• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Gabriele Farina; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti; Tuomas Sandholm

We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are not allowed to communicate during play but can coordinate before the game. In that setting, it is known that the best the team can do is sample a profile of potentially randomized strategies (one per player) from a joint (a

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Arnaud Cadas; Josu Doncel; Jean-Michel Fourneau; Ana Bušić

We study the performance of general dynamic matching models. This model is defined by a connected graph, where nodes represent the class of items and the edges the compatibilities between items. Items of different classes arrive one by one to the system according to a given probability distribution. Upon arrival, an item is matched with a compatible item according to the First Come First Served discipline

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Giacomo Como; Stéphane Durand; Fabio Fagnani

We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these players are forced to a controlled value while the others are left to repeatedly play a best response action, the system will converge to the greatest Nash equilibrium

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Mengnian Xu; Yanjiao Chen; Wei Wang

The multi-UAV network is promising to extend conventional networks by providing broader coverage and better reliability. Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of wireless signals and the broader coverage expose multi-UAV communications to the threats of passive eavesdroppers. Recent studies mainly focus on securing a single legitimate link, or communications between a UAV and multiple ground users in

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-20
Artem Baklanov; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportion-ality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highly non-trivial obstacles to achieving fairness, and avery vibrant line of research has aimed to circumvent them using appropriate notions of approximate fairness. Recentwork has established that even approximate versions

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-20
Dong Xu; Chao Meng; Qingpeng Zhang; Puneet Bhardwaj; Young-Jun Son

A hybrid simulation-based framework involving system dynamics and agent-based simulation is proposed to address duopoly game considering multiple strategic decision variables and rich payoff, which cannot be addressed by traditional approaches involving closed-form equations. While system dynamics models are used to represent integrated production, logistics, and pricing determination activities of

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-20
Ashish Goel; Benjamin Plaut

We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many real-world markets

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-20
Sreenivas Gollapudi; Kostas Kollias; Benjamin Plaut

A two-sided market consists of two sets of agents, each of whom have preferences over the other (Airbnb, Upwork, Lyft, Uber, etc.). We propose and analyze a repeated matching problem, where some set of matches occur on each time step, and our goal is to ensure fairness with respect to the cumulative allocations over an infinite time horizon. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm for additive

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-19
Shengjun Pan; Brendan Kitts; Tian Zhou; Hao He; Bharatbhushan Shetty; Aaron Flores; Djordje Gligorijevic; Junwei Pan; Tingyu Mao; San Gultekin; Jianlong Zhang

This paper describes a new win-rate based bid shading algorithm (WR) that does not rely on the minimum-bid-to-win feedback from a Sell-Side Platform (SSP). The method uses a modified logistic regression to predict the profit from each possible shaded bid price. The function form allows fast maximization at run-time, a key requirement for Real-Time Bidding (RTB) systems. We report production results

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Wenjie Bai; Jeremiah Blocki; Ben Harsha

We introduce password strength information signaling as a novel, yet counter-intuitive, defense against password cracking attacks. Recent breaches have exposed billions of user passwords to the dangerous threat of offline password cracking attacks. An offline attacker can quickly check millions (or sometimes billions/trillions) of password guesses by comparing their hash value with the stolen hash

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Atrisha Sarkar; Krzysztof Czarnecki

With autonomous vehicles (AV) set to integrate further into regular human traffic, there is an increasing consensus of treating AV motion planning as a multi-agent problem. However, the traditional game theoretic assumption of complete rationality is too strong for the purpose of human driving, and there is a need for understanding human driving as a bounded rational activity through a behavioral game

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21
Giacomo Como; Fabio Fagnani; Lorenzo Zino

We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging to a single population exchange information through pairwise interactions, whereby they get aware of the actions played by the other players and the corresponding

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-21

Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by fostering motivated teams, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms races that ensue. However, even when the "market maker" is willing and able to maintain parity between teams, it may fail to maintain a level playing field, as some teams acquire enough advantage within the system

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-20

This volume contains the proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logic and Formal Verification (GandALF 2020). The symposium took place as a fully online event on September 21-22, 2020. The GandALF symposium was established by a group of Italian computer scientists interested in mathematical logic, automata theory, game theory, and their applications to the specification

更新日期：2020-09-22
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-18
Sid Chi-Kin Chau; Khaled Elbassioni; Yue Zhou

Coalition formation is a central part of social interactions. In the emerging era of social peer-to-peer interactions (e.g., sharing economy), coalition formation will be often carried out in a decentralized manner, based on participants' individual preferences. A likely outcome will be a stable coalition structure, where no group of participants could cooperatively opt out to form another coalition

更新日期：2020-09-21
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-18
Daniel M. Kane; Scott Duke Kominers

We examine a new variant of the classic prisoners and lightswitches puzzle: A warden leads his $n$ prisoners in and out of $r$ rooms, one at a time, in some order, with each prisoner eventually visiting every room an arbitrarily large number of times. The rooms are indistinguishable, except that each one has $s$ lightswitches; the prisoners win their freedom if at some point a prisoner can correctly

更新日期：2020-09-21
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-17
Toby Walsh

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal solution.

更新日期：2020-09-20
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-17
Hao Wang; Xiao-Yong Yan; Jinshan Wu

Social gravity law widely exists in human travel, population migration, commodity trade, information communication, scientific collaboration and so on. Why is there such a simple law in many complex social systems is an interesting question. Although scientists from fields of statistical physics, complex systems, economics and transportation science have explained the social gravity law, a theoretical

更新日期：2020-09-20
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-17
Toby Walsh

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report

更新日期：2020-09-20
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-17
Toby Walsh

Facility location problems often permit facilities to be located at any position. But what if this is not the case in practice? What if facilities can only be located at particular locations like a highway exit or close to a bus stop? We consider here the impact of such constraints on the location of facilities on the performance of strategy proof mechanisms for locating facilities.We study four different

更新日期：2020-09-20
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-16
Zhiyuan Wang; Lin Gao; Tong Wang; Jingjing Luo

In mobile Internet ecosystem, Mobile Users (MUs) purchase wireless data services from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to access to Internet and acquire the interested content services (e.g., online game) from Content Provider (CP). The popularity of intelligent functions (e.g., AI and 3D modeling) increases the computation-intensity of the content services, leading to a growing computation pressure

更新日期：2020-09-18
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-15
Brian Hu Zhang; Tuomas Sandholm

Often---for example in war games, strategy video games, and financial simulations---the game is given to us only as a black-box simulator in which we can play it. In these settings, since the game may have unknown nature action distributions (from which we can only obtain samples) and/or be too large to expand fully, it can be difficult to compute strategies with guarantees on exploitability. Recent

更新日期：2020-09-18
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-16
Maiki Fujita; Takeshi Koshiba; Kenji Yasunaga

Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. An adversary for SMT can corrupt a subset of the channels and make eavesdropping and tampering over the channels. In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic security model for SMT in which adversaries have some preferences

更新日期：2020-09-18
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-15
Renming LiuDTU Management, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark; Siyu ChenCEE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States; Yu JiangDTU Management, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark; Ravi SeshadriSingapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology, Singapore; Moshe E. Ben-AkivaCEE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States; Carlos Lima AzevedoDTU Management, Technical

This study investigates the efficiency and effectiveness of area-based tradable credit scheme (TCS) based on the trip-based Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram model for the morning commute problem. In the proposed tradable credit scheme, the regulator distributes initial credits to all travelers and designs a time-varying and trip length specific credit tariff. Credits are traded between travelers and

更新日期：2020-09-16
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-15
Ashish Goel; Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy; Sukolsak Sakshuwong; Tanja Aitamurto

We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call "Knapsack Voting". We study its strategic properties - we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given

更新日期：2020-09-16
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-15
Neil GhaniUniversity of Strathclyde; Clemens KupkeUniversity of Strathclyde; Alasdair LambertUniversity of Strathclyde; Fredrik Nordvall ForsbergUniversity of Strathclyde

We extend the open games framework for compositional game theory to encompass also mixed strategies, making essential use of the discrete probability distribution monad. We show that the resulting games form a symmetric monoidal category, which can be used to compose probabilistic games in parallel and sequentially. We also consider morphisms between games, and show that intuitive constructions give

更新日期：2020-09-16
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-15
Haoning Xi; Wei Liu; David Rey; S. Travis Waller; Philip Kilby

Mobility as a Service (MaaS) has recently received a significant attention from researchers, industry stakeholders, and the public sector. The vast majority of existing MaaS paradigms are articulated based on the traditional segmentation of travel modes, e.g. private vehicle, public transportation (bus, metro, light rail) and shared mobility (car/bike/ride-sharing, ride-sourcing). In the context of

更新日期：2020-09-16
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-14
Julien Grand-Clement; Christian Kroer

Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are known to be sensitive to parameter specification. Distributionally robust MDPs alleviate this issue by allowing for ambiguity sets which give a set of possible distributions over parameter sets. The goal is to find an optimal policy with respect to the worst-case parameter distribution. We propose a first-order methods framework for solving Distributionally robust

更新日期：2020-09-16
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-14
Georgios Amanatidis; Georgios Birmpas; Aris Filos-Ratsikas; Alexandros A. Voudouris

We consider the one-sided matching problem, where n agents have preferences over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions. The goal is to match every agent to a single item so as to maximize the social welfare. Most of the related literature, however, assumes that the values of the agents are not a priori known, and only access to the ordinal preferences

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-14
Zhe Feng; Guru Guruganesh; Christopher Liaw; Aranyak Mehta; Abhishek Sethi

The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a coarse-correlated equilibrium of the game. However, much less is known about equilibrium selection in the case that multiple equilibria exist. In this work, we study the convergence

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-10
Jack Geary; Henry Gouk

Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are susceptible to an issue that we refer to as conflict. Our results show that when conflict occurs, it causes suboptimal and potentially dangerous behaviour. In response

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-13
Christos Papadimitriou; Kiran Vodrahalli; Mihalis Yannakakis

On-line firms deploy suites of software platforms, where each platform is designed to interact with users during a certain activity, such as browsing, chatting, socializing, emailing, driving, etc. The economic and incentive structure of this exchange, as well as its algorithmic nature, have not been explored to our knowledge; we initiate their study in this paper. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-12
Shivika Narang; Arpita Biswas; Y Narahari

Matching algorithms have been classically studied with the goal of finding stable solutions. However, in many important societal problems, the degree of fairness in the matching assumes crucial importance, for instance when we have to match COVID-19 patients to care units. We study the problem of finding a stable many-to-one matching while satisfying fairness among all the agents with cardinal utilities

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-14
Yuanyuan Shi; Baosen Zhang

In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents learn and compete without the full knowledge of the system or each other. We consider the dynamics of the policy gradient algorithm, which is a widely adopted continuous control reinforcement

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-10
Huale Li; Xuan Wang; Fengwei Jia; Yifan Li; Yulin Wu; Jiajia Zhang; Shuhan Qi

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a popular method to deal with decision-making problems of two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information. Unlike existing studies that mostly explore for solving larger scale problems or accelerating solution efficiency, we propose a framework, RLCFR, which aims at improving the generalization ability of the CFR method. In the RLCFR, the game strategy

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-13
Yuanyi Zhong; Yuan Zhou; Jian Peng

Reinforcement learning from self-play has recently reported many successes. Self-play, where the agents compete with themselves, is often used to generate training data for iterative policy improvement. In previous work, heuristic rules are designed to choose an opponent for the current learner. Typical rules include choosing the latest agent, the best agent, or a random historical agent. However,

更新日期：2020-09-15
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-11
Modibo Camara; Jason Hartline; Aleck Johnsen

A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs determined by an unknown state of the world. Traditionally, these models require strong and often-impractical assumptions about beliefs (a common prior over the state). In this paper, we dispense with the common prior. Instead

更新日期：2020-09-14
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-10
Itai Ashlagi; Mark Braverman; Clayton Thomas; Geng Zhao

We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent. Specifically, every agent within a tier has the same public score, and agents on each side have preferences independently generated proportionally to the public scores of the

更新日期：2020-09-14
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-10
David Grimsman; Joshua H. Seaton; Jason R. Marden; Philip N. Brown

A popular formalism for multiagent control applies tools from game theory, casting a multiagent decision problem as a cooperation-style game in which individual agents make local choices to optimize their own local utility functions in response to the observable choices made by other agents. When the system-level objective is submodular maximization, it is known that if every agent can observe the

更新日期：2020-09-11
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-10
Mattia Bianchi; Sergio Grammatico

We consider the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario. Specifically, each agent can only receive information from some neighbors via a communication network, while its cost function depends on the strategies of possibly all agents. In particular, while the existing methods assume undirected or balanced communication, in this paper we allow for non-balanced, directed graphs

更新日期：2020-09-11
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-09
Chryssis Georgiou; Marios Mavronicolas; Burkhard Monien

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a b$, then there exists a normal 2-players, 2-values, 3-strategies game without $\mathsf{F}$-equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to provide an (almost complete) answer on whether there is, for a given concave function $\mathsf{F}$, a counterexample game without $\ma 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-09 Gabriele Farina; Tuomas Sandholm Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of extensive-form games allows for a richness of behaviors and incentives that are not possible in normal-form settings. This richness translates to a significantly different complexity 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-09 Muhammad Aneeq uz Zaman; Kaiqing Zhang; Erik Miehling; Tamer Ba{ş}ar In this paper, we study large population multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of discrete-time linear-quadratic mean-field games (LQ-MFGs). Our setting differs from most existing work on RL for MFGs, in that we consider a non-stationary MFG over an infinite horizon. We propose an actor-critic algorithm to iteratively compute the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) of the LQ-MFG. There are 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-09 Zhiyi Huang; Qiankun Zhang; Yuhao Zhang Three decades ago, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (STOC 1990) defined the online matching problem and gave an optimal$1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.632$-competitive algorithm. %introduced the Ranking algorithm with the optimal$1-\frac{1}{e}$competitive ratio. Fifteen years later, Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani (FOCS 2005) introduced the first generalization called \emph{AdWords} driven by online 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-08 Cong Chen; Yinfeng Xu Despite the emphases on computability issues in research of algorithmic game theory, the limited computational capacity of players have received far less attention. This work examines how different levels of players' computational ability (or "rationality") impact the outcomes of sequential scheduling games. Surprisingly, our results show that a lower level of rationality of players may lead to better 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-08 Jerry Anunrojwong; Yiling Chen; Bo Waggoner; Haifeng Xu We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equivalence of prediction market equilibria with those of a simpler signaling game with commitment introduced by Kong and Schoenebeck (2018). We then extend their results by giving computationally efficient algorithms for additional 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-02 Wenjia Ba; Haim Mendelson; Mingxi Zhu We study the implications of selling through a voice-based virtual assistant (VA). The seller has a set of products available and the VA decides which product to offer and at what price, seeking to maximize its revenue, consumer- or total-surplus. The consumer is impatient and rational, seeking to maximize her expected utility given the information available to her. The VA selects products based on 更新日期：2020-09-10 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-07 Thomas Brihaye; Gilles Geeraerts; Axel Haddad; Engel Lefaucheux; Benjamin Monmege Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modelling the price of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise the price to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock and arbitrary integer weights 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-05 Ashkan Zehfroosh; Herbert G. Tanner This paper presents a theoretical framework for probably approximately correct (PAC) multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms for Markov games. The paper offers an extension to the well-known Nash Q-learning algorithm, using the idea of delayed Q-learning, in order to build a new PAC MARL algorithm for general-sum Markov games. In addition to guiding the design of a provably PAC MARL algorithm 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-02 Azlan Iqbal We present an algorithm that correctly updates the Forsyth-Edwards Notation (FEN) chessboard character string after any move is made without the need for an intermediary array representation of the board. In particular, this relates to software that have to do with chess, certain chess variants and possibly even similar board games with comparable position representation. Even when performance may 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-06 Piotr Skowron; Arkadii Slinko; Stanisław Szufa; Nimrod Talmon In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects---each with a cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select---based on voter preferences---a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumulative votes, e.g., for the setting when 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-02 René Carmona; Kenza Hamidouche; Mathieu Laurière; Zongjun Tan In this paper, zero-sum mean-field type games (ZSMFTG) with linear dynamics and quadratic utility are studied under infinite-horizon discounted utility function. ZSMFTG are a class of games in which two decision makers whose utilities sum to zero, compete to influence a large population of agents. In particular, the case in which the transition and utility functions depend on the state, the action 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-04 Yuki Oyama; Yusuke Hara; Takashi Akamatsu This study establishes a novel framework of Markovian traffic equilibrium assignment based on the network generalized extreme value (NGEV) model, which we call NGEV equilibrium assignment. The use of the NGEV model in traffic assignment has recently been proposed and enables capturing the path correlation without explicit path enumeration. However, the NGEV equilibrium assignment has never been investigated 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-04 Yunong Chen; Andrew Belmonte; Christopher Griffin The mechanism behind the emergence of cooperation in both biological and social systems is currently not understood. In particular, human behavior in the Ultimatum game is almost always irrational, preferring mutualistic sharing strategies, while chimpanzees act rationally and selfishly. However, human behavior varies with geographic and cultural differences leading to distinct behaviors. In this letter 更新日期：2020-09-08 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-03 Robert Prentner The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world, that individual fitness need not be the most import criteria of success, and that some strategies are very strong in a direct confrontation but could still perform 更新日期：2020-09-05 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-03 Yongge Wang This paper compares mathematical models for automated market makers including logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), liquidity sensitive LMSR (LS-LMSR), constant product/mean/sum, and others. It is shown that though LMSR may not be a good model for Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications, LS-LMSR has several advantages over constant product/mean based automated market makers. However, LS-LMSR requires 更新日期：2020-09-05 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-03 Marcell Blahota; Istvan Blahota; Attila Szolnoki Cyclic dominance offers not just a way to maintain biodiversity, but also serves as a sort of defensive alliance against an external invader. Interestingly, a new level of competition can be observed when two cyclic loops are present. Here the inner invasion speed plays a decisive role on the evolutionary outcome, because faster invasion rate provides an evolutionary advantage to an alliance. In this 更新日期：2020-09-05 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-02 Djordje Gligorijevic; Tian Zhou; Bharatbhushan Shetty; Brendan Kitts; Shengjun Pan; Junwei Pan; Aaron Flores Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price auction type, advertisers and demand platforms are compelled to adapt to a new volatile environment. Bid shading is a known technique for preventing overpaying in auction 更新日期：2020-09-05 • arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-03 Saad Al Muttakee; Abu Reyan Ahmed; Md. Saidur Rahman Consider an online facility assignment problem where a set of facilities$F = \{ f_1, f_2, f_3, \cdots, f_{|F|} \}$of equal capacity$l$is situated on a metric space and customers arrive one by one in an online manner on that space. We assign a customer$c_i$to a facility$f_j$before a new customer$c_{i+1}$arrives. The cost of this assignment is the distance between$c_i$and$f_j\$. The objective

更新日期：2020-09-05
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-09-01
René Carmona; Kenza Hamidouche; Mathieu Laurière; Zongjun Tan

In this paper, zero-sum mean-field type games (ZSMFTG) with linear dynamics and quadratic cost are studied under infinite-horizon discounted utility function. ZSMFTG are a class of games in which two decision makers whose utilities sum to zero, compete to influence a large population of indistinguishable agents. In particular, the case in which the transition and utility functions depend on the state

更新日期：2020-09-02
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