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What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-03-18 Dean Spears, H. Orri Stefánsson
Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We
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The entrepreneurial theory of ownership Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-03-14 Sergei Sazonov
This paper introduces a theory of ownership that is rooted in Israel Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship – The Entrepreneurial Theory of Ownership. Its central idea is that natural resources are not available to us automatically as other approaches to justice implicitly assume. Before we can use a resource, we need to do preparatory work in the form of making an entrepreneurial judgement on it. This
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Non-Archimedean population axiologies Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-03-07 Calvin Baker
Non-Archimedean population axiologies – also known as lexical views – claim (i) that a sufficient number of lives at a very high positive welfare level would be better than any number of lives at a very low positive welfare level and/or (ii) that a sufficient number of lives at a very low negative welfare level would be worse than any number of lives at a very high negative welfare level. Such axiologies
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Manipulation in politics and public policy Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-03-06 Keith Dowding, Alexandra Oprea
Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions – Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty – distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a ‘hypothetical disclosure test’ to measure the degree
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Epistemic problems in Hayek’s defence of free markets Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-02-23 Jonathan Benson
Friedrich von Hayek’s classical liberalism argued that free markets allow individuals the greatest opportunity to achieve their ends. This paper develops an internal critique of this claim. It argues that once externalities are introduced, the forms of economic knowledge Hayek thought to undermine government action and orthodox utilitarianism also rule out relative welfarist assessments of more or
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How to be absolutely fair Part I: The Fairness formula Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-02-08 Stefan Wintein, Conrad Heilmann
We present the first comprehensive theory of fairness that conceives of fairness as having two dimensions: a comparative and an absolute one. The comparative dimension of fairness has traditionally been the main interest of Broomean fairness theories. It has been analysed as satisfying competing individual claims in proportion to their respective strengths. And yet, many key contributors to Broomean
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How to be absolutely fair Part II: Philosophy meets economics Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2024-02-08 Stefan Wintein, Conrad Heilmann
In the article ‘How to be absolutely fair, Part I: the Fairness formula’, we presented the first theory of comparative and absolute fairness. Here, we relate the implications of our Fairness formula to economic theories of fair division. Our analysis makes contributions to both philosophy and economics: to the philosophical literature, we add an axiomatic discussion of proportionality and fairness
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The view from Manywhere: normative economics with context-dependent preferences Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-12-27 Guilhem Lecouteux, Ivan Mitrouchev
We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of self-determination, according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension
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The relevance of mechanisms and mechanistic knowledge for behavioural interventions: the case of household energy consumption Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-12-06 Till Grüne-Yanoff, Caterina Marchionni, Tatu Nuotio
We argue that behavioural public policies (BPP) should be categorized by the kind of mechanism through which they operate, not by the kind of treatment they implement. Reviewing the energy consumption BPP literature, we argue (i) that BPPs are currently categorized by treatment; (ii) that treatment-based categories are subject to mechanistic heterogeneity: there is substantial variation of mechanisms
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Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-11-09 Michele Loi, Anders Herlitz, Hoda Heidari
This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits
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Better than nothing: On defining the valence of a life Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-11-07 Campbell Brown
The valence of a life – that is, whether it is good, bad or neutral – is an important consideration in population ethics. This paper examines various definitions of valence. The main focus is ‘temporal’ definitions, which define valence in terms of the ‘shape’ of a life’s value over time. The paper argues that temporal definitions are viable only with a restricted domain, and therefore are incompatible
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Must Prioritarians be Antiegalitarian? Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-11-06 Gustav Alexandrie
It has been argued that Prioritarianism violates Risky Non-Antiegalitarianism, a condition stating roughly that an alternative is socially better than another if it both makes everyone better off in expectation and leads to more equality. I show that Risky Non-Antiegalitarianism is in fact compatible with Prioritarianism as ordinarily defined, but that it violates some other conditions that may be
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Signs of character: a signalling model of Hume’s theory of moral and immoral actions Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-10-04 Ahmer Tarar
In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argues that morality pertains primarily to character, and that actions have moral content only to the extent that they signal good or bad character. I formalize his signalling theory of moral/immoral actions using simple game-theoretic models. Conditions exist under which there is a separating equilibrium in which actions do indeed credibly signal character, but
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Adaptive preferences, self-expression and preference-based freedom rankings Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-09-26 Annalisa Costella
If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain
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Reasoning with reasons: Lewis on common knowledge Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Huub Vromen
David Lewis is widely regarded as the philosopher who introduced the concept of common knowledge. His account of common knowledge differs greatly from most later accounts in philosophy and economy, with the central notion of his theory being ‘having reason to believe’ rather than ‘knowledge’. Unfortunately, Lewis’s account is rather informal, and the argument has a few gaps. This paper assesses two
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Reconfiguring essential and discretionary public goods Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-09-01 Friedemann Bieber, Maurits de Jongh
When is state coercion for the provision of public goods justified? And how should the social surplus of public goods be distributed? Philosophers approach these questions by distinguishing between essential and discretionary public goods. This article explains the intractability of this distinction, and presents two upshots. First, if governments provide configurations of public goods that simultaneously
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Stratified social norms Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-06-05 Han van Wietmarschen
This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating
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Designing a just soda tax Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-06-01 Douglas MacKay, Alexandria Huber-Disla
Soda taxes are controversial. While proponents point to their potential health benefits and the public projects that could be funded with their revenue, critics argue that they are paternalistic and regressive. In this paper, we explore the prospects for designing a just soda tax, one that appropriately balances the often-competing ethical considerations of promoting social welfare, respecting people’s
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Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-05-19 Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras, Robert Sugden
We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values and intentions. We define three ‘logical’ conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such
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Subjective total comparative evaluations Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-05-05 Daniel M. Hausman
In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged
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Identity, ethics and behavioural welfare economics Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-04-27 Ivan Mitrouchev, Valerio Buonomo
Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference
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Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-04-14 Ivan Moscati
I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch
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J.S. Mill and market harms: a response to Endörfer Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-03-24 Ben Saunders
Endörfer has recently argued that proponents of the harm principle are wrong to exempt market harms as potential justifications for state interference. I argue that – contrary to suggestions in Endörfer’s article – John Stuart Mill did not exempt market harms from his harm principle. On Mill’s view, the state can (as a matter of principle) legitimately interfere with free markets to prevent market
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The hierarchy in economics and its implications Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-03-13 Jack Wright
This paper argues for two propositions. (I) Large asymmetries of power, status and influence exist between economists. These asymmetries constitute a hierarchy that is steeper than it could be and steeper than hierarchies in other disciplines. (II) This situation has potentially significant epistemic consequences. I collect data on the social organization of economics to show (I). I then argue that
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Description invariance: a rational principle for human agents Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-02-16 Sarah A. Fisher
This article refines a foundational tenet of rational choice theory known as the principle of description invariance. Attempts to apply this principle to human agents with imperfect knowledge have paid insufficient attention to two aspects: first, agents’ epistemic situations, i.e. whether and when they recognize alternative descriptions of an object to be equivalent; and second, the individuation
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A social-status rationale for repugnant market transactions Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2023-01-31 Patrick Harless, Romans Pancs
Individuals often deem market transactions in sex, human organs and surrogacy, among others, repugnant. Repugnance norms can be explained by appealing to social-status concerns. We study an exchange economy in which agents abhor consumption dominance: one’s social status is compromised if one consumes less of every good than someone else does. Dominance may be forestalled by partitioning goods into
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Market nudges and autonomy Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-12-27 Viktor Ivanković, Bart Engelen
Behavioural techniques or ‘nudges’ can be used for various purposes. In this paper, we shift the focus from government nudges to nudges used by for-profit market agents. We argue that potential worries about nudges circumventing the deliberative capacities or diminishing the control of targeted agents are greater when it comes to market nudges, given that these (1) are not constrained by the principles
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Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-12-27 Roberto Fumagalli
Normative welfare economics commonly assumes that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and relies on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare. In recent years, several authors have criticized welfare economists’ reliance on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare and have advocated grounding normative welfare economics on opportunities
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Is luxury tax justifiable? Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-12-20 Hyunseop Kim
This paper examines whether, and if so when, luxury tax is justifiable. After a characterization of luxury tax, I critically examine several arguments that have been or can be made in defence of luxury tax, including Ng’s diamond good argument and a variation of Frank’s positional good argument. I put forward an alternative, expressive argument, according to which luxury tax can help to create and
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Impartiality and democracy: an objection to political exchange Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-12-02 Matthew T. Jeffers
The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid
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Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-11-17 Andrew M. Colman
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent
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The Welfare Diffusion Objection to Prioritarianism Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-11-14 Tomi Francis
According to the Welfare Diffusion Objection, we should reject Prioritarianism because it implies the ‘desirability of welfare diffusion’: the claim that it can be better for there to be less total wellbeing spread thinly between a larger total number of people, rather than for there to be more total wellbeing, spread more generously between a smaller total number of people. I argue that while Prioritarianism
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Revisiting variable-value population principles Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-11-11 Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga
We examine a general class of variable-value population principles. Our particular focus is on the extent to which such principles can avoid the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. We show that if a mild limit property is imposed, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion implies the sadistic conclusion. This result generalizes earlier observations by showing that they apply to a substantially larger class
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Reply to Spears’s ‘The Asymmetry of Population Ethics’ Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-10-20 Jonas H. Aaron
Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More
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The Econ within or the Econ above? On the plausibility of preference purification Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-09-05 Lukas Beck
Scholars disagree about the plausibility of preference purification. Some see it as a familiar phenomenon. Others denounce it as conceptually incoherent, postulating that it relies on the psychologically implausible assumption of an inner rational agent. I argue that different notions of rationality can be leveraged to advance the debate: procedural rationality and structural rationality. I explicate
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Weighted sufficientarianisms: Carl Knight on the excessiveness objection Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-09-05 Dick Timmer
Carl Knight argues that lexical sufficientarianism, which holds that sufficientarian concerns should have lexical priority over other distributive goals, is ‘excessive’ in many distinct ways and that sufficientarians should either defend weighted sufficientarianism or become prioritarians. In this article, I distinguish three types of weighted sufficientarianism and propose a weighted sufficientarian
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Why we need future generations: a defence of direct intergenerational reciprocity Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-09-05 Fausto Corvino
In this article I argue that the non-reciprocity problem does not apply to intergenerational justice. Future generations impact, here and now, on the well-being of people now living. I firstly illustrate the economic-synchronic model of direct intergenerational reciprocity (DIR): future generations allow people now living to maintain the economic system future-oriented and capital-preserving. The rational
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Respecting equality in economic option appraisal: valuing the time of your life Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-08-31 Donald Franklin
Even where willingness-to-pay as a measure of welfare impact is adjusted for diminishing marginal utility, welfare economics is shown to favour policies that add to the life expectancy or that enhance the quality of life of persons who are already better-off. I propose an alternative, Equal Respect methodology, under an axiomatic claim that at the point of decision the prospective life years of all
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On environmental justice, Part I: an intuitive conservation dilemma Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-08-24 Joseph Mazor
This article introduces an intuitive conservation dilemma called the Canyon Dilemma: Is it possible to condemn the mining of the Grand Canyon, even by a poor generation, while also permitting this generation’s mining of an unremarkable small canyon? It then argues that not one of several prominent theories of environmental justice, including various forms of egalitarianism, welfarism, deep-ecological
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On environmental justice, Part II: non-absolute equal division of rights to the natural world Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-08-24 Joseph Mazor
This article considers whether any interpretation of the idea of equal claims to the natural world can resolve the Canyon Dilemma (i.e. can justify protecting the Grand Canyon but not a small canyon from mining by a poor generation). It first considers and ultimately rejects the idea of subjecting natural resource rights to an intergenerational equal division. It then demonstrates that a pluralist
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Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-08-15 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections
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When utilitarianism dominates justice as fairness: an economic defence of utilitarianism from the original position Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-08-11 Hun Chung
The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic
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The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-07-12 Enrico Petracca
The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical
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Relative priority Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-06-17 Lara Buchak
The good of those who are worse off matters more to the overall good than the good of those who are better off does. But being worse off than one’s fellows is not itself bad; nor is inequality itself bad; nor do differences in well-being matter more when well-being is lower in an absolute sense. Instead, the good of the relatively worse-off weighs more heavily in the overall good than the good of the
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Sources of transitivity Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-06-13 Daniel Muñoz
Why should ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness
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Better vaguely right than precisely wrong in effective altruism: the problem of marginalism Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-05-30 Nicolas Côté, Bastian Steuwer
Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms)
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The problem of low expectations and the principled politician Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-04-29 Sam Schmitt
Nobel laureate James Buchanan downplays any theory of ethical politicians, focusing instead on rules which economize personal restraint, setting lower moral expectations. Through a constructive critique of James Buchanan’s work, I argue these lowered expectations come at a cost: degraded character in politicians, leading to constitutional decay. Buchanan lacks a theory to address choices between (a)
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Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-04-11 João V. Ferreira
Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based on context-independent choices and the other based on reason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy
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The marketplace of rationalizations Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-03-03 Daniel Williams
Recent work in economics has rediscovered the importance of belief-based utility for understanding human behaviour. Belief ‘choice’ is subject to an important constraint, however: people can only bring themselves to believe things for which they can find rationalizations. When preferences for similar beliefs are widespread, this constraint generates rationalization markets, social structures in which
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Calibration dilemmas in the ethics of distribution Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-02-09 Jacob M. Nebel, H. Orri Stefánsson
This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several ‘calibration dilemmas’, in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then
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Comparing Rubin and Pearl’s causal modelling frameworks: a commentary on Markus (2021) Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-02-04 Naftali Weinberger
Markus (2021) argues that the causal modelling frameworks of Pearl and Rubin are not ‘strongly equivalent’, in the sense of saying ‘the same thing in different ways’. Here I rebut Markus’ arguments against strong equivalence. The differences between the frameworks are best illuminated not by appeal to their causal semantics, but rather reflect pragmatic modelling choices.
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A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2022-02-02 Marc Fleurbaey, Stéphane Zuber
We highlight a new paradox for the social evaluation of risk that bears on the evaluation of individual well-being rather than social welfare, but has serious implications for social evaluation. The paradox consists in a tension between rationality, respect for individual preferences, and a principle of informational parsimony that excludes individual risk attitudes from the assessment of riskless
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A dilemma for reasons additivity Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-27 Geoff Keeling
This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely
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Eliminating Group Agency Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-27 Lars J. K. Moen
Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist
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The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-27 Christoph Schamberger
Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral
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Rational Responses to Risk, Paul Weirich. Oxford University Press, 2020, xi + 269 pages. Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-22 Ittay Nissan-Rozen
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On the measurement of need-based justice Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-22 Nils Springhorn
Need-based justice is an important ingredient for a pluralistic theory of justice. But how can need-based justice be measured? I will argue that need-based justice cannot be measured by measuring need-satisfaction. This is because need-based justice does not only depend on need-satisfaction, but also on opportunities to avoid or at least mitigate undersupply. Depending on these opportunities, one and
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Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making, José Luis Bermúdez. Cambridge University Press, 2020, x + 330 pages. Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-21 Fay Niker
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The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy, Stephanie Kelton. Public Affairs, 2020, 325 pages. Econ. Philos. (IF 1.615) Pub Date : 2021-12-21 Gabriele Contessa