Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 3, Page 472-472, April 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 3, Page 466-471, April 2023.

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Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 3, Page 355-380, April 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 3, Page 329-354, April 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 3, April 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 2, Page 327-327, January 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 2, Page 320-326, January 2023.

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Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 2, Page 286-306, January 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 2, Page 271-285, January 2023.

This article argues that the dominant “nonconventionalist” theories of promising cannot account for the moral impact of two basic commercial practices: the transferability of contractual rights and the “discharge” of contractual debt in bankruptcy. Nonconventionalism’s insensitivity to certain features of social context precludes it from registering the moral significance of these social phenomena

According to some, when you do the right thing, your moral beliefs make no difference to your act’s moral worth. Huckleberry Finn believes he is doing something wrong in helping Jim escape slavery. Yet his act reflects well on him. Some conclude that acting rightly reflects just as well on you whether you believe you are doing something right, wrong, supererogatory, or neutral. I argue against this

Certain forms of practical deference seem to be incompatible with personal autonomy. I argue that such deference undermines autonomy not by compromising the governance of an authentic self, nor by constituting a failure to track objective reasons, but by constituting a particular social relation: one of interpersonal rule. I analyze this social relation and distinguish it from others, including ordinary

Although we are morally responsible for things of various kinds, what we bear direct responsibility for are certain exercises of our agency (and perhaps some omissions of these). Theorists disagree about what kind of agency is in this respect the source of our responsibility. Some hold that it is agency the exercises of which are actions. Others say that it is agency exercised in forming reasons-responsive

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 2, January 2023.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, Page 162-162, October 2022.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, Page 156-161, October 2022.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, Page 152-156, October 2022.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, Page 147-151, October 2022.

Should parental rights be allocated to the best available parent? Anca Gheaus has argued that they should and that the interests of those who might rear them are strictly irrelevant to their allocation. This discussion article defends the view that parents’ interests are relevant to parental rights, against this latest argument. I show that the Best Available Parent View, as stated, conflicts with

This discussion article replies to a challenge for potential perspectivism raised by Davide Fassio in this journal. Potential Perspectivism holds that what one ought to do depends on facts that are potentially accessible. Fassio argues against potential perspectivism based on cases of conjunction agglomeration failure of facts that are potentially accessible. I offer a refined account of potential

How should we choose on behalf of people with different attitudes to risk? Simon Blessenohl has recently argued that this question poses a dilemma: it seems that sometimes we must choose either acts that everyone disprefers or else acts that are sure to turn out worse than some other act. In this article, I offer a complaints-centered account of how to take people’s attitudes to risk into consideration

I defend the view that individual agents have instrumental moral reasons for and against contributing to collective actions. I distinguish three versions of this view found in the literature and argue that only one withstands scrutiny: the version on which each individual contribution to a collective action is a cause of the latter’s large-scale outcomes. The central difficulty with this view is its

Spontaneous freedom, the freedom of unplanned and unscripted activity enjoyed by “free spirits,” is central to everyday talk about “freedom.” Yet the freedom of spontaneity is absent from contemporary moral philosophers’ theories of freedom. This article begins to remedy the philosophical neglect of spontaneous freedom. I offer an account of the nature of spontaneous freedom and make a case for its

I offer a novel distinction between two concepts of competition. The first, parallel competition, is designed to create separate pathways for each competitor wherein they can maximize their performance. The second, friction competition, is designed to facilitate a clash between competitors. Each concept is utilized as an institutional mechanism to generate social benefits. In parallel competition,

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, Page 1-4, October 2022.

Ethics, Volume 133, Issue 1, October 2022.

Ethics, Volume 132, Issue 4, Page 917-918, July 2022.

Ethics, Volume 132, Issue 4, Page 911-916, July 2022.

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When blame is understood to be emotion-based or affective, its emotional tone is standardly identified as one of anger. We argue that this conception of affective blame is overly restrictive. By attending to cases of blame that emerge against a background of a particular kind of hope invested in others, we identify a blaming response characterized not by anger but by sadness: reactive disappointment

A common argument against lockdowns is that they restrict freedom. On this view, lockdowns might be effective in protecting public health, but their impact on freedom is purely negative. This article challenges that view. It argues that while lockdowns restrict freedom, so too do viruses. Since viruses restrict freedom and lockdowns protect us from viruses, lockdowns can protect us from the harmful

I propose and defend a novel view called “de se consequentialism,” which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates—contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others—that agent-neutral consequentialism is consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, it clarifies the nature of agent-centered constraints, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated

Sometimes it is not one’s place to blame or forgive. This phenomenon is captured under the philosophical notion of standing. However, there is an asymmetry to be explained here. One can successfully blame, even if one lacks the standing to do so. Yet, one cannot successfully forgive if one lacks the standing to do so. In this article we explain this asymmetry. We argue that a complete explanation depends

Ethics, Volume 132, Issue 4, July 2022.

Ethics, Volume 132, Issue 3, Page 757-758, April 2022.

Ethics, Volume 132, Issue 3, Page 752-756, April 2022.

Sam Berstler defends a general moral advantage for misleading over lying by arguing that liars, but not misleaders, act unfairly toward the other members of their linguistic community. This article spells out three difficulties for Berstler’s account. First, though Berstler aims to avoid an error theory, it is dubitable that her account fits with intuitions on the matter. Second, there are some lies

Should harms to different individuals be aggregated? Moderate views answer yes and no. Aggregation is appropriate in some but not all cases. Such views need to determine a threshold at which aggregation switches from appropriate to inappropriate. Alex Voorhoeve proposes a method for determining this threshold which links other-regarding and self-regarding ethics. This proposal, however, implies a spurious

This article provides the first large-scale, longitudinal study examining publication rates by gender in philosophy journals. We find that from 1900 to 1990 the proportion of women authorships in philosophy increased, but it has plateaued since the 1990s (unlike in other disciplines). Top Philosophy journals publish the lowest proportion of women, and anonymous review does not increase the proportion

Egalitarians often claim that well-off states’ immigration restrictions create or reinforce objectionable inequality. Standard defenses of this claim appeal to the distributive consequences of exclusion. This article offers a relational egalitarian defense of more open borders. On this view, well-off states’ immigration restrictions are problematic because they accord the citizens of well-off states

The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligations, and the residual duties they entail upon being violated, have various prima facie surprising features. We give an account to explain these features. Promises have a point. The point of a promise to φ is a promise-independent reason to φ for the promisee’s sake. A promise turns this reason into a duty