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  • Internal habits formation and optimality
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-16
    Mauro Bambi; Fausto Gozzi

    In a very influential model with internal habits, Carroll et al., (2017, 2000), establish that an increase in economic growth may cause a positive change in savings. The optimality of this result, and of many other contributions using a similar framework, has been questioned by some authors who have observed that the parametrization used in these models always implies a utility function not jointly

  • Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-23
    Yuji Fujinaka; Toshiji Miyakawa

    This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness

  • A simple characterisation for sustained growth
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    Thai Ha-Huy; Nhat Thien Tran

    This article considers an inter-temporal optimisation problem in a general form and gives conditions ensuring the convergence to infinity of the economy. These conditions can be easily verified and applied for a large class of problems in the literature. Some applications for different economies are given as illustrative examples.

  • Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    Xin Feng

    In this paper, we study how to disclose the precision of the winner selection mechanism (i.e., the contest success function) that determines how effective a player’s effort is in determining his/her winning probability. Specifically, we focus on the disclosure of the adopted discriminatory power r of the Tullock contest. The discriminatory power r is exogenously given, and the contest organizer knows

  • Randomly evolving tastes and delayed commitment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    R. Vijay Krishna; Philipp Sadowski

    We consider a decision maker with randomly evolving tastes who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, such as those in consumption savings problems. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice that features uncertain consumption utilities, which evolve according to a subjective Markov process. The parameters of the representation, which are the subjective Markov

  • Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-30
    James C.D. Fisher

    In classic matching markets, individuals choose their partners and each pair chooses a contract from a finite set of feasible contracts; the existence of stable allocations then follows from the (generalized) Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We consider an extension where the contract set is a compact subset of a topological vector space (e.g., Rk or ℂ[0,1]) and give a simple topological argument, which

  • Behavioral equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in asset markets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-24
    Igor Evstigneev; Thorsten Hens; Valeriya Potapova; Klaus R. Schenk-Hoppé

    This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic feature is that it relies only on objectively observable market data and does not use hidden individual agents’

  • Allocation inequality in cost sharing problem
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-22
    Zhi Chen; Zhenyu Hu; Qinshen Tang

    This paper considers the problem of cost sharing, in which a coalition of agents, each endowed with an input, shares the output cost incurred from the total inputs of the coalition. Two allocations—average cost pricing and the Shapley value—are arguably the two most widely studied solution concepts to this problem. It is well known in the literature that the two allocations can be respectively characterized

  • Inequality and catching-up under decreasing marginal impatience
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-17
    Kazumichi Iwasa; Laixun Zhao

    This paper examines how endogenous time preference interacts with inequalities in economic development. We consider two distinct groups of households with intrinsic inequality (e.g., capitalists and workers), and show that (i) under decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), an unequal society may be preferable for poor households than an egalitarian one in which every household owns an equal share of asset;

  • General existence of competitive equilibrium in the growth model with an endogenous labor–leisure choice
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-16
    Aditya Goenka; Manh-Hung Nguyen

    We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in the canonical optimal growth model with elastic labor supply under general conditions. In this model, strong conditions to rule out corner solutions are often not well justified. We show using a separation argument that there exist Lagrange multipliers that can be viewed as a system of competitive prices. Neither Inada conditions, nor strict concavity

  • Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-11
    Maria Gabriella Graziano; Marialaura Pesce; Niccolò Urbinati

    We introduce new notions of bargaining set for mixed economies which rest on the idea of generalized coalitions (Aubin, 1979) to define objections and counter-objections. We show that the bargaining set defined through generalized coalitions coincides with competitive allocations under assumptions which are weak and natural in the mixed market literature. As a further result, we identify some additional

  • Market selection with an endogenous state
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-09
    Thomas W.L. Norman

    This paper explores market selection in general equilibrium when the state of the economy is endogenous. Analysis of consumer survival in this case requires solution of the model’s dynamics, for which evolutionary game theory can be useful; for instance, if the state and beliefs are Markovian and utility logarithmic, then the dynamics of consumption shares are described by the replicator dynamics.

  • Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-06
    Junichi Fujimoto; Junsang Lee

    This paper examines optimal lending contracts between a single not-for-profit lender and a continuum of risk-averse borrowers, where the lending relationships are continually created and destroyed. The lender self-finances its costs via income from loans, while borrowers can walk away from the current relationship in any period and search for a new relationship. We characterize the optimal allocation

  • Matching with externalities: The role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-12
    Milton dos Santos Braitt; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

    In matching problems with externalities, prudence measures the importance an agent gives to others’ potential reactions when she considers deviating and social connectedness measures others’ capacity to react to the agent’s deviation. Assuming that externalities and preferences are random, the roles of prudence and social connectedness are studied. It is shown that asymptotic stability—a property that

  • The weak α-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-05
    Zhe Yang

    In this paper, we introduce the notion of the weak α-core for exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities, and establish the nonemptiness theorem of the weak α-core.

  • Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-26
    M.J. Albizuri, B.J. Dietzenbacher, J.M. Zarzuelo

    This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly

  • Stopping with congestion and private payoffs
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-19
    Caroline Thomas

    This paper analyses a two-player stopping game with multiarmed bandits in which each player chooses between learning about the quality of her private risky arm and competing for the use of a single shared safe arm. The qualities of the players’ risky arms are independent. A player whose risky arm produces a success no longer competes for the safe arm. We assume that a player observes her opponent’s

  • Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-13
    Madhav Raghavan

    A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two

  • Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-06
    Kyung Hwan Baik; Hanjoon Michael Jung

    We study contests in which there are multiple alternative public-good/bad prizes, and the players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which prize to have awarded to them. Each prize may be a public good for some players and a public bad for the others, and the players expend their effort simultaneously and independently. We first prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of

  • Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-06
    David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor

    We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side of the market, and worsened outcomes for the agents on the same side of the market. Our argument draws upon recently developed methods

  • Distorted stochastic dominance: A generalized family of stochastic orders
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-28
    Tommaso Lando, Lucio Bertoli-Barsotti

    We study a generalized family of stochastic orders, semiparametrized by a distortion function H, namely H-distorted stochastic dominance, which may determine a continuum of dominance relations from the first- to the second-order stochastic dominance (and beyond). Such a family is especially suitable for representing a decision maker’s preferences in terms of risk aversion and may be used in those situations

  • New Results for additive and multiplicative risk apportionment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-25
    Henri Loubergé, Yannick Malevergne, Béatrice Rey

    We provide new characterizations of the preference for additive and multiplicative risk apportionment when risk ordering relies on stochastic dominance. We then point out a simple property of risk apportionment with additive risks: Quite generally, an observed preference for additive risk apportionment in a specific risk environment is preserved when the decision-maker is confronted to other risk situations

  • A new approach to the existence and regularity of linear equilibrium in a noisy rational expectations economy
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-24
    Youcheng Lou, Shouyang Wang

    This paper gives a new approach to show the existence and regularity of linear equilibrium established by Lou ⓡ al. (2019) for a noisy rational expectations economy. Different from the existing method which essentially requires to find a fixed point of a system of nonlinear algebraic equations, the new approach is operated directly on an alternative form of market-clearing conditions. One main advantage

  • On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-23
    Tibor Heumann

    We study sender–receiver games in which a privately informed sender sends a message to N receivers, who then take an action. The sender’s type space T has finite cardinality (i.e., |T|<∞). We show that every equilibrium payoff vector (resp. every Pareto efficient equilibrium payoff vector) is achieved by an equilibrium in which the sender sends at most |T|+N (resp. |T|+N−1) messages with positive probability

  • Nonrecursive separation of risk and time preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-16
    Matthias Albrecht Fahrenwaldt, Ninna Reitzel Jensen, Mogens Steffensen

    Recursive utility disentangles preferences with respect to time and risk by recursively building up a value function of local increments. This involves certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Instead we disentangle preferences with respect to time and risk by building up a value function as a non-linear aggregation of certainty equivalents of direct utility of consumption. This entails time-consistency

  • Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-23
    Andrew Caplin, John Leahy

    This paper builds upon Caplin and Leahy (2014), which introduced a new mathematical apparatus for understanding allocation markets with nontransferable utility, as such covering the housing market and other markets for large indivisible goods. In the current paper we complete the study of comparative statics initiated therein. We introduce homotopy methods to characterize how equilibrium changes in

  • Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-16
    Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating teams. We introduce axioms formalizing alternative ways of allocating the extra revenue obtained from additional viewers. We show that, combined with some other standard axioms, they provide axiomatic characterizations of three focal rules for this problem: the uniform rule, the equal-split rule and

  • Multidimensional inequality and inframodular order
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-14
    Zaier Aouani, Alain Chateauneuf

    Motivated by the pertinence of Pigou–Dalton (PD) transfers for inequality measurement when only one attribute is involved, we show that inframodular functions are consistent with multidimensional PD transfers and that weakly inframodular functions fit more accurately with the traditional notion of PD transfers. We emphasize, for inequality rankings of allocations of multiple attributes in a population

  • Exact parametric restrictions for 3-cycles in the RSS model: A complete and comprehensive characterization
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-09
    Liuchun Deng, M. Ali Khan, Tapan Mitra

    This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for 3-period cycles in the two-sector Robinson–Solow–Srinivasan (RSS) model, taking as its point of departure an independently-(and simultaneously-) discovered exact discount-factor restriction for a general class of growth models by Mitra and Nishimura–Yano (MNY) in 1996. Our investigation of this remarkable result in the specificity of the RSS

  • Recoverability revisited
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-05
    Yuhki Hosoya

    This study considers the uniqueness problem of the preference relation corresponding to a demand function, which is called the “recoverability problem”. We show that if a demand function has sufficiently wide range and is income-Lipschitzian, then there exists a unique corresponding upper semi-continuous preference relation. Moreover, we explicitly construct a utility function that represents this

  • On the existence of the ex post symmetric random entry model
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-04
    Ju Hu

    This paper studies symmetry among countably infinitely many agents who randomly enter into a stochastic process, one for each period. Upon entry, they observe only the current period signal and try to draw inference about the underlying state governing the stochastic process. We show that there exist random entry models under which agents are ex post symmetric. That is, all agents have identical posterior

  • Equilibria in a large production economy with an infinite dimensional commodity space and price dependent preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-02
    Hyo Seok Jang, Sangjik Lee

    We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and apply recent results for an infinite dimensional separable Banach space such as Lyapunov’s convexity theorem and an exact Fatou’s lemma to obtain the result.

  • Convergence in games with continua of equilibria
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-27
    Sebastian Bervoets, Mathieu Faure

    In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful

  • Randomization under ambiguity: Efficiency and incentive compatibility
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-20
    Zhiwei Liu, Xinxi Song, Nicholas C. Yannelis

    We generalize de Castro and Yannelis (2018) by taking into account the use of randomization. We answer the following questions: Is each efficient allocation of de Castro and Yannelis (2018) still Pareto optimal? Are all efficient allocations still incentive compatible under the Wald’s maxmin preferences? We provide positive answers and give applications.

  • Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-19
    Özgün Ekici

    We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for “indivisible objects”) are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially unowned; k agents initially do not own houses; the remaining n−k agents (the so-called “existing tenants”) initially own the remaining n−k houses (each owns one). In this setting

  • Two definitions of correlated equilibrium
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-18
    Christian W. Bach, Andrés Perea

    Correlated equilibrium constitutes one of the basic solution concepts for static games with complete information. Actually two variants of correlated equilibrium are in circulation and have been used interchangeably in the literature. Besides the original notion due to Aumann (1974), there exists a simplified definition typically called canonical correlated equilibrium or correlated equilibrium distribution

  • Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-12
    Fatma Aslan, Jean Lainé

    We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley–Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence

  • Can harmful events be another source of environmental traps?
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-05-11
    Can Askan Mavi

    This paper aims to present a new explanation for environmental traps through the presence of endogenous hazard rate. We show that adaptation and mitigation policies affect the occurrence of environmental traps differently. The former could cause environmental traps, whereas the latter could help society avoid such traps by decreasing the probability of a harmful event occurring. As a result, we present

  • An improved bound for the Shapley–Folkman theorem
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-30
    Eric Budish, Philip J. Reny

    We provide an up to 30% improvement in the Shapley–Folkman theorem error-bound, and briefly discuss its consequences for the course allocation problem.

  • Probabilistic sophistication without completeness
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-22
    Edi Karni

    This is a study of probabilistically sophisticated choice behavior when the preference relation is incomplete. Invoking the analytical framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and building on the work of Machina and Schmeidler (1995), the paper provides an axiomatic characterization of the general multi-prior multi-utility probabilistically sophisticated representation. In addition, the paper examines

  • Influence in private-goods allocation
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-22
    Madhav Raghavan

    We reinterpret the ‘bossiness’ of a private-goods allocation rule (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) as the ability of an agent to ‘influence’ another’s welfare with no change to her own welfare. In applications where non-bossiness is not possible, we propose simple conditions on (1) which agents may have influence (acyclicity and preservation), and (2) the welfare consequences of influence (positivity

  • Resource-envy-free and efficient allocations: A new solution for production economies with dedicated factors
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-17
    Laurence Kranich

    I consider the problem of determining an equitable and efficient allocation of resources in production economies with factors which must be dedicated to production and cannot be consumed directly. First, I show that in such economies envy-free and efficient allocations exist under standard assumptions. However, I argue this notion of fairness is unsuitable for the present context. I then introduce

  • Closure and preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-11
    Christopher P. Chambers, Alan D. Miller, M. Bumin Yenmez

    We investigate the results of Kreps (1979), dropping his completeness axiom. As an added generalization, we work on arbitrary lattices, rather than a lattice of sets. We show that one of the properties of Kreps is intimately tied with representation via a closure operator. That is, a preference satisfies Kreps’ axiom (and a few other mild conditions) if and only if there is a closure operator on the

  • Cooperative game with nondeterministic returns
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-09
    Jian Yang, Jianbin Li

    We study a non-traditional cooperative game where returns from coalitions are nondeterministic. The long-standing concept of core can be generalized to reflect players’ contentment with their allocations. It is now imperative to formalize the restrictions, such as those pertaining to information, on allocations. The latter are also at times more conducive to fractional representations. With probabilistic

  • Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-09
    Daniel Lehmann

    This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality (r,s), 0≤r,s, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers r and s. The quality (r,s) measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger r and s the closer the fit. For r,s≤1 this notion provides a graceful degradation for the

  • Intensity of preferences for bivariate risk apportionment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-09
    David Crainich, Louis Eeckhoudt, Olivier Le Courtois

    Bivariate risk apportionment is the preference for dispersing risks associated with two aspects of individuals’ well-being into different states of the world. In this paper, we propose an intensity measure of this preference by extending to the bivariate case the concept of marginal rate of substitution between risks of different orders introduced in the univariate case by Liu and Meyer (2013). We

  • Non-Archimedean preferences over countable lotteries
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-09
    Jeffrey Sanford Russell

    We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces.

  • Constrained inefficiency of competitive entrepreneurship
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-02
    Sakai Ando, Misaki Matsumura

    We study the constrained efficiency of a competitive entrepreneurship model that features the occupation choice between entrepreneurs and workers. It is shown that, even when (1) the only friction is uninsurable entrepreneurial risks and (2) agents are risk-averse, the competitive market can generate too many entrepreneurs. We present a sufficient statistic that determines the constrained inefficiency

  • Subjective expected utility with imperfect perception
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-02
    Marcus Pivato, Vassili Vergopoulos

    In many decisions under uncertainty, there are constraints on both the available information and the feasible actions. The agent can only make certain observations of the state space, and she cannot make them with perfect accuracy—she has imperfect perception. Likewise, she can only perform acts that transform states continuously into outcomes, and perhaps satisfy other regularity conditions. To incorporate

  • Financial risk taking in the presence of correlated non-financial background risk
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-04-02
    W. Henry Chiu

    This paper characterizes the stochastic deterioration resulting from taking a zero-mean financial risk in the presence of correlated non-financial background risk. We show in particular that it has an equivalent stochastic order as well as a necessary and sufficient “integral condition” that implies and is implied by a particular sense in which the stochastic deterioration can be decomposed into a

  • No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-26
    Duygu Yengin, Youngsub Chun

    Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we characterize interesting subfamilies of the VCG mechanisms by investigating the implications of either no-envy or solidarity requirements. First, we present a characterization of the strategy-proofand envy-freemechanisms. Next, we present

  • Existence of solutions to principal–agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-21
    Guillaume Carlier, Kelvin Shuangjian Zhang

    We prove an existence result for the principal–agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider a more general coercivity condition which takes into account the principal’s cost and the agents’ preferences. Our existence proof is simple and flexible enough

  • Aggregate play and welfare in strategic interactions on networks
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-19
    Karan N. Chadha, Ankur A. Kulkarni

    In recent work by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further extended to include games with imperfect substitutability in Bramoullé et al. (2014). The vast multiplicity of equilibria in such games along with the dramatic changes

  • Weighted representative democracy
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-18
    Marcus Pivato, Arnold Soh

    We propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then

  • Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-05
    Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen

    In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.

  • A foundation for Pareto optimality
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-04
    Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins

    Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of fixed-agenda social choice theory, we present a characterization of the Pareto optimal social choice correspondence. We introduce a new independence condition, P-independence. When combined with three natural assumptions

  • Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-03-04
    Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña

    We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical, non-refundable cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our focus is on the case in which the threshold

  • Constrained no-regret learning
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-02-24
    Ye Du, Ehud Lehrer

    We investigate a dynamic decision making problem with constraints. The decision maker is free to take any action as long as the empirical frequency of the actions played does not violate pre-specified constraints. In a case of violation the decision maker is penalized. We introduce the constrained no-regret learning model. In this model the set of alternative strategies, with which a dynamic decision

  • Can everyone benefit from innovation?
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-02-19
    Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi

    This paper investigates whether there is an allocation rule for which innovation never hurts anyone. Existing studies provide possibility characterizations together with efficiency and a natural participation constraint, assuming the domain of one input good and one output good in which nobody prefers to consume more of the input good than what she has. We show that this possibility result does not

  • A simplified approach to subjective expected utility
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-02-13
    Lorenzo Stanca

    I provide a novel simplified approach to Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility. Such an approach is based on abstract integral representation theorems in the space of measurable functions. The advantage of such an approach is that these results can be used to easily obtain variations on Savage’s theorem, such as representations with state-dependent utility or probability measures that can

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