Contingentists—who hold that it is contingent what there is—are divided on the claim that having a property or standing in a relation requires being something. This claim can be formulated as a natural schematic principle of higher-order modal logic. On this formulation, I argue that contingentists who are also higher-order contingentists—and so hold that it is contingent what propositions, properties

The best accuracy arguments for probabilism apply only to credence functions with finite domains, that is, credence functions that assign credence to at most finitely many propositions. This is a significant limitation. It reveals that the support for the accuracy-first programme in epistemology is a lot weaker than it seems at first glance, and it means that accuracy arguments cannot yet accomplish

The term ‘epistemic trespassing’ has recently been coined to denote a person’s judgments regarding a domain where they are not epistemic experts. In this paper, I focus on expert trespassing testimony – that is, testimony by an expert in a domain of expertise other than his own. More specifically, I focus on intra-scientific trespassing testimony between scientific collaborators. By developing a number

According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants

There is a long-standing gap in the literature as to whether Gödelian incompleteness constitutes a challenge for Neo-Logicism, and if so how serious it is. In this paper, I articulate and address the challenge in detail. The Neo-Logicist project is to demonstrate the analyticity of arithmetic by deriving all its truths from logical principles and suitable definitions. The specific concern raised by

This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As will be argued, once some basic features of our naïve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence

Communication can be risky. Like other kinds of actions, it comes with potential costs. For instance, an utterance can be embarrassing, offensive, or downright illegal. In the face of such risks, speakers tend to act strategically and seek ‘plausible deniability’. In this paper, we propose an account of the notion of deniability at issue. On our account, deniability is an epistemic phenomenon. A speaker

The nineteenth century saw the development of reductive views of attention. The German philosopher and psychologist Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) proposed an original reductive view according to which attention is nothing but interest and interest itself is a positive feeling. Stumpf’s view was developed by Francis Bradley (1846-1924), George Frederick Stout (1860-1944), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916), but

In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of

Many theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality. If they are right in doing so, it follows, on pain of explanatory circularity, that epistemic rationality cannot itself be a form

What kinds of mental states can be based on epistemic reasons? The standard answer is only beliefs. I argue that perceptual states can also be based on reasons, as the result of crossmodal interactions. A perceptual state from one modality can provide a reason on which an experience in another modality is based. My argument identifies key markers of the basing relation and locates them in the crossmodal

We all know that being reasonable is important in daily life. Beyond daily life, major political and ethical theorists give central place to reasonableness in their accounts of just and moral behaviour. In the law, at least in the Anglo-American setting, reasonableness is the standard for a wide range of behaviour, from administrative decisions to torts. But what is it to be reasonable? In answer,

Context and Coherence: The Logic and Grammar of Prominence, by StojnićUna. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. vii + 219.

The Practical Origins of Ideas, by QuelozMatthieu. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xii + 281.

Hegel's Concept of Life: Self-Consciousness, Freedom, Logic, by KarenNg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xiv + 319.

Mind, fzab031, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab031

Morality and Mathematics, by Clarke-DoaneJustin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. x + 208.

Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics, by DiamondCora. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. 331.

Pathways to Alternative Epistemologies in Africa, edited by AfolayanAdeshinaYacob-HalisoOlajumokeOloruntobaSamuel Ojo. Springer2021. Pp. xi + 240.

Fiction: A Philosophical Analysis, by AbellCatharine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 198.

The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning, by NovaesCatarina Dutilh. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xiii + 271.

Taking Frege at His Word, by WeinerJoan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 317.

The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the ‘Mind-Body Problem’, by CharlesDavid. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiii + 303.

Norms and Necessity, by ThomassonAmie. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xi + 294.

Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy, by ShiehSanford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xxiv + 441.

AbstractThe literature on indicative conditionals contains two appealing views. The first is the selectional view: on this view, conditionals operate by selecting a single possibility, which is used to evaluate the consequent. The second is the informational view: on this view, conditionals don’t express propositions, but rather impose constraints on information states of speakers. Both views are supported

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, by BortolottiLisa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 162.

Barristers in England are obliged to follow the ‘cab rank rule’, according to which they must take any case offered to them, as long as they have time in their schedule and can agree on fees. This rule is designed to ensure that unpopular people and causes can get legal representation. In philosophy, by contrast, we know we need no structural rule to ensure that seemingly hopeless causes receive representation

Realisms Interlinked: Objects, Subjects, and Other Subjects, by ChakrabartiArindam. London: Bloomsbury, 2020. Pp. x + 341.

Causation in Psychology, by CampbellJohn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020. Pp. 203.

AbstractTruth is often considered to be a logico-linguistic tool for expressing indirect endorsements and infinite conjunctions. In this article, I will point out another logico-linguistic function of truth: to enable and validate what I call a blind argument, namely, an argument that involves indirectly endorsed statements. Admitting this function among the logico-linguistic functions of truth has

Portraits and Philosophy, edited by MaesHans. New York, NY: Routledge, 2020. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. Pp. xi + 303.

There Are No Such Things as Theories, by FrenchSteven. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 266.

AbstractI explore the relationship between a prominent analysis of intrinsic properties, due to Langton and Lewis, and the phenomenon of quantum entanglement. As I argue, the analysis faces a puzzle. The full analysis classifies certain properties of entangled particles as intrinsic. But when combined with an extremely plausible assumption about duplication, the main part of the analysis classifies

Aristotle and the Eleatic One, by ClarkeTimothy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. xiv + 227.

Neither Heroes Nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation, by StanglRebecca. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. ix + 207.

The Ethical Demand, by LøgstrupK E. Translated with an introduction and notes by Bjørn Rabjerg and Robert Stern. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. liv + 239.