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  • Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-06-03
    Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien, Simone Tonin

    We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot–Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), that

  • Limits of price competition: cost asymmetry and imperfect information
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-04-03
    Sneha Bakshi

    In a class of asymmetric-cost duopoly price competition games, price-elastic individual demand reveals a threshold of informed buyers below which equilibrium is in monopoly prices. Even if the threshold is met, unless all buyers are informed, monopoly prices are listed and are more likely between less alike sellers. An increase in the efficient seller’s cost weakly reduces its rival’s price (in a first

  • Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-03-29
    Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler, Alexandra Zaby

    We use a first-capacity-then-price-setting game as a theoretical benchmark for an experimental study which identifies capacity precommitment, intra-play communication, and prior experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical model determines capacity thresholds above which firms have an incentive to coordinate on higher than equilibrium prices. The experimental data confirm that

  • On lattices from combinatorial game theory: infinite case
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-03-12
    Alda Carvalho, Carlos P. Santos, Cátia Dias, Francisco Coelho, João P. Neto, Richard J. Nowakowski, Sandra Vinagre

    Given a set of combinatorial games, the children are all those games that can be generated using as options the games of the original set. It is known that the partial order of the children of all games whose birthday is less than a fixed ordinal is a distributive lattice and also that the children of any set of games form a complete lattice. We are interested in the converse. In a previous paper,

  • Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-03-10
    Rubén Becerril-Borja, Andrés Perea

    We introduce the idea that a player believes at every stage of a dynamic game that his opponents will choose rationally in the future and have chosen rationally in a restricted way in the past. This is summarized by the concept of common belief in future and restricted past rationality, which is defined epistemically. Moreover, it is shown that every properly rationalizable strategy of the normal form

  • Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-03-06
    Volker Britz, Hans Gersbach

    We examine how democratic mechanisms can yield socially desirable outcomes in the presence of uncertainty about an underlying state of nature. We depart from a conventional mechanism design approach because we aim for democratic mechanisms to reflect some basic properties of decision-making in democracies. In particular, actual decisions are made by majority voting. The proposals to be voted upon are

  • Consistency of the equal split-off set
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2020-02-21
    Bas Dietzenbacher, Elena Yanovskaya

    This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (Banach Center Publ 71:39–46, 2006)) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility which extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (Econometrica 57:615–635, 1989) solution for convex games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore consistency of the equal split-off set on the domains of exact partition

  • The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-08-19
    Jasper de Jong, Marc Uetz

    We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which n selfish players select disjoint subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this basic class of games. Special attention is given to a subclass of set packing games, namely throughput scheduling games, where the items represent jobs, and the subsets that a player can select

  • Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-08-14
    Ori Haimanko

    We introduce a new axiom for power indices, which requires the total (additively aggregated) power of the voters to be nondecreasing in response to an expansion of the set of winning coalitions; the total power is thereby reflecting an increase in the collective power that such an expansion creates. It is shown that total-power monotonic indices that satisfy the standard semivalue axioms are probabilistic

  • Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-08-12
    Bary S. R. Pradelski, Heinrich H. Nax

    In two-sided markets with transferable utility (‘assignment games’), we study the dynamics of trade arrangements and price adjustments as agents from the two market sides stochastically match, break up, and re-match in their pursuit of better opportunities. The underlying model of individual adjustments is based on the behavioral theories of adaptive learning and aspiration adjustment. Dynamics induced

  • Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-07-23
    Lawrence M. Ausubel, Oleg Baranov

    Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues

  • Associated consistency, value and graphs
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-06-20
    Gérard Hamiache, Florian Navarro

    This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show

  • A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-27
    Andrés Salamanca

    In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted-utility transfer procedure. We construct a three-player cooperative game in which Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 13(2):69–96

  • Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-25
    Alfredo Valencia-Toledo, Juan Vidal-Puga

    We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from

  • Fair division in the presence of externalities
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-20
    Oskar Skibski, Tomasz Michalak

    The problem of fair division of payoff is one of the key issues when considering cooperation of strategic individuals. It arises naturally in a number of applications related to operational research, including sharing the cost of transportation or dividing the profit among supply chain agents. In this paper, we consider the problem of extending the Shapley Value—a fundamental payoff division scheme—to

  • A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-17
    Daniel Danau, Annalisa Vinella

    Riordan and Sappington (J Econ Theory 45:189–199, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent’s type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is rewarded for one signal realization and punished equally for all the others. Gary-Bobo and

  • Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-13
    Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Vladimir V. Mazalov

    A tournament can be represented as a set of candidates and the results from pairwise comparisons of the candidates. In our setting, candidates may form coalitions. The candidates can choose to fix who wins the pairwise comparisons within their coalition. A coalition is winning if it can guarantee that a candidate from this coalition will win each pairwise comparison. This approach divides all coalitions

  • Dominance of weighted nested split graph networks in connections models
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-05-04
    Norma Olaizola, Federico Valenciano

    In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of weighted networks in a setting where nodes derive utility from their direct and indirect connections. Under rather general conditions, based on a set of assumptions about the value that connections in a weighted network generate, and about link-formation technology, we prove that any network is dominated by a special type of nested split graph

  • Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-04-29
    Takaaki Abe

    This paper provides conditions for a game with externalities to have a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS). We observe that the notion of convexity defined by Hafalir [Games Econ Behav 61:242–258, 2007] does not guarantee the existence of a PMAS in the presence of externalities. We introduce a new notion of convexity and show that while our convexity is not a stronger condition than Hafalir’s

  • On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-04-26
    Michal Krol, Magdalena Ewa Krol

    This paper uses a novel experimental design to investigate the strategic value of making a public payoff sacrifice (“burning money”) in a setting modelled after the battle-of-the-sexes game. Unlike prior studies, we find that subjects choose to burn money in a significant portion of decision trials and that burning makes the first movers more likely to achieve their preferred stage two equilibrium

  • Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
    Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.615) Pub Date : 2019-04-09
    Jiabin Wu

    We consider a population of agents whose preference types are unobservable but imperfectly correlated with certain observable labels such as customs, languages, and origins. In addition, the matching process exhibits homophily: agents tend to interact with those who share the same labels. We show that labelling and homophily interact in a non-trivial way to influence the evolution of preferences, which

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