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Optimal student allocation with peer effects Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita
This paper studies an optimal assignment problem of heterogenous students to schools with a particular kind of preference complementarity: peer effects, defined by the average ability of those in the same school. The tractability of the problem allows us to characterize the optimal assignment mechanism, which has a simple “(stochastic) pass-fail” structure. Its shape is mainly determined by the convexity/concavity
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A fair procedure in a marriage market Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2024-02-10 Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina
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Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2024-01-31 Sanyyam Khurana
Consider a single-unit auction with resale and two risk neutral bidders. The ranking of the valuations is known to both the bidders—that is, the bidders know the identity of the highest and lowest valuation bidders. We show that, when the value-rankings are revealed, the classic result of “bid symmetrization” does not hold. Surprisingly, the bidder with the lowest valuation produces a stronger bid
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The hierarchy of public governance: resource allocation versus bureaucratic inefficiency Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-12-29 Susheng Wang, Jun Xiao
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On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-12-19 Yu Gu, Yongchao Zhang
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Job rotation or specialization? A dynamic matching model analysis Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Morimitsu Kurino, Yoshinori Kurokawa
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Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-11-28 Jop Schouten, Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg, Peter Borm
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A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-11-08 Jianxin Yi
In this paper, we focus on the domain of decreasing marginal valuations and show that in the presence of budget-constrained bidders there is no multi-unit auction that satisfies the following four properties: incentive compatibility, Pareto optimality, individual rationality and no positive transfers. This result strengthens the impossibility results of two previous studies.
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Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-10-17 Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee
This paper presents an extension of maxmed mechanisms introduced by Sprumont (J Econ Theory 148:1102–1121, 2013) to the multiple homogeneous object setting. To address the complexities of the multiple objects setting, we consider special families of mechanisms, which contain a mechanism for each possible number of available objects. We interpret these families as ex-ante sale procedures, which specify
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Efficient mask allocation during a pandemic Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-10-03 Wei-Cheng Chen, Lin Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao
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Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-09-28 Hayri Alper Arslan, Yang Song, Tong Wang
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The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-09-18 Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
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Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-07-29 Ricardo Gonçalves, Indrajit Ray
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Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-07-25 Karl Jandoc, Ruben Juarez
Agents endowed with powers compete for a divisible prize by forming coalitions. When a coalition wins, all non-members are eliminated. The winning coalition then divides the prize among its members according to a given sharing rule. We investigate the case where the sharing rule satisfies a property we call consistent ranking. Consistent ranking ensures that agents’ rankings of competing coalitions
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Communication and coordination with constraints Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-07-22 Raghul S. Venkatesh
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Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-07-20 Oleg Muratov
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Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-06-29 Maria Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi
In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams that are generating impacts according to the Cobb–Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result
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The perks of being in the smaller team: incentives in overlapping contests Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-06-24 Christoph March, Marco Sahm
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Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-06-26 Gregory Pavlov
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Efficient work-from-home allocation for pandemic mitigation Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-06-21 Wei-Cheng Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao, Yi-Hsuan Lin
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The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-05-26 Yajing Chen, Patrick Harless, Zhenhua Jiao
This study considers the problem of random assignment of a set of objects to a set of agents based on strict ordinal preferences of the agents. We analyze the fractional Boston rule, which is a generalization of the classical Boston rule to random assignment environments. We introduce two new axioms—stochastic dominance (sd)-rank-efficiency and equal-rank envy-freeness—which are respectively efficiency
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King Solomon’s dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-02-07 Makoto Hagiwara, Fumihiro Yonekura
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Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously? Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-02-02 Remy Oddou
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Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-01-23 Yukinori Iwata
We investigate the strategic manipulation of two-stage voting procedures with the nomination process. First, some alternatives are nominated by aggregating voters’ opinions, which are positive or negative views about which alternatives are eligible as candidates for collective decision-making. Subsequently, the voting outcome is chosen from the set of nominated alternatives by aggregating the voters’
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Bargaining power in crisis bargaining Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2023-01-05 Bahar Leventoğlu
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The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-12-16 Colin von Negenborn
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On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-12-07 William Thomson
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Locally efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in exchange economies Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-12-01 Takeshi Momi
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Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-28 Marek Pycia, M. Utku Ünver
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Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-22 Semih Koray, Murat Sertel
Delegation games are studied in the context of a symmetric linear Cournotic duopoly where redelegation is permissible. In the absence of extraneous delegation costs, the following results are demonstrated: (1) Each principal has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of his delegation chain. (2) As the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound, (i) total output at the (Cournot) equilibrium
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Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-11 Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee
This paper characterizes Vickrey auction with reserve price [VARP], in single and multiple objects settings, using normative and strategic axioms. In particular, it provides a new interpretation of reserve price as the infimum of a particular set of non-negative real numbers. In the single object case, we find that a strategyproof mechanism satisfies anonymity in welfare, agent sovereignty and non-bossiness
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Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-12 John Duffy, Alexander Matros, Zehra Valencia
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Trade of a common value good Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-12 Steven R. Williams
When traders have private information about a common value good, adverse selection alone is insufficient to prevent trade of the good and estimation of the common value based upon the traders’ private information. We explore sufficient conditions for nonexistence of trading mechanisms in which trade of a common good occurs, along with cases in which such mechanisms exist.
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And the first runner-up is...: comparing winner selection procedures in multi-winner Tullock contests Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-11-09 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Theodore L. Turocy
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Designing randomized response surveys to support honest answers to stigmatizing questions Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-10-31 James C. D. Fisher, Timothy J. Flannery
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Nonparametric identification and estimation of all-pay auction and contest models Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-09-15 Ksenia Shakhgildyan
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Difference-form group contests Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-09-05 María Cubel, Santiago Sanchez-Pages
This paper is the first to study difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups where their probability of victory depends on the absolute difference of their effective efforts. We show that key equilibrium variables in these contests can be expressed as a function of a modified version of the Watts poverty index. We use the properties of this index to study the impact of heterogeneity
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Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-09-02 José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris, María-José Solís-Baltodano
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To sell public or private goods Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-08-04 Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx
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Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-08-02 Mikhail Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin
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Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-07-20 Lars Ehlers
We study the problem of locating multiple public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies for each public good a location. In Miyagawa (Mechanisms for providing a menu of public goods. University of Rochester., 1998) each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize
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Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-07-12 Hiroto Sato
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Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-06-17 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Lars Peter Østerdal
We analyze the implications of axioms formalizing entitlements to continued life for the evaluation of population health, when combined with basic structural axioms. A straightforward implication of our analysis is that if the scope of equal entitlements to continued life is not limited, concerns for morbidity are dismissed in the evaluation of population health. Nevertheless, with axioms formalizing
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Compromising as an equal loss principle Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-05-11 Olivier Cailloux, Beatrice Napolitano, M. Remzi Sanver
A social choice rule aggregates the preferences of a group of individuals over a set of alternatives into a collective choice. The literature admits several social choice rules whose recommendations are supposed to reflect a compromise among individuals. We observe that all these compromise rules can be better described as procedural compromises, i.e., they impose over individuals a willingness to
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Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-04-19 Dmitry Sedov
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Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-04-04 Trivikram Dokka, Hervé Moulin, Indrajit Ray, Sonali SenGupta
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Deviation from proportionality and Lorenz-domination for claims problems Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-04-01 Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Iago Núñez Lugilde, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez
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Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-03-23 Sulagna Dasgupta, Debasis Mishra
We explore the consequences of weakening the notion of incentive compatibility from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) in the random assignment model. If the common prior of the agents is the uniform prior, then a large class of random mechanisms are OBIC with respect to this prior—this includes the probabilistic serial mechanism. We then introduce a robust version
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Paying it forward: an experimental study on social connections and indirect reciprocity Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-03-08 Pinghan Liang, Juanjuan Meng
This paper studies how in-group social connections affect outsiders’ pro-social behavior towards group members. We employ an indirect investment game, in which a recipient of a good deed has to return to a beneficiary, instead of the original donor. We introduce the naturally-occurring social connections between the donor and the beneficiary, and show that such connections increase the recipients’
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A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-03-07 Duygu Nizamogullari, İpek Özkal-Sanver
Classical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as the “outside option”. This conception implicitly assumes that there are always some empty rooms to be shared. However, there are many instances when this is not the case. We introduce roommate problems with a limited number of rooms, where the “outside option” is “having no room”. In this general framework,
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New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-03-03 J. Sánchez-Pérez
In this paper we present a different perspective than the more traditional approaches to study solutions for multi-issue allocation problems. This perspective is based on a direct sum decomposition for the vector space of these problems by identifying those subspaces that are relevant to the study of linear symmetric solutions. We then use such decomposition to derive some basic applications involving
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Testing alone is insufficient Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-03-01 Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai, Akhil Vohra, Rakesh Vohra
The fear of contracting a serious illness caused by a contagious disease limits economic activity even after reopening. Widespread testing alone will not alleviate this problem. We argue that targeted testing in concert with targeted transfers is essential. We propose a model with these features to determine where agents should be tested and how they should be incentivized. Agents with a low wage,
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Other-regarding preferences and giving decision in a risky environment: experimental evidence Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-02-24 Mickael Beaud, Mathieu Lefebvre, Julie Rosaz
We investigate whether and how an individual giving decision is affected in risky environments in which the recipient’s wealth is random. We demonstrate that, under risk neutrality, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskiness of the recipient’s payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Furthermore, we observe
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Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-02-21 Dominic Keehan, Dodge Cahan, John McCabe-Dansted, Arkadii Slinko
We study spatial competition by firms which is often studied in the context of linear markets where customers always shop at the nearest firm. Here, customer behavior is determined by a probability vector \(\mathbf{p }=(p_1,\ldots ,p_n)\) where \(p_i\) is the probability that a customer visits the ith closest firm. At the same time, the market is circular a là Salop (Bell J Econ 10(1):141–156, 1979)
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A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-02-18 Rohan Chowdhury
We present a two-sided one-to-one market setting where one side of the market is objectively ranked. Constraints prevent agents on the other side from matching with agents who are ranked higher than an agent-specific threshold. The domain allows for indifferences, with preferences of one side being derived from a master preference list, while agents on the other side have general preferences. We analyze
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A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-02-11 Muharrem Yeşilırmak
Around the world, some countries rely on exam based placement into public schools whereas some others rely on home address based placement. Recently, Turkey has changed its public high school admission rule from exam based placement to home address based placement. This raised concerns regarding equality of opportunity since high quality public schools are located in rich neighborhoods. To quantify
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Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity Rev. Econ. Des. (IF 0.238) Pub Date : 2022-02-09 Darong Dai, Guoqiang Tian
In this study we analyse optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules in a two-region, two-period federation model. The two regions differ in privately observable discount factors and in publicly observable durability of local public goods. We address the question of whether the contributor region of redistribution should face a weaker borrowing constraint than the recipient region.