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Delegation to incentivize information production Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 Cheng Li, Huangxing Mao
This paper examines the impact of delegating decision-making authority to a biased and uninformed agent in a Bayesian persuasion model. We find that delegation can incentivize the sender to produce more information about the merits of the sender’s proposed project. This is because an agent with a small negative bias requires more compelling evidence than the principal to implement the project. The
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Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 Abdullah Almeer, Umut Dur, Will Harris, Greg Hauser, William Phan, Yanning Zhang
We study the assignment of an object with multiple copies where various numbers can be reserved for some types of individuals. We focus on the reserve system’s ability to increase the representation of a targeted type. We consider a general setting that covers many features considered in the recent literature; in particular, an individual can belong to more than one type and the priorities of individuals
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Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita
When provided with the performance ranking of multiple sets of agents as input, which set of agents is expected to play the key role? To address this question, we introduce a new rule (transformation rule) that maps a performance ranking over sets of agents into a contributing ranking over sets of agents. Preference extension (PE) and social ranking problem (SRP) represent two special cases. We prove
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Coherence of inequality measures with respect to partial orderings of income distributions Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-08 Terence Chan
This paper investigates the coherence of a new class of ratio-based inequality indices introduced in with respect to certain partial orderings of the underlying income distributions. While coherence with respect to stochastic dominance has been extensively studied, the appropriate partial ordering for this new class of indices is quantile ratio dominance. This paper also establishes coherence with
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Network externalities in a vertically differentiated luxury goods market Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-03 Di Wu, Ji Sun, Leonard F.S. Wang, Huizhong Liu
This study examines the impact of network externalities on the market performance of vertically differentiated luxury products. Luxury consumption triggers vanity-driven utility, which decreases due to the snob effect as market share expands. By employing a duopoly model under price competition, we demonstrate that a higher degree of network externalities enhances high-quality product market share
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Optimal influence under observational learning Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Nikolas Tsakas
We study the optimal targeting problem of a firm that is seeking to maximize the diffusion of a product in a society where agents learn from their neighbors. The firm can seed the product to a subset of the population and our goal is to find which the optimal subset to target is. We provide a condition that characterizes the optimal targeting strategy for any network structure. The key parameter in
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Taylor and fiscal rules: When do they stabilize the economy? Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-02-01 Francesco Magris, Daria Onori
We consider a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities and fractional cash in-advance constraint on consumption expenditures. We study the stability properties of the model when Taylor rules react either to current inflation or to expected one. We account for different public sector budget identities and different fiscal policies ensuring Government solvency. Under an independent Central Bank, forward-looking
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A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-26 Christian Ewerhart
The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In the present paper, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH is true, then any game in the family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family
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Dynamics of opinion polarization in a population Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-24 Ricardo Cano Macias, Jorge Mauricio Ruiz Vera
This article addresses the polarization of the population around an idea and proposes a simple model that describes its dynamics in a society characterized by asymmetries in freedom of expression. The model considers a population divided into followers of an idea, consisting of moderate sympathizers and staunch defenders, and a group of opponents who try to spread their position but are also susceptible
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Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-24 Elpiniki Bakaouka, Marc Escrihuela-Villar, Walter Ferrarese
We discuss horizontal mergers in a homogeneous good industry where firms compete à la Bertrand with increasing marginal production costs. We show that profitable mergers can occur even for lower post-merger prices with respect to the pre-merger scenario, thus implying an increase in consumer surplus. The driving force of the result is the ability of the merged entity cutting production costs by sharing
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Note on “A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains” by Guanhao Li, Mathematical Social Sciences 125 (2023), 42–57 Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-19 Clemens Puppe, Arkadii Slinko
The note presents a counter example to Li (2023).
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Expectations for the MPC chair and interest rate persistence Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Yuta Saito
This paper examines how the public’s expectations for the chair of the monetary policy committee influence policy outcomes. We show that the expectation that the chair will propose their ideal policy at the meeting can lead a majority of the committee to reject the policy change. The result suggests that the expectation of the chair’s agenda setting is a determinant of interest rate persistence.
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Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-13 Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Lars Ehlers
In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many different extensions have been proposed.
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Classification aggregation without unanimity Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Olivier Cailloux, Matthieu Hervouin, Ali I. Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver
A classification is a surjective mapping from a set of objects to a set of categories. A classification aggregation function aggregates every vector of classifications into a single one. We show that every citizen sovereign and independent classification aggregation function is essentially a dictatorship. This impossibility implies an earlier result of Maniquet and Mongin (2016), who show that every
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Characterizations of approval ranking Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Hiroyuki Komatsu
In this paper, we consider those voting situations in which each voter decides whether he or she approves each candidate. Given a list of such approvals, a “social preference function” picks a ranking of the candidates. We are interested in finding out which social preference functions are non-manipulable. We show that a particular social preference function, referred to as approval ranking, is more
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Strategy-proof allocation of objects: A characterization result Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-28 Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given
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Costly expressive voting Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Arthur Fishman, Doron Klunover
We incorporate expressive utility into Börgers’ (2004) canonical symmetric model of costly voting. It is shown that, under reasonable conditions, there exist two types of Bayesian Equilibria, those in which voters vote instrumentally and those in which they vote expressively. We show that equilibria in which voting is expressive is characterized by higher turnout and higher welfare. It is also shown
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Creative destruction vs destructive destruction: A Schumpeterian approach for adaptation and mitigation Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-16 Can Askan Mavi
This article aims to demonstrate how a market exposed to a catastrophic event strives to find a balance between adaptation and mitigation policies through R&D strategies. Our analysis reveals that, within our framework, there exists no trade-off between adaptation and mitigation. Rather, the critical relationship exists between adaptation and pollution because adaptation (wealth accumulation) increases
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Relational utility and social norms in games Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-09 Ruiyang Su, Bryce Morsky
Social norms, the informal rules of society, and relational utility, e.g. utility generated by guilt, are mechanisms by which cooperation and coordination can be facilitated. Here we add relational utility, derived from social norms, to the standard utility functions for several classic games and find that the qualitative outcome of these games can be altered. We find that social dilemmas can be converted
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Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-12-02 Diego Carrasco, Shino Takayama, Yuki Tamura, Terence Yeo
We consider two-stage electoral competitions with strategic voters, investigating the effects of valence (i.e., a candidate’s personal quality) on policy polarization. In our model, two parties compete in a general election, and each party has two office-seeking candidates. Parties first hold a primary election to decide their representative, and then put forward their winning candidate to compete
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Rational Shortlist Method with refined rationales Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-21 Hassan Nosratabadi
We study a shortlisting model of choice where a decision-maker first applies her inherent rationale and then follows with a sequence of refined rationales that are triggered by inferior alternatives in a menu. Our decision-maker exhausts all the possible paths of sequential filtering. This model captures choice anomalies in multi-attribute choice space where shortlisting seems to be a natural heuristic
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Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-17 Eric Gonzalez-Sanchez, Gino Loyola
We propose an ultimatum bargaining model in which the parties experience an envy-based externality that is private information. Our results indicate that there is a threshold for the proposer’s envy which determines whether there will be either a perfectly equitable, certain agreement or an uncertain, inequitable agreement, and that this threshold rises as the distribution of the responder’s envy level
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On the difficulty of characterizing network formation with endogenous behavior Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-15 Benjamin Golub, Yu-Chi Hsieh, Evan Sadler
Bolletta (2021) studies a model in which a network is strategically formed and then agents play a linear best-response investment game in it. The model is motivated by an application in which people choose both their study partners and their levels of educational effort. Agents have different one-dimensional types—private returns to effort. A main result claims that (pairwise Nash) stable networks
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Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-02 Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual
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On the measurement of electoral volatility Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-11-03 Sandip Sarkar, Bharatee Bhusana Dash
Electoral volatility measures the degree of vote switching between political parties in two consecutive elections. Political scientists use this as an indicator of party system (in)stability. Pedersen (1979) states that volatility should increase when the number of parties changes and/or relevant parties experience vote transfer between elections. However, his proposed functional form of measuring
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Robust Bayesian choice Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-31 Lorenzo Stanca
A major concern with Bayesian decision making under uncertainty is the use of a single probability measure to quantify all relevant uncertainty. This paper studies prior robustness as a form of continuity of the value of a decision problem. I show that this notion of robustness is characterized by a form of stable choice over a sequence of perturbed decision problems, in which the available acts are
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Subjective complexity under uncertainty Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-16 Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
Complexity of the problem of choosing among uncertain acts is a salient feature of many of the environments in which departures from expected utility theory are observed. I study a class of Generalized Simple Bounds preferences in which acts that are complex from the perspective of the decision maker are bracketed by “simple” acts to which they are related by statewise dominance. I then study a refinement
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Analytic approach for models of optimal retirement with disability risk Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-10-05 Jiwon Chae, Bong-Gyu Jang, Seyoung Park
Models of optimal retirement should reflect market incompleteness in reality caused by disability risk. In this paper, we develop an analytic approach for optimal retirement models with disability risk. More precisely, we provide an analytically tractable characterization of total wealth that is the sum of financial wealth and the present value of future income. We then provide analytic properties
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Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-29 János Flesch, Zsombor Z. Méder, Ronald Peeters, Yianis Sarafidis
We consider the intertemporal price discrimination problem of a durable good monopolist facing a population of consumers who are time inconsistent. We show that price trajectories, profits and welfare are sensitive to consumers’ first- and second-order beliefs regarding their time preferences. Surprisingly, we find that sales and profits are largest when consumers are sophisticated, i.e., when consumers
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Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-29 Benjamín Tello
We study matching with couples problems where hospitals have one vacant position. We introduce a constraint on couples’ preferences over pairs of hospitals called restricted complementarity, which is a “translation” of bilateral substitutability in matching with contracts. Next, we extend Klaus and Klijn’s (2007) path to stability result by showing that if couples’ preferences satisfy restricted complementarity
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Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-27 Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is resource-, population-, and weight-monotone, satisfies group-strategyproofness, and can be implemented in polynomial time. We generalize these results to the class
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Mergers of complements, endogenous product differentiation and welfare Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-15 Tien-Der Han, Arijit Mukherjee
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent holders benefits the consumers and the society by reducing the input prices. We show that the effects of a merger of complements are not so straightforward in a dynamic set up with endogenous product differentiation in the final goods market. The merger of complements reduces the total input prices and
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Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing with shelving Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-14 Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar
We consider a market of technology transfer and licensing with an outside innovator and two asymmetric potential licensees where the licensees have asymmetric absorptive capacities of a cost reducing innovation. The low-cost efficient licensee/firm can only benefit from the new technology if the size of the cost reducing innovation is strictly bigger than the cost difference from its competitor. The
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Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-09-13 Tamás Solymosi
It is well known that in assignment markets competitive prices always exist, but no price mechanism is strategy-proof for all agents. We investigate the extent a single agent can influence three special competitive price vectors by misreporting his/her reservation values. We provide an exact formula how the minimum, the maximum, and the fair competitive price vectors change, and show that at the fair
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Positively correlated choice Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-20 Guy Barokas
We provide an axiomatic foundation for a choice model with two periods between which preferences are updated, but the second period choices are positively correlated with past choices in a manner that is unrelated to the agent’s preferences. Specifically, in our model, the agent chooses alternative x over alternative y in contrast to his past choice if and only if the difference between the utility
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Computational complexity of necessary envy-freeness Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-18 Haris Aziz, Ildikó Schlotter, Toby Walsh
We consider the fundamental problem of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have strict ordinal preferences over individual items. We focus on the well-studied fairness criterion of necessary envy-freeness. For a constant number of agents, the computational complexity of the deciding whether there exists an allocation that satisfies necessary envy-freeness has been open for several years
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Information design and sensitivity to market fundamentals Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-08-18 Pedro Guinsburg
I apply persuasion to a linear-in-best-responses setup that encompasses Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolistic Competition games. Before the state of the world is realized, firms must design public signals regarding an individual payoff parameter. Full Disclosure enables companies to connect actions to states of the world at the expense of releasing crucial information to the competitors. On the other
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When is frugality optimal? Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-29 Bertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Georges Zaccour
We consider an optimal growth model in which the decision maker chooses the consumption path that maximizes her utility over a finite planning horizon. At each instant of time, she can opt for a regular product that pollutes the environment, or a non-polluting frugal product, which procures, however, lower utility. Depending on the parameter values, different optimal paths can materialize, including
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Characterization of optimal durations of unemployment benefits in a nonstationary job search model Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-25 Gilles Joseph, Paul-Emile Maingé
This paper studies the optimal duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in a job search model where a risk neutral UI agency cannot monitor the search effort of risk-averse workers. Unemployment assistance benefits for noneligible unemployed are taken as exogenous by the unemployment agency which chooses optimally the constant level of UI benefits, the date of their exhaustion and the constant
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Experiments versus distributions of posteriors Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-17 Stefan Terstiege, Cédric Wasser
A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of posterior beliefs can be induced by an experiment if and only if the posterior beliefs average to the prior belief. We present a general version of this result that applies to infinite state and signal spaces.
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Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-14 Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena, Peter Sudhölter
In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including parametric rules
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Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-12 Nejat Anbarci, Kutay Cingiz, Mehmet S. Ismail
In this note, we introduce a general model of dynamic n-player multi-battle Blotto contests in which asymmetric resources and non-homogeneous battlefield prizes are possible. Each player’s probability of winning the prize in a battlefield is governed by a ratio-form contest success function and players’ resource allocation on that battlefield. We show that there exists a pure subgame perfect equilibrium
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Unrealized arbitrage opportunities in naive equilibria with non-Bayesian belief processes Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-11 Alexander Zimper
A non-Bayesian decision maker forms posterior beliefs through an – ever so slightly – violation of Bayes’ rule. A naive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium for a multiperiod complete markets economy such that every economic agent – Bayesian or non-Bayesian – assumes that all economic agents are Bayesian decision makers. If all agents are indeed Bayesian decision makers, the naive equilibrium coincides
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Effects of development aid (grants and loans) on the economic dynamics of the recipient country Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-07 Cuong Le Van, Ngoc-Sang Pham, Thi Kim Cuong Pham
This paper investigates the nexus between foreign aid (in both forms: grant and loan), poverty trap, and economic development in a recipient country by using a Solow model with two new ingredients: a development loan and a fixed cost in the production process. The presence of this fixed cost generates a poverty trap. We show that foreign aid may help the country to escape from the poverty trap and
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A classification of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-06 Guanhao Li
In this paper, we introduce a weaker notion of separability for set-systems and demonstrate that the class of maximal weakly separated systems precisely corresponds to the class of peak-pit maximal Condorcet domains. Additionally, we present a generalisation of arrangements of pseudolines and establish that the sets of chamber sets from them coincide with maximal weakly separated systems, enabling
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The disclosure decision game: Subsidies and incentives for R&D activity Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-07-04 Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti, Luca Gori
This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity
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Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-06-28 Pablo Amorós
A group of students who have applied for scholarships must be ranked. The committee responsible for determining this ranking consists of the students’ advisors. While impartial towards other students, the advisors are biased towards favoring their students. This paper examines the implementation of the deserving ranking via backward induction. Some of the best-known sequential mechanisms utilized in
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When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-20 Ratul Das Chaudhury, Sukanta Bhattacharya
We model the situation where a borrower can choose to acquire costly information about the outcome before implementing a risky project. The borrower is resource-constrained and faces a trade-off between incurring the cost of information or putting effort into the project. We provide novel insights about the type of project the borrower chooses and identify the conditions under which the borrower acquires
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Optimal tariffs with endogenous vertical structure: Uniform versus discriminatory tariffs Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-09 Ki-Dong Lee, Kangsik Choi
Using the export-rivalry model, we examine the welfare impact of two tariff regimes when firms’ vertical structure is endogenously determined via the strategic behavior of each firm. First, with discriminatory tariffs, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently low, the rent-shifting effects of vertical separation becomes less important and firms chooses vertical integration to enjoy
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Targeted advertising with R&D rivalry Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-05-05 Changying Li, Youping Li, Jianhu Zhang
We analyze the effect of targeted informative advertising on firms’ incentive to improve product quality and the welfare implications. We find that, compared with mass advertising, targeted advertising results in (i) a decreased incentive to invest in R&D unless the cost of advertising is sufficiently low, (ii) a lower mark-up, net of product quality, being charged to consumers, and (iii) a smaller
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Strategic behaviour and manipulation resistance in Peer-to-Peer, crowdsourced information gathering Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-17 William George
To realize the potential of crowdsourcing to tap into collective intelligence, one should consider how “crowds” are incentivized. One model, widely applied in blockchain oracles, constructs a coordination game where “true reporting” should be a focal point. Beyond well-known strategic behaviour associated to Keynesian Beauty Contests, we see this model provokes an additional layer of strategic behaviour
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Capital-augmenting technical change in the context of untapped automation opportunities Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-07 Arthur Jacobs
I explore the effects of capital-augmenting technical change (CATC) in a task-based production setting where untapped automation opportunities exist. I contribute to the literature by showing analytically that CATC is a convenient modeling approach to automation, of which the labor market implications match the empirical literature. In my setting, CATC lowers the labor share of income even in the face
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A conceptual model for FRAND royalty setting Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-05 Jens Leth Hougaard, Chiu Yu Ko, Xuyao Zhang
Setting an industry-wide standard is crucial for the interoperability, compatibility, and efficiency of information and communication technologies. To minimize holdup problems, patent holders are often required to ex-ante commit to licensing their technologies under Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Yet, there is little consensus, in both courtrooms and industries, on the exact
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Agglomeration and welfare of the Krugman model in a continuous space Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-04-05 Kensuke Ohtake
Two spatial equilibria, agglomeration, and dispersion, in a continuous space core–periphery model, are examined to discuss which equilibrium is socially preferred. It is shown that when transport cost is lower than a critical value, the agglomeration equilibrium is preferable in the sense of the Scitovszky criterion, while when the transport cost is above the critical value, the two equilibria cannot
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Sharing a collective probability of success Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-29 Pierre Dehez
How to allocate the probability of reaching a target resulting from the joint action of a group of players? This question is framed within transferable utility games. We analyze the properties of games resulting from different scenarios, characterize their core and provide a proper axiomatic foundation to their Shapley value.
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When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-27 Mostapha Diss, Keith Dougherty, Jac C. Heckelman
We use Ehrhart polynomials to estimate the likelihood of each three-candidate social ranking produced by pairwise majority rule assuming an even number of voters and the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition. We then calculate the probability the ranking is transitive and the probability of a weak Condorcet winner. Finally, we determine the weak Condorcet efficiency of various voting rules. We prove
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Social influence: The Usage History heuristic Mathematical Social Sciences (IF 0.6) Pub Date : 2023-03-21 Bary S.R. Pradelski
Individual behavior such as choice of fashion, adoption of new products, and selection of means of transport, is influenced by taking account of others’ actions. We study social influence in a heterogeneous population and analyze the behavior of the dynamic processes. Prior work has assumed that agents are influenced by the Adoption Ratio. We introduce a new heuristic of social influence where agents