样式: 排序: IF: - GO 导出 标记为已读
-
The effect of moral framing on attitudes towards offshore wind farms in Turkey J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 Elif Göral, Christopher M. Hannum
Public support of renewable energy has become more important as the share of renewable energy increases recently. To avoid public opposition framing strategies can be used. In this study, we aim to reveal the effect of moral framing on support for an intended offshore wind farm (OWF) project in Turkey. We designed a survey with two framing conditions in line with the assertions of Moral Foundations
-
Green self-image boosts online volunteering for environmental causes: Experimental evidence J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 C. Mónica Capra, Bing Jiang, Yuxin Su
We investigate the effect of salient green self-image on the willingness to participate in online volunteering for an environmental cause. Our experimental study shows that when the information about participants’ own perceived consciousness and responsibility is made salient, the likelihood of volunteering increases by 11.85 percentage points. Our study contributes to the literature by showing a causal
-
Uncertainty and climate change: The IPCC approach vs decision theory J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Anastasios Xepapadeas
Uncertainty is one of the most important challenges in the study of climate change and its interactions with the economy. This paper looks at this uncertainty from two different points of view. The first one is the way in which the IPCC deals with uncertainty in its reports, and the way in which that uncertainty is communicated. The IPCC approach is implemented using a combination of quantitative and
-
Would you lie about your mother's birthday? A new online dishonesty experiment J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Victor von Loessl, Christoph Bühren, Björn Frank, Heike Wetzel, Elina Wiederhold
We ask a representative sample of German household decision-makers to enter their mother's birthday, with potential payments depending on the month and the day they state. Thus, we create an incentive to lie. Compared to the die-under-the-cup experiment, our alternative has a lower probability that the income-maximizing outcome is true. Furthermore, it is better suited for online surveys and samples
-
The positionality of goods and the positional concern’s origin J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-17 Martín Leites, Analía Rivero, Gonzalo Salas
This paper investigates what goods are positional, the degree of individuals’ positional concern, and their possible drivers for a sample of Uruguayan younger. The participants’ degree of positional concern is generated using a choice experimental approach. The study combines longitudinal information about participants’ perceptions of the visibility of the goods and their reference groups and randomized
-
Incomplete promises and the norm of keeping promises J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-16 Sergio Mittlaender
Promises, like contracts, are inherently incomplete and rarely specify what the promisor ought to do in different possible contingencies, thereby being apt to be interpreted differently by the promisor and promisee, with their conflicting interests, and in a self-serving manner whenever circumstances change. This article studies the effect of the incompleteness of a promise on the decision to keep
-
Valuing Insurance Against Small probability risks: A Meta-Analysis J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-15 Selim Mankaï, Sébastien Marchand, Ngoc Ha Le
The demand for voluntary insurance against low-probability, high-impact risks is lower than expected. To assess the magnitude of the demand, we conduct a meta-analysis of contingent valuation studies using a dataset of experimentally elicited and survey-based estimates. We find that the average stated willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance is 87% of expected losses. We perform a meta-regression analysis
-
Climate change, tipping points, and economics J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-12 Aart de Zeeuw
This paper discusses the response of the economics profession to a possible occurrence of tipping points in natural systems, with a drop in welfare. For a climate tipping point, the hazard-rate model is relevant, and the paper shows that in a Ramsey growth model with climate tipping, the effect on policy is increased saving and increased taxation of greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change is often
-
Investigating the effect of three different factors including experience, personality and color on the decision-making process in stock markets using EEG J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-28 Pegah AsleBagh, Ali Bonyadi Naeini, MohammadReza Moeeni
Stock markets and exchanges are crucial economic pillars in every country. Decision-making in the stock market poses significant challenges and fundamental problems for investors in this field. According to studies conducted in the field of psychology, it has been found that investors' personal experiences and personality characteristics are among the factors that influence their decision-making. This
-
Gender effects in dictator game giving under voluntary choice of the recipient’s gender: Women favour female recipients J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-02-02 Maximilian Baltrusch, Philipp C. Wichardt
Allowing for free choice of the recipient’s gender in a dictator game (), women give more frequently to their own gender (70.3% vs 9.4%) while men do not prefer a specific recipient’s gender (33.3% vs 27.8%). Conditional on a positive transfer being made, the average amount of transfers to each gender does not vary between genders, though. Once a charity recipient is added to the possible choices,
-
Effectiveness of the approval mechanism in a three-player common pool resource dilemma J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-29 Koffi Serge William Yao, Emmanuelle Lavaine, Marc Willinger
Selfish players in common pool resources games (CPR) prevent to reach socially efficient outcomes. To solve this CPR dilemma, we investigate further the approval mechanism (AM) in a three-player CPR game. Adding a third player is useful to test the efficiency of approval rules, i.e. majority versus unanimity, in the second stage of the AM. We find that the AM mitigates over-exploitation in three player
-
Wellbeing: Decision Making and Behavior During COVID-19 J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-26 Doron Kliger, Meira Levy, Israel Rachevski
We explored the wellbeing (WB) of individuals and the way in which it interacted with their decision making during the COVID-19 pandemic. We used a questionnaire that includes open- and closed-ended questions to assess individuals’ WB and their views and intentions regarding development and rerouting their life. For the estimation, we devised a structural equation model in which covariates of feature
-
Removing barriers to plant-based diets: Assisting doctors with vegan patients J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-26 Romain Espinosa, Thibaut Arpinon, Paco Maginot, Sébastien Demange, Florimond Peureux
Shifting to plant-based diets can alleviate many of the externalities associated with the current food system. Spontaneous shifts in diet are often hindered by consumers’ imperfect knowledge about the health risks and benefits, which leads them to seek advice from their doctors. However, doctors have often had only limited nutrition training, and often express negative opinions of plant-based diets
-
Let's think about the future: The effect of positive and negative future primes on pro-environmental behavior J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-23 Andrea Essl, David Hauser, Frauke von Bieberstein
In an online experiment (N = 810), we examine whether primes on positive and negative future events unrelated to an environmental context affects pro-environmental behavior measured with an incentivized decision task. In this task, individuals decide between keeping money for themselves and investing part or the entire amount in planting trees. The results show that participants primed on future events
-
Sending emails to reduce medical costs?The effect of feedback on general practitioners’ claiming of fees J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Ole Kristian Aars, Geir Godager, Oddvar Kaarboe, Tron Anders Moger
Audit and feedback is employed as a strategy to guide practices of health care professionals towards certain targets. The outcome of interest can be quality improvements, but also ensuring that health care workers adhere to relevant regulations. We conducted a nationwide field experiment in the Norwegian primary care sector to study the behavioral responses from giving general practitioners feedback
-
Question-order effects on judgements under uncertainty J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-18 Rafael Novella, Ericka G. Rascón Ramirez
Data on judgements under uncertainty (e.g., expectations and risk preferences) have been increasingly used to predict and understand people's decision making. However, little is known about how sensitive the elicitation of such measures is to questionnaire design. Using a survey experiment conducted in Chile, we assess order effects on the elicitation of expectations and risk preference measures. To
-
Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-11 Joep Sonnemans
Does reporting beliefs change beliefs? This question may seem impossible to answer, because one cannot compare the beliefs of participants who did or did not report their beliefs: we cannot know beliefs that we don't measure. In an experiment, participants first answer trivia questions, and are then asked to estimate how many questions they have answered right. In the two treatments the payoff function
-
-
The ego is no fool: Absence of motivated belief formation in strategic interactions J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Giovanni Burro, Alessandro Castagnetti
We investigate whether individuals are more easily fooled by others when they enhance their personal characteristics and abilities. We use an experiment in which participants complete an IQ test and then play a sender–receiver game. The experiment has a 2x2 factorial design. First, we determine the state either by the receiver’s relative performance or by a randomly drawn number. Second, monetary incentives
-
The effect of heterogeneity and risk on co-operation: Experimental evidence J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-12 Anwesha Banerjee
Using data from a laboratory experiment, I study how co-operation is affected when the benefit from the public good is risky (uncertain) and heterogeneous amongst members of a group. I investigate whether heterogeneity in benefits affects contributions differently under certainty and uncertainty, and whether the distribution of risk within the group affects contribution behavior. I find that heterogeneity
-
Predicting compliance: Leveraging chat data for supervised classification in experimental research J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-06 Carina I. Hausladen, Martin Fochmann, Peter Mohr
Behavioral and experimental economics have conventionally employed text data to facilitate the interpretation of decision-making processes. This paper introduces a novel methodology, leveraging text data for predictive analytics rather than mere explanation. We detail a supervised classification framework that interprets patterns in chat text to estimate the likelihood of associated numerical outcomes
-
How time flies: Time perception and intertemporal choice J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-05 Xiu Chen, Xiaojian Zhao
This paper identifies a potential gap between time preference and intertemporal choices such as time discounting tasks: The intertemporal choices could be partly driven by a biased perception of time and thus may not completely reveal actual time preference. To test this, we explore the causal relationship between time perception and intertemporal choices by conducting a laboratory experiment in which
-
Voluntary cooperation for mitigating collective-risk under spatial externalities J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-05 Yohei Mitani, Naoya Yukizaki
Promoting public cooperation has become a challenge for authorities in the pandemic era. We develop a novel risk mitigation game laboratory experiment that explores the coordination and voluntary cooperation problems under spatial risk externalities, where the effect of an agent's effort depends on the spatially weighted efforts of all local and global members. We show that tax-like centralized interventions
-
Deliberation, mood response, and the confirmation bias in the religious belief domain J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2024-01-04 David L. Dickinson
A novel task was developed to examine the confirmation bias in religious beliefs, which compares to a classic political confirmation bias task. In Study 1, a balanced number of Christian versus non-religious (liberals and conservative) participants were recruited (n = 402). The data showed strong confirmation bias evidence in both the religious and political beliefs domains, and this bias appears to
-
Economists and the climate J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-28 Thomas Sterner, Jens Ewald, Erik Sterner
To date, environmental economists have been very engaged with questions surrounding climate change while interest from mainstream economics has been moderate. Economists have been quite unanimous in their recommendation to focus climate policy on pricing carbon. This is an important point, often under-appreciated by other disciplines. Still, the message may have been oversimplified and exaggerated
-
Impact of open-mindedness on information avoidance: Tailored vs. generic communication J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-27 Delong Meng, Siyu Wang
This study explores the impact of open-mindedness on tailored versus generic information communication. We develop a preference formation model and formulate the following hypotheses: (1) in the case of generic information, open-minded individuals tend to avoid information less, resulting in them being better-informed; (2) with tailored information, close-minded individuals display stronger resistance
-
Sexual objectification of women in media and the gender wage gap: Does exposure to objectifying pictures lower the reservation wage? J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Fredrik Carlsson, Mitesh Kataria, Elina Lampi
Using an online experiment, we investigate the influence of sexual objectification in media on reservation wages. In the experiment, subjects (843 women and 307 men in the main analysis) are asked to evaluate advertisements in women's magazines. In the treatment groups, the ads portray women in sexually objectifying poses, while the poses are neutral in the control group. The main research hypothesis
-
Exposure to immersive virtual environments decreases present bias J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-19 Valeria Faralla, Alessandro Innocenti, Stefano Baraldi, Sara Ermini, Luca Lusuardi, Maurizio Masini, Vincenzo Santalucia, Diletta Scaruffi, Matteo Sirizzotti
In a Cave Automatic Virtual Environment, we conducted an experiment to investigate the influence of future self-continuity on the delay of immediate monetary gratification. By utilizing immersive virtual environments, we aimed to accentuate the role of environmental cues in shaping behavior. Our findings revealed that these environmental stimuli had a significant impact, leading to a higher likelihood
-
The relationship between monetary incentives, social status, and physical activity J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Natalia I. Valdez Gonzalez, Jennifer Y. Kee, Marco A. Palma, J. Ross Pruitt
We conduct a field experiment to better understand the role of social status with and without monetary incentives as motivation to increase physical activity. We find that social status alone does not induce a change in physical activity. When social status is combined with monetary incentives, however, we find a change in the number of daily steps. This change is heterogeneous. Individuals with low
-
It's time to cheat! J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-20 Alessandro Bucciol, Simona Cicognani, Natalia Montinari
We study the correlation between time preferences and cheating. In our experiment, cheating increases the earnings of those who commit it and only entails a moral cost. We are the first to measure both (a proxy for) the propensity to cheat and time preferences at the individual level, determining whether cheaters are more likely to be more present-biased or to have a higher discount factor. We observe
-
Repugnant markets and preferences in public J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-14 Emil Persson, Gustav Tinghög
This study examines the effect of making judgments in public (vs. private) on the moral permissibility and willingness to engage in three types of potentially repugnant markets (organ sale, prostitution, marijuana). An experiment was conducted where participants responded to a series of questions about repugnant markets and their answers were either publicly revealed to the group they were in, using
-
Scarcity and consumption priorities J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-16 Momi Dahan, Doron Sayag
This paper focuses on whether economic scarcity tend to change consumption priorities as measured by the share of spending on necessity goods relative to luxury goods in a large national supermarket chain in Israel for the years 2011–2018. Based on detailed weekly revenue data from that supermarket chain, we found that in weeks of economic scarcity (i.e., weeks without payments of social security allowances
-
Better us later than me now —: Regulatee-size and time-inconsistency as determinants of demand for environmental policies J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-12 Marius Alt
To adequately design and implement effective environmental policies, it is paramount for policymakers to understand preferences for regulatory instruments and the factors that facilitate their implementation. In this study, I experimentally investigate two possible facilitators of the implementation of environmental policies. I assess (1) whether interventions are demanded as commitment devices if
-
Signaling trustworthiness with the choice of a prosocial project: Theory and experiment J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-11 Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, Graciela Kuechle, Luise Marie Rohland
This paper studies the conditions under which the choice of a prosocial project signals trustworthiness and thereby increases financial transfers by investors. Results from theory and a laboratory experiment show that when there is a choice between a purely financial project and a prosocial project, the choice of the latter leads to higher transfers from investors, higher engagement in the risky prospect
-
Child images affect sports fans' prosociality and aggression J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-09 Muhammed Bilgehan AYTAÇ, Hüsnü BİLİR
This study explores the effect of child images in advertisements on financial support provided by team fans -including the intention to buy licensed club products- and reported aggression toward rival team fans. An online experiment was conducted on Turkey's three largest rival club fans (Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray, and Beşiktaş). Used visual materials were derived from Football (Study 1) and Basketball
-
Who cares when Value (Mis)reporting may be found out? An Acquiring-a-Company experiment with value messages and information leaks J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-07 Daniela Di Cagno, Werner Güth, Tim Lohse, Francesca Marazzi, Lorenzo Spadoni
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study how information leaks affect lying and market outcomes in an ultimatum bargaining setting with asymmetric information. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random leaks buyers, however, can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally accepts or not. Only 14
-
Going green: Framing effects in a dynamic coordination game J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-02 Reyer Gerlagh, Eline van der Heijden
We study decision-making in a (novel) dynamic coordination game that simulates ‘social tipping’. The game involves groups of three subjects who initially find themselves in a stable state with positive network externalities. Over seven rounds, they have the opportunity to transition to an alternative stable state with higher payoff, based on the other network. The transition is slow, costly and requires
-
Women lean back when representing others in competitions J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-12-01 Maliheh Paryavi
This study examined the role that being a ‘representative’ plays in competition behavior of women and men through a laboratory experiment where self-representing and other-representing individuals had to decide whether to enter a mix-gender tournament that involved performing in a male-stereotyped task. While self-representing men and women exhibited very similar performance and competitiveness behaviors
-
Drought risk attitudes in pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in Kenya J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-30 Teun Schrieks, W.J. Wouter Botzen, Toon Haer, Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts
Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities are amongst the most vulnerable groups in the world to increased drought risk caused by climate change. Risk preferences play a key role in drought adaptation decisions, but little research has been done on risk preferences in (agro-)pastoral communities. This study therefore examines risk attitudes amongst Kenyan (agro-)pastoralists, which can inform the development
-
Cooperation is unaffected by the threat of severe adverse events in public goods games J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-25 Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, Chiara Nardi, Veronica Pizziol
In the context of a one-shot public goods game with a large group size and a low marginal per capita return, we study if and how cooperation is affected by the presence of environmental risk – defined as an exogenous stochastic process that generates a severe adverse event with a very small probability – and by the correlation of such risk among the group members. More specifically, we run an online
-
An experimental study of auctioneers’ and bidders’ preferences over corruption in auctions J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-23 Abraham Saucedo Cepeda
This paper examines the role of auctioneers’ payoff structure in determining (a) their willingness to solicit bribes in exchange for an auctioned item, (b) their preference over soliciting a bribe from an auction’s highest- or lowest-bidder, and (c) the likelihood an auction is won by its highest-bidder. I conduct an auction experiment with bribery in which auctioneers’ net-of-bribes payoffs are not
-
Scoring rules in experimental procurement J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-22 Gian Luigi Albano, Angela Cipollone, Roberto Di Paolo, Giovanni Ponti, Marco Sparro
We report the results of an experiment where subjects compete for procurement contracts to be awarded by means of a scoring auction. Two experimental conditions are considered, depending on the relative weight of quality vs price in the scoring rule. We show that different quality-price weights dramatically alter the strategic environment and affect efficiency. Our evidence shows that each weighting
-
Gender, personality, and performance J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-15 Shannon N. Minehan, Dennis Wesselbaum
This paper studies the effect of personality on performance by gender. We investigate this relationship in the academic labor market for Economists. We build a unique and novel data set from individual CVs of 2,471 faculty members employed at the Top 100 US University Economics Departments and use the facial Width-to-Height ratio (fWHR) to proxy for personality traits. We are interested in the marginal
-
, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2020), Review of McCloskey, Deidre Nansen and Carden, Art. J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-19 Gary D. Lynne
Abstract not available
-
Tax amnesties and the insurance effect: An experimental study J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Christian Koch, Cornelius Müller
Many countries grant exemption from legal prosecution under certain conditions, allowing for voluntary disclosures regarding tax evasion. Empirically, tax amnesties appear most successful when accompanied by an increase in enforcement efforts as they help evaders to adjust to the new circumstances. Time-limited amnesties are frequently repeated and, in some countries, even made permanent. Anticipated
-
No influence of simple moral awareness cues on cheating behaviour in an online experiment J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-09 Luu Duc Toan Huynh, Philipp Stratmann, Rainer Michael Rilke
We study the influence of moral awareness cues on cheating in an online experiment (n = 551). People’s awareness of ethical issues is a pre-condition of moral behaviour. The results show that reminding people of the different ethical dimensions of their actions does not reduce cheating. Our results highlight that raising moral awareness in an online experiment is not sufficient to mitigate cheating
-
Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-08 Alvaro Forteza, Irene Mussio, Juan S. Pereyra
If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with
-
How altruistic is indirect reciprocity? — Evidence from gift-exchange games in the lab J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Daniel Hopp, Karolin Süß
Indirect reciprocity involves human cooperation, where one agent rewards or punishes another agent for behaving kindly or unkindly towards a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent reward or punish because she (altruistically) cares about the third party? Or does she take the other agent’s behavior as a signal of how the latter would treat her
-
An introduction to a critique of Bernheim & Sprenger (2020) and a response by the authors J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-11-03 Todd R. Kaplan
Abstract not available
-
Social preferences, support for redistribution, and attitudes towards vulnerable groups J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-26 Begoña Cabeza Martínez
In this work, I explore the explanatory power of experimentally-elicited social preferences over self-reported support for redistribution. Social preferences are obtained by means of a simplified dictator game embedded in an online survey that also includes a questionnaire on preferences for redistribution, beliefs, inequality perceptions, and ideological positioning. I find that social preferences
-
Climate policy versus growth concerns: Suggestions for economic research and communication J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-26 Jeroen van den Bergh
Climate change has revived the old debate on growth-vs-environment. In view of lack of definitive evidence for polarized pro- and anti-growth positions, I propose a different take on the debate which may provide new insights for designing climate policy to garner sufficient socio-political support. To this end, I explain a third position of being indifferent about economic growth – known as ‘agrowth’
-
Do you follow your head or your heart? The simultaneous impact of framing effects and incidental emotions on investment decisions J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-24 Simona Cantarella, Carola Hillenbrand, Chris Brooks
This study is situated in an investment context and explores how the effect of framing (gain versus loss framing) changes the impact of incidental emotions (fear and excitement) on behavioral and physiological outcome measures. While existing literature has found that the effects of framing and incidental emotions both impact decision-making independently, the present study extends this literature
-
How consequential is policy consequentiality? Evidence from online discrete choice experiment with ornamental plants J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-18 Xuan Wei, Hayk Khachatryan
Stated preference surveys often employ policy consequentiality scripts to examine respondents’ concern for the policy in question and their belief in the impact of their responses on the provision of the respective good. In this study, we used an online choice experiment to investigate how perceptions of policy consequentiality influence individual preferences regarding ornamental plants cultivated
-
Incentivizing cooperation against a norm of defection: Experimental Evidence from Egypt J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-21 Mazen Hassan, Engi Amin, Sarah Mansour, Stefan Voigt
Voluntary cooperation contributes significantly to development and prosperity. Settings where the social norm is free-riding, however, offer a particular challenge for public goods contribution. In this paper we ask two questions: how could high contributors to public goods in such contexts be encouraged to sustain their contributions against a defecting crowd? Second, how can low contributors – who
-
A criticism of Bernheim & Sprenger's (2020) tests of rank dependence J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-18 Peter P. Wakker
Bernheim and Sprenger (2020, Econometrica; SB) claimed to experimentally falsify rank dependence in prospect theory. This paper criticizes SB's results and novelty claims. Their experiments only captured well-known heuristics and not genuine preferences. Many falsifications of rank dependence have been made before, and SB's equalizing reductions have also been used before. SB thought to identify probability
-
On the empirical validity of cumulative prospect theory: A response to the Wakker commentaries J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-14 B. Douglas Bernheim, Charles Sprenger
In Bernheim and Sprenger (2020) and Bernheim, Royer, and Sprenger (2022), we devised and implemented a new test of rank-dependent probability weighting for Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). This paper responds to critical commentary by Wakker (0000), which recapitulates both Abdellaoui, Li, Wakker, and Wu (2020) and Wakker (2022a). We demonstrate that the Wakker commentaries proceed from fundamental
-
Timing of rebates and generosity J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-10 David Fielding, Stephen Knowles, Ronald Peeters
Many countries provide rebates through the tax system for donations that individuals make to charity. In most countries, these tax rebates are not claimed until the end of the tax year, although there are some exceptions. In a small number of countries, there are payroll-giving schemes whereby employees can choose to have a charitable donation deducted from their wages and the tax rebate is immediate
-
Setting the stage: Fairness behavior in virtual reality dictator games J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-03 Florian Horky, Felix Krell, Jarko Fidrmuc
By utilizing an experimental approach, we investigate how interactional effects and different virtual environment settings (e.g. office, surreal and control group) change human behavior. For this purpose, we conduct a series of 101 double-blind dictator games in both a physical and two differing virtual settings. Our results provide evidence that virtual environments are playing an important role in
-
Patronizing behavior in heterogeneous teams: A laboratory experiment J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-06 Victor Klockmann, Alicia von Schenk
Collaboration among group members in organizations is highly prevalent and often encouraged. Yet, inefficient task assignment and patronizing may weaken the self-regulated learning process of an inexperienced group member. In a laboratory experiment, we exogenously vary the environment in which cooperative, heterogeneous groups interact. First, we introduce a time budget for task completion that is
-
The willingness to pay for voice in dictator games J. Behav. Exp. Econ. (IF 1.831) Pub Date : 2023-10-06 Pascal Langenbach, Tim Friehe
Voice is valuable in relationships, but how much are people willing to pay for it? This paper reports findings about recipients’ willingness to pay for voice in standard dictator games. From our data, we obtain two key findings: first, people underestimate the true value of voice and, second, they are particularly skeptical of the value of voice after an irrevocable allocation decision has already