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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-09-25
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 74, Issue 3, September 2023.
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Neural Oscillations as Representations Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-29 Manolo Martínez, Marc Artiga
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Analogue Computation and Representation Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-14 Corey J. Maley
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Uwe Peters
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Monothematic Delusions and the Limits of Rationality Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Adam Bradley, Quinn Hiroshi Gibson
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Truthlikeness for Quantitative Deterministic Laws Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Alfonso García-Lapeña
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Quantifying Proportionality and the Limits of Higher-Level Causation and Explanation Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-11 Alexander Gebharter, Markus I. Eronen
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Grasping in Understanding Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-04 Miloud Belkoniene
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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What Does the World Look Like according to Superdeterminism? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-08-01 Augustin Baas, Baptiste Le Bihan
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Black Boxes or Unflattering Mirrors? Comparative Bias in the Science of Machine Behaviour Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-07-28 Cameron Buckner
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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On Valence: Imperative or Representation of Value? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-07-26 Peter Carruthers
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Toward a Theory of Homology: Development and the De-Coupling of Morphological and Molecular Evolution Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-07-25 James DiFrisco
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-06-21
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 74, Issue 2, June 2023.
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Correspondence Theory of Semantic Information Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-24 Marcin Miłkowski
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-19
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 74, Issue 1, March 2023.
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Classical Particle Indistinguishability, Precisely Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-15 James Wills
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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The PC Algorithm and the Inference to Constitution Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-12 Lorenzo Casini, Michael Baumgartner
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Mathematical Structure and Empirical Content Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-09 Michael E. Miller
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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[math] Soundness Isn’t Enough: Number-Theoretic Indeterminacy’s Unsavory Physical Commitments Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-09 Sharon Berry
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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A Note on Verisimilitude and Accuracy Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-08 Randall G. McCutcheon
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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On Superdeterministic Rejections of Settings Independence Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-04 Gerardo S. Ciepielewski, Elias Okon, Daniel Sudarsky
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-05-02 Barbara Osimani, Jürgen Landes
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Evidential Probabilities and Credences Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Anna-Maria Asunta Eder
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Explaining the Success of Induction Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-21 Igor Douven
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Comparing Mathematical Explanations Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-19 Isaac Wilhelm
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Evidence in Default: Rejecting Default Models of Animal Minds Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-14 Mike Dacey
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Essentially Ergodic Behaviour Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-12 Paula Reichert
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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The Kalām Cosmological Argument Meets the Mentaculus Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-12 Dan Linford
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Epistemic Engagement, Aesthetic Value, and Scientific Practice Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-12 Adrian Currie
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Micro-foundations and Methodology: A Complexity-Based Reconceptualization of the Debate Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-11 Nadia Ruiz, Armin W. Schulz
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Anti-reductionist Interventionism Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-04-11 Reuben Stern, Benjamin Eva
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Conventionality and Causality in Lewis-Type Evolutionary Prediction Games Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-03-24 Gordon Michael Purves
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-03-20
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 73, Issue 4, December 2022.
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Self-Assembling Games and the Evolution of Salience Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-03-17 Jeffrey A. Barrett
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Boolean Difference-Making: A Modern Regularity Theory of Causation Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-03-13 Michael Baumgartner, Christoph Falk
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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The Value of Biased Information Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-22 Nilanjan Das
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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In Search of the Holy Grail: How to Reduce the Second Law of Thermodynamics Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-22 Katie Robertson
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Explanatory Distance Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-16 Elanor Taylor
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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A New Perspective on Time and Physical Laws Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-15 Lucy James
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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A Puzzle Concerning Local Symmetries and Their Empirical Significance Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-15 Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Theoretical Virtues in Scientific Practice: An Empirical Study Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-02-14 Moti Mizrahi
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Well-Being Coherentism Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-01-27 Gil Hersch
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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A Bayesian Account of Establishing Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-01-27 Jon Williamson
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Peer Review May Not Be Such a Bad Idea: Response to Heesen and Bright Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-01-18 Darrell P. Rowbottom
In a recent article in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Heesen and Bright argue that prepublication peer review should be abolished and replaced with postpublication peer review (provided the matter is judged purely on epistemic grounds). In this article, I show that there are three problems with their argument. First, it fails to consider the epistemic cost of implementing the change
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The Value of Categorical Polythetic Diagnoses in Psychiatry Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-01-17 Sam Fellowes
Some critics argue that the types of psychiatric diagnosis found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Disease are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms
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The Neo-Gouldian Argument for Evolutionary Contingency: Mass Extinctions Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2023-01-17 T. Y. William Wong
The Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency found in Wonderful Life can be dissected into three premises: palaeontological, macro-evolutionary, and developmental. Discussions of evolutionary contingency have revolved primarily around the developmental. However, a shift in methodological practice and new palaeontological evidence subsequent to the book’s publication appears to threaten the palaeontological
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When a Crisis Becomes an Opportunity: The Role of Replications in Making Better Theories Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-12-20 Jane Suilin Lavelle
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Ahead of Print.
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Why Do We Need a Theory of Implementation? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-12-20 André Curtis-Trudel
The received view of computation is methodologically bifurcated: it offers different accounts of computation in the mathematical and physical cases. But little in the way of argument has been given for this approach. This article rectifies the situation by arguing that the alternative, a unified account, is untenable. Furthermore, once these issues are brought into sharper relief we can see that work
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-11-01
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 73, Issue 3, September 2022.
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Accurate Updating for the Risk-Sensitive Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-10-11 Catrin Campbell-Moore, Bernhard Salow
Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief-revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means–end
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How Stable Is Objective Chance? Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-09-26 John Cusbert
This article examines the stability of objective chance. I defend the stable chance thesis (SCT): that in any given possible world, any pair of intrinsic duplicate physical setups with the same chances of being subject to the same external influences must yield the same chances. I argue that SCT compares favourably to rivals in the literature. I then consider a challenge to SCT involving time travel
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Mixtures and Psychological Inference with Resting State fMRI Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-09-26 Joseph McCaffrey, David Danks
In this article, we examine the use of resting state fMRI data for psychological inferences. We argue that resting state studies hold the paired promises of discovering novel functional brain networks, and of avoiding some of the limitations of task-based fMRI. However, we argue that the very features of experimental design that enable resting state fMRI to support exploratory science also generate
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On the Structure and Function of Scientific Perspectivism in Categorical Quantum Mechanics Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-09-19 Vassilios Karakostas, Elias Zafiris
Contemporary scientific perspectivism is primarily viewed as a methodological framework of how we obtain and form scientific knowledge of nature, through a broadly perspectivist process, especially, with reference to quantum mechanics. In the present study, this is implemented by representing categorically the global structure of a quantum algebra of events in terms of structured interconnected families
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Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probabilities Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-08-24 Yang Liu
The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that for a given pair of events, one event may be considered ‘more probable’ than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, for example, lack of robust statistical information. I take it that these cases involve
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Protective Measurements and the Reality of the Wave Function Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-08-23 Shan Gao
It has been debated whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. In this article, I present a new analysis of the relationship between protective measurements and the reality of the wave function. First, I briefly introduce protective measurements and the ontological models framework for them. Second, I give a simple proof of Hardy’s theorem in terms of protective measurements
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Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-08-09 Chloé de Canson
There is widespread excitement in the literature about the method of arbitrary functions: many take it to show that it is from the dynamics of systems that the objectivity of probabilities emerge. In this article, I differentiate three ways in which a probability function might be objective, and I argue that the method of arbitrary functions cannot help us show that dynamics objectivize probabilities
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Calibrating Chromatography: How Tswett Broke the Experimenters’ Regress Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-08-05 Jonathan Livengood, Adam Edwards
We propose a new account of calibration according to which calibrating a technique shows that the technique does what it is supposed to do. To motivate our account, we examine an early twentieth-century debate about chlorophyll chemistry and Mikhail Tswett’s use of chromatographic adsorption analysis to study it. We argue that Tswett’s experiments established that his technique was reliable in the
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Grounded Shadows, Groundless Ghosts Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-08-05 Ezra Rubenstein
According to a radical account of quantum metaphysics that I label ‘high-dimensionalism’, ordinary objects are the ‘shadows’ of high-dimensional fundamental ontology (for example, Albert [2013], [unpublished-a]; Ney [2015]). Critics—especially Maudlin ([2007], [2010], [2019])—allege that high-dimensionalism cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the manifest image. In this article, I examine
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Epistemic Separability and Everettian Branches: A Critique of Sebens and Carroll Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-07-18 Richard Dawid, Simon Friederich
We discuss the proposal by Sebens and Carroll to derive the Born rule in Everettian quantum mechanics from a principle they call ‘ESP-QM’. We argue that the proposal fails: ESP-QM is not, as Sebens and Carroll argue, a ‘less general version’ of an independently plausible principle, ESP, and can only be motivated by the empirical success of quantum mechanics, including use of the Born rule. Therefore
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Front Matter Br. J. Philos. Sci. (IF 3.4) Pub Date : 2022-05-17
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 73, Issue 2, June 2022.