当前期刊: Journal of Mathematical Economics Go to current issue    加入关注    本刊投稿指南
显示样式:        排序: IF: - GO 导出
我的关注
我的收藏
您暂时未登录!
登录
  • On the closed-form solution of an endogenous growth model with anticipated consumption
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-21
    Manuel A. Gómez

    This paper derives a closed-form solution of the AK endogenous growth model with logarithmic preferences and anticipated future consumption which enters additively into effective consumption. We get an explicit representation of the time paths of the economic variables in level by resorting to Gaussian Hypergeometric functions. We compare the model with anticipated future consumption to the model with

    更新日期:2021-01-22
  • Determination of general equilibrium with incomplete markets and default penalties
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-10
    Yang Zhan; Chuangyin Dang

    This paper is concerned with the existence and computation of general equilibrium with incomplete asset markets and default. Due to the incompleteness of asset markets, the excess demand functions are typically not continuous at prices and delivery rates for which the assets have redundant nominal deliveries. This discontinuity results in a serious problem for the existence and computation of general

    更新日期:2021-01-19
  • On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-18
    Feng Zhu

    I analyze the optimal favoritism in a complete-information all-pay contest with two players, whose costs of effort are weakly convex. The contest designer could favor or harm some contestants using one of two instruments: head starts and handicaps. I find that any given player’s effort distribution is ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance according to how (ex post) symmetric the players

    更新日期:2021-01-19
  • Epidemics and macroeconomic outcomes: Social distancing intensity and duration
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-18
    Davide La Torre; Danilo Liuzzi; Simone Marsiglio

    We analyze the determination of the optimal intensity and duration of social distancing policy aiming to control the spread of an infectious disease in a simple macroeconomic-epidemiological model. In our setting the social planner wishes to minimize the social costs associated with the levels of disease prevalence and output lost due to social distancing, both during and at the end of epidemic management

    更新日期:2021-01-19
  • A new preference model that allows for narrow framing
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-16
    Jing Guo; Xue Dong He

    Narrow framing is the idea that, when considering a monetary risk, the individual evaluates it to some extent in isolation and separately from her other risks. Originally documented in experimental settings, narrow framing has been widely applied to explain real-world investor behavior. We show that a prominent mathematical model of narrow framing presented in Barberis and Huang (2009) has some drawbacks

    更新日期:2021-01-18
  • Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-09
    P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Arkadi Predtetchinski

    At each moment in time, an alternative from a finite set is selected by a stochastic process. Players observe the selected alternative and sequentially cast a yes or a no vote. If the set of players casting a yes vote is decisive for the selected alternative, it is accepted and the game ends. Otherwise the next period begins. We refer to this class of problems as stopping games. Collective choice games

    更新日期:2021-01-10
  • Learning versus habit formation: Optimal timing of lockdown for disease containment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-09
    Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Kalyan Chatterjee; Kaustav Das; Jaideep Roy

    We analyze a model where the government has to decide whether to impose a lockdown in a country to prevent the spread of a possibly virulent disease. If the government decides to impose a lockdown, it has to determine its intensity, timing and duration. We find that there are two competing effects that push the decision in opposite directions. An early lockdown is beneficial not only to slow down the

    更新日期:2021-01-10
  • Perseverance and suspense in tug-of-war
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-06
    Emin Karagözoğlu; Çağrı Sağlam; Agah R. Turan

    We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert

    更新日期:2021-01-06
  • Disentangling preferences and limited attention: Random-utility models with consideration sets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2021-01-04
    Peter Gibbard

    This paper presents a model of choice with limited attention. The decision-maker forms a consideration set, from which she chooses her most preferred alternative. Both preferences and consideration sets are stochastic. While we present axiomatisations for this model, our focus is on the following identification question: to what extent can an observer retrieve probabilities of preferences and consideration

    更新日期:2021-01-04
  • Competitive General Equilibrium with network externalities
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-29
    Augusto Nieto-Barthaburu

    We identify sufficient conditions for existence of competitive equilibrium with network externalities and indivisibilities. Such combination of externalities and indivisibilities is present in many goods and services with network effects, and it makes existence of equilibrium non-trivial. We provide an existence theorem in a model with a measure space of consumers. Key conditions for existence are

    更新日期:2020-12-29
  • A bargaining set for roommate problems
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-28
    Ata Atay; Ana Mauleon; Vincent Vannetelbosch

    Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibility of blocking pairs. We adopt the weak stability notion of Klijn and Massó (2003) for the marriage problem and we extend it to the roommate problem. We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept

    更新日期:2020-12-28
  • A weak α-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-19
    Zhe Yang; Xian Zhang

    Inspired by Kajii (1992) and Askoura (2011, 2017), we introduce the notion of the weak α-core for games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents. First, we extend the work of Kajii (1992) to games with spaces of strategies defined on Hausdorff topological vector spaces. Furthermore, we prove the nonemptiness of the weak α-core. Finally, we establish the relations between normal-form games

    更新日期:2020-12-20
  • Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-18
    André Casajus

    We provide a concise characterization of the class of positively weighted Shapley values by three properties, two standard properties, efficiency and marginality, and a relaxation of the balanced contributions property called the weak balanced contributions property. Balanced contributions: the amount one player gains or loses when another player leaves the game equals the amount the latter player

    更新日期:2020-12-18
  • Cardinal revealed preference: Disentangling transitivity and consistent binary choice
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    Victor H. Aguiar; Roberto Serrano

    We present a new notion of cardinal revealed preference that exploits the expenditure information in classical consumer theory environments with finite data. We propose a new behavioral axiom, Acyclic Enticement (AE), that requires the acyclicity of the cardinal revealed-preference relation. AE is logically independent from the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). We show that the Generalized

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • Social decision for a measure society
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    Youcef Askoura; Antoine Billot

    Preference aggregation is here investigated for a society defined as a measure space of individuals and called a measure society. Individual preferences are represented through continuous vnm utilities. It is shown that aggregating preferences in an utilitarian way for any kind of measure society is possible under adapted Pareto conditions.

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • Necessity of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion for the concavity of consumption functions
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    Alexis Akira Toda

    Carroll and Kimball (1996) have shown that, in the class of utility functions that are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and have nonnegative third derivatives, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) is sufficient for the concavity of consumption functions in general consumption-saving problems. This paper shows that HARA is necessary, implying the concavity of consumption is not a robust prediction

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • The growth effects of anticipated versus unanticipated population aging
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    A.O. Belyakov; A.N. Kurbatskiy; K. Prettner

    We analyze the effects of anticipated population aging within a general equilibrium R&D-based endogenous growth model with overlapping generations. In doing so we model aging as a rise of longevity and a simultaneous drop in fertility. In contrast to an unanticipated rise of longevity, consumers increase their savings and reduce their consumption long before the rise of longevity actually happens.

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • Preferences and information processing under vague information
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    Wojciech Olszewski

    The standard decision-theoretic model separates information and preferences. We argue that some behavioral phenomena in information processing (e.g., polarization) are closely related to this separation. We propose a model in which agents receive vague information, which they refine when they are required to make probabilistic judgements, or to take an action. By doing so, they also refine their beliefs

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • Verification results for age-structured models of economic-epidemics dynamics
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-17
    Giorgio Fabbri; Fausto Gozzi; Giovanni Zanco

    In this paper we propose a macro-dynamic age-structured set-up for the analysis of epidemics/economic dynamics in continuous time. The resulting optimal control problem is reformulated in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space framework where we perform the basic steps of dynamic programming approach. Our main result is a verification theorem which allows to guess the feedback form of optimal strategies

    更新日期:2020-12-17
  • Persuasion under costly learning
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-16
    Dong Wei

    A Sender (seller) tries to persuade a rationally inattentive Receiver (buyer) to take a particular action (e.g., buying). Learning is costly for the Receiver who can choose to process strictly less information than what the sender provides. In a binary-action binary-state model, we show that optimal disclosure involves information distortion, but to a lesser extent than the case without learning costs;

    更新日期:2020-12-16
  • A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-11
    Edward Honda

    We study a class of preferences that generalize substitutable ones and allows complementarities in a college admissions model. We show that a stable matching exists under this class of preferences by using an algorithm which we call the Conditional Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Furthermore, we show that the algorithm is strategy-proof for the student side if we assume in addition a law of aggregate

    更新日期:2020-12-11
  • Taming the spread of an epidemic by lockdown policies
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-08
    Salvatore Federico; Giorgio Ferrari

    We study the problem of a policymaker who aims at taming the spread of an epidemic while minimizing its associated social costs. The main feature of our model lies in the fact that the disease’s transmission rate is a diffusive stochastic process whose trend can be adjusted via costly confinement policies. We provide a complete theoretical analysis, as well as numerical experiments illustrating the

    更新日期:2020-12-08
  • Unawareness without AU Introspection
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-08
    Satoshi Fukuda

    This paper studies unawareness in terms of the lack of knowledge in a model that generalizes both a non-partitional standard-state-space model and a stationary generalized-state-space model. The resulting model may not necessarily satisfy AU Introspection: an agent, who is unaware of an event, is unaware of being unaware of it. Yet, the paper shows that such agent does not know whether she is unaware

    更新日期:2020-12-08
  • A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-21
    Michel Le Breton; Alexander Shapoval; Shlomo Weber

    In this paper we examine a game-theoretical generalization of the landscape theory introduced by Axelrod and Bennett (1993). In their two-bloc setting each player ranks the blocs on the basis of the sum of her individual evaluations of members of the group. We extend the Axelrod–Bennett setting by allowing an arbitrary number of blocs and expanding the set of possible deviations to include multi-country

    更新日期:2020-12-04
  • Endowment-regarding preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-12-02
    Van Quy Nguyen

    We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of

    更新日期:2020-12-02
  • The Borda class
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-19
    Zoi Terzopoulou; Ulle Endriss

    The Borda rule, originally defined on profiles of individual preferences modelled as linear orders over the set of alternatives, is one of the most important voting rules. But voting rules often need to be used on preferences of a different format as well, such as top-truncated orders, where agents rank just their most preferred alternatives. What is the right generalisation of the Borda rule to such

    更新日期:2020-12-01
  • Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-28
    Susumu Cato

    This paper examines the aggregation of preferences with a finitely additive measure space of agents. We consider three types of non-dictatorship axioms: non-dictatorship, coalitional non-dictatorship, and atomic non-dictatorship. First, we show that the existence of an atom is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a social welfare function that satisfies weak Pareto, independence

    更新日期:2020-12-01
  • Mixtures of mean-preserving contractions
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-27
    Joseph Whitmeyer; Mark Whitmeyer

    Given any purely atomic probability distribution with support on n points, P, any mean-preserving contraction (mpc) of P, Q, with support on m>n points is a mixture of mpcs of P, each with support on at most n points. We illustrate several applications of this result to Bayesian persuasion and information design.

    更新日期:2020-11-27
  • Shortlisting procedure with a limited capacity
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-25
    Sen Geng; Erkut Y. Özbay

    A decision maker, who is overwhelmed by the number of available alternatives, limits her consideration. We investigate a model where a decision maker’s capacity determines whether she is overwhelmed: She considers all the available alternatives if their number does not exceed her capacity; otherwise, she applies a shortlisting procedure to reduce the number of alternatives to within her capacity. We

    更新日期:2020-11-26
  • Optimally biased Tullock contests
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-28
    Shanglyu Deng; Qiang Fu; Zenan Wu

    This paper examines optimally biased Tullock contests. We consider a multi-player Tullock contest in which players differ in their prize valuations. The designer is allowed to impose identity-dependent treatments – i.e., multiplicative biases – to vary their relative competitiveness. The literature has been limited, because a closed-form solution to the equilibrium is in general unavailable when the

    更新日期:2020-11-22
  • Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: Characterizations
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-12
    Siwei Chen; Eun Jeong Heo

    In school choice problems, a list of restrictions have been imposed on priorities to achieve desirable properties of rules. However, it is difficult to verify these “acyclicity” conditions and identify the structure of the restricted priority profiles. To improve visibility and verifiability, we provide characterizations of these conditions. We also present the logical relations among the conditions

    更新日期:2020-11-22
  • School choice with priority-based affirmative action: A responsive solution
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-11-10
    Zhenhua Jiao; Ziyang Shen

    We propose a solution to the school choice problem with priority-based affirmative action. This solution is a special case of Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (henceforth, EADAM), specifically, we require that all minority students should give consent to priority waiving while none of the majority students consent. We formalize this solution as efficiency-adjusted deferred

    更新日期:2020-11-21
  • Internal habits formation and optimality
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-16
    Mauro Bambi; Fausto Gozzi

    In a very influential model with internal habits, Carroll et al., (2017, 2000), establish that an increase in economic growth may cause a positive change in savings. The optimality of this result, and of many other contributions using a similar framework, has been questioned by some authors who have observed that the parametrization used in these models always implies a utility function not jointly

    更新日期:2020-11-13
  • Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-26
    Rasoul Ramezanian; Mehdi Feizi

    We introduce a notion of efficiency, called Stepwise Ordinal Efficiency (SOE), and prove that it coincides with a fairness notion of interim favoring ranks, in the sense of Harless (2018). We also prove that SOE implies ordinal efficiency, while it is not compatible with rank efficiency. Then, we provide an impossibility result which states that no mechanism meets SOE, weak strategy-proof, and strong

    更新日期:2020-10-26
  • Arbitrage concepts under trading restrictions in discrete-time financial markets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-22
    Claudio Fontana; Wolfgang J. Runggaldier

    In a discrete-time setting, we study arbitrage concepts in the presence of convex trading constraints. We show that solvability of portfolio optimization problems is equivalent to absence of arbitrage of the first kind, a condition weaker than classical absence of arbitrage opportunities. We center our analysis on this characterization of market viability and derive versions of the fundamental theorems

    更新日期:2020-10-22
  • Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-23
    Yuji Fujinaka; Toshiji Miyakawa

    This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness

    更新日期:2020-10-16
  • A simple characterisation for sustained growth
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    Thai Ha-Huy; Nhat Thien Tran

    This article considers an inter-temporal optimisation problem in a general form and gives conditions ensuring the convergence to infinity of the economy. These conditions can be easily verified and applied for a large class of problems in the literature. Some applications for different economies are given as illustrative examples.

    更新日期:2020-10-13
  • Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    Xin Feng

    In this paper, we study how to disclose the precision of the winner selection mechanism (i.e., the contest success function) that determines how effective a player’s effort is in determining his/her winning probability. Specifically, we focus on the disclosure of the adopted discriminatory power r of the Tullock contest. The discriminatory power r is exogenously given, and the contest organizer knows

    更新日期:2020-10-13
  • Randomly evolving tastes and delayed commitment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-10-10
    R. Vijay Krishna; Philipp Sadowski

    We consider a decision maker with randomly evolving tastes who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, such as those in consumption savings problems. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice that features uncertain consumption utilities, which evolve according to a subjective Markov process. The parameters of the representation, which are the subjective Markov

    更新日期:2020-10-10
  • Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-30
    James C.D. Fisher

    In classic matching markets, individuals choose their partners and each pair chooses a contract from a finite set of feasible contracts; the existence of stable allocations then follows from the (generalized) Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We consider an extension where the contract set is a compact subset of a topological vector space (e.g., Rk or ℂ[0,1]) and give a simple topological argument, which

    更新日期:2020-10-08
  • Behavioral equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics in asset markets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-24
    Igor Evstigneev; Thorsten Hens; Valeriya Potapova; Klaus R. Schenk-Hoppé

    This paper analyzes a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of an asset market based on behavioral and evolutionary principles. The core of the model is a non-traditional game-theoretic framework combining elements of stochastic dynamic games and evolutionary game theory. Its key characteristic feature is that it relies only on objectively observable market data and does not use hidden individual agents’

    更新日期:2020-10-05
  • Allocation inequality in cost sharing problem
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-22
    Zhi Chen; Zhenyu Hu; Qinshen Tang

    This paper considers the problem of cost sharing, in which a coalition of agents, each endowed with an input, shares the output cost incurred from the total inputs of the coalition. Two allocations—average cost pricing and the Shapley value—are arguably the two most widely studied solution concepts to this problem. It is well known in the literature that the two allocations can be respectively characterized

    更新日期:2020-09-29
  • Inequality and catching-up under decreasing marginal impatience
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-17
    Kazumichi Iwasa; Laixun Zhao

    This paper examines how endogenous time preference interacts with inequalities in economic development. We consider two distinct groups of households with intrinsic inequality (e.g., capitalists and workers), and show that (i) under decreasing marginal impatience (DMI), an unequal society may be preferable for poor households than an egalitarian one in which every household owns an equal share of asset;

    更新日期:2020-09-23
  • General existence of competitive equilibrium in the growth model with an endogenous labor–leisure choice
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-16
    Aditya Goenka; Manh-Hung Nguyen

    We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in the canonical optimal growth model with elastic labor supply under general conditions. In this model, strong conditions to rule out corner solutions are often not well justified. We show using a separation argument that there exist Lagrange multipliers that can be viewed as a system of competitive prices. Neither Inada conditions, nor strict concavity

    更新日期:2020-09-20
  • Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-11
    Maria Gabriella Graziano; Marialaura Pesce; Niccolò Urbinati

    We introduce new notions of bargaining set for mixed economies which rest on the idea of generalized coalitions (Aubin, 1979) to define objections and counter-objections. We show that the bargaining set defined through generalized coalitions coincides with competitive allocations under assumptions which are weak and natural in the mixed market literature. As a further result, we identify some additional

    更新日期:2020-09-18
  • Market selection with an endogenous state
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-09
    Thomas W.L. Norman

    This paper explores market selection in general equilibrium when the state of the economy is endogenous. Analysis of consumer survival in this case requires solution of the model’s dynamics, for which evolutionary game theory can be useful; for instance, if the state and beliefs are Markovian and utility logarithmic, then the dynamics of consumption shares are described by the replicator dynamics.

    更新日期:2020-09-16
  • Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-06
    Junichi Fujimoto; Junsang Lee

    This paper examines optimal lending contracts between a single not-for-profit lender and a continuum of risk-averse borrowers, where the lending relationships are continually created and destroyed. The lender self-finances its costs via income from loans, while borrowers can walk away from the current relationship in any period and search for a new relationship. We characterize the optimal allocation

    更新日期:2020-09-16
  • Matching with externalities: The role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-12
    Milton dos Santos Braitt; Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

    In matching problems with externalities, prudence measures the importance an agent gives to others’ potential reactions when she considers deviating and social connectedness measures others’ capacity to react to the agent’s deviation. Assuming that externalities and preferences are random, the roles of prudence and social connectedness are studied. It is shown that asymptotic stability – a property

    更新日期:2020-09-12
  • The weak α-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-09-05
    Zhe Yang

    In this paper, we introduce the notion of the weak α-core for exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities, and establish the nonemptiness theorem of the weak α-core.

    更新日期:2020-09-05
  • Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-26
    M.J. Albizuri, B.J. Dietzenbacher, J.M. Zarzuelo

    This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly

    更新日期:2020-08-26
  • Stopping with congestion and private payoffs
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-19
    Caroline Thomas

    This paper analyses a two-player stopping game with multiarmed bandits in which each player chooses between learning about the quality of her private risky arm and competing for the use of a single shared safe arm. The qualities of the players’ risky arms are independent. A player whose risky arm produces a success no longer competes for the safe arm. We assume that a player observes her opponent’s

    更新日期:2020-08-19
  • Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-13
    Madhav Raghavan

    A house allocation rule should be flexible in its response to changes in agents’ preferences. We propose a specific notion of this flexibility. An agent is said to be swap-sovereign over a pair of houses at a profile of preferences if the rule assigns her one of the houses at that profile and assigns her the other house when she instead reports preferences that simply swap the positions of the two

    更新日期:2020-08-13
  • Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-06
    David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor

    We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side of the market, and worsened outcomes for the agents on the same side of the market. Our argument draws upon recently developed methods

    更新日期:2020-08-06
  • Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-08-06
    Kyung Hwan Baik; Hanjoon Michael Jung

    We study contests in which there are multiple alternative public-good/bad prizes, and the players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which prize to have awarded to them. Each prize may be a public good for some players and a public bad for the others, and the players expend their effort simultaneously and independently. We first prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of

    更新日期:2020-08-06
  • Distorted stochastic dominance: A generalized family of stochastic orders
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-28
    Tommaso Lando, Lucio Bertoli-Barsotti

    We study a generalized family of stochastic orders, semiparametrized by a distortion function H, namely H-distorted stochastic dominance, which may determine a continuum of dominance relations from the first- to the second-order stochastic dominance (and beyond). Such a family is especially suitable for representing a decision maker’s preferences in terms of risk aversion and may be used in those situations

    更新日期:2020-07-28
  • New Results for additive and multiplicative risk apportionment
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-25
    Henri Loubergé, Yannick Malevergne, Béatrice Rey

    We provide new characterizations of the preference for additive and multiplicative risk apportionment when risk ordering relies on stochastic dominance. We then point out a simple property of risk apportionment with additive risks: Quite generally, an observed preference for additive risk apportionment in a specific risk environment is preserved when the decision-maker is confronted to other risk situations

    更新日期:2020-07-25
  • A new approach to the existence and regularity of linear equilibrium in a noisy rational expectations economy
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-24
    Youcheng Lou, Shouyang Wang

    This paper gives a new approach to show the existence and regularity of linear equilibrium established by Lou ⓡ al. (2019) for a noisy rational expectations economy. Different from the existing method which essentially requires to find a fixed point of a system of nonlinear algebraic equations, the new approach is operated directly on an alternative form of market-clearing conditions. One main advantage

    更新日期:2020-07-24
  • On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-23
    Tibor Heumann

    We study sender–receiver games in which a privately informed sender sends a message to N receivers, who then take an action. The sender’s type space T has finite cardinality (i.e., |T|<∞). We show that every equilibrium payoff vector (resp. every Pareto efficient equilibrium payoff vector) is achieved by an equilibrium in which the sender sends at most |T|+N (resp. |T|+N−1) messages with positive probability

    更新日期:2020-07-23
  • Nonrecursive separation of risk and time preferences
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-07-16
    Matthias Albrecht Fahrenwaldt, Ninna Reitzel Jensen, Mogens Steffensen

    Recursive utility disentangles preferences with respect to time and risk by recursively building up a value function of local increments. This involves certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Instead we disentangle preferences with respect to time and risk by building up a value function as a non-linear aggregation of certainty equivalents of direct utility of consumption. This entails time-consistency

    更新日期:2020-07-16
  • Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods
    J. Math. Econ. (IF 0.746) Pub Date : 2020-06-23
    Andrew Caplin, John Leahy

    This paper builds upon Caplin and Leahy (2014), which introduced a new mathematical apparatus for understanding allocation markets with nontransferable utility, as such covering the housing market and other markets for large indivisible goods. In the current paper we complete the study of comparative statics initiated therein. We introduce homotopy methods to characterize how equilibrium changes in

    更新日期:2020-06-23
Contents have been reproduced by permission of the publishers.
导出
全部期刊列表>>
微生物研究
亚洲大洋洲地球科学
NPJ欢迎投稿
自然科研论文编辑
ERIS期刊投稿
欢迎阅读创刊号
自然职场,为您触达千万科研人才
spring&清华大学出版社
城市可持续发展前沿研究专辑
Springer 纳米技术权威期刊征稿
全球视野覆盖
施普林格·自然新
chemistry
物理学研究前沿热点精选期刊推荐
自然职位线上招聘会
欢迎报名注册2020量子在线大会
化学领域亟待解决的问题
材料学研究精选新
GIANT
ACS ES&T Engineering
ACS ES&T Water
屿渡论文,编辑服务
阿拉丁试剂right
上海中医药大学
浙江大学
西湖大学
化学所
北京大学
清华
隐藏1h前已浏览文章
课题组网站
新版X-MOL期刊搜索和高级搜索功能介绍
ACS材料视界
清华大学-1
武汉大学
浙江大学
天合科研
x-mol收录
试剂库存
down
wechat
bug