样式: 排序: IF: - GO 导出 标记为已读
-
Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Kohei Kawamura, Vasileios Vlaseros
-
A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Manfred Besner
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a level structure. This value prevents symmetrical groups of players of different sizes from being treated equally. We use efficiency, additivity, the null player property, and two new properties to give an axiomatic characterization. The first property, called joint productivity, is a fairness property
-
One-bound core games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-10 Doudou Gong, Bas Dietzenbacher, Hans Peters
This paper introduces the new class of one-bound core games, where the core can be described by either a lower bound or an upper bound on the payoffs of the players, named lower bound core games and upper bound core games, respectively. We study the relation of the class of one-bound core games with several other classes of games and characterize the new class by the structure of the core and in terms
-
Minimal farsighted instability Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-10 Pierre de Callataÿ, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
-
Nash implementation of supermajority rules Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-23
Abstract A committee of n experts from a university department must choose whom to hire from a set of m candidates. Their honest judgments about the best candidate must be aggregated to determine the socially optimal candidates. However, experts’ judgments are not verifiable. Furthermore, the judgment of each expert does not necessarily determine his preferences over candidates. To solve this problem
-
Participation constraints in first-price auctions Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-10 Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Guoqiang Tian, Wei Wang
We study the endogenous participation problem when bidders are characterized by a two-dimensional private information on valuations and participation costs in first-price auctions. Bidders participate whenever their private costs are less than or equal to the expected revenue from participating. We show that there always exists an equilibrium in this general setting with two-dimensional types of ex-ante
-
On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-05 Kwanghyun Kim
-
Selling two complementary goods Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Komal Malik, Kolagani Paramahamsa
-
Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-27 Malte Braack, Christian Henning, Johannes Ziesmer
-
Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-28 Ludovic A. Julien
In this paper we study a non-cooperative sequential equilibrium concept, namely the Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium, in a game in which heterogeneous atomic traders interact in interrelated markets. To this end, we consider a two-stage quantity setting strategic market game with a finite number of traders. Within this framework, we define a Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium. Then, we show existence and local
-
Exact asymptotics and continuous approximations for the Lowest Unique Positive Integer game Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-20 Arvind Srinivasan, Burton Simon
-
Coalition-weighted Shapley values Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Iago Núñez Lugilde
-
Winning strategies of (i, j) multimove games on Thai, Japanese, and Chinese chess games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Tanayot Prapaithrakul, Saharath Sanguanpong, Nantapath Trakultraipruk
-
A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-11 Francesc Dilmé
-
Professor Stef Tijs (1937–2023) Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-11 Peter Borm, Hans Peters
-
Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-11 Quan Li, Kang Rong
-
Deterministic n-person shortest path and terminal games on symmetric digraphs have Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Endre Boros, Paolo Giulio Franciosa, Vladimir Gurvich, Michael Vyalyi
-
A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Yoshio Kamijo
The Nash bargaining solution (Nash in Econometrica 18(2):155–162, 1950) is the most used game theory tool for analyzing bargaining problems. Its validity is examined from an equilibrium analysis using a non-cooperative game such as Nash’s demand game (NDG). Since the NDG has multiple equilibria, we need an equilibrium selection. In this note, we apply the Harsanyi and Selten (A general theory of equilibrium
-
Evolution of preferences in multiple populations Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-07 Yu-Sung Tu, Wei-Torng Juang
We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and the information about the opponents’ preferences. Individuals’ realized fitnesses are given by material payoff functions. Following Dekel et al. (Rev Econ Stud 74:685–704
-
Best-response equilibrium: an equilibrium in finitely additive mixed strategies Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-31 Igal Milchtaich
A generalization of mixed strategy equilibrium is proposed, where mixed strategies need only be finitely additive and payoff functions are not required to be integrable or bounded. This notion of best-response equilibrium is based on an extension of the idea that an equilibrium strategy is supported in the player’s set of best-response actions, but is applicable also when no best-response actions exist
-
An egalitarian solution to minimum cost spanning tree problems Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-25 Emre Doğan, İbrahim Barış Esmerok
We introduce a new core selection to minimum cost spanning tree problems satisfying continuity, population and cost monotonicity, solidarity, and ranking. We prove that it Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the irreducible core of the problem, including the celebrated folk solution unless they yield the same outcome. Therefore, among the core selections satisfying solidarity, our solution generates
-
Deterrence games and the disruption of information Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-18 Siyu Ma, Yair Tauman, Richard Zeckhauser
-
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Dai Zusai
We present a general framework of evolutionary dynamics under persistent heterogeneity in payoff functions and revision protocols, allowing continuously many types in a game with finitely many strategies. Unlike existing literature, we do not assume anonymity of the game nor aggregability of the dynamic. The dynamic is formulated as a differential equation of a joint probability measure of types and
-
Equal-speed pursuit and evasion on manifolds Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-07 Andrew Gard
-
A myopic adjustment process for mean field games with finite state and action space Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-01 Berenice Anne Neumann
-
Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-06 Agustín G. Bonifacio, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
-
Asymmetric majority pillage games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-04 Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat, Naoki Yoshihara
-
Nash equilibria in random games with right fat-tailed distributions Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-19 Ting Pei, Satoru Takahashi
-
Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-14 Torsten Heinrich, Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo, Marco Pangallo, Alex Scott, Bassel Tarbush, Samuel Wiese
-
Cheating robot games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-08 Melissa A. Huggan, Richard J. Nowakowski
-
Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-26 Chirantan Ganguly, Indrajit Ray
We consider a version of the Battle of the Sexes with private information and allow cheap talk regarding the players’ types before the game. We show that a desirable type-coordination property is achieved at the unique fully revealing symmetric equilibrium (when it exists). Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium that exists when the fully revealing equilibrium does
-
Submixing and shift-invariant stochastic games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-25 Hugo Gimbert, Edon Kelmendi
-
Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-20 Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
-
On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-11 Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Damiano Turchet
We address the problem of monopoly in general equilibrium in a mixed version of a monopolistic two-commodity exchange economy where the monopolist, represented as an atom, is endowed with one commodity and “small traders,” represented by an atomless part, are endowed only with the other. First we provide an economic theoretical foundation of the monopoly solution in this bilateral framework through
-
Making friends meet: network formation with introductions Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-10 Jan-Peter Siedlarek
-
Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-09 Lucas Pahl
-
The “desire to conform” and dynamic search by a committee Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-05 Murali Agastya, Jorge Rojas-Vallejos
-
Impartial games with decreasing Sprague–Grundy function and their hypergraph compound Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-04 Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich, Nhan Bao Ho, Kazuhisa Makino, Peter Mursic
-
A threshold model of urban development Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-02 Alberto Vesperoni, Paul Schweinzer
-
Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang
-
Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Jihwan Do
-
Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Jian Yang
We study nonatomic games in which players’ choices are guided by general preferences. Rather than ones over actions while also under influences of player-action profiles, we let the preferences be over returns received by individual players and let the returns be then linked to all players’ actions. Our modeling choice has rendered otherwise standard analysis quite fruitful. Not only can we establish
-
Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Özer Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki
Combination of a TU-game and an undirected graph representing cooperation restrictions among the players is called a TU-game with communication structure. For TU-games with communication structure, the average tree solution is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all spanning trees of the undirected graph. In this paper, we provide new characterizations for the
-
Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Shaofei Jiang
-
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Ville Korpela
Often preferences in a group of agents are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demands that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome, we could equally well require that there are no equilibria at all
-
Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Jin Hyuk Choi, Kookyoung Han
-
Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-11 Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada
This paper considers the solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set that admit a potential function. We say that a solution admits a potential function if the solution is given as the marginal contribution according to the potential function. Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 57(3):589–614, 1989) show that the Shapley value is the only solution that is efficient and admits the HM potential
-
Complexity of stability in trading networks Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-08 Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Ildikó Schlotter, Alexander Teytelboym
-
Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-08 Zhonghao Shui
This paper considers an auctioneer who has a non-monotonic utility function with a unique maximizer. The auctioneer is able to reject all bids over some amount by using rejection prices. We show that the optimal rejection price for such an auctioneer is lower than and equal to that maximizer in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions, respectively. Further, in each auction we characterize
-
On the structure of core solutions of discontinuous general cooperative games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-04 Qi-Qing Song
The existence of core solutions for general cooperative games (Game Econ Behav 4:145–160, 1992) is extended to the case with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. The analysis shows that the core of a discontinuous general cooperative game is homeomorphic to a KKMS-related region of a simplex. Each discontinuous general cooperative game has a refined stable set consisting of some efficient core
-
Establishing human connections: experimental evidence from the helping game Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Miriam Al Lily
-
Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-31 Manuel Foerster
-
Continuous optimisation problem and game theory for multi-agent pathfinding Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-29 Alexander V. Kuznetsov, Andrew Schumann, Małgorzata Rataj
-
Horizontal product differentiation in Varian’s model of sales Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-01-30 Kuninori Nakagawa
We consider the explicit introduction of firms’ choice of location into Varian’s model of sales. In our model, firms compete for both uninformed and informed consumers in a two-stage spatial competition model in which firms choose price and location. We obtain a result where both prices and locations are randomized in the subgame perfect equilibrium. The difference between each firm’s choice of location
-
Equilibria in bottleneck games Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-01-27 Ryo Kawasaki, Hideo Konishi, Junki Yukawa
-
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-01-26 Sylvain Béal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Philippe Solal, Peter Sudhölter
-
Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-01-05 Takuma Wakayama, Takehiko Yamato
-
Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-30 Fredrik Ødegaard, Charles Z. Zheng
-
Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-05 Xin Feng
-
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2022-12-02 Olivier Bos, Tom Truyts
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is sufficiently strong, the expected revenue