Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 3, March 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 3, March 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 3, Page 838-838, March 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 3, March 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 2, February 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 2, February 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 2, Page 593-593, February 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 2, Page 592-592, February 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 2, February 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who prefers the same action regardless of his type. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent’s type at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent’s type. Transparent mechanisms are optimal: the principal’s payoff is the same as

We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred acceptance (DA) results in higher mean welfare than the adaptive Boston mechanism. This is due to students making strategic mistakes. The welfare gain of a switch from actual Boston to DA is over 90% of the welfare difference between

This paper investigates the sources of wage growth over the life cycle, determined by sectoral and firm mobility, unobserved ability, the accumulation of cognitive-abstract or routine-manual skills, and whether workers enroll in vocational training at the start of their career. Our analysis uses longitudinal administrative data over three decades and shows that routine-manual skills drive early wage

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 1, January 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 1, January 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 1, Page 246-246, January 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 131, Issue 1, January 2023.

Journal of Political Economy, Ahead of Print.

The economic consequences of large-scale government investments in education depend on general equilibrium effects in both the labor market and the education sector. I develop a general equilibrium model capturing the consequences of massive countrywide schooling initiatives. I provide unbiased estimates of the model’s elasticities, using a regression discontinuity derived from Indian government policy

Although there are many competing explanations for the Industrial Revolution, there has been no effort to evaluate them econometrically. This paper analyzes how the very different patterns of growth across the counties of England between the 1760s and 1830s can be explained by a wide range of potential variables. We find that industrialization occurred in areas that began with low wages but high mechanical

How should countries cooperate in setting fiscal and trade policies when government expenditures must be financed with distorting taxes? We show that even if countries cannot make explicit transfers to each other, every point on the Pareto frontier is production efficient, so that international trade and capital flows should be effectively free. Trade agreements must be supplemented with fiscal policy

We study the welfare implications of personalized pricing implemented with machine learning. We use data from a randomized controlled pricing field experiment to construct personalized prices and validate these in the field. We find that unexercised market power increases profit by 55%. Personalization improves expected profits by an additional 19% and by 86% relative to the nonoptimized price. While

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 12, December 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 12, December 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 12, Page 3337-3342, December 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 12, Page 3334-3334, December 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 12, December 2022.

I propose a methodology for constructing counterfactuals with respect to changes in policy rules that does not require fully specifying a particular model yet is not subject to Lucas critique. It applies to a class of dynamic stochastic models whose equilibria are well approximated by a linear representation. It rests on the insight that many such models satisfy a principle of counterfactual equivalence:

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer’s visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm’s realized effective value

We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as an aggregation of quality signals generated in different markets. Such aggregation yields a beneficial informativeness effect for incentivizing the global player. It however also

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 11, November 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 11, November 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 11, Page 3024-3024, November 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 11, November 2022.

We study the relative effectiveness of exit (divestment and boycott) and voice (engagement) strategies in a world where companies generate externalities and some agents care about the social impact of their decisions. We show that if the majority of investors are even slightly socially responsible, voice achieves the socially optimal outcome. In contrast, exit does not unless everybody is significantly

Resource-based theories propose that firms grow by diversifying into products that use common capabilities. We provide evidence for common-input capabilities, using a policy that removed entry barriers in input markets to show that the similarity of a firm’s and an industry’s input mix determines firm production choices. We model industry choice and economies of scope from input capabilities. When

Despite substantial evidence that resources and outcomes are transmitted across generations, there has been limited inquiry into the extent to which antipoverty programs actually disrupt the cycle of bad outcomes. We leverage the rollout of the United States’s largest early-childhood program, Head Start, to estimate the effect of early-childhood exposure among mothers on their children’s long-term

We describe how capital accumulation and the network structure of US production interact to amplify the effects of sectoral trend growth rates in total factor productivity and labor on trend GDP (gross domestic product) growth. We derive expressions that conveniently summarize this long-run amplification effect by way of sectoral multipliers. We estimate that sector-specific factors have historically

Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution. These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers that do not directly depend on quantity sold. I introduce an estimation strategy that uses observed product selections to inform unobserved allowances. I use retailers’ replacement threats, which may allow them to capture

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 10, October 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 10, October 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 10, October 2022.

Journal of Political Economy, Volume 130, Issue 10, Page 2770-2770, October 2022.

We consider a dynamic game of electoral competition with adverse selection, moral hazard, and imperfect monitoring. We show that this dynamic game can be estimated using a flexible maximum likelihood estimator. We implement the estimator using data from recent mayoral elections in large US cities with binding two-term limits. Our empirical findings suggest that there are large differences in performance

This paper develops a flexible recipe for identifying unobserved input allocations, as well as quantity- and revenue-based total factor productivity (TFP) across product lines, for multiproduct producers, using demand- and supply-side information. Applying variants of this recipe to a panel of plants manufacturing machinery in India from 2000–2007 yields sizable within-plant TFP differences. Removing

Many firms claim that “social impact” influences their strategies. This paper develops a structural model that quantifies social impact as the sum of surpluses to a firm and its stakeholders. With data from a for-profit firm whose prosocial expenditures are measurable and salient to consumers, the analysis shows that the firm spends prosocially beyond profit maximization, thereby increasing welfare

We model asset management as a continuum between active and passive: managers can deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise trader–induced distortions, but agency frictions constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets have high volatility, and the risk-return relationship becomes inverted. Distortions

This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of skill mismatch and quantifies its impact on labor productivity. We build a tractable directed search model, in which workers differ in skills along multiple dimensions and sort into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements. Skill mismatch arises because of information frictions and is prolonged by search frictions. Estimated to the United States, the model