other class of structures categorically equivalent to it will have the same representational capacities. [Hudetz, 2019a] has presented an apparent counterexample to this claim; in this note, I argue that the counterexample
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Setting the demons loose: computational irreducibility does not guarantee unpredictability or emergence Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Hamed Tabatabaei Ghomi
ABSTRACT A phenomenon resulting from a computationally irreducible (or computationally incompressible) process is supposedly unpredictable except via simulation. This notion of unpredictability has been deployed to formulate some recent accounts of computational emergence. Via a technical analysis of computational irreducibility, I show that computationally irreducibility can establish the impossibility
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Fair Infinite Lotteries, Qualitative Probability, and Regularity Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Nicholas DiBella
Abstract A number of philosophers have thought that fair lotteries over countably infinite sets of outcomes are conceptually incoherent by virtue of violating Countable Additivity. In this paper, I show that a qualitative analogue of this argument generalizes to an argument against the conceptual coherence of a much wider class of fair infinite lotteries—including continuous uniform distributions.
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Realism and Observation: The View from Generative Grammar Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Gabe Dupre
Abstract Standard proposals of scientific anti-realism assume that the methodology of a scientific research program can be endorsed without accepting its metaphysical commitments. I argue that the distinction between competence, the rules governing one’s language faculty, and performance, linguistic behavior, precludes this. Linguistic theories aim to describe competence, not performance, and so must
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Why mental disorders are not like software bugs Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Harriet Fagerberg
Abstract According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This paper argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the ‘natural dysfunction analysis’ of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then analyse the necessary conditions
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Rethinking Ethnography for Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Nancy J. Nersessian,Miles MacLeod
Abstract We lay groundwork for applying ethnographic methods in philosophy of science. We frame our analysis in terms of two tasks, 1) to identify the benefits of an ethnographic approach in philosophy of science, and 2) to structure an ethnographic approach for philosophical investigation best adapted to provide information relevant to philosophical interests and epistemic values. To this end, we
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What Are Neural Representations? A Cummins Functions Approach Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Ori Hacohen
Abstract This paper introduces the Cummins Functions Approach to neural representations (CFA), which aims to capture the notion of representation that is relevant to contemporary neuroscientific practice. CFA shares the common view that 'to be a representation of X' amounts to 'having the function of tracking X', but maintains that the relevant notion of function is defined by Robert Cummins's account
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Severity and Trustworthy Evidence: Foundational Problems versus Misuses of Frequentist Testing Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 Aris Spanos
AbstractFor model-based frequentist statistics, based on a parametric statistical model ${{\cal M}_\theta }({\bf{x}})$, the trustworthiness of the ensuing evidence depends crucially on (i) the validity of the probabilistic assumptions comprising ${{\cal M}_\theta }({\bf{x}})$, (ii) the optimality of the inference procedures employed, and (iii) the adequateness of the sample size (n) to learn from data
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Against Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Quality Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 Marc Lange
AbstractSeveral philosophers propose probabilistic measures of how well a potential scientific explanation would explain the given evidence. These measures could elaborate “best” in “inference to the best explanation”. This paper argues that none of these measures (and no other measure built exclusively from such probabilities) succeeds. The paper considers the various rival explanations that scientists
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Ethnography, Archaeology and The Late Pleistocene Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 Kim Sterelny
Abstract The use of ethnography to understand archaeology is both prevalent and controversial. This paper develops an alternative approach, using ethnography to build and test a general theory of forager behaviours, and their variations in different conditions, one which can then be applied even to prehistoric sites differing from contemporary experience. Human behavioural ecology is chosen as the
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Varieties of Data-Centric Science: Regional Climate Modeling and Model Organism Research Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 Elisabeth Lloyd,Greg Lusk,Stuart Gluck,Seth McGinnis
Abstract Modern science’s ability to produce, store, and analyze big datasets is changing the way that scientific research is practiced. Philosophers have only begun to comprehend the changed nature of scientific reasoning in this age of “big data.” We analyze data-focused practices in biology and climate modeling, identifying distinct species of data-centric science: phenomena-laden in biology and
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Forced Changes Only: A New Take on the Law of Inertia Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 Daniel Hoek
ABSTRACT Newton’s First Law of Motion is typically understood to govern only the motion of force-free bodies. This paper argues on textual and conceptual grounds that the law is in fact a stronger, more general principle. The First Law limits the extent to which any body can change its state of motion — even if that body is subject to impressed forces. The misunderstanding can be traced back to an
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Purely Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power – A Critique Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-02-10 William Roche,Elliott Sober
Abstract All extant purely probabilistic measures of explanatory power satisfy the following technical condition: if Pr(E | H1) > Pr(E | H2) and Pr(E | ∼H1) < Pr(E | ∼H2), then H1’s explanatory power with respect to E is greater than H2’s explanatory power with respect to E. We argue that any measure satisfying this condition faces three serious problems – the Problem of Temporal Shallowness, the Problem
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Speculation Made Material: Experimental Archaeology and Maker’s Knowledge Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Adrian Currie
AbstractExperimental archaeology is often understood both as testing hypotheses about processes shaping the archaeological record and as generating tacit knowledge. Considering lithic technologies, I examine the relationship between these conceptions. Experimental archaeology is usefully understood via “maker’s knowledge”: archaeological experiments generate embodied know-how enabling archaeological
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Epidemics from the Population Perspective Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Jonathan Fuller
AbstractMany epidemics consist in individuals spreading infection to others. From the population perspective, they also have population characteristics important in modeling, explaining, and intervening in epidemics. I analyze epidemiology’s contemporary population perspective through the example of epidemics by examining two central principles attributed to Geoffrey Rose: a distinction between the
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Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Barry Ward
AbstractSimple random-sampling resolutions of the raven paradox relevantly diverge from scientific practice. We develop a stratified random-sampling model, yielding a better fit and apparently rehabilitating simple random sampling as a legitimate idealization. However, neither accommodates a second concern, the objection from potential bias. We develop a third model that crucially invokes causal considerations
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Diversity, Trust, and Conformity: A Simulation Study Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Sina Fazelpour,Daniel Steel
AbstractPrevious simulation models have found positive effects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but have not explored effects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even
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Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Elanor Taylor
AbstractStrong emergentism is the position that certain higher-level properties display a kind of metaphysical autonomy from the lower-level properties in which they are grounded. The prospect of collapse is a problem for strong emergentism. According to those who press the collapse problem any purportedly strongly emergent feature inheres in the emergence base and so is not genuinely autonomous from
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Static-Dynamic Hybridity in Dynamical Models of Cognition Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Naftali Weinberger,Colin Allen
AbstractDynamical models of cognition have played a central role in recent cognitive science. In this paper, we consider a common strategy by which dynamical models describe their target systems neither as purely static nor as purely dynamic, but rather using a hybrid approach. This hybridity reveals how dynamical models involve representational choices that are important for understanding the relationship
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On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Mikayla Kelley
Abstract There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance
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The Bound-State Answer to the Special Composition Question Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Claudio Calosi
This is a version of the so called Special Composition Question (SCQ). SCQ was famously introduced in the metaphysics literature by Van Inwagen (1987), and it has been driving the debate on composition ever since. Answers to SCQ can be broadly divided in two camps: extreme or moderate answers. According to extreme answers ψ is irrelevant for composition: either composition always occurs, i.e. a set
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Beyond Hempel: Reframing the Debate about Scientific Explanation Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Fons Dewulf
Abstract I argue that Carl Hempel’s pioneering work on scientific explanation introduced an assumption which Hempel never motivated, namely that explanation is an aim of science. Ever since, it largely remained unquestioned in analytic philosophy of science. By expanding the historical scope of the debate on explanation to philosophers from the first half of the 20th century, I show that the debate
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Theoretical virtues: do scientists think what philosophers think they ought to think? Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Samuel Schindler
Abstract Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one’s acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compared their views
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Scientific Perspectivism and the Methodology of Modern Mathematical Physics Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Noah Stemeroff
Abstract Perspectival realists often appeal to the methodology of science to secure a realist account of the retention and continued success of scientific claims through the progress of science (e.g. Massimi, 2016). However, in the context of modern physics, the retention and continued success of scientific claims is typically only definable within a mathematical framework. In this paper, I argue that
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Natural Selection of Independently Originated Life Clades Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Margarida Hermida
Abstract Life on Earth descends from a common ancestor. However, it is likely that there are other instances of life in the universe. If so, each abiogenesis event will have given rise to an independently originated life clade (IOLC), of which Earth-life is an example. In this paper, I argue that the set of all IOLCs in the universe forms a Darwinian population subject to natural selection, with more
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What Makes Behavioral Measures of Consciousness Subjective and Direct? Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Jakub Jonkisz
Abstract This article addresses two issues: the distinction between objective and subjective measures and the directness of such measures. It is argued that the distinction is unambiguous only when based on a methodological criterion (i.e. the threshold utilized by the measures) rather than a semantic one (i.e. their referring either to the world or to the participant’s inner states). Different senses
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The Metarepresentational Role of Mathematics in Scientific Explanations Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Colin McCullough-Benner
Abstract Several philosophers have argued that to capture the generality of certain scientific explanations, we must count mathematical facts among their explanantia. I argue that we can better understand these explanations by adopting a more nuanced stance toward mathematical representations, recognizing the role of mathematical representation schemata in representing highly abstract features of physical
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On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-12 Michael Nielsen
Abstract In a recent paper, Pettigrew (2021) reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al. (2009). But Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.
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There Is Cause to Randomize Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Cristian Larroulet Philippi
AbstractWhile practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Richard Pettigrew
AbstractAccuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, additivity, and strict propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical
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Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets: Structure and Evidence Sensitivity Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Patrick Grim,Frank Seidl,Calum McNamara,Hinton E. Rago,Isabell N. Astor,Caroline Diaso,Peter Ryner
AbstractWe model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between those propositions. Updating is Bayesian across the network as a whole. The impact of evidence at one point within a scientific theory can have a very different
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Energy Requirements Undermine Substrate Independence and Mind-Body Functionalism Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Paul Thagard
AbstractSubstrate independence and mind-body functionalism claim that thinking does not depend on any particular kind of physical implementation. But real-world information processing depends on energy, and energy depends on material substrates. Biological evidence for these claims comes from ecology and neuroscience, while computational evidence comes from neuromorphic computing and deep learning
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Answers at Gunpoint: On Livengood and Sytsma’s Revolver Case Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Alexander Max Bauer,Jan Romann
AbstractJonathan Livengood and Justin Sytsma have published a series of studies on “Actual Causation and Compositionality,” in which they investigate causal attributions of laypeople. We use one of their vignettes to follow up on their research. Our findings cast doubt on their conclusion that ordinary causal attributions tend to violate the compositionality constraint if one looks at cases in which
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Understanding Deep Learning with Statistical Relevance Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Tim Räz
AbstractThis paper argues that a notion of statistical explanation, based on Salmon’s statistical relevance model, can help us better understand deep neural networks. It is proved that homogeneous partitions, the core notion of Salmon’s model, are equivalent to minimal sufficient statistics, an important notion from statistical inference. This establishes a link to deep neural networks via the so-called
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Two Notions of Ecological Function Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Antoine C. Dussault
AbstractThis paper discusses Millstein’s (2020) criticism of the consensus view formed against selected-effects ecological functions. I argue that Millstein’s defense of coevolution-based selected-effects ecological functions applies to a notion of function as an activity, whereas proponents of the consensus view are concerned with a notion of ecological function as the contribution of an organism
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Recent Work in the Philosophy of Medicine: An Essay Review Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 John E. Huss
Is philosophy of medicine a subfield of philosophy of science? Of philosophy of biology? Should it overlap with bioethics? Or is it its own field like philosophy of technology or philosophy of law? Should we worry about the reliability of medical knowledge? With such questions in mind, I briefly review three books in the philosophy of medicine: an introductory survey by R. Paul Thompson and Ross E
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Review of Jean Gayon and Victor Petit’s Knowledge of Life Today - Jean Gayon, Interviewed by Victor Petit. Knowledge of Life Today: Conversations on Biology. London & Hoboken, NJ: ISTE/John Wiley and Sons (2019). xx + 378 pp. Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 David Depew
through the “typicality” approach in Bohmian mechanics (Dürr et al., 1992) or the “decision-theoretic” approach in many-worlds theories (Wallace, 2007). These are deep and open areas where aspiring researchers might find a foothold. I do not mean to suggest problems with Barrett’s book; rather, these are topics the same audience may wish to pursue further. In sum, Barrett’s book is a fantastic resource
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Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability? Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Amber Maimon,Meir Hemmo
AbstractIt is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple
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What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress” Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 David Colaço
AbstractThis paper accounts for broad definitions of memory, which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don’t count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis
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Review of Jeffrey A. Barrett’s The Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics - Jeffrey A. Barrett, The Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020), 272 pp., $88.00. Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2022-01-01 Benjamin H. Feintzeig
In The Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Jeffrey A. Barrett provides an excellent introductory-level text for graduate students or advanced undergraduates. Many today teach the philosophy of quantum mechanics through David Albert’s classic text Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Albert, 1992). Barrett’s book fulfills many of the same roles, and more: Barrett reports on cutting edge progress
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When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate? Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 Boaz Miller
Normatively inappropriate scientific dissent prevents warranted closure of scientific controversies and confuses the public about the state of policy-relevant science, such as anthropogenic climate change. Against recent criticism by de Melo-Martín and Intemann of the viability of any conception of normatively inappropriate dissent, I identify three conditions for normatively inappropriate dissent:
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The Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox Is Your Paradox Too: A Puzzle for Conditional Physical Probability Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 Alexander Meehan,Snow Zhang
The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox is often presented as an obscure problem that certain mathematical accounts of conditional probability must face. In this article, we point out that the paradox arises in the physical sciences, for physical probability or chance. By carefully formulating the paradox in this setting, we show that it is a puzzle for everyone, regardless of one’s preferred probability formalism
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Model Organisms for Studying Decision-Making: A Phylogenetically Expanded Perspective Philosophy of Science (IF 1.7) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 Linus Ta-Lun Huang,Leonardo Bich,William Bechtel
This article explores the use of model organisms in studying the cognitive phenomenon of decision-making. Drawing on the framework of biological control to develop a skeletal conception of decision-making, we show that two core features of decision-making mechanisms can be identified by studying model organisms, such as E. coli, jellyfish, C. elegans, lamprey, and so on. First, decision mechanisms