This paper introduces strategic agents into a two-sided market. We model strategic agents as advertisers who can invest in ad quality, which in turn affects readers, platforms and themselves. When platforms can choose prices on both the reader side and the advertiser side, strategic agents intensify competition, leading to lower prices and profits for the platforms. However, when prices on the reader

This paper explores the sustainability of collusion under either ad valorem or specific taxation in an infinitely repeated duopoly game. I compare ad valorem taxes and specific taxes that generate the same average price or tax revenue in the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. I find that collusion is less sustainable under ad valorem than specific taxation when marginal costs are asymmetric and constant

Incorporating an exclusive dealing extension into Cournot competition, we analyze the multiproduct downstream firms’ choice of organizational form between the unitary form (U-form) for corporate incentive and the multidivisional form (M-form) for divisional incentive. The U-form in the managerial delegation for downstream firms is a dominant strategy under partial and binding exclusive dealings, while

This paper discusses the licensing of technology between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The firms produce products of different qualities (high and low) and incur different costs per unit of output produced. It is shown that technology is transferred from the firm that produces the higher quality product to the firm that produces the lower quality

We compare outcomes of the common identical-item auction formats in an independent private value environment. In single-unit demand cases, discriminatory auctions, uniform-price auctions, sequential auctions with disclosing only the winner’s identity, and sequential auctions with disclosing both the winner’s identity and winning price, are revenue equivalent. The seller’s expected revenue is the lowest

This paper examines the welfare consequences of private provision of green goods in output markets with product differentiation. In our setting, consumers can be prone to engage in the consumption of green goods (e.g., from eco-labels or due to some forms of altruism), and firm entry is endogenous. Our analysis shows that firms underinvest in environmentally cleaner products in situations where the

This study analyses self-insurance and saving decisions in a two-period model when the utility function depends on income and health. In this study, we consider an intertemporal and multi-dimensional cost–benefit structure of self-insurance and saving, unlike in the standard one-argument utility model. We show that the impacts of the changes in initial income and health on self-insurance and saving

By analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free

This work examines the effects of different kinds of subsidies on risk prevention from a theoretical standpoint. We show that both a subsidy on the cost of prevention activities and a subsidy on wealth have ambiguous effects on the level of present contemporaneous prevention. Similar kinds of subsidies have however increasing effects on the level of advance prevention and, under plausible assumptions

We investigate the collusive incentive for far-sighted manufacturers selling via managerial retailers. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that revenue delegation can impede upstream collusion in Bertrand models. This happens due to market exit in the deviation phase when products are close substitutes. The result of managerial delegation hindering upstream collusion is robust if we allow

This paper investigates optimal contracts between risk-neutral parties when both exert efforts and the agent faces limited liability. We identify a sufficient and necessary condition for any contract to implement the second-best outcome, i.e., the best possible outcome in double moral hazard even when the agent faces unlimited liability. It is shown that a simple share-or-nothing with bonus contract

This paper compares ad valorem and per unit taxation in the context of price signaling. In the model, a taxation designer chooses between ad valorem and per unit taxation to maximize tax revenues, and a monopoly firm, whose product quality can be either high or low, uses price as a quality signal. The analysis shows that, compared to per unit taxation, ad valorem taxation raises the low-quality firm’s

We consider an economy with two categories of agents: entrepreneurs and workers. In laissez-faire, the former gain from having their children educated, while the latter, although they may profit from their own education, have no interest in sending their children to school. We first characterise the preferred education policy-cum-redistributive taxation for the two groups, and find that entrepreneurs

We study the potential for rational bubbles in the innovation sector to affect long term economic growth. We show that stock market prices of research and development (R&D) firms can include a bubble component when credit constraints are present. Bubbles are self-sustained in equilibrium by a “liquidity” premium that originates when credit constraints are relaxed. Bubbles expand the borrowing and production

This paper describes how process and product innovations respond to cost and demand changes. In the present model firms simultaneously choose process and product innovations within a model of vertical differentiation and uncovered market. We show that the outcome is unique both in monopoly and in the duopoly. In these outcomes, a demand increase (decrease) enhances (depresses) both process and product

This paper analyzes the impact of the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy on the stability of an one-sector AK economy. The monetary authority pegs the money growth factor while the fiscal authority implements a progressive consumption tax. The demand of money is motivated by a fractional liquidity constraint on consumption expenditures. When only the monetary authority operates,

This paper investigates the impact of market incompleteness on investment decisions. In contrast to previous studies, we assume an entrepreneur has power utility and investment causes an additive increase in her wealth. By using the binomial theorem, we derive the analytical solutions for the option value and investment threshold. First, we show that an increase in wealth alleviates the over-investment

We analyze the effects of strategic Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on social welfare in an industry where firms are owned by consumers (publicly owned) and CSR commitment takes the form of a fraction of the consumer surplus into the firms’ objective function. We compare this market configuration with the standard case of firms owned by entrepreneurs (privately owned). In line with the empirical

This paper explores the study of bilateral oligopoly, in which both sellers and buyers have substantial influence on the market. We lead readers coherently through the key results that emerge from the literature on bilateral oligopoly by means of worked examples based on the same underlying two commodity exchange economy, along with broader consideration of the relevant literature. This allows us to

This paper establishes the conditions under which indeterminacy can occur in a Neoclassical growth model with international labor mobility. In the model, workers are supposed to move freely across countries without restrictions, and according to a Harris–Todaro mechanism that makes migration flows sensitive to differences among labor markets conditions. The paper shows that indeterminacy requires the

This paper uses a search model to study the competition between a store brand and a third-party brand in a platform. Consumers sample products in a sequential ordering. Sampling cost is crucial for determining product orderings. We find that, the platform prefers making the third-party brand prominent when the outside market is closed, and generally prefers making the store brand prominent when there

We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce heterogeneous goods. The public sector competes with a private sector that may be composed of uniplant firms or a multiplant firm. Private firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that the stake held by the government in the state corporation depends on several factors: the degree to which private firms

This paper analyses the effects upon firms and consumers of horizontal mergers in a multitier decentralized supply chain with a finite number of players in each tier, when firms may opt for two different post-merger internal organization forms: multidivisional, in which separate divisions are kept, or traditional, with cost synergies. To this effect, we develop and solve a formal game theory-based

We show that the comparison of the two-part licensing mechanisms considered in the San Martin and Saracho (2015) context is exactly identical to that in Colombo and Filippini (J Econ 118:47–76, 2016) context. This means that the results obtained in Colombo and Filippini (J Econ 118:47–76, 2016) when the patentee chooses between per-unit and ad valorem royalties are incorrect. We conclude that when

This paper investigate how the corporate (profit) tax rate affects the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly, while introducing a minimum profit constraint for the private firm. Firstly, we show that the profit tax rate directly affects the behavior of the partially privatized firm and affects the behavior of the private firm through strategic interaction. In addition, we investigate the

We construct a three-period overlapping generations model in which corrup- tion, mortality and fertility rates, and economic development are determined endogenously. We consider a less developed economy suffering from a high degree of corruption and high mortality and fertility rates in a poverty trap. We focus on two policies: raising public sector wages as a means of reducing corruption and increasing

I study the impact of competition and taxation on the openness and the intellectual property policies of two-sided digital platforms. I model a market in which two platforms compete for users and developers. First, I find that higher competition shortens the period of exclusivity granted to developers but does not influence the degree of openness of a platform. However, the higher the degree of differentiation

In this paper we consider a differentiated oligopoly with two product varieties that are supplied by two groups of firms. After computing the Cournot solution of the game, we study its sensitivity to different sources of competition, namely the degree of product substitutability and market composition. Market composition can change either via new firms entering one industry or via firms switching production

We analyse a market where quality is reflected in sunk costs and/or marginal costs. Firms provide too low quality as compared to the socially optimal solution whenever quality affects (at least) sunk costs. Entry would then increase welfare, but the number of firms is restricted by an upper limit that depends on how sunk costs and consumer utility are affected by a quality change. Firms may even produce

This paper first analyzes a fiscal-policy game between two jurisdictions connected by mutual migration and obtains two main results. (i) As the mutual migration intensifies, both jurisdictions in the Nash equilibrium choose more public consumption, less public investment and more total spending, and finance the total spending entirely with debt. (ii) While the Nash equilibrium without any restriction

Many studies examine the relationship between aging and economic growth; however, only a few theoretical studies find a possible non-linear relationship. Thus, this study theoretically investigates the impact of population aging on economies. We construct a three-period overlapping generations model with two sectors: non-education and education. We assume that learning-by-doing effects compound as