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On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-03-16 Peter Werner
This study investigates how the exogenous provision of norm information concerning wage inequality influences the acceptance of wage differences. In an experiment where one employer interacts with two employees who differ in productivities, two main treatments provide information suggesting either an injunctive norm for small or for large wage differences prior to the interaction.
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Efficiency wages with motivated agents Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-03-16 Jesper Armouti-Hansen, Lea Cassar, Anna Deréky, Florian Engl
Many jobs serve a social purpose beyond profit maximization, contributing positively to society. This paper uses a modified principal-agent gift-exchange game with positive externality (prosocial treatment) to study how workers' prosocial motivation interacts with the use of efficiency wages in stimulating effort. We find that prosocial motivation and efficiency wages are independent in stimulating
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Equilibrium information in credence goods Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-03-15 Ting Liu, Ching-to Albert Ma
We study credence goods in a general model. A consumer may suffer a loss which is a continuous random variable. Privately observing the loss value, an expert can provide a repair at a price to eliminate the consumer's loss. All perfect-Bayesian equilibria are inefficient, in that some losses are not repaired. In closed form, we derive a pooling equilibrium (where losses are inferred to be in an interval)
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Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 M, a, t, h, i, e, u, , V, ., , L, e, d, u, c
This article proposes a dynamic model to examine the structure of “simple” relational contracts, obeying realistic properties that can be easily understood and audited by both parties. In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter cheating limits the number of relationships a buyer can sustain. Trade is thus restricted to durable relationships
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Two experiments on trading information goods in a network Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yutaka Kayaba, Jun Maekawa, Hitoshi Matsushima
We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the
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Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Yanlin Chen, Audrey Hu, Jun Zhang
We study an optimal information/mechanism design problem for selling an object to a number of asymmetric, privately informed bidders in which the winning bidder competes with a third party under differentiated Cournot competition afterwards. We show how to decompose the problem into two sub-problems: Bayesian persuasion and standard mechanism design. Full disclosure of the winner's marginal cost emerges
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An undecidable statement regarding zero-sum games Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-22 Mark Fey
In this paper, we give an example of a statement concerning two-player zero-sum games which is undecidable, meaning that it can neither be proven or disproven by the standard axioms of mathematics. Earlier work has shown that there exist “paradoxical” two-player zero-sum games with unbounded payoffs, in which a standard calculation of the two players' expected utilities of a mixed strategy profile
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Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-21 Jens Großer, Thorsten Giertz
We experimentally study pork barrel politics in repeated two-candidate majoritarian elections with costly voting. Candidates form distinct supporter groups by favoring some voters in budget spending and ignoring others. Relative to compulsory voting, voluntary voting induces on average larger, more narrowly targeted favors and therefore more inequality among otherwise identical voters. Against our
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Corrigendum to “Informational externalities and emergence of consensus” [Games Econ. Behav. 66 (2) (2009) 979–994] Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-20 Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille
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Multi-dimensional reasoning in competitive resource allocation games: Evidence from intra-team communication Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-10 Ayala Arad, Stefan P. Penczynski
We experimentally investigate behavior and reasoning in various competitive resource allocation games with large strategy spaces. In the experiment, a team of two players plays as one entity against other teams. Team members communicate with one another before choosing a strategy. We analyze their messages using three different classification approaches and find that the vast majority of players think
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The impact of fraud on reputation systems Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-09 Jan Philipp Krügel, Fabian Paetzel
Reputation systems can mitigate opportunistic behavior and improve efficiency on online marketplaces. However, rating fraud is a major problem on many websites. We experimentally investigate the circumstances under which rating fraud undermines the functioning of a reputation system and reduces efficiency. We find that the ability to manipulate feedback received from others generally reduces the reliability
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Popular matchings with weighted voters Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Klaus Heeger, Ágnes Cseh
We consider a natural generalization of the well-known problem where every vertex has a weight. We call a matching more popular than matching if the weight of vertices preferring to is larger than the weight of vertices preferring to . For this case, we show that it is -hard to find a popular matching. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that delivers a popular matching or a proof for its
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Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-07 Ninghua Du, Quazi Shahriar
In a moral hazard framework, an agent considers undertaking a task of uncertain difficulty. An of the task's difficulty by the principal convinces the agent to perform only easy tasks. By contrast, information design theory predicts that can induce the agent to continue working even when the work turns out to be challenging. Our experimental evidence confirms that delayed disclosure outperforms immediate
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Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 V, a, t, s, a, l, , K, h, a, n, d, e, l, w, a, l
Individuals update their beliefs and respond to new information in idiosyncratic ways. I show that an individual's idiosyncrasies such as under-reaction, over-reaction, or frustration can have spillover effects and adversely affect the long run beliefs of society. I derive sufficient conditions for convergence of beliefs for all possible networks of agents with heterogeneous idiosyncrasies. Beliefs
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Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Francesca Barigozzi, Helmuth Cremer
We study how workers' concern for coworkers' ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. Two firms offer nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or low) and their taste for being employed by any of the two firms. Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the
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Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-05 Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai
Strategic interactions pose central issues that are not adequately explained by the traditional concepts of dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), Nash equilibrium (NE), and their refinements. A comprehensive analysis of equilibrium concepts within the von Neumann-Nash framework of -person optimization reveals a decreasing hierarchy of nested concepts ranging from DSE to NE. These concepts are defined
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Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon, Max Klimm
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic mechanism with an additive performance guarantee of in a setting with individuals where each individual casts nominations, where . This bound is for and for . The
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Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-19 B, e, i, x, i, , Z, h, o, u
I study a two-player continuous-time dynamic coordination game with observational learning. Each player has one opportunity to make a reversible investment with an uncertain return that is realized only when both players invest. Each player learns about the potential return by observing a private signal and the actions of the other player. In equilibrium, players' roles as leader and follower are endogenously
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Partnerships based on Joint Ownership Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-19 Matthias Blonski, Daniel Herbold
In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a for which
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Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Ata Atay, Christian Trudeau
We study queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but on how many machines. After minimizing the processing costs and machine costs, we share the proceeds of this cooperation, and study the existence of stable allocations. First, we study queueing problems, and examine how to share the total cost. We provide an upper bound
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Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 E, n, r, i, c, o, , D, e, , M, a, g, i, s, t, r, i, s
I propose a notion of Rationalizability, called Incomplete Preference Rationalizability, for games with incomplete preferences. Under an appropriate topological condition, the incomplete preference rationalizable set is non-empty and compact. I argue that incomplete orderings can be used to model incomplete information in strategic settings. Drawing on this connection, I show that in games with private
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Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 A, r, t, h, u, r, , D, o, l, g, o, p, o, l, o, v
I characterize the outcomes of a class of model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, such as stateless Q-learning, in a prisoner's dilemma. The behavior is studied in the limit as players stop experimenting after sufficiently exploring their options. A closed form relationship between the learning rate and game payoffs reveals whether the players will learn to cooperate or defect. The findings have
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Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-17 Ran I. Shorrer, Sándor Sóvágó
College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a
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A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Hiromichi Goko, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Hanna Sumita, Akihisa Tamura, Yu Yokoi, Makoto Yokoo
The notion of is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by introducing an additional divisible resource, i.e., money. In this paper, we aim to design a truthful allocation mechanism of indivisible goods to achieve fairness and efficiency criteria with a limited
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Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2024-01-10 Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Tatiana Mayskaya, Arina Nikandrova
A rational principal delegates learning to an overconfident agent who overestimates the precision of the information he collects. The principal chooses between two contracts: commitment, in which the agent commits to the duration of learning in advance, and flexible, in which the agent decides when to stop learning in real time. When the agent is sufficiently overconfident, the principal optimally
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A stranger in a strange land: Promises and identity Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-23 Gary Charness, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Stefano Papa
One's social identity tends to favor those belonging to one's group. At the same time, communication has had beneficial social consequences in controlled laboratory experiments. Can communication improve trust and outcomes between out-group members by making them more familiar? We construct a simple weak mechanism of group favoritism (different assigned colors) that induces in-group favoritism. Communication
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Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Cédric Argenton, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Wieland Müller
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known
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Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-15 Helmut Bester, József Sákovics
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two–sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves
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Independent versus collective expertise Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-12 Emiliano Catonini, Andrey Kurbatov, Sergey Stepanov
We consider the problem of a decision-maker who seeks for advice from several experts. The experts have reputation concerns which generate incentives to herd on the prior belief about the state of the world. We address the following question: Should the experts be allowed to exchange their information before providing advice (“collective expertise”) or not (“independent expertise”)? We show that collective
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Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Adriana Piazza, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected by three factors: the prudence of coalitions when evaluating a deviation, the social connectedness of those
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Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-16 R, o, s, s, , R, h, e, i, n, g, a, n, s, -, Y, o, o
I present a class of models for random matching markets with non-homogeneous agent preferences, drawn from the computer science literature on network structure. An analogue of the Watts–Strogatz (1998) ‘small-world’ network model supports significant incentives to manipulate matching outcomes. The scope for manipulation remains substantial as markets become large and unbalanced—contrasting prior work
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School choice with costly information acquisition Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-01 Tyler Maxey
I study a model of centralized school choice in which students engage in costly search over schools before submitting preference reports to a clearinghouse. I consider three classes of preferences over schools—idiosyncratic, common, and hybrid—and characterize outcomes under two search protocols—simultaneous and sequential. With idiosyncratic preferences, there are no search externalities, and inefficiencies
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Reallocation with priorities Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-12-05 Julien Combe, Jan Christoph Schlegel
We consider a reallocation problem with priorities where each agent is initially endowed with a house and is willing to exchange it but each house has a priority ordering over the agents of the market. In this setting, it is well known that there is no individually rational and stable mechanism. As a result, the literature has introduced a modified stability notion called μ0-stability. In contrast
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Order independence for rationalizability Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Julien Manili
This paper provides a sufficient monotonicity condition for the solution of a rationalizability procedure to be independent of the order of elimination. The analysis unfolds in an abstract environment that applies to any game and elimination procedure. Monotonicity is satisfied by rationalizability procedures based on monotone belief operators, such as “directed” rationalizability, interim correlated
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Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-29 Tobias Cagala, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke, Simeon Schudy
Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in
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The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-30 Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong, Joosung Lee
We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, under complete information, GPR is core-selecting, implying
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Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-30 Bo Chen, Bo Chen
We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations. To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an information disclosure policy through Bayesian persuasion about the bidder with private information. We characterize optimal disclosure and find that optimal disclosure exhibits almost full disclosure, where the uninformed bidder
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Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-30 Pietro Battiston, Sharon G. Harrison
Models with sunspot equilibria have long been a topic of interest among economists. It then became an interesting question to ask whether there is empirical support for their existence. One approach to answer this question is through lab experiments. A growing literature has not only successfully reproduced these equilibria in the lab, but also improved our understanding of the conditions under which
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Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-23 Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders, Frits Spieksma
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) increase kidney transplantation by facilitating the exchange of incompatible donors. Increasing the scale of KEPs leads to more opportunities for transplants. Collaboration between transplant organizations (agents) is thus desirable. As agents are primarily interested in providing transplants for their own patients, collaboration requires balancing individual and common
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Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 R. Pablo Arribillaga, Agustín G. Bonifacio
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowed, we look for rules in which manipulations are not obvious. First, we show that a rule does not have obvious manipulations if and only if when an agent
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Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-23 Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi, Riccardo D. Saulle
Rotation programs are widely used in our society. For instance, a job rotation program is an HR strategy where employees rotate between two or more jobs in the same business. We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. We introduce the notion of implementation in ordered cycles, where each ordered cycle is a rotation program for an assignment
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The n-player Hirshleifer contest Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 Christian Ewerhart, Guang-Zhen Sun
While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high and intermediate levels of noise, the equilibrium is in pure
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Auction timing and market thickness Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 Isaías N. Chaves, Shota Ichihashi
A seller faces a pool of potential bidders that changes over time. She can delay the auction to have a thicker market later on. The seller imposes static distortions (through her choice of reserve prices) and dynamic distortions (through her choice of market thickness). Under a condition on types that generalizes increasing hazard rates, we show that (i) regulating only static distortions can harm
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School choice with transferable student characteristics Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, Antonio Romero-Medina
We consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transferable student characteristics. Fair Pareto improvements can alleviate the trade-off between efficiency and stability in this framework. A group of students may improve their outcomes by exchanging their seats and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned without generating justified envy among
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Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 Yuval Heller, Christoph Kuzmics
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian
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Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be) Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-21 Peilu Zhang, Yinjunjie Zhang, Marco A. Palma
Women frequently react less favorably to competition than men. In this paper, we investigate the effects of social roles on willingness to compete (WTC). Subjects compete in two-person teams. In the treatment, one team member is randomly assigned the role of “breadwinner/manager”, and the other person is randomly assigned as the “supporter/assistant”. The only difference between the roles is the labels
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Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-20 Yoichi Kasajima, Manabu Toda
We propose a new axiom called “own-side singles monotonicity” in one-to-one matching problems between men and women. Suppose that there is an agent who is not matched in a problem. Suppose for simplicity it is a woman. Now in a new problem, we improve (or leave unchanged) her ranking for each man. Own-side singles monotonicity requires that each woman should not be made better off (except for her)
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Buying winners Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-17 Charles Louis-Sidois
Two principals with heterogenous budgets compete to buy the best agent (the winner). First, the principals make initial offers to the agents before the winner is known. Then, if the winner has not accepted any offer, the principals make a second round of offers after the winner is revealed. In equilibrium, the principal with the higher budget offers her entire budget to the winner after he is revealed
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Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Xiang Sun, Jin Xu, Junjie Zhou
In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality
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Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Wonki Jo Cho, William Thomson
We consider the problem of allocating a social endowment of private goods among a group of n agents with linear preferences. We search for rules that satisfy three standard requirements. First is (Pareto-)efficiency. Second is the fairness requirement of “equal treatment of equals” (in welfare terms). Third is the incentive requirement of “strategy-proofness”: no agent should ever benefit from misrepresenting
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Unaware consumers and disclosure of deficiencies Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Stefanie Y. Schmitt, Dominik Bruckner
We analyze firms' incentives to disclose deficiencies that reduce the quality of goods when consumers lack information. We distinguish two types of information: First, only some consumers are aware of the existence of deficiencies. Second, only some consumers have the expertise to infer the true levels of deficiencies once they are aware of the existence of deficiencies. We show that the interplay
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Rent Dissipation and Streamlined Costs: Laboratory Experiments Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-03 Charles A. Holt, Angela M. Smith
The effect of group size and effort cost on rent dissipation in the standard Tullock rent seeking model is examined using a laboratory experiment. Data support qualitative comparative static Nash equilibrium predictions as reductions in both group size and effort cost increase effort levels. However, effort and dissipation rates are above Nash predictions for all treatments. In addition, while cutting
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Constrained contests with a continuum of battles Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-11-04 Sung-Ha Hwang, Youngwoo Koh, Jingfeng Lu
We study a contest problem in which two players compete on a continuum of battlefields by spending resources subject to some constraints on their strategies. Following Myerson (1993), we assume that each player's resource allocation on each battlefield is an independent random draw from the same distribution. Within each battlefield, the player who allocates a higher level of resources wins, but both
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Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-10-27 Joseph Siani, Narcisse Tedjeugang, Bertrand Tchantcho
The influence relation, defined within the set of simple games, is identified as a preorder. Additionally, it is proved to be a subpreorder of the preorders induced by the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf–Coleman indices. When this relation extends to voting games with abstention, detailed in Tchantcho et al. (2008), and further to multichoice voting games as in Pongou et al. (2014), it is shown that these
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The Infinitely Repeated Volunteer's Dilemma: An Experimental Study Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Andrew Kloosterman, Shakun Mago
We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one
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Influencing a polarized and connected legislature Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Ratul Das Chaudhury, C. Matthew Leister, Birendra Rai
When can an interest group exploit polarization between political parties to its advantage? Building upon Battaglini and Patacchini (2018), we study a model where an interest group credibly promises payments to legislators conditional on voting for its preferred policy. A legislator can be directly susceptible to other legislators and value voting like them. The overall pattern of inter-legislator
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Stochastic replicator dynamics: A theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-10-23 Kangkan Dev Choudhury, Tigran Aydinyan
We study the dynamics of strategic choice in an environment where payoffs are perturbed by strategy-specific noise and strategy revision is governed by the simple proportional imitation protocol. Applying the stochastic replicator dynamic to a two-by-two symmetric game, we derive the steady-state frequencies of the strategies and show that the dominated strategy can persist in equilibrium if the variance
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Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment Games Econ. Behav. (IF 1.265) Pub Date : 2023-10-25 Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa, Tetsuo Yamamori
This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the