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Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division values J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-16 Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu, René van den Brink
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider relaxations of symmetry in line with Casajus (2019) to characterize the class of (positively) weighted division values. Secondly, we show that the class of weighted
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Imperfect competition in the banking sector and economic instability J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-12 Francesco Carli, Teresa Lloyd-Braga, Leonor Modesto
We study the impact of competition in the banking sector on the emergence of endogenous cycles driven by self-fulling volatile expectations. We consider an OLG model with two sectors and two household types: workers, who consume and work when young and save through bank deposits; and entrepreneurs, who seek bank loans to finance current consumption and to invest in a productive technology that transforms
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Non-vetoed matching with status quo J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-02 M, u, s, t, a, f, a, , O, ǧ, u, z, , A, f, a, c, a, n
We consider a matching market where there is an initial matching a priori. Both sides of the market can veto the new matching whenever they would rather keep their initial assignment. We propose a stability notion, called “conditional stability”. Our first mechanism—“Non-Vetoed Deferred Acceptance” ()—is non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and strategy-proof. These three properties are incompatible with
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Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li
Shapley and Scarf (1974) appeared in the first issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and is one of the journal’s most impactful publications. As we approach the remarkable milestone of the journal’s 50th anniversary (1974–2024), this article serves as a commemorative exploration of Shapley and Scarf (1974) and the extensive body of literature that follows it.
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Fifty years of mathematical growth theory: Classical topics and new trends J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Emmanuelle Augeraud-Veron, Raouf Boucekkine, Fausto Gozzi, Alain Venditti, Benteng Zou
We present an overview of selected contributions of the ’ authors to growth theory in the last half century. We start with the classical optimal growth theory within a benchmark multisector model and outline the successive developments in the analysis of this model, including the turnpike theory. Different refinements of the benchmark are considered along the way. We then survey the abundant literature
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On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 M. Ali Khan, Richard P. McLean, Metin Uyanik
This paper presents results on the existence of an equilibrium in the context of a typology consisting of qualitative, generalized and constrained generalized normal form games with the following features: (i) a set of players of arbitrary cardinality, (ii) action sets that may be non-compact subsets of a non-Hausdorff and non-locally convex space, (iii) individual preferences satisfying a weakened
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Opinions and vaccination during an epidemic J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Josselin Thuilliez, Nouhoum Touré
High levels of vaccine hesitancy remain poorly understood during an epidemic. Using high-frequency data in France at departmental level and exploiting the Covid-19 vaccination campaign calendar, we observe that vaccination among the elderly influences vaccination among young adults. We then propose a simple epidemiological economic model with two partially vaccinated demographic groups - the young
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Two characterizations of the dense rank J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 José Luis García-Lapresta, Miguel Martínez-Panero
In this paper, we have considered the dense rank for assigning positions to alternatives in weak orders. If we arrange the alternatives in tiers (i.e., indifference classes), the dense rank assigns position 1 to all the alternatives in the top tier, 2 to all the alternatives in the second tier, and so on. We have proposed a formal framework to analyze the dense rank when compared to other well-known
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Increasing returns to scale and financial fragility J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Jiahong Gao, Robert R. Reed
How do liquidity creation and financial fragility depend on increasing returns to scale? We study this question in a version of the model with limited commitment. We show that while a higher minimum scale generally lowers welfare since it makes the investment technology more restrictive, there exhibits a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of instability and size thresholds. In particular
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Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 G, a, b, r, i, e, l, l, e, , D, e, m, a, n, g, e
In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in
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On two mechanisms in job rotation problems J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang
We study a class of priority-based allocation problems, the general job rotation problems first proposed by Yu and Zhang (2020), in which each position is occupied by at most one agent, and each agent occupies at most one position. The priority structure is that at each occupied position, its occupant has the lowest priority while all other agents have equal highest priority; at other positions, all
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Innovation through competitive experimentation J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-05 Peter Achim
This paper studies optimal contest design for competitive experimentation. A principal wants to implement a project and seeks contributions from multiple agents that increase the value of the project. The agent’s chances of success are independent and their experimentation efforts are unobservable. To induce effort, the principal offers a mechanism that specifies rewards and a termination time which
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Transitions between equilibria in Bilingual Games under Probit Choice J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-29 Srinivas Arigapudi
We study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria under the probit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models
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An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-02 G. Bloise, C. Le Van, Y. Vailakis
We study stochastic dynamic programming with recursive utility in settings where multiplicity of values is only attributed to unbounded returns. That is, we consider Koopmans aggregators that, when artificially restricted to be bounded, satisfy the traditional Blackwell’s discounting condition (as it certainly happens with time-additive aggregators). We argue that, when the truncation is removed, the
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How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting? J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-02-02 Paul Calcott, Vladimir Petkov
This paper studies the behavior of a consumer whose time preferences exhibit globally decreasing impatience. We ask how well this behavior could be approximated with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that a quasi-hyperbolic approximation can reproduce the consumer’s equilibrium strategies and their local comparative statics. However, such an approximation would provide biased assessments of measures
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Detecting profitable deviations J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-24 David M. Rahman
Rochet’s Theorem characterizes implementable allocations in a mechanism design environment in terms of cyclic monotonicity, a concept from convex analysis. In this paper, I offer an alternative approach to both the proof and interpretation of this result, based on linear duality. This duality reveals a formal relationship between incentives and detection, much like that between prices and quantities
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Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: An axiomatic approach J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-24 Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
We address the problem of clearing mutual obligations among agents when a financial network collapses. To do so, we adopt an axiomatic approach and provide the first comprehensive characterization of the rules based on the principle of proportionality, covering the entire domain of financial systems. While a previous attempt by Csóka and Herings (2021) tackled this issue in a context where agents have
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Bank bailouts: Moral hazard and commitment J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Khai Zhi Sim
This paper investigates moral hazard from bank bailouts and its welfare implications. The traditional channel of moral hazard in existing literature arises from banks offering excessively attractive deposit contracts that lead to inefficiently large bailouts when there is a run. This paper introduces a new, second channel of moral hazard: bailouts discourage banks from offering deposit contracts that
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Strategic disclosure with reputational concerns J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Wenhao Zhang
I study a strategic disclosure model wherein an uninformed decision-maker (DM) consults an expert of uncertain types regarding the state before acting. The expert may be an honest type, who is committed to reporting the truth; or a strategic type, whose payoff increases in the DM’s action independent of the state and, thus, strategically discloses information to facilitate his agenda while also valuing
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Bubble economics J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Tomohiro Hirano, Alexis Akira Toda
This article provides a self-contained overview of the theory of rational asset price bubbles. We cover topics from basic definitions, properties, and classical results to frontier research, with an emphasis on bubbles attached to real assets such as stocks, housing, and land. The main message is that bubbles attached to real assets are fundamentally nonstationary phenomena related to unbalanced growth
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An equilibrium model of city with atmospheric pollution dispersion J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Mohamed Bahlali, Quentin Petit
We propose a spatial model of city coupling a labour market, a residential market, and air pollution resulting from commuter traffic. The city can be of any shape. Agents choose where to work and live in order to maximize their utility, by consuming goods, residential surface and by valuing air quality. Pollution dispersion is described by an advection–diffusion equation. We prove existence of equilibria
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Stabilization policy and lags J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-15 Olivier Loisel
Macroeconomic stabilization policy is notoriously subject to inside lags (which delay the reaction of policy to the state of the economy) and outside lags (which delay the effects of policy on the economy). In a broad class of dynamic rational-expectations models, I show that neither inside lags nor outside lags of any length restrict the ability of the policymaker to ensure local-equilibrium determinacy
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On the fragility of the basis on the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation in economic dynamics J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Yuhki Hosoya
In this paper, we provide an example of the optimal growth model in which there exist infinitely many solutions to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation but the value function does not satisfy this equation. We consider the cause of this phenomenon, and find that the lack of a solution to the original problem is crucial. We show that under several conditions, there exists a solution to the original
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Stability and mean growth rate of stochastic Solow model driven by jump–diffusion process J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Zhong-Wei Liao, Jinghai Shao
This work focuses on the stability and mean growth rate of stochastic Solow growth model. The uncertainty in our model is generated by the technology part, which includes fluctuations on the technological accumulation and jump growth from new inventions and ideas. We introduce the criteria of stability, including stochastic stability and exponential stability, and the sufficient condition for the existence
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Mixture independence foundations for expected utility J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2024-01-10 Jingyi Meng, Craig S. Webb, Horst Zank
An alternative preference foundation for expected utility is provided. Our segregated approach considers four logically independent implications of the classic von Neumann–Morgenstern independence axiom. The monotonicity principle is, for a transitive relation, equivalent to monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Rank-dependent separability is similar to the comonotonic sure-thing
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Discounted dynamic optimization and Bregman divergence J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-27 Gerhard Sorger
We define the concept of Bregman continuity and show that a function is an optimal policy function of a discounted dynamic optimization problem if and only if it is Bregman continuous.
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Anchored belief updating from recommendations J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-21 Hyoeun Park, Jason Paulo Tayawa
We study a belief updating behavior in a framework where information is presented as a recommendation from a menu of actions. We introduce a property on belief updating called order independence of recommendations, which is analogous to the Bayes’ Rule property of path independence of signals. We show that order independence and the properties that characterize the contraction rule of Ke et al. (2021)
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On reaching social consent J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Wonki Jo Cho, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
We explore the process of reaching social consent by means of a model of group identification, in which we seek to relatively evaluate agents’ opinions on who belongs to a given group. Our main concerns are captured by two new axioms in this setting, dubbed separability and individual monotonicity. In the dichotomous setting, we show that the two axioms, combined with symmetry, characterize the family
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On concave functions over lotteries J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-21 Roberto Corrao, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
This note discusses functions over lotteries that are concave and continuous, but are not necessarily superdifferentiable. Earlier work claims that concave continuous utility for lotteries that satisfy best-outcome independence can be written as the minimum of affine functions. We give a counter-example that cannot be written as the minimum of affine functions, because there is no tangent hyperplane
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Habits and demand changes after COVID-19 J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-12-02 Mauro Bambi, Daria Ghilli, Fausto Gozzi, Marta Leocata
In this paper, we investigate how a transitory lockdown of a sector of the economy may have changed our habits and, therefore, altered the goods’ demand permanently. In a two-sector infinite horizon economy, we show that the demand of the goods produced by the sector closed during the lockdown could shrink or expand with respect to their pre-pandemic level depending on the lockdown’s duration and the
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Optimal consumption for recursive preferences with local substitution — the case of certainty J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Hanwu Li, Frank Riedel, Shuzhen Yang
We characterize optimal consumption policies in a recursive intertemporal utility framework with local substitution. We establish existence, uniqueness, and a version of the Kuhn–Tucker theorem. The structure of optimal consumption plans is described explicitly for a large class of aggregators. For Epstein-Zin preferences, the solution coincides with the solution of the corresponding time-additive
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Null players, outside options, and stability: The conditional Shapley value J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-27 André Casajus, Pierfrancesco La Mura
We suggest a new component efficient solution for monotonic TU games with a coalition structure, the conditional Shapley value. In contrast to other such solutions, it satisfies the null player property. Nevertheless, it accounts for the players’ outside options in productive components of coalition structures. For all monotonic games, there exist coalition structures that are stable under the conditional
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Asset bubble and growth: Elastic labor supply with fiscal policy J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-23 Kathia Bahloul Zekkari
This paper examines the interaction between asset bubbles and endogenous growth. Using an overlapping generations model with elastic labor supply and fiscal policy, we demonstrate that the inefficiency of the equilibrium without bubble, in conjunction with specific fiscal policy criteria, guarantees the existence of a bubble. This inefficiency is due to the sub-optimality of labor supply. Furthermore
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A menu dependent Luce model with a numeraire J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-14 John Rehbeck
This paper proposes and characterizes a simple extension to the Luce rule when the value of each alternative can be enhanced or diminished by a non-negative menu dependent parameter that can be thought of as a measure of menu complexity. The characterization follows from two properties that hinge on the default option: monotone consistency and strong independent log-odds. We make no restriction on
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Stable and weakly additive cost sharing in shortest path problems J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-17 Eric Bahel, María Gómez-Rúa, Juan Vidal-Puga
In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Previous works have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges each demander
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Cost allocation in energy distribution networks J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-09 David Lowing
This paper presents a cost allocation problem arising from energy distribution and proposes cost allocation rules that depend on the distribution network and consumer demands. To determine relevant rules, we adopt a normative approach and compare two principles: (i) the connection principle and (ii) the uniformity principle. The Connection rule is proposed in accordance with (i), while the Uniform
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Cautious belief and iterated admissibility J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-10 Emiliano Catonini, Nicodemo De Vito
We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. We show that iterated admissibility characterizes the behavioral implications of “cautious rationality and common cautious belief in cautious rationality” in a terminal lexicographic type structure. For arbitrary type structures, the behavioral implications of these epistemic
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Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-04 Stefano Barbieri, Iryna Topolyan
We explore public randomization (Harris et al., 1995) in group contests and introduce group public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We consider group all-pay auctions with weakest-link and best-shot impact functions. While best-shot contests without public randomization are known for their multiplicity of equilibria, introducing public randomization results in a unique GPRE in which only one of the
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On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-11-04 Chinmay Ingalagavi, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
We consider the problem of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives based on the preferences of voters, modelled as Social Choice Correspondences (SCCs) in the literature. We focus on two domain restrictions inspired by Barberà et al. (2001) in the context of single-peaked utility functions. We find that for the narrower domain, the set of tops-only, unanimous, and strategy-proof
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An α-MaxMin utility representation for close and distant future preferences with temporal biases J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-31 Jean-Pierre Drugeon, Thai Ha-Huy
This paper provides a framework for understanding preferences over utility streams across different time periods. We analyze preferences for the close future, for the distant future, and a synthesis of both, establishing a representation involving weights over time periods. Examining scenarios where two utility streams cannot be robustly compared to each other, we introduce notions in which one has
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The Sure-Thing Principle J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-31 Jean Baccelli, Lorenz Hartmann
The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing
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Context-sensitive rationality: Choice by salience J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-30 Alfio Giarlotta, Angelo Petralia, Stephen Watson
We describe a context-sensitive approach to individual choice, in which the explanation is provided by a family of linear orders indexed by all available items. Selection from a menu is then recovered by the classical maximization paradigm, subject to the constraint that the justifying rationale must be indexed by an item of the menu. This approach allows us to pursue two complementary goals: (1) a
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A multidimensional, nonconvex model of optimal growth J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-31 Stefano Bosi, Thai Ha-Huy
In this article, we consider a multidimensional economy where the standard supermodularity property fails. We generalize the notion of net gain of investment, introduced by Kamihigashi and Roy (2007) and applied to one-sector growth models, to the case of multiple capital stocks. We prove the convergence to the set of steady states without relying on the monotonicity of optimal path. Our approach differs
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Two-stage elimination games J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-29 Aner Sela
We study two-stage elimination games with four heterogeneous players. In the first stage, the players are allocated into two contests, each of which includes two players competing against each other in an all-pay auction. The winners of the two contests then interact with each other in the second stage. The outcomes of the interaction in the second stage are given by a general form of the players’
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The general equilibrium effects of localised technological progress: A Classical approach J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-13 Naoki Yoshihara, Roberto Veneziani
We study the general equilibrium effects of localised technical progress à la Atkinson–Stiglitz in economies in which capital is a vector of reproducible and heterogeneous goods. We show that there is no obvious relation between ex-ante profitable innovations and the functional distribution of income that actually emerges in equilibrium. Unlike in the standard macroeconomic approach to technical progress
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Symmetric mechanism design: Comment J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-12 Bo Chen, Dmitriy Knyazev
In an earlier paper published in this journal, Azrieli and Jain (2018) claim that a social choice function (SCF) is symmetrically implementable in a dominant strategy equilibrium only if the SCF is symmetric. This result crucially relies on their notion of dominant strategy, which is used in the game theory literature and is stronger than the one traditionally used in the mechanism design literature
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A dual approach to agency problems J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Chang Koo Chi, Kyoung Jin Choi
This paper presents a dual approach to the standard model of moral hazard. We formulate the dual of the principal–agent problem under the assumption that the incentive constraint can be replaced by a local constraint (the first-order approach), to examine whether the relaxed agency problem yields a candidate solution. The dual formulation generates a convex conjugate, which transforms the agent’s utility
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Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 Umut Dur, Yanning Zhang
We study the allocation of homogeneous positions under affirmative action policies where some positions are reserved for underrepresented groups on a “minimum guarantee” basis. Each individual has a merit-based score and may be eligible for multiple reserves. When an individual counts towards each of the reserves that she is eligible for upon admission, we propose a choice function that satisfies three
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Robust incentives for risk J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-10-01 Maxwell Rosenthal
This paper studies a moral hazard problem wherein the principal is uncertain about the agent’s risk preferences and production technology. The principal, desiring robustness, evaluates contracts according to their worst case payoff against the set of preferences and technologies that satisfy her assumptions about the agent and his capabilities. We show that contracts which exhibit robustness to severe
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Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-29 Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa
Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem deals with the impossibility for agents to acknowledge their distinct posterior beliefs. We consider agreeing to disagree in an extended framework with lexicographic probability systems. A weak agreement theorem in the sense of identical posteriors only at the first lexicographic level obtains. Somewhat surprisingly, a possibility result does emerge for the deeper
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An axiomatic approach to default risk and model uncertainty in rating systems J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-16 Max Nendel, Jan Streicher
In this paper, we deal with an axiomatic approach to default risk. We introduce the notion of a default risk measure, which generalizes the classical probability of default (PD), and allows to incorporate model risk in various forms. We discuss different properties and representations of default risk measures via monetary risk measures, families of related tail risk measures, and Choquet capacities
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Rationalization of indecisive choice behavior by pluralist ballots J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-12 José Carlos R. Alcantud, Domenico Cantone, Alfio Giarlotta, Stephen Watson
We describe a bounded rationality approach for indecisive choice behavior, in which all, some or none of the items in a menu may be selected. Choice behavior is s-pluralist if there is a population of voters – encoded by arbitrary binary relations – such an item is selected from a menu if and only if it is endorsed by a share of voters larger than s. We prove that all forms of pluralism are equivalent
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Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-09-07 Egor Starkov
This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria with payoff-relevant signaling can exist without requiring unreasonable off-path beliefs. The paper provides a sharp characterization of possible separating equilibria: all signaling must take place through attrition, when
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Common assumption of rationality J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-25 H. Jerome Keisler, Byung Soo Lee
We build on the work of Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler (2008, BFK) by showing that rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) is possible in complete lexicographic type structures and characterizes iterated admissibility—i.e., iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Our result is unexpected in light of BFK’s result proving the impossibility of RCAR in continuous complete
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On rational choice from lists of sets J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-20 Gleb Koshevoy, Ernesto Savaglio
We analyze the rationality of a Decision Maker (DM) who chooses from lists of sets of alternatives. We propose and study four general classes of choice mechanism, representing the DM’s choice-behavior, and a new axiom, that we call No-Regret (NR). We show that the NR axiom, suggesting that alternatives disregarded as of no interest for the DM be ignored, is a rationality axiom that encompasses some
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Equilibrium selection under changes in endowments: A geometric approach J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-19 Andrea Loi, Stefano Matta, Daria Uccheddu
In this paper we propose a geometric approach to the selection of the equilibrium price. After a perturbation of the parameters, the new price is selected thorough the composition of two maps: the projection on the linearization of the equilibrium manifold, a method that underlies econometric modeling, and the exponential map, that associates a tangent vector with a geodesic on the manifold. As a corollary
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Allocating the surplus induced by cooperation in distribution chains with multiple suppliers and retailers J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-19 Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca, Justo Puerto
The coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control plays an important role in improving the profits of retailers and suppliers in the supply chain. We focus on supply chains under decentralized control in which noncompeting retailers can order from multiple suppliers to replenish their stocks. The goal of the firms in the chain is to maximize their
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Stable and meta-stable contract networks J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-18 Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander V. Karzanov
This paper studies a multilateral matching market in which each participant can sign contracts with any other agents. This market subsumes the two-sided matching and the roommate problem as special cases. We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices i∈I are interpreted as agents, and the edges c∈C as contracts that can be concluded between agents
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On the continuity of outcomes in a monopoly market J. Math. Econ. (IF 1.3) Pub Date : 2023-08-09 Kai Hao Yang
A monopolist with a constant marginal cost faces an arbitrary nondecreasing and upper-semicontinuous demand function on R+ that takes a value in {0,1} outside of a fixed compact interval. This paper derives topological properties of outcomes induced by this monopolist’s optimal pricing problem. Specifically, the monopolist’s optimal profit is continuous in the marginal cost and the demand (under the