While in two-player zero-sum games the Nash equilibrium is a well-established prescriptive notion of optimal play, its applicability as a prescriptive tool beyond that setting is limited. Consequently, the study of decentralized learning dynamics that guarantee convergence to correlated solution concepts in multiplayer, general-sum extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games has become an important topic

We consider the learning task of prediction of formation of core stable coalition structure in hedonic games based on agents' noisy preferences. We have considered two cases: complete information (noisy preferences of all the agents are entirely known) and partial information (noisy preferences over some coalitions are only known). We introduce a noise model that probabilistically scales the valuations

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such settings, forming preferences is both difficult and critical. Prior work has suggested various prediction mechanisms that help agents make decisions about their preferences

This volume contains the proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logic and Formal Verification (GandALF 2021). The aim of GandALF 2021 symposium is to bring together researchers from academia and industry which are actively working in the fields of Games, Automata, Logics, and Formal Verification. The idea is to cover an ample spectrum of themes, ranging from theory to applications

Internet of Things (IoT) devices and applications can have significant vulnerabilities, which may be exploited by adversaries to cause considerable harm. An important approach for mitigating this threat is remote attestation, which enables the defender to remotely verify the integrity of devices and their software. There are a number of approaches for remote attestation, and each has its unique advantages

In this paper we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores to a group of n agents, each of which has a general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocation is not guaranteed to exist, we consider the notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). In contrast to the fruitful results regarding the (approximation of) EFX allocations for goods, very little is known

Off-chain protocols constitute one of the most promising approaches to solve the inherent scalability issue of blockchain technologies. The core idea is to let parties transact on-chain only once to establish a channel between them, leveraging later on the resulting channel paths to perform arbitrarily many peer-to-peer transactions off-chain. While significant progress has been made in terms of proof

JUBILEE is a securely computed mechanism for debt relief and forgiveness in a frictionless manner without involving trusted third parties, leading to more harmonious debt settlements by incentivising the parties to truthfully reveal their private information. JUBILEE improves over all previous methods: - individually rational, incentive-compatible, truthful/strategy-proof, ex-post efficient, optimal

To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recent credit system where in each round, countries are given an initial kidney transplant allocation which is adjusted by a credit function yielding a target allocation. The goal is to find a solution in the

Mobile Edge Caching is a promising technique to enhance the content delivery quality and reduce the backhaul link congestion, by storing popular content at the network edge or mobile devices (e.g. base stations and smartphones) that are proximate to content requesters. In this work, we study a novel mobile edge caching framework, which enables mobile devices to cache and share popular contents with

We study a dynamic traffic assignment model, where agents base their instantaneous routing decisions on real-time delay predictions. We formulate a mathematically concise model and derive properties of the predictors that ensure a dynamic prediction equilibrium exists. We demonstrate the versatility of our framework by showing that it subsumes the well-known full information and instantaneous information

Financial options are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike values and trade options of different strikes independently, even for those written on the same underlying asset. Such independent market design can introduce arbitrage opportunities and lead to the thin market problem

Financial networks model a set of financial institutions (firms) interconnected by obligations. Recent work has introduced to this model a class of obligations called credit default swaps, a certain kind of financial derivatives. The main computational challenge for such systems is known as the clearing problem, which is to determine which firms are in default and to compute their exposure to systemic

Fuzzy Message Detection (FMD) is a recent cryptographic primitive invented by Beck et al. (CCS'21) where an untrusted server performs coarse message filtering for its clients in a recipient-anonymous way. In FMD - besides the true positive messages - the clients download from the server their cover messages determined by their false-positive detection rates. What is more, within FMD, the server cannot

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling scheme and participants form a posterior belief about the state of the network based on prior beliefs and received signal. They subsequently select routes minimizing

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the agents' valuations are matroid-rank functions. In this setup, we establish a notable dichotomy between two of the most well-studied fairness notions in discrete fair

We consider a facility location game in which $n$ agents reside at known locations on a path, and $k$ heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adversely affected by some subset of the facilities, and is unaffected by the others. We design two classes of mechanisms for choosing the facility locations given the reported agent preferences: utilitarian mechanisms that strive

Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient algorithms for certain families of team game. In particular, if the game has common external information, also known as A-loss recall -- informally, actions played

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self-destroying" as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensive-form game

We present the single track road problem. In this problem two agents face each-other at opposite positions of a road that can only have one agent pass at a time. We focus on the scenario in which one agent is human, while the other is an autonomous agent. We run experiments with human subjects in a simple grid domain, which simulates the single track road problem. We show that when data is limited

This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade between a buyer and a seller is costlier than a trade mediated by a middleman. For each such market, we examine an associated cooperative game with transferable utility

Classic mechanism design often assumes that a bidder's action is restricted to report a type or a signal, possibly untruthfully. In today's digital economy, bidders are holding increasing amount of private information about the auctioned items. And due to legal or ethical concerns, they would demand to reveal partial but truthful information, as opposed to report untrue signal or misinformation. To

An irreducible stochastic matrix with rational entries has a stationary distribution given by a vector of rational numbers. We give an upper bound on the lowest common denominator of the entries of this vector. Bounds of this kind are used to study the complexity of algorithms for solving stochastic mean payoff games. They are usually derived using the Hadamard inequality, but this leads to suboptimal

We consider an information elicitation game where the center needs the agent to self-report her actual usage of a service and charges her a payment accordingly. The center can only observe a partial signal, representing part of the agent's true consumption, that is generated randomly from a publicly known distribution. The agent can report any information, as long as it does not contradict the signal

We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some nodes of the line, each agent derives a cost that is equal to her total distance from the facilities she approves. The goal is to decide where to locate the two facilities

Continuous games have compact strategy sets and continuous utility functions. Such games can have a highly complicated structure of Nash equilibria. Algorithms and numerical methods for the equilibrium computation are known only for particular classes of continuous games such as two-person polynomial games or games with pure equilibria. This contribution focuses on the computation and approximation

Mean field control (MFC) is an effective way to mitigate the curse of dimensionality of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems. This work considers a collection of $N_{\mathrm{pop}}$ heterogeneous agents that can be segregated into $K$ classes such that the $k$-th class contains $N_k$ homogeneous agents. We aim to prove approximation guarantees of the MARL problem for this heterogeneous

In this paper, we propose Posterior Sampling Reinforcement Learning for Zero-sum Stochastic Games (PSRL-ZSG), the first online learning algorithm that achieves Bayesian regret bound of $O(HS\sqrt{AT})$ in the infinite-horizon zero-sum stochastic games with average-reward criterion. Here $H$ is an upper bound on the span of the bias function, $S$ is the number of states, $A$ is the number of joint actions

The Multi-valued Action Reasoning System (MARS) is an automated value-based ethical decision-making model for artificial agents (AI). Given a set of available actions and an underlying moral paradigm, by employing MARS one can identify the ethically preferred action. It can be used to implement and model different ethical theories, different moral paradigms, as well as combinations of such, in the

We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if the output of the player is very low or very high. We model this using two objective functions: binary threshold, where a player's contribution to the designer's utility is 1 if her output is above a certain

In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic model over multiple zones. Agents choose whether to activate (i.e., interact with others), how many other agents to interact

In this paper, we investigate the problem about how to bid in repeated contextual first price auctions. We consider a single bidder (learner) who repeatedly bids in the first price auctions: at each time $t$, the learner observes a context $x_t\in \mathbb{R}^d$ and decides the bid based on historical information and $x_t$. We assume a structured linear model of the maximum bid of all the others $m_t

We study the performance of voting mechanisms from a utilitarian standpoint, under the recently introduced framework of metric-distortion, offering new insights along three main lines. First, if $d$ represents the doubling dimension of the metric space, we show that the distortion of STV is $O(d \log \log m)$, where $m$ represents the number of candidates. For doubling metrics this implies an exponential

In fair division of indivisible goods, l-out-of-d maximin share (MMS) is the value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning the goods into d bundles and choosing the l least preferred bundles. Most existing works aim to guarantee to all agents a constant fraction of their one-out-of-n MMS. But this guarantee is sensitive to small perturbation in agents' cardinal valuations. We consider a more robust

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to simple problems, in more complicated situations where assumptions such as infinite population size may be relaxed, deriving analytic solutions can be intractable

Similar to the role of Markov decision processes in reinforcement learning, Stochastic Games (SGs) lay the foundation for the study of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and sequential agent interactions. In this paper, we derive that computing an approximate Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in a finite-state discounted Stochastic Game within the exponential precision is \textbf{PPAD}-complete

We introduce balancedness a fairness axiom in house allocation problems. It requires a mechanism to assign the top choice, the second top choice, and so on, on the same number of profiles for each agent. This axiom guarantees equal treatment of all agents at the stage in which the mechanism is announced when all preference profiles are equally likely. We show that, with an interesting exception for

Augmented Reality, or simply AR, is the incorporation of information in digital format that includes live footage of a certain user's real-time environment. Also now, various universities are using Augmented Reality. Applying the technology in the education sector can result in having a smart campus. In line with that, this paper will discuss how Augmented Reality is being used now in different learning

We present a new method for multi-agent planning involving human drivers and autonomous vehicles (AVs) in unsignaled intersections, roundabouts, and during merging. In multi-agent planning, the main challenge is to predict the actions of other agents, especially human drivers, as their intentions are hidden from other agents. Our algorithm uses game theory to develop a new auction, called \model, that

We consider mechanisms for truthfully eliciting probabilistic predictions from a group of experts. The standard approach -- using a proper scoring rule to separately reward each expert -- is not robust to collusion: experts may collude to misreport their beliefs in a way that guarantees them a larger total reward no matter the eventual outcome. Chun and Shachter (2011) termed any such collusion "arbitrage"

In this paper we introduce a Linear Program (LP) based formulation of a Rendezvous game with markers on the infinite line and solve it. In this game one player moves at unit speed while the second player moves at a speed bounded by vmax smaller than 1. We observe that in this setting a slow moving player may have interest to rest still instead of moving. This shows that in some conditions the wait-for-mummy

We study fair and efficient allocation of divisible goods, in an online manner, among $n$ agents. The goods arrive online in a sequence of $T$ time periods. The agents' values for a good are revealed only after its arrival, and the online algorithm needs to fractionally allocate the good, immediately and irrevocably, among the agents. Towards a unifying treatment of fairness and economic efficiency

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized payoffs using Bayes's rule. Players adjust their strategies by accounting for best response strategies given the belief. We show that, with probability 1, beliefs

In this letter, we point to three widely accepted challenges that the quantum theory, quantum information, and quantum foundations communities are currently facing: indeterminism, the semantics of conditional probabilities, and the spooky action at a distance. We argue that these issues are fundamentally rooted in conflations commonly made between causal dependencies, counterfactual dependencies, and

Is there an algorithm that takes a game in normal form as input, and outputs a Nash equilibrium? If the payoffs are integers, the answer is yes, and lot of work has been done in its computational complexity. If the payoffs are permitted to be real numbers, the answer is no, for continuity reasons. It is worthwhile to investigate the precise degree of non-computability (the Weihrauch degree), since

Peer reviewed publications are considered the gold standard in certifying and disseminating ideas that a research community considers valuable. However, we identify two major drawbacks of the current system: (1) the overwhelming demand for reviewers due to a large volume of submissions, and (2) the lack of incentives for reviewers to participate and expend the necessary effort to provide high-quality

This work considers the problem of learning cooperative policies in multi-agent settings with partially observable and non-stationary environments without a communication channel. We focus on improving information sharing between agents and propose a new multi-agent actor-critic method called \textit{Multi-Agent Cooperative Recurrent Proximal Policy Optimization} (MACRPO). We propose two novel ways

In this work, we focus on resource allocation in a decentralised open market. In decentralised open markets consists of multiple vendors and multiple dynamically-arriving buyers, thus makes the market complex and dynamic. Because, in these markets, negotiations among vendors and buyers take place over multiple conflicting issues such as price, scalability, robustness, delay, etc. As a result, optimising

Abstract. Matching logic cannot handle concurrency. We introduce concurrent matching logic (CML) to reason about fault-free partial correctness of shared-memory concurrent programs. We also present a soundness proof for concurrent matching logic (CML) in terms of operational semantics. Under certain assumptions, the assertion of CSL can be transformed into the assertion of CML. Hence, CSL can be seen

Justified representation (JR) is a standard notion of representation in multiwinner approval voting. Not only does a JR committee always exist, but previous work has also shown through experiments that the JR condition can typically be fulfilled by groups of fewer than $k$ candidates. In this paper, we study such groups -- known as $n/k$-justifying groups -- both theoretically and empirically. First

In the prophet secretary problem, $n$ values are drawn independently from known distributions, and presented in random order. A decision-maker must accept or reject each value when it is presented, and may accept at most $k$ values in total. The objective is to maximize the expected sum of accepted values. We study the performance of static threshold policies, which accept the first $k$ values exceeding

In resource allocation, it is common to assume that agents have a utility for their allocated items and zero utility for unallocated ones. We refer to such valuation domain as 1-D. This assumption of zero utility for unallocated items is not always valid. For example, in the pandemic, allocation of ventilators, oxygen beds, and critical medical help yields dis-utility to an agent when not received

Our ability to know when to trust the decisions made by machine learning systems has not kept up with the staggering improvements in their performance, limiting their applicability in high-stakes domains. We introduce Prover-Verifier Games (PVGs), a game-theoretic framework to encourage learning agents to solve decision problems in a verifiable manner. The PVG consists of two learners with competing

Congestion pricing has received lots of attention in scientific discussion. Congestion pricing means that the operator increases prices at the time of congestion and the traffic demand are expected to decrease. In a certain sense, shadow prices are an optimal way of congestion pricing: users are charged shadow prices, i.e., the expectations of future losses because of blocked connections. The shadow

The inaccessibility of user-perceived reality remains an open issue in pursuing the accurate calibration of optical see-through (OST) head-mounted displays (HMDs). Manual user alignment is usually required to collect a set of virtual-to-real correspondences, so that a default or an offline display calibration can be updated to account for the user's eye position(s). Current alignment-based calibration

We present the first game characterization of contrasimilarity, the weakest form of bisimilarity. The game is finite for finite-state processes and can thus be used for contrasimulation equivalence checking, of which no tool has been capable to date. A machine-checked Isabelle/HOL formalization backs our work and enables further use of contrasimilarity in verification contexts.

Federated learning (FL) trains a machine learning model on mobile devices in a distributed manner using each device's private data and computing resources. A critical issues is to evaluate individual users' contributions so that (1) users' effort in model training can be compensated with proper incentives and (2) malicious and low-quality users can be detected and removed. The state-of-the-art solutions

One practical requirement in solving dynamic games is to ensure that the players play well from any decision point onward. To satisfy this requirement, existing efforts focus on equilibrium refinement, but the scalability and applicability of existing techniques are limited. In this paper, we propose Temporal-Induced Self-Play (TISP), a novel reinforcement learning-based framework to find strategies

Access to capital is a major constraint for economic growth in the developing world. Yet those attempting to lend in this space face high defaults due to their inability to distinguish creditworthy borrowers from the rest. In this paper, we propose two novel scoring mechanisms that incentivize community members to truthfully report their signal on the creditworthiness of others in their community.

Weighted voting games apply to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a novel approach to the study of the power of big vs.~small players in these games. We model small (big) players as having single (multiple) votes. The aggregate relative power of big players is measured w.r.t.~their votes proportion