• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-06
Omer Ben-Porat; Sharon Hirsch; Lital Kuchy; Guy Elad; Roi Reichart; Moshe Tennenholtz

The connection between messaging and action is fundamental both to web applications, such as web search and sentiment analysis, and to economics. However, while prominent online applications exploit messaging in natural (human) language in order to predict non-strategic action selection, the economics literature focuses on the connection between structured stylized messaging to strategic decisions

更新日期：2020-04-08
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-07
Dirk Bergemann; Alessandro Bonatti; Tan Gan

A data intermediary pays consumers for information about their preferences and sells the information so acquired to firms that use it to tailor their products and prices. The social dimension of the individual data---whereby an individual's data are predictive of the behavior of others---generates a data externality that reduces the intermediary's cost of acquiring information. We derive the intermediary's

更新日期：2020-04-08
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-04
Shahram Dehdashti; Lauren Fell; Abdul Karim Obeid; Catarina Moreira; Peter Bruza

This article presents a unified probabilistic framework that allows both rational and irrational decision making to be theoretically investigated and simulated in classical and quantum games. Rational choice theory is a basic component of game theoretic models, which assumes that a decision maker chooses the best action according to their preferences. In this article, we define irrationality as a deviation

更新日期：2020-04-08
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-06
Haris Aziz

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an ex-ante envy-free lottery over envy-free up to one item (EF1) deterministic allocations. It has the following advantages over a recently proposed algorithm: it does not rely on the linear programming machinery including separation oracles; it is SD-efficient (both ex-ante and ex-post); and the ex-ante outcome is equivalent to the outcome returned

更新日期：2020-04-08
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2018-02-26
Ashish R. Hota; Shreyas Sundaram

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can

更新日期：2020-04-08
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-02
Sander Heinsalu

The optimal price of each firm falls in the search cost of consumers, in the limit to the monopoly price, despite the exit of lower-value consumers in response to costlier search. Exit means that fewer inframarginal consumers remain. The decrease in marginal buyers is smaller, because part of demand is composed of customers coming from rival firms. These buyers can be held up and are not marginal.

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-02
Aritra Mitra; Saurabh Bagchi; Shreyas Sundaram

We study a setting where each agent in a network receives certain private signals generated by an unknown static state that belongs to a finite set of hypotheses. The agents are tasked with collectively identifying the true state. To solve this problem in a communication-efficient manner, we propose an event-triggered distributed learning algorithm that is based on the principle of diffusing low beliefs

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-03
Vijay V. Vazirani; Mihalis Yannakakis

In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser \cite{hylland} gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has nice properties -- it is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal -- and hence it provides an attractive, off-the-shelf method for running an application involving such a market

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-03
Matheus V. X. Ferreira; S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider the sale of a single item to multiple buyers by a revenue-maximizing seller. Recent work of Akbarpour and Li formalizes credibility as an auction desideratum, and prove that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction (Akbarpour and Li, 2019). In contrast, when buyers' valuations are MHR, we show that the mild additional assumption of a cryptographically

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-03
Felix Brandt; Markus Brill; Hans Georg Seedig; Warut Suksompong

A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insights that improve our understanding of stable choice functions. In particular, (i) we show that every stable choice function is generated by a unique simple choice function, which never excludes

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-11-24
Supriyo Ghosh; Patrick Jaillet

The recent advancement in cyberphysical systems has led to an exponential growth in the use of automated devices which in turn has created new security challenges. By manipulating cyberphysical components, a potential attacker can modify the capacities of multiple edges so as to disrupt the network of interest. Existing robust network flow models typically assume that the entire flow of an attacked

更新日期：2020-04-06
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-31
Monica Anna Giovanniello; Simone Tonin

We study how the quality dimension affects the social optimum in a model of spatial differentiation where two facilities provide a public service. If quality enters linearly in the individuals' utility function, a symmetric configuration, in which both facilities have the same quality and serve groups of individuals of the same size, does not maximize the social welfare. This is a surprising result

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-02
Jianxiong Guo; Weili Wu

Revenue maximization (RM) is one of the most important problems on online social networks (OSNs), which attempts to find a small subset of users in OSNs that makes the expected revenue maximized. It has been researched intensively before. However, most of exsiting literatures were based on non-adaptive seeding strategy and on simple information diffusion model, such as IC/LT-model. It considered the

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-01

In this paper, we study the problem of learning the exact structure of continuous-action games with non-parametric utility functions. We propose an $\ell_1$ regularized method which encourages sparsity of the coefficients of the Fourier transform of the recovered utilities. Our method works by accessing very few Nash equilibria and their noisy utilities. Under certain technical conditions, our method

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-01-11
Thomas Brihaye; Florent Delgrange; Youssouf Oualhadj; Mickael Randour

The window mechanism was introduced by Chatterjee et al. to strengthen classical game objectives with time bounds. It permits to synthesize system controllers that exhibit acceptable behaviors within a configurable time frame, all along their infinite execution, in contrast to the traditional objectives that only require correctness of behaviors in the limit. The window concept has proved its interest

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-04-01
Andrea Celli; Alberto Marchesi; Gabriele Farina; Nicola Gatti

Recently, there has been growing interest around less-restrictive solution concepts than Nash equilibrium in extensive-form games, with significant effort towards the computation of extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE). In this paper, we show how to leverage the popular counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) paradigm to induce simple

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-01-10
Erel Segal-Halevi; Warut Suksompong

A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious. We generalize this result by showing that it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired sizes and divide the cake among the groups, so that

更新日期：2020-04-03
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-27
Nozer Singpurwalla

In this paper we put forward the viewpoint that the notion of stress testing financial institutions and engineered systems can also be made viable appropos the stress testing an individual's strength of conviction in a probability distribution. The difference is interpretation and perspective. To make our case we consider a game theoretic setup entailing two players, an adversarial C, and an amicable

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-27
Tomás Alves; Samuel Gomes; João Dias; Carlos Martinho

Throughout the years, social norms have been promoted as an informal enforcement mechanism for achieving beneficial collective outcomes. Among the most used methods to foster interactions, framing the context of a situation or setting in-game rules have shown strong results as mediators on how an individual interacts with their peers. Nevertheless, we found that there is a lack of research regarding

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-29
Laura Arditti; Giacomo Como; Fabio Fagnani

We consider graphical games as introduced by Kearns et al. (2001). First we analyse the interaction of graphicality with a notion of strategic equivalence of games, providing a minimal complexity graphical description for games. Then we study the interplay between graphicality and the classical decomposition of games proposed by Candogan et al. (2011), characterizing the graphical properties of each

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-29
Laura Arditti; Giacomo Como; Fabio Fagnani

We introduce the notion of separable games, which refines and generalizes that of graphical games. We prove that there exists a minimal splitting with respect to which a game is separable. Moreover we prove that in every strategic equivalence class, there is a game separable with respect to the minimal splitting in the class. This game is also graphical with respect to the smallest graph in the class

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-02-13
Niloofar Bayat; Richard Ma; Vishal Misra; Dan Rubenstein

An objective of network neutrality is that the design of regulations for the Internet will ensure that it remains a public, open platform where innovations can thrive. While there is broad agreement that preserving the content quality of service falls under the purview of net neutrality, the role of differential pricing, especially the practice of \emph {zero-rating} remains controversial. Even though

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-20
Jianxiong Guo; Xingjian Ding; Weili Wu

The combined cooling, heating and power (CCHP) system is a typical distributed, electricity-gas integrated energy scheme in a community. First, it generates electricity by use of gas, and then exploits the waste heat to supply community with heat and cooling. In this paper, we consider a smart city consisting of a number of communities (CCHPs) and an agent of power grid (APG), where CCHPs can sell

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-30
Yurid Nugraha; Ahmet Cetinkaya; TOmohisa Hayakawa; Hideaki Ishii; Quanyan Zhu

A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-30
Diptangshu Sen; Kushaagra Goyal; Arnob Ghosh; Varun Ramamohan

We consider a scenario where the retailers can select different prices to the users in a smart grid. Each user's demand consists of an elastic component and an inelastic component. The retailer's objective is to maximize the revenue, minimize the operating cost, and maximize the user's welfare. The retailer wants to optimize a convex combination of the above objectives using a price signal. The discriminations

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2017-09-27
Stefanos Leonardos; Costis Melolidakis; Constandina Koki

We study a vertical market with an upsteam supplier and multiple downstream retailers. Demand uncertainty falls to the supplier who acts first and sets a uniform wholesale price before the retailers observe the realized demand and engage in retail competition. Our focus is on the supplier's optimal pricing decision. We express the price elasticity of expected demand in terms of the mean residual demand

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-02-19
Jason Hartline; Aleck Johnsen; Denis Nekipelov; Zihe Wang

Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to solve the problem of inferring the values of agents in a dominant-strategy mechanism from the social choice function implemented by the mechanism and the per-unit prices paid by the agents (the agent bids are not observed).

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-05-04
Mahsa Derakhshan; Negin Golrezaei; Renato Paes Leme

We study the problem of computing data-driven personalized reserve prices in eager second price auctions without having any assumption on valuation distributions. Here, the input is a data-set that contains the submitted bids of $n$ buyers in a set of auctions and the problem is to return personalized reserve prices $\textbf r$ that maximize the revenue earned on these auctions by running eager second

更新日期：2020-03-31
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-27
Yutao Jiao; Ping Wang; Dusit Niyato; Bin Lin; Dong In Kim

Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising technology to prolong the lifetime of the sensors and communication devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing framework which consists of two mutually dependent phases: task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing

更新日期：2020-03-30
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2018-04-26
Yutao Jiao; Ping Wang; Dusit Niyato; Kongrath Suankaewmanee

As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as miners, in the network with incentives for confirming new block of transactions through a process of "block mining" by solving a cryptographic puzzle. Under the

更新日期：2020-03-30
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-26
Fanta Camara; Nicola Bellotto; Serhan Cosar; Florian Weber; Dimitris Nathanael; Matthias Althoff; Jingyuan Wu; Johannes Ruenz; André Dietrich; Gustav Markkula; Anna Schieben; Fabio Tango; Natasha Merat; Charles W. Fox

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) must share space with human pedestrians, both in on-road cases such as cars at pedestrian crossings and off-road cases such as delivery vehicles navigating through crowds on high-streets. Unlike static and kinematic obstacles, pedestrians are active agents with complex, interactive motions. Planning AV actions in the presence of pedestrians thus requires modelling of their

更新日期：2020-03-30
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-12-13
Yutao Jiao; Ping Wang; Dusit Niyato; Bin Lin; Dong In Kim

In traditional machine learning, the central server first collects the data owners' private data together and then trains the model. However, people's concerns about data privacy protection are dramatically increasing. The emerging paradigm of federated learning efficiently builds machine learning models while allowing the private data to be kept at local devices. The success of federated learning

更新日期：2020-03-30
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-26
Le Cong Dinh; Long Tran-Thanh; Tri-Dung Nguyen; Alain B. Zemkoho

This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of the game. Suppose that while repeatedly playing this game, the row player chooses her strategy at each round by using a no-regret algorithm to minimize her (pseudo)

更新日期：2020-03-28
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-26
Kun Li; Shengling Wang; Xiuzhen Cheng; Qin Hu

Quality control plays a critical role in crowdsourcing. The state-of-the-art work is not suitable for large-scale crowdsourcing applications, since it is a long haul for the requestor to verify task quality or select professional workers in a one-by-one mode. In this paper, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof crowdsourcing mechanism, guiding workers to truthfully report the quality of submitted

更新日期：2020-03-28
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-26
Michal Feldman; Galia Shabtai

We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a natural condition of {\em no underbidding}. No underbidding means that an agent's bid on every item is at least its marginal value given the outcome. In a 2nd price auction, underbidding on an item is weakly dominated by bidding the item's marginal value. Indeed, the no underbidding assumption is justified both theoretically

更新日期：2020-03-28
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-11-21
Paulin JacquotTROPICAL; Cheng WanEDF R&D OSIRIS; Olivier BeaudeEDF R&D OSIRIS; Nadia OudjaneEDF R&D OSIRIS

Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challenging when the number of players is large. In the framework of atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that variational Nash equilibria of a large aggregative game can be approximated by a Wardrop equilibrium of an auxiliary population game of smaller dimension. Each population

更新日期：2020-03-28
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-09-18
Renos Karamanis; Eleftherios Anastasiadis; Panagiotis Angeloudis; Marc Stettler

Transportation Network Companies employ dynamic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise driver participation and balance supply and demand for rides. Surge pricing multipliers are commonly used and are applied following demand and estimates of customer and driver trip valuations. Combinatorial double auctions have been identified as a suitable alternative, as they can achieve maximum

更新日期：2020-03-28
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-24
Hélène Barcelo; Valerio Capraro

Do people discriminate between men and women when they are in charge of punishing defectors or rewarding cooperators? Answering this question has potentially far-reaching implications on gender equity, since cooperative behaviour forms the basis of our societies and is typically enforced through punishment or rewarding. In this paper we report on two pre-registered experiments, that we hope shed some

更新日期：2020-03-26
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-25
Stefan Kober; Stefan Weltge

Kurz and Napel (2015) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen, Cheung, and Ng (2019) showed that the dimension is at most 24. We provide

更新日期：2020-03-26
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-21
Guohui Ding; Joewie J. Koh; Kelly Merckaert; Bram Vanderborght; Marco M. Nicotra; Christoffer Heckman; Alessandro Roncone; Lijun Chen

We consider solving a cooperative multi-robot object manipulation task using reinforcement learning (RL). We propose two distributed multi-agent RL approaches: distributed approximate RL (DA-RL), where each agent applies Q-learning with individual reward functions; and game-theoretic RL (GT-RL), where the agents update their Q-values based on the Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix Q-value game. We validate

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-22
Jehong Yoo; Reza Langari

In this paper we consider the application of Stackelberg game theory to model discretionary lane-changing in lightly congested highway setting. The fundamental intent of this model, which is parameterized to capture driver disposition (aggressiveness or inattentiveness), is to help with the development of decision-making strategies for autonomous vehicles in ways that are mindful of how human drivers

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-22
Jehong Yoo; Reza Langari

Merging in the form of a mandatory lane-change is an important issue in transportation research. Even when safely completed, merging may disturb the mainline traffic and reduce the efficiency or capacity of the roadway. In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg game-theoretic driver behavior model where the so-called utilities or payoffs reflect the merging vehicle's aggressiveness as it pertains the

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-22
Yanjun Han; Zhengyuan Zhou; Tsachy Weissman

We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions with censored feedback, where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces a challenging dilemma: if she wins the bid--the only way to achieve positive payoffs--then she is not able to observe the highest bid of

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-22
Pedro Hespanhol; Anil Aswani

There is growing concern about the possibility for tacit collusion using algorithmic pricing, and regulators need tools to help detect the possibility of such collusion. This paper studies how to design a hypothesis testing framework in order to decide whether agents are behaving competitively or not. In our setting, agents are utility-maximizing and compete over prices of items. A regulator, with

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-23
Takafumi Otsuka

In this paper, we study the egalitarian solution for games with discrete side payment, where the characteristic function is integer-valued and payoffs of players are integral vectors. The egalitarian solution, introduced by Dutta and Ray in 1989, is a solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic form, which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of indivisual

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-23
Yu-Guan Hsieh; Franck Iutzeler; Jérôme Malick; Panayotis Mertikopoulos

Owing to their stability and convergence speed, extragradient methods have become a staple for solving large-scale saddle-point problems in machine learning. The basic premise of these algorithms is the use of an extrapolation step before performing an update; thanks to this exploration step, extra-gradient methods overcome many of the non-convergence issues that plague gradient descent/ascent schemes

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-20
Barbara Franci; Sergio Grammatico

We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) with joint feasibility constraints and expected-value cost functions. We propose a distributed stochastic preconditioned projected reflected gradient algorithm and show its almost sure convergence when the pseudogradient mapping is cocoercive. The algorithm is based on monotone operator splitting methods for SGNEPs when the expected-value

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-03-23
Ryan Beal; Georgios Chalkiadakis; Timothy J. Norman; Sarvapali D. Ramchurn

In this paper we present a novel approach to optimise tactical and strategic decision making in football (soccer). We model the game of football as a multi-stage game which is made up from a Bayesian game to model the pre-match decisions and a stochastic game to model the in-match state transitions and decisions. Using this formulation, we propose a method to predict the probability of game outcomes

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2018-03-21
Kevin He

I study endogenous learning dynamics for people expecting systematic reversals from random sequences - the "gambler's fallacy." Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are "good enough," so predecessors' experience contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. Since

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2018-11-09
Raman Arora; Michael Dinitz; Teodor V. Marinov; Mehryar Mohri

The notion of \emph{policy regret} in online learning is a well defined? performance measure for the common scenario of adaptive adversaries, which more traditional quantities such as external regret do not take into account. We revisit the notion of policy regret and first show that there are online learning settings in which policy regret and external regret are incompatible: any sequence of play

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-03-08
Roberto Cominetti; Marco Scarsini; Marc Schröder; Nicolás Stier-Moses

Since demand in transportation networks is uncertain, commuters need to anticipate different traffic conditions. We capture this uncertainty by assuming that each commuter may make the trip or not with a fixed probability, creating an atomic congestion game with Bernoulli demands. Each commuter participates with an exogenous probability $p_i\in[0,1]$, which is common knowledge, independently of everybody

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-03-11
Vitalik Buterin; Daniel Reijsbergen; Stefanos Leonardos; Georgios Piliouras

We present an overview of hybrid Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget (FFG): a Proof-of-Stake checkpointing protocol overlaid onto Ethereum's Proof-of-Work blockchain. We describe its core functionalities and reward scheme, and explore its properties. Our findings indicate that Casper's implemented incentives mechanism ensures liveness, while providing safety guarantees that improve over standard Proof-of-Work

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-03-11
Stefanos Leonardos; Daniel Reijsbergen; Georgios Piliouras

Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols rely on voting mechanisms to reach consensus on the current state. If an enhanced majority of staking nodes, also called validators, agree on a proposed block, then this block is appended to the blockchain. Yet, these protocols remain vulnerable to faults caused by validators who abstain either accidentally or maliciously. To protect against such faults while retaining

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-06-20
Gilie Gefen; Omer Ben-Porat; Moshe Tennenholtz; Elad Yom-Tov

People increasingly turn to the Internet when they have a medical condition. The data they create during this process is a valuable source for medical research and for future health services. However, utilizing these data could come at a cost to user privacy. Thus, it is important to balance the perceived value that users assign to these data with the value of the services derived from them. Here we

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-06-15
Stefanos Leonardos; Daniel Reijsbergen; Georgios Piliouras

The rapid evolution of blockchain technology has brought together stakeholders from fundamentally different backgrounds. The result is a diverse ecosystem, as exemplified by the development of a wide range of different blockchain protocols. This raises questions for decision and policy makers: How do different protocols compare? What are their trade-offs? Existing efforts to survey the area reveal

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-11-06
Mahdi Mousavi; Anja Klein

We study multi-hop data-dissemination in a wireless network from one source to multiple nodes where some of the nodes of the network act as re-transmitting nodes and help the source in data dissemination. In this network, we study two scenarios; i) the transmitting nodes do not need an incentive for transmission and ii) they do need an incentive and are paid by their corresponding receiving nodes by

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2019-06-30
Linan Huang; Quanyan Zhu

This paper studies rational and persistent deception among intelligent robots to enhance the security and operation efficiency of autonomous vehicles. We present an N-person K-stage nonzero-sum game with an asymmetric information structure where each robot's private information is modeled as a random variable or its type. The deception is persistent as each robot's private type remains unknown to other

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2020-02-17
Qiaomin Xie; Yudong Chen; Zhaoran Wang; Zhuoran Yang

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum Markov games in which the two players simultaneously take actions. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward function and transition kernel possess a linear structure. Both the offline and online settings of the problems are considered. In the offline setting, we

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2017-10-19
Themistoklis Melissourgos; Sotiris Nikoletseas; Christoforos Raptopoulos; Paul Spirakis

The Moran process, as studied by Lieberman et al. [L05], is a stochastic process modeling the spread of genetic mutations in populations. In this process, agents of a two-type population (i.e. mutants and residents) are associated with the vertices of a graph. Initially, only one vertex chosen u.a.r. is a mutant, with fitness $r > 0$, while all other individuals are residents, with fitness $1$. In

更新日期：2020-03-24
• arXiv.cs.GT Pub Date : 2018-10-10
George Christodoulou; Themistoklis Melissourgos; Paul G. Spirakis

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq 1$ multiple-access channels. To do that, a player chooses a slotted-time protocol that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step she will attempt

更新日期：2020-03-24
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