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Au introspection and symmetry under non-trivial unawareness Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Yoshihiko Tada
This note discusses the relationship between AU Introspection (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event, then she is unaware of that she is unaware of the event) and Symmetry (i.e., an agent is unaware of some event if and only if she is unaware of the complement set) for non-trivial unawareness (i.e., there is an event an agent is unaware of). without Negative Introspection using a set-theoretical
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Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Susheng Wang
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Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-02-24 Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez, Gonzalo Olcina, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
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The role of noise variance on effort in group contests Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Merve İntişah, Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı
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Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-02-14 William Thomson
In the context of classical exchange economies, we study four ways in which agents can strategically take advantage of allocation rules by affecting who participates and on what terms (Thomson in Soc Choice Welf 42:289–311, 2014). (1) An agent transfers their endowment to someone else and withdraws. The two of them may end up controlling resources that allow them to simultaneously reach higher welfare
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The co-determination decision game with consumption externalities Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-02-13 Luca Gori, Luciano Fanti
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Is social capital bridging or bonding? Evidence from a field experiment with association members Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-02-10 Giacomo Degli Antoni, Gianluca Grimalda
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False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-01-25
Abstract We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof
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Decomposition of interaction indices: alternative interpretations of cardinal–probabilistic interaction indices Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Sébastien Courtin, Rodrigue Tido Takeng , Frédéric Chantreuil
In cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index is an extension of the concept of one-point solution that takes into account interactions among players. In this paper, we focus on cardinal–probabilistic interaction indices that generalize the class of semivalues. We provide two types of decompositions. With the first one, a cardinal–probabilistic interaction index for a given coalition
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Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Minkyung Wang
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Suspicious minds and views of fairness Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-01-06 Øivind Schøyen
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Are risk attitude, impatience, and impulsivity related to the individual discount rate? Evidence from energy-efficient durable goods Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2024-01-02 Sébastien Foudi
Discounting is a manifestation of behavioral impulsivity, which is closely related to self-regulation processes. The decision-making process for intertemporal choices is governed by the inhibition of impulses, which can influence both risk and time-related attitudes. This paper utilizes self-reported measures of risk, impatience, and impulsivity attitudes to examine their impact on the implicit discount
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Decision-making under risk: when is utility-maximization equivalent to risk-minimization? Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-12-28 Francesco Ruscitti, Ram Sewak Dubey, Giorgio Laguzzi
Motivated by the analysis of a general optimal portfolio selection problem, which encompasses as special cases an optimal consumption and an optimal debt-arrangement problem, we are concerned with the questions of how a personality trait like risk-perception can be formalized and whether the two objectives of utility-maximization and risk-minimization can be both achieved simultaneously. We address
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Expected utility, independence, and continuity Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-12-26 Kemal Ozbek
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Quasi-separable preferences Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-12-26 Wei-zhi Qin, Hendrik Rommeswinkel
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Belief inducibility and informativeness Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-12-24 P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Dominik Karos, Toygar T. Kerman
We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated messages that are contingent on the true state of the world. Our focus lies on the beliefs of receivers induced via the signal chosen by the sender and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the inducible distributions of posterior beliefs. Classifying signals as minimal, individually
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Individual selection criteria for optimal team composition Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-12-23 Lu Hong, Scott E. Page
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Gender differences in temporal stability and decay in stability of trust Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Hamza Umer
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Independent postulates for subjective expected utility Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Mikko Harju, Juuso Liesiö, Kai Virtanen
Although the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory is more than 60 years old, it was recently discovered by Hartmann (Econometrica 88(1):203–205, 2020, https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17428) that one of the original seven postulates is redundant, i.e., it is implied by the other six postulates. In this brief communication, we show that this redundant axiom is the only one that is implied by the other
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Cost-(in)effective public good provision: an experimental exploration Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-10-20 Nathan W. Chan, Stephen Knowles, Ronald Peeters, Leonard Wolk
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Characterization of a k-th best element rationalizable choice function with full domain Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-10-20 Taposik Banerjee
The idea of confining the idea of ‘rationality’ with that of the ‘choice of best elements’ unnecessarily limits the sense and scope of ‘rationality’. The existing internal consistency conditions that are popularly used in the social choice theory to assess a choice function are insufficient to analyse several choice patterns. The paper tries to address that problem by accepting a broader definition
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Belief-independence and (robust) strategy-proofness Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-09-16 Michael Müller
An important appeal of strategy-proofness is the robustness that it implies. Under a strategy-proof voting rule, every individual has an optimal strategy independently of the behavior of all other voters, namely truth-telling. In particular, optimal play is robust with respect to the beliefs voters may have about the type and the behavior of the other voters. Following Blin and Satterthwaite (Economet
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Differential marginality, inessential games and convex combinations of values Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-09-12 Zeguang Cui, Erfang Shan, Wenrong Lyu
The principle of differential marginality (Casajus in Theory and Decis 71(2):163-–174) for cooperative games is a very appealing property that requires equal productivity differentials to translate into equal payoff differentials. In this paper we apply this property to axiomatic characterizations of values. We show that differential marginality implies additivity and symmetry under certain conditions
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Spillovers and strategic commitment in R&D Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-08-27 Huizhong Liu, Jingwen Tian
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Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-08-24 Walter Ferrarese, Antoni Rubí-Barceló
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of
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How sure are you? — the properties of self-reported conviction in the elicitation of health preferences with discrete choice experiments Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-08-01 Michał Jakubczyk, Michał Lewandowski
Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are often used to elicit preferences, for instance, in health preference research. However, DCEs only provide binary responses, whilst real-life choices are made with varying degrees of conviction. We aimed to verify whether eliciting self-reported convictions on a 0–100 scale adds meaningful information to the binary choice. Eighty three respondents stated their preferences
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Social influence in committee deliberation Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-07-21 Chaim Fershtman, Uzi Segal
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1-convex extensions of incomplete cooperative games and the average value Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-07-10 Jan Bok, Martin Černý
The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of this paper is 1-convexity under this framework. We are interested in two heavily intertwined questions. First, given an incomplete game, how can we fill in the missing
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Dynamic decision-making when ambiguity attitudes depend on exogenous events Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-28 Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva, Olivier Renault
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The value of information under ambiguity: a theoretical and experimental study on pest management in agriculture Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-20 Stéphane Couture, Stéphane Lemarié, Sabrina Teyssier, Pascal Toquebeuf
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Who accepts Savage’s axiom now? Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-20 Steven J. Humphrey, Nadia-Yasmine Kruse
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Multiattribute regret: theory and experimental study Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-16 Yoichiro Fujii, Hajime Murakami, Yutaka Nakamura, Kazuhisa Takemura
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Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-07 Vincent Martinet, Pedro Gajardo, Michel De Lara
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Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-06-06 Fabrice Le Lec, Astrid Matthey, Ondřej Rydval
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The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-29 Agustin G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo
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A new axiomatization of discounted expected utility Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-29 Berenice Anne Neumann, Marc Oliver Rieger
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Compassion and envy in distributional comparisons Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-26 Flaviana Palmisano
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The leveling axiom Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-24 Alvaro Sandroni, Leo Katz
We characterize general constraints under which rational choices are characterized by asymmetric revealed preferences. A key feature of our main characterization result is expressed by the leveling axiom. We also consider the special case of a law-abiding decision maker who chooses optimally among legal options. We show that the law does not necessarily satisfy the leveling axiom and, therefore, transitivity
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Meta-Inductive Probability Aggregation Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-20 Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Gerhard Schurz
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Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-17 Benjamin Patrick Evans, Mikhail Prokopenko
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Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-13 Francesca Pancotto, Simone Righi, Károly Takács
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The precautionary principle when project implementation capacity is congestible Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-05-11 Anthony Heyes, Sandeep Kapur
The precautionary principle justifies postponing the implementation of development projects to await better information about their environmental impacts. But if implementation capacity is congestible, as is often the case in practical settings, a postponed project may have to vie for implementation priority with projects that arrive later. Limitations of implementation capacity create two risks. First
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An experimental investigation of social risk preferences for health Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Arthur E. Attema, Olivier L’Haridon, Gijs van de Kuilen
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The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-04-24 Shiran Rachmilevitch
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Socially interdependent risk taking Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-04-19 Alexandros Karakostas, Giles Morgan, Daniel John Zizzo
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Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-03-28 Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
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Games with possibly naive present-biased players Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-02-17 Marco A. Haan, Dominic Hauck
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Care and anger motives in social dilemmas Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-02-07 Patrick Ring, Christoph A. Schütt, Dennis J. Snower
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Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-01-31 Juan C. Candeal
This paper explores the concept of a social evaluation functional in the case of an arbitrary set of alternatives. In the first part, a characterization of projective social evaluations functionals is shown whenever the common restricted domain is the set of all bounded utility functions equipped with the supremum norm topology. The result makes a crucial use, among others, of a continuity axiom. In
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Rationalizable behavior in the Hotelling–Downs model of spatial competition Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2023-01-16 Joep van Sloun
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On the predictions of cumulative prospect theory for third and fourth order risk preferences Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2022-12-31 Ivan Paya, David A. Peel, Konstantinos Georgalos
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Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games Theory Decis. (IF 0.802) Pub Date : 2022-12-15 Jaeok Park, Doo Hyung Yun
We introduce possibilistic beliefs into strategic games, describing a player’s belief about his opponents’ strategies as the set of their strategies he regards as possible. We formulate possibilistic strategic games where each player has preferences over his own strategies conditional on his possibilistic belief about his opponents’ strategies. We define several solution concepts for possibilistic