• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2021-01-12
Ravi Kant Rai, Urban Larsson, Neel Patel

We study zero-sum combinatorial games within the framework of so-called Richman auctions (Lazarus et al., in Games No Chance 29:439–449, 1996). We modify the alternating play scoring ruleset Cumulative Subtraction (Cohensius et al., in Electron J Combin 26(P4):52, 2019), to a discrete bidding scheme, similar to Develin and Payne (Electron J Combin 17(1):85, 2010). Players bid to move, and the player

更新日期：2021-01-12
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2021-01-07
Sanjay Bhattacherjee, Palash Sarkar

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted voting procedure having a primary player who is a blocker and a set of secondary players. The voting weights are not fixed and are determined based on the subset of players which participate in the voting. We introduce the notion of voting schema to formally model such a voting procedure. Individual voting games arise

更新日期：2021-01-07
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2021-01-07
Zhiwei Cui, Yan-An Hwang, Ding-Cheng You

Monotonicity is an appealing principle of relational power measures in social networks. It states that as the influence of an individual changes, the relational power measure should change in the same direction. We axiomatically characterize the $$\beta$$- and score-measures on directed networks using three axioms: two different monotonicity axioms, the same symmetry axiom and two different efficiency

更新日期：2021-01-07
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2021-01-07
Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano

Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question

更新日期：2021-01-07
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2021-01-02
Marco Serena

We propose a simple model to investigate whether an agent works harder when she is informed of the tasks’ deadlines (i.e., under transparent management) or not (i.e., under opaque management). We do so in a stylized model where; (1) in each period, the agent may work at some cost, rather than shirk at no cost, so as to increase her probability of completing the task, (2) the agent receives an exogenous

更新日期：2021-01-02
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-11-23
Hiromasa Ogawa

This study examines how a CEO’s sensitivity affects information transmission from multiple unit managers when they communicate strategically during decision-making for technology investment. We develop a simple cheap talk model comprising one CEO and K unit managers, wherein the CEO makes a decision to maximize the units’ profit after the managers reveal their preference for the decision through cheap

更新日期：2020-11-23
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-11-23
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa, Elena Molis

We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s

更新日期：2020-11-23
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-11-17
Bettina Klaus, Panos Protopapas

We study correspondences that choose an interval of alternatives when agents have single-peaked preferences over locations and ordinally extend their preferences over intervals. We extend the main results of Moulin (Public Choice 35:437–455, 1980) to our setting and show that the results of Ching (Soc Choice Welf 26:473–490, 1997) cannot always be similarly extended. First, strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness

更新日期：2020-11-17
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-11-03
José Luis Contreras, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

This paper extends the roommate problem to include externalities, allowing preferences for a partner to depend on the situation of others. Stability concepts for matchings and partitions of the set of agents are proposed and characterized, conditional on all agents having prudent expectations about other agents’ reactions to deviations. We prove that any roommate problem with externalities has a stable

更新日期：2020-11-03
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-28
Francesco Fallucchi, Andrea Mercatanti, Jan Niederreiter

We apply the classifier-Lasso (Su et al. 2016) to detect the presence of latent types in two data sets of previous contest experiments, one that keeps the grouping of contestants fixed over the experiment and one that randomly regroups contestants after each round. Our results suggest that there exist three distinct types of players in both contest regimes. The majority of contestants in fixed groups

更新日期：2020-10-30
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-26
Shuige Liu

We characterize three interrelated solution concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model in a framework with incomplete information. Based on it, we give two groups of conditions; one characterizes permissibility and proper rationalizability, the other characterizes permissibility in an alternative

更新日期：2020-10-26
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-26
Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing

更新日期：2020-10-26
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-21
René Levínský, Abraham Neyman, Miroslav Zelený

In this paper we offer a new, unifying approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity. In our model, the strategy of a player in a game does not directly map the set H of histories to the set of her actions. Instead, the player’s perception of H is represented by a map $$\varphi :H \rightarrow X,$$ where X reflects the “cognitive complexity” of the player, and the strategy chooses its mixed

更新日期：2020-10-26
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-20
Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki

The purpose of this paper is to study which coalition structures have stable distributions. We employ the projective core as a stability concept. Although the projective core is often defined only for the grand coalition, we define it for every coalition structure. We apply the core notion to a variety of economic models including the public goods game, the Cournot and Bertrand competition, and the

更新日期：2020-10-20
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-20
Werner Güth, Paul Pezanis-Christou

We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incomplete information by an evolutionary setup postulating (i) minimal common knowledge, (ii) optimal responses to conjectural beliefs how others behave and (iii) evolutionary selection of conjectural beliefs with fitness measured by expected payoffs. After justifying the game forms we derive the evolutionary games

更新日期：2020-10-20
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-10-16
Amir Ban, Ron Lavi

We investigate second-price sequential auctions of unit-demand bidders with time-variable valuations under complete information. We describe how a bidder figures willingness to pay by calculating option values, and show that when bidders bid their option value, and a condition of consistency is fulfilled, a subgame-perfect equilibrium is the result. With no constraints on valuations, equilibria are

更新日期：2020-10-17
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-09-28
Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa

This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable

更新日期：2020-09-28
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-09-23
Qianqian Kong, Hans Peters

An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is a profile of linear orders on the player set, one for each issue within the set of issues: such a linear order is interpreted as the order in which the players will support the issue under consideration. A power index assigns to each player in an issue game a nonnegative number, where these numbers sum

更新日期：2020-09-23
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-09-18
Achille Basile, Vincenzo Scalzo

We give sufficient and necessary conditions for the non-emptiness of the alpha-core in the setting of strategic games with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. In order to prove our results, we can avoid the use of Scarf’s Theorem for NTU-games, by suitably appealing to the Ky Fan minimax inequality. Examples clarify our conditions and allow the comparison of our results with the previous ones

更新日期：2020-09-20
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-09-07
Yehuda John Levy

This note shows that the work by Simon and Tomkowicz (Israel J Math 227(1):215–231, 2018) answers another outstanding open question in game theory in addition to the non-existence of approximate Harsányi equilibrium in Bayesian games: it shows that strategic form games with bounded and separately continuous payoffs need not possess approximate equilibria.

更新日期：2020-09-08
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-09-04
Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

We study first-price auctions in which the number of bidders is the seller’s private information, and investigate the use of a reserve price to signal this private information. We use the D1 criterion to refine the set of equilibria and characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium outcome, where the reserve price increases with the number of bidders. The key driving force is a certain form of single-crossing

更新日期：2020-09-05
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-08-03
Miguel A. Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni, Miltiadis Makris

We consider auctions where bidders’ valuations are positively correlated with their productivity in a second-stage aftermarket. We test in the lab whether bidders recognize the opportunity to signal their productivity through their bidding and, conditional on them doing so, whether disclosing different information about the auction outcomes affects their signaling behavior. Our results confirm that

更新日期：2020-08-04
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-08-03
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh

We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification of the Talmud rule in bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal axiomatization of the rule, which combines consistency with meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Our game actually considers bilateral negotiations, inspired by those bounds, which are extended to an arbitrary number of creditors, by

更新日期：2020-08-03
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-07-27
Martin Mihelich; Yan Shu

We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the kth price auction by using inverse of distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.

更新日期：2020-07-27
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-07-22
Aner Sela

We study Tullock contests with n symmetric players. We show that in a contest without an exit option, if prizes and punishments (negative prizes) have the same cost, it is optimal for the designer who wants to maximize the players’ total effort to allocate the entire prize sum to a single punishment without any prize. On the other hand, in a contest with an exit option, it is optimal to allocate the

更新日期：2020-07-22
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-07-16
Takuya Iimura

We prove some interesting properties of unilaterally competitive games when there are more than two players. We show that such games possess: (1) a Nash equilibrium, (2) maximin-solvability, (3) strong solvability in the sense of Nash, and (4) weak acyclicity, all in pure strategies of finite or infinite games.

更新日期：2020-07-16
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-07-06
Eleonora Braggion; Nicola Gatti; Roberto Lucchetti; Tuomas Sandholm; Bernhard von Stengel

We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if no coalition of players can jointly deviate so that all players in the coalition get strictly better payoffs. Our main result concerns games with two players and states that if a game admits a strong Nash equilibrium, then the payoff pairs in the support of the equilibrium lie on a straight line in

更新日期：2020-07-06
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-06-26
Hiromasa Takahashi, Toru Takemoto, Akihiro Suzuki

Joint debts are debts that more than one debtor guarantees mutually. They are sometimes interpreted as a version of the tragedy of the commons. However, a simple model of the dynamic tragedy of the commons fails to capture an important feature of joint debts. The authors model joint debts as a joint borrowing limit game and compare the model with the dynamic tragedy of the commons model. Thereby, the

更新日期：2020-06-26
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-06-25

This paper proposes a dynamic model for the process of industry consolidation by sequences of mergers and acquisitions that create synergy gains to merging firms and may impose positive or negative externalities on the remaining firms in the industry. We allow firms to make acquisition offers that are conditional and unconditional on acceptances of target firms, instead of the usual conditional offers

更新日期：2020-06-25
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-06-18
Parkash Chander

This paper is concerned with an old question: Will oligopolistic firms have incentives to merge to monopoly and will the monopoly, if the firms indeed merge, be stable? To answer this question, I motivate and introduce a new core concept for a general partition function game and prove stability of the merger-to-monopoly by applying the new core concept, labelled the strong-core, to Cournot oligopoly

更新日期：2020-06-19
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-06-03
Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien, Simone Tonin

We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot–Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), that

更新日期：2020-06-03
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-04-03
Sneha Bakshi

In a class of asymmetric-cost duopoly price competition games, price-elastic individual demand reveals a threshold of informed buyers below which equilibrium is in monopoly prices. Even if the threshold is met, unless all buyers are informed, monopoly prices are listed and are more likely between less alike sellers. An increase in the efficient seller’s cost weakly reduces its rival’s price (in a first

更新日期：2020-04-03
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-03-29
Werner Güth; Manfred Stadler; Alexandra Zaby

We use a first-capacity-then-price-setting game as a theoretical benchmark for an experimental study which identifies capacity precommitment, intra-play communication, and prior experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical model determines capacity thresholds above which firms have an incentive to coordinate on higher than equilibrium prices. The experimental data confirm that

更新日期：2020-03-29
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-03-12
Alda Carvalho, Carlos P. Santos, Cátia Dias, Francisco Coelho, João P. Neto, Richard J. Nowakowski, Sandra Vinagre

Given a set of combinatorial games, the children are all those games that can be generated using as options the games of the original set. It is known that the partial order of the children of all games whose birthday is less than a fixed ordinal is a distributive lattice and also that the children of any set of games form a complete lattice. We are interested in the converse. In a previous paper,

更新日期：2020-03-12
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-03-10
Rubén Becerril-Borja; Andrés Perea

We introduce the idea that a player believes at every stage of a dynamic game that his opponents will choose rationally in the future and have chosen rationally in a restricted way in the past. This is summarized by the concept of common belief in future and restricted past rationality, which is defined epistemically. Moreover, it is shown that every properly rationalizable strategy of the normal form

更新日期：2020-03-10
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-03-06
Volker Britz; Hans Gersbach

We examine how democratic mechanisms can yield socially desirable outcomes in the presence of uncertainty about an underlying state of nature. We depart from a conventional mechanism design approach because we aim for democratic mechanisms to reflect some basic properties of decision-making in democracies. In particular, actual decisions are made by majority voting. The proposals to be voted upon are

更新日期：2020-03-06
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-02-21
Bas Dietzenbacher, Elena Yanovskaya

This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (Banach Center Publ 71:39–46, 2006)) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility which extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (Econometrica 57:615–635, 1989) solution for convex games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore consistency of the equal split-off set on the domains of exact partition

更新日期：2020-02-21
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-02-19
Yangbo Song; Mihaela van der Schaar

What networks can form and persist when agents are self-interested? Can such networks be efficient? A substantial theoretical literature predicts that various networks emerge randomly and efficiency is unlikely to be sustained, but these predictions are in stark contrast to empirical findings. In this paper, we present a new model of network formation. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume

更新日期：2020-02-19
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-31
Z. Emel Öztürk

We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters vary. Two fundamental axioms of consistency in such a setting, reinforcement and composition-consistency, are incompatible. We first observe that the latter implies four conditions each of which can be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We find that two of these conditions are compatible

更新日期：2020-01-31
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-29
Pablo Amorós

The opinions of a group of experts must be aggregated to determine the deserving winner of a competition. The procedure of aggregation is majoritarian if, whenever a majority of experts honestly believe that a contestant is the best, the given contestant is considered the deserving winner. The fact that an expert believes that a contestant is the best does not necessarily imply that he/she wants this

更新日期：2020-01-29
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-29
Takuya Iimura; Toshimasa Maruta; Takahiro Watanabe

A game is solvable if the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty and interchangeable. A pairwise solvable game is a two-person symmetric game in which any restricted game generated by a pair of strategies is solvable. We show that the set of equilibria in a pairwise solvable game is interchangeable. Under a quasiconcavity condition, we derive a complete order-theoretic characterization and some topological

更新日期：2020-01-29
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-27
Helmuts Āzacis

I study sequential first-price auctions where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure rules when the valuations of bidders are either perfectly positively or perfectly negatively correlated across

更新日期：2020-01-27
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-20
Liliana Garrido-da-Silva; Sofia B. S. D. Castro

The Rock–scissors–paper game has been studied to account for cyclic behaviour under various game dynamics. We use a two-person parametrised version of this game. The cyclic behaviour is observed near a heteroclinic cycle, in a heteroclinic network, with two nodes such that, at each node, players alternate in winning and losing. This cycle is shown to be as stable as possible for a wide range of parameter

更新日期：2020-01-20
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-18
Wei-Torng Juang; Guang-Zhen Sun; Kuo-Chih Yuan

We develop a model of two parallel contests, asymmetric in quantity of homogeneous prizes open to contest, with a finite number of homogeneous risk-neutral bidders. Whether the bidder upon entry into a particular contest is aware of the realized number of competing contestants in the contest is irrelevant to the expected effort at equilibrium. At equilibrium the expected effort per capita in the larger

更新日期：2020-01-18
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-09
Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo; Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo; Estela Sánchez Rodríguez

This paper extends the concept of face games, introduced by González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (Games Econ Behav 62:100–105, 2008) for convex games, to the general class of balanced games. Each face of the core is the core of a face game and contains the best stable allocations for a coalition provided that the members of the complement coalition get their miminum worth inside the core. Since face

更新日期：2020-01-09
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-08
Manfred Besner

A new concept for TU-values, called value dividends, is introduced. Similar to Harsanyi dividends, value dividends are defined recursively and provide new characterizations of values from the Harsanyi set. In addition, we generalize the Harsanyi set where each of the TU-values from this set is defined by the distribution of the Harsanyi dividends via sharing function systems and give an axiomatic characterization

更新日期：2020-01-08
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2020-01-08
Shiran Rachmilevitch

I study the following repeated version of Nash’s Demand Game: whenever the demands are not jointly compatible, the player who stated the lower demand (the less greedy player) obtains the following advantage: his offer is the only one “on the table”, and the greedier player needs to respond to this offer by either accepting it (which terminates the game) or rejecting it (which triggers a one-period

更新日期：2020-01-08
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-12-23
Felipe Balmaceda

This paper studies a principal-agent relationship when both are risk-neutral and in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Contracts must satisfy the limited-liability and monotonicity conditions. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal contract is simple, in the sense that each type is offered the same contract. These are: the action and the agent’s type are complements

更新日期：2019-12-23
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-12-18
Kiho Yoon

We study the bilateral trading problem under private information. We characterize the range of possible mechanisms which satisfy ex-post efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. In particular, we show that the famous Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility result no longer holds when contingent contracts are allowed.

更新日期：2019-12-18
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-12-04
Shunsuke Hanato

We analyze a bargaining model which is a generalization of the model of Rubinstein (Econometrica 50(1):97–109, 1982) from the viewpoint of the process of how a proposer is decided in each period. In our model, a player’s probability to be a proposer depends on the history of proposers and players divide a pie of size 1. We derive a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and analyze how its SPE payoffs are

更新日期：2019-12-04
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-09-28
Bertrand Mbama Engoulou; Lawrence Diffo Lambo

In this paper, we evaluate in the context of weighted (j, k)-simple games, the maximal degree of perturbations which may be allowed, in voters weights and/or in the quotas, without changing the structure of the game. For this purpose, we extend on (j, k)-simple games the notion of amplitude well known for ordinary simple games. Recall that, (j, k)-simple games provide a model of decision making in

更新日期：2019-09-28
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-09-27
Yukihiko Funaki; Harold Houba; Evgenia Motchenkova

We develop a novel model of price-fee competition in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures and costly transportation. The model captures a variety of real market situations and it is the continuous quantity version of the assignment game with indivisible goods on a fixed network. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier

更新日期：2019-09-27
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-08-19
Jasper de Jong; Marc Uetz

We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which n selfish players select disjoint subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this basic class of games. Special attention is given to a subclass of set packing games, namely throughput scheduling games, where the items represent jobs, and the subsets that a player can select

更新日期：2019-08-19
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-08-14
Ori Haimanko

We introduce a new axiom for power indices, which requires the total (additively aggregated) power of the voters to be nondecreasing in response to an expansion of the set of winning coalitions; the total power is thereby reflecting an increase in the collective power that such an expansion creates. It is shown that total-power monotonic indices that satisfy the standard semivalue axioms are probabilistic

更新日期：2019-08-14
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-08-12
Bary S. R. Pradelski; Heinrich H. Nax

In two-sided markets with transferable utility (‘assignment games’), we study the dynamics of trade arrangements and price adjustments as agents from the two market sides stochastically match, break up, and re-match in their pursuit of better opportunities. The underlying model of individual adjustments is based on the behavioral theories of adaptive learning and aspiration adjustment. Dynamics induced

更新日期：2019-08-12
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-07-23
Lawrence M. Ausubel; Oleg Baranov

Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple incomplete-information model that allows correlations among bidders’ values. We perform a full equilibrium analysis of three core-selecting auction formats as applied to the “local-local-global” model. We show that seller revenues

更新日期：2019-07-23
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-07-16
Bo Chen

This study investigates how externalities from downstream competition shape sorting in upstream labor markets. I model this as a two-stage game: A first stage of simultaneous one-to-one matching between firms and managers and a second stage of Cournot competition among matched pairs. If a firm’s technology and human capital are strategic complements, it is rational for each firm-manager pair to expect

更新日期：2019-07-16
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-06-28
Oliver Kirchkamp; J. Philipp Reiß

We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate the extent to which the amount of underbidding depends on the seemingly innocuous parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data, we present and test a theory that introduces constant markdown bidders into a population of fully rational

更新日期：2019-06-28
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-06-20
Gérard Hamiache; Florian Navarro

This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show

更新日期：2019-06-20
• Int. J. Game Theory (IF 0.565) Pub Date : 2019-06-10
Tamás Solymosi

We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nuceolus and investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by

更新日期：2019-06-10
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