In two studies, participants performed a switching task, and we provided to only half of them feedback on goal progress (how much of the task still remains). Importantly, this feedback did not inform participants on how well they performed. We found that participants in the feedback condition achieved a higher asymptotic level of performance, reported less fatigue and took shorter breaks between blocks compared to the control condition. These results suggest that asymptotic level of performance reflects not only ability (as is commonly assumed in the literature) but also motivation. We suggest that when people know when a focal task would end, they invest more effort in it because foregoing other activities becomes less costly (i.e., opportunity cost of engaging in the focal activity decreases) and because knowing when a task would end frees the actor from the need to conserve effort. These results suggest a simple, effective and costless way to improve cognitive performance that may be applied in educational and organizational settings.

In a process known as the Baldwin Effect, developmental plasticity, such as learning, has been argued to accelerate the biological evolution of high-fitness traits, including language and complex intelligence. Here we investigate the evolutionary consequences of developmental plasticity by asking which aspects of a plastic trait are the focus of genetic change. The aspects we consider are: (i) dependencies between elements of a trait, (ii) the importance of each element to fitness, and (iii) the difficulty of acquiring each element through plasticity. We also explore (iv) how cultural inheritance changes the relationship between plasticity and genetic change. We find that evolution by natural selection preferentially fixes elements that are depended upon by others, important to fitness, or difficult to acquire through plasticity, but that cultural inheritance can suppress and even reverse genetic change. We replicate some of these effects in experimental evolutionary simulations with human learners. We conclude that what the Baldwin Effect affects depends upon the mechanism of plasticity, which for behavior and cognition includes the psychology of learning.

It is generally acknowledged that humans have an egocentric bias; processing self-related stimuli in a specialised, preferential manner. The self-bias has been studied within cognitive domains such as memory, attention and perception; but never across cognitive domains in order to assess whether self-biases are a product of a common bias, or independent. This has relevance for conditions such as Autism Spectrum Disorder: certain self-biases are reduced in those with autism, but the pattern of results is not consistent across different cognitive domains. Self-bias was measured across the attentional and perceptual domains on two well-established tasks: the attentional blink (attention) and shape-label matching (perception) tasks. Processing of each participant's own name was compared to processing of the name of another individual very familiar to the participant (to control for familiarity), and the name of an unfamiliar other. In the attentional domain, the attentional blink for the participant's own name was reduced compared to that for the name of a familiar or unfamiliar other. In the perceptual domain, participants showed stronger associations between their own name and a geometric shape than between the other classes of names and associated shapes. Thus, strong evidence of a self-bias, independent of familiarity, was found on both tasks. However, across two experiments, the magnitude of the self-bias on the attentional blink and shape-label matching tasks was not correlated, supporting the idea that self-biases across cognitive domains are distinct. Furthermore, in contrast with extant models, neither type of self-bias was predicted by autistic traits.

Recent eye-movement evidence suggests readers are more likely to skip a high-frequency word than a low-frequency word independently of the semantic or syntactic acceptability of the word in the sentence. This has been interpreted as strong support for a serial processing mechanism in which the decision to skip a word is based on the completion of a preliminary stage of lexical processing prior to any assessment of contextual fit. The present large-scale study was designed to reconcile these findings with the plausibility preview effect: higher skipping and reduced first-pass reading times for words that are previewed by contextually plausible, compared to implausible, sentence continuations that are unrelated to the target word. Participants' eye movements were recorded as they read sentences containing a short (3–4 letters) or long (6 letters) target word. The boundary paradigm was used to present parafoveal previews which were either higher or lower frequency than the target, and either plausible or implausible in the sentence context. The results revealed strong, independent effects of all three factors on target skipping and early measures of target fixation duration, while frequency and plausibility interacted on later measures of target fixation duration. Simulations using the E-Z Reader model of eye-movement control in reading demonstrated that plausibility effects on skipping are potentially consistent with the assumption that higher-level contextual information only affects post-lexical integration processes. However, no current model of eye movements in reading provides an explicit account of the information or processes that allow readers to rapidly detect an integration failure.

Successful navigation involves finding the way, planning routes, and avoiding collisions. Whilst previous research has shown that people can navigate using non-visual cues, it is not clear to what degree learned non-visual navigational abilities generalise to ‘new’ environments. Furthermore, the ability to successfully avoid collisions has not been investigated separately from the ability to perceive spatial layout or to orient oneself in space. Here, we address these important questions using a virtual echolocation paradigm in sighted people. Fourteen sighted blindfolded participants completed 20 virtual navigation training sessions over the course of 10 weeks. In separate sessions, before and after training, we also tested their ability to perceive the spatial layout of virtual echo-acoustic space. Furthermore, three blind echolocation experts completed the tasks without training, thus validating our virtual echo-acoustic paradigm. We found that over the course of 10 weeks sighted people became better at navigating, i.e. they reduced collisions and time needed to complete the route, and increased success rates. This also generalised to ‘new’ (i.e. untrained) virtual spaces. In addition, after training, their ability to judge spatial layout was better than before training. The data suggest that participants acquired a ‘true’ sensory driven navigational ability using echo-acoustics. In addition, we show that people not only developed navigational skills related to avoidance of collisions and finding safe passage, but also processes related to spatial perception and orienting. In sum, our results provide strong support for the idea that navigation is a skill which people can achieve via various modalities, here: echolocation.

Accurate recognition of others' emotions is an important skill for successful social interaction. Unsurprisingly, it has been an enduring topic of interest, and notable individual differences have been observed. Despite this focus, the underlying functional architecture of this ability has not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning emotion recognition across different sensory domains and stimulus modalities. Using a structural equation modelling approach, Study 1 (N = 284) established the structure of emotion recognition ability across three expressive domains – face, body and voice – and observed strong evidence for a superordinate ‘supramodal’ emotion recognition factor, over and above domain-specific factors. Additionally, we observed a significant moderate negative association between this superordinate factor and alexithymia. In Study 2 (N = 218), findings indicated that supramodal emotion recognition ability and face identity recognition are two related but independent constructs. In Study 3 (N = 249), we examined links from both supramodal emotion recognition and face identity recognition to broader cognitive ability, and observed that general intelligence was a significant predictor of supramodal emotion recognition ability. In contrast, there was no association between intelligence and face identity recognition ability. Across three independent samples, then, our findings offer strong support for an emotion recognition ability factor existing across visual and auditory domains encompassing social signals conveyed by face, body and voice, and outline its associations to broader cognitive and affective traits.

Failing to remember the source of retrievable information is known as source amnesia. This phenomenon has been extensively investigated in long-term memory but rarely in working memory, as we share the intuition that the source information of an item that we have encountered in the immediate past is always available. However, a recent study (Chen, Carlson, & Wyble, 2018) challenged this common sense by showing the source amnesia for simple visual stimuli (e.g., colored square) in the context of working memory when participants did not expect having to report source information, which indicated that the source information of visual stimuli was not automatically encoded into working memory. The current study sought to further examine this newly discovered phenomenon by testing whether it persists with complex and meaningful stimuli in the visual modality (Experiments 1, 4a & 4b), cross-visual-and-auditory modalities (Experiments 2a & 2b), and within-auditory modality (Experiment 3). Interestingly, the results revealed that short-term source amnesia was a robust effect in the visual modality even for complex and meaningful stimuli, whereas it was absent in the cross-visual-and-auditory or within-auditory modalities, regardless of reporting expectation. This indicates differences in working memory representations of visual and auditory stimuli, namely, the representation of auditory stimuli was stored together with the corresponding original sources, while that of visual stimuli was stored independently of its source information. These findings have crucial implications for further clarifying the longstanding debate regarding whether or not there is a modality-independent working memory storage system for different modalities.

Our understanding of proportions can be both symbolic, as when doing calculations in school mathematics, or intuitive, as when folding a bed sheet in half. While an understanding of symbolic proportions is crucial for school mathematics, the cognitive foundations of this ability remain unclear. Here we implemented a computerized training game to test a causal link from intuitive (nonsymbolic) to symbolic proportional reasoning and other math abilities in 4th grade children. An experimental group was trained in nonsymbolic proportional reasoning (PR) with continuous extents, and an active control group was trained on a remarkably similar nonsymbolic magnitude comparison. We found that the experimental group improved at nonsymbolic PR across training sessions, showed near transfer to a paper-and-pencil nonsymbolic PR test, transfer to symbolic proportions, and far transfer to geometry. The active control group showed only a predicted far transfer to geometry. In a second experiment, these results were replicated with an independent cohort of children. Overall this study extends previous correlational evidence, suggesting a functional link between nonsymbolic PR on one hand and symbolic PR and geometry on the other.

Four behavioral studies (ns ~ 200 to 400) extended neural studies of ventral stream damage and fMRI activation and behavioral studies of scene recall conducted on individual memories to individual differences in normal populations. Ratings of scene and contents were made on one set of autobiographical memories. Ratings of reliving, vividness, belief, emotional intensity, and temporal specificity were made on different memories. Thus, correlations between these ratings were due to variability in the participants, not the events remembered. Scene correlated more highly than contents with reliving, vividness, belief, and emotional intensity but not temporal specificity. Scene correlated more highly than other visual imagery tests with reliving, vividness, and belief. Scene correlated with individual differences tests of episodic memories and future events more highly than it did with tests of semantic memory and spatial navigation abilities. Moreover, scene had high test-retest correlations measured at periods of up to one month. The ability to recall scenes is a stable disposition, with both convergent and divergent validity, which predicts basic qualities of autobiographical memories. A Scene Recall Imagery Test is introduced.

Contextual information influences how we perceive speech, but it remains unclear at which level of processing contextual information merges with acoustic information. Theories differ on whether early stages of speech processing, like sublexical processing during which articulatory features and portions of speech sounds are identified, are strictly feed-forward or are influenced by semantic and lexical context. In the current study, we investigate the time-course of lexical context effects on judgments about the individual sounds we perceive by recording electroencephalography as an online measure of speech processing while subjects engage in a lexically biasing phoneme categorization task. We find that lexical context modulates the amplitude of the N100, an ERP component linked with sublexical processes in speech perception. We demonstrate that these results can be modeled in an interactive speech perception model and are not well fit by any established feed-forward mechanisms of lexical bias. These results support interactive speech perception theories over feed-forward theories in which sublexical speech perception processes are only driven by bottom-up information.

Despite burgeoning evidence that listeners are highly sensitive to statistical distributions of speech cues, the mechanism underlying learning may not be purely statistical tracking. Decades of research in animal learning suggest that learning results from prediction and prediction error. Two artificial language learning experiments test two predictions that distinguish error-driven from purely statistical models; namely, cue competition – specifically, Kamin’s (1968) ‘blocking’ effect (Experiment 1) – and the predictive structure of learning events (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, prior knowledge of an informative cue blocked learning of a second cue. This finding may help explain second language learners’ difficulty in acquiring native-level perception of non-native speech cues. In Experiment 2, learning was better with a discriminative (cue–outcome) order compared to a non-discriminative (outcome–cue) order. Experiment 2 suggests that learning speech cues, including reversing effects of blocking, depends on (un)learning from prediction error and depends on the temporal order of auditory cues versus semantic outcomes. Together, these results show that (a) existing knowledge of acoustic cues can block later learning of new cues, and (b) speech sound acquisition depends on the predictive structure of learning events. When feedback from prediction error is available, this drives learners to ignore salient non-discriminative cues and effectively learn to use target cue dimensions. These findings may have considerable implications for the field of speech acquisition.

Tactile perception is referenced to, and modulated by, body parts and their boundaries. For example, tactile distances presented over the wrist are perceptually elongated relative to those presented within the hand or arm. This phenomenon is argued to result from a segmentation of tactile space according to body parts and their boundaries, i.e., touches presented within a body part are perceived as being more similar, and therefore closer together, whereas those that straddle a body part boundary (e.g. presented across two body parts) are perceived as more distinct and thus further apart. We tested the hypothesis that language shapes this effect by providing consolidatory labels for categories and boundaries, as it does in other perceptual domains. We examined the perceptual elongation of distance over the wrist in a group of Croatian adults (n = 37) whose first language does not differentiate between hand and arm at the wrist in common noun terms (instead, the Croatian word “ruka” encompasses the entire limb). Croatian adults, like UK adults reported in a previous study (Le Cornu Knight, Longo, & Bremner, 2014), perceived distances presented proximodistally over the wrist boundary as longer than those presented mediolaterally, whereas the reverse was found for both the hand and the arm. This pattern of results was remained when Croatian participants were split into two groups of inexperienced or proficient English-language speakers. This is striking evidence that body part boundaries consistently modulate tactile perception, despite differences in the linguistic distinctions of such body parts made by one's first language.

There is accumulating evidence that articulatory/motor knowledge plays a role in phonetic processing, such as the recent finding that orofacial somatosensory inputs may influence phoneme categorization. We here show that somatosensory inputs also contribute at a higher level of the speech perception chain, that is, in the context of word segmentation and lexical decision. We carried out an auditory identification test using a set of French phrases consisting of a definite article “la” followed by a noun, which may be segmented differently according to the placement of accents within the phrase. Somatosensory stimulation was applied to the facial skin at various positions within the acoustic utterances corresponding to these phrases, which had been recorded with neutral accent, that is, with all syllables given similar emphasis. We found that lexical decisions reflecting word segmentation were significantly and systematically biased depending on the timing of somatosensory stimulation. This bias was not induced when somatosensory stimulation was applied to the skin other than on the face. These results provide evidence that the orofacial somatosensory system contributes to lexical perception in situations that would be disambiguated by different articulatory movements, and suggests that articulatory/motor knowledge might be involved in speech segmentation.

While previous research has demonstrated that gaze position can increase the accessibility of previous memories when reconstructing the past (Johansson & Johansson, 2014), the present study tested whether such gaze behavior can assist in selecting target memories in the face of competing memories. An adapted retrieval practice paradigm was used, where participants were engaged in selective retrieval while looking at locations that overlapped with the encoding location of either the target item or the competing item. Replicating previous findings, we show that encoding-retrieval compatibility in gaze positions increases the likelihood of successful remembering. We furthermore provide novel evidence that looking at locations where competing items were encoded during retrieval practice induces forgetting of the competitors during subsequent tests of memory. Corroborating evidence from changes in pupil size suggests that such gaze induced forgetting is modulated by the increased demands to successfully resolve interference from competing memories. This study represents the first demonstration that gaze position can both up- and downregulate memory accessibility during competitive memory retrieval and offers novel insights into the underlying dynamics.

People often say that during unpleasant events, e.g. traumatic incidents such as car accidents, time slows down (i.e. time is overestimated). However aversive events can elicit at least two dissociable subtypes of reactions: fear (transient and relating to an imminent event) and anxiety (diffuse and relating to an unpredictable event). We hypothesised that anxiety might have an opposite effect on time perception compared to fear. To test this we combined a robust anxiety manipulation (threat-of-shock) with a widely used timing task in which participants judged whether the duration of a stimulus was long or short. In line with our hypothesis, across three experiments (with varying stimulus timings and shock levels), participants significantly underestimated time under inducted anxiety, as indicated by a rightward shift of the psychophysical function (meta-analytic effect size: d = 0.68, 95% confidence interval: 0.42-0.94). In two further studies, we were unable to replicate previous findings that fear leads to time overestimation, after adapting our temporal cognition task, which suggests a dissociation between fear and anxiety on how they affect time perception. Our results suggest that experimentally inducing anxiety leads to underestimating the duration of temporal intervals, which might be a starting point in explaining different subjective experiences of disorders related to fear (e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder) and anxiety (e.g. generalised anxiety disorder).

Adopting a continuous identification task (CID-R) with embedded questions about prior occurrence, recent research has proposed that implicit and explicit memory are underpinned by a single memory system, since there is a systematic relationship between implicit memory (measured by identification) and explicit memory (measured by subjective report of recognition; for an example, see Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008). We were interested in whether this pattern would extend to recall of information from a study phase (Experiment 1) or recall from semantic memory (Experiment 2). We developed a degraded face identification version of the CID-R task using Gaussian blur. We reproduced previous results regarding the relationship between explicit responses on the recognition task (old/new) and stimuli identification, pointing to a continuity between explicit and implicit memory. Critically, we also found that the strength of the implicit effect (i.e., stimuli identification) was predicted by the accuracy in recall (retrieval of context in Experiment 1 and correct responses to general knowledge questions about the face in Experiment 2). Our results support the idea that memory is unidimensional and related to memory trace strength; both for recall and recognition, and interestingly, for semantic and episodic recall.

Infants' development of joint attention shows significant advances between 9 and 12 months of age, but we still need to learn much more about how infants coordinate their attention with others during this process. The objective of this study was to use eye tracking to systematically investigate how 8- and 12-month-old infants as well as adults dynamically select their focus of attention while observing a social partner demonstrate infant-directed actions. Participants were presented with 16 videos of actors performing simple infant-directed actions from a first-person perspective. Looking times to faces as well as hands-and-objects were calculated for participants at each age, and developmental differences were observed, although all three groups looked more at hands-and-objects than at faces. In order to assess whether visual attention was coordinated with the actors' behaviors, we compared participants looking at faces and objects in response to gaze direction as well as infant-directed actions vs. object-directed actions. By presenting video stimuli that involved continuously changing actions, we were able to document that the likelihood of joint attention changes in both real and developmental time. Overall, adults and 12-month-old infants' visual attention was modulated by gaze cues as well as actions, whereas this was only partially true for 8-month-old infants. Our results reveal that joint attention is not a monolithic process nor does it develop all at once.

Comprehenders have been shown to use both syntactic and semantic cues to understand pronouns like he and she. In Ana threw the ball to Liz. She…, there is a syntactic bias to assign “she” to the previous subject (Ana), and a semantic bias to assign it to the goal referent (Liz). How do people learn these biases? We tested how sensitivity to these cues is modulated by linguistic experience, measured with an Author Recognition Task (Stanovich & West, 1989). In two experiments, we found both the subject and goal biases overall, but higher print exposure only predicted use of the subject bias, not the goal bias. Our results suggest that the subject bias, and not the goal bias, may be learned from exposure.

We deconstruct continuous streams of action into smaller, meaningful events. Research has shown that the ability to segment continuous activity into such events and remember their contents declines with age; however, knowledge improves with age. We investigated how young and older adults use knowledge to more efficiently encode and later remember information from everyday events by having participants view a series of self-paced slideshows depicting everyday activities. For some activities, older adults produce more normative scripts than do young adults (older adult activities) and for other activities, young adults produce more normative scripts than do older adults (young adult activities). Overall, participants viewed event boundaries longer than within events (i.e., the event boundary advantage) replicating prior research (e.g., Hard, Recchia, & Tversky, 2011). Importantly, older adults demonstrated the boundary advantage for the older adult activities but not the young adult activities, and they also had better recognition memory for the older adult activities than the young adult activities. We also found that the magnitude of a participant's boundary advantage was associated with better memory, but only for the less knowledgeable activities. Results indicate that older adults use their intact knowledge to better encode and remember everyday activities, but that knowledge and event segmentation may have independent influences on event memory.

People often make tradeoffs between current and future benefits. Some research frameworks suggest that people treat the future self as if it were another person, subordinating future needs to current ones just as they might subordinate others' needs to their own. Although people make similar choices for future selves and others in some contexts, it remains unclear whether these behaviors are governed by the same decision policies. So, we identify and compare the unique influence of four relevant factors (need, deservingness, liking, and similarity) on monetary decisions in both the interpersonal and intrapersonal domains. Do people treat the future self and others similarly? Yes and no. Yes, because the influence of these factors on allocations is similar for both types of targets. No, because monetary allocations to the future self are consistently higher than allocations to others. Although the future self is treated like others in some ways, important differences remain that are not fully captured by this analogy.

Our interactions with the visual world are guided by attention and visual working memory. Things that we look for and those we ignore are stored as templates that reflect our goals and the tasks at hand. The nature of such templates has been widely debated. A recent proposal is that these templates can be thought of as probabilistic representations of task-relevant features. Crucially, such probabilistic templates should accurately reflect feature probabilities in the environment. Here we ask whether observers can quickly form a correct internal model of a complex (bimodal) distribution of distractor features. We assessed observers’ representations by measuring the slowing of visual search when target features unexpectedly match a distractor template. Distractor stimuli were heterogeneous, randomly drawn on each trial from a bimodal probability distribution. Using two targets on each trial, we tested whether observers encode the full distribution, only one peak of it, or the average of the two peaks. Search was slower when the two targets corresponded to the two modes of a previous distractor distribution than when one target was at one of the modes and another between them or outside the distribution range. Furthermore, targets on the modes were reported later than targets between the modes that, in turn, were reported later than targets outside this range. This shows that observers use a correct internal model, representing both distribution modes using templates based on the full probability distribution rather than just one peak or simple summary statistics. The findings further confirm that performance in odd-one out search with repeated distractors cannot be described by a simple decision rule. Our findings indicate that probabilistic visual working memory templates guiding attention, dynamically adapt to task requirements, accurately reflecting the probabilistic nature of the input.

Conventions play a fundamental, yet contested, role in social reasoning from childhood to adulthood. Conventions about how to eat, dress, speak, or play are often said to be alterable, contingent on authorities or consensus, specific to contexts, and–thereby–distinct from moral concerns. This view of conventional norms has faced two puzzles. Children and adults judge that (a) some conventions should not be adopted and (b) some violations of conventions would be wrong even if the conventions were removed. The puzzles derive, in part, from the notion of “pure” conventions: conventions detached from non-conventional concerns. This paper proposes and examines a novel solution to the two puzzles, termed the constraint view. According to the constraint view, children and adults deem conventions as alterable within constraints imposed by non-conventional concerns. The present research focused on constraints imposed by concerns with agents to whom the norms apply and concerns with others affected by the norms. Findings from four studies with preschoolers and adults supported the constraint view. Participants evaluated actions and norms based on concerns with effects on agents and others, deeming conventions to be alterable insofar as the altered norms did not negatively impact agents or others. The constraint view offers a new framework for research on how children and adults integrate conventional and non-conventional concerns when they evaluate norms and acts.

Many of the signs produced across sign languages are iconic, in the sense that they resemble the concepts they represent. We examined whether location, one of basic sign parameters along with handshape and movement, is systematically used for purposes of iconicity. Our findings revealed a mapping of vertical sign space that is exploited in its entirety for encoding typical locations in natural space. In all of the twenty sign languages we analyzed, signs were more likely to have high locations with concepts typically occurring in high vs. low regions of natural space (e.g., cloud vs. root). Furthermore, the height of signs produced to identify a visual object varied depending on object position (e.g., it was higher for basketball in the basket than basketball on the floor). It thus appears that signing space is permeable to semantic and episodic features, and iconicity plays a crucial role in making signing space so adaptable.

Across four experiments we tested children's (N = 229, aged 4–9) beliefs about what makes an individual a member of a group. One model (groups as institutions) predicts children believe groups are based on constitutive rules, i.e. collectively agreed-upon rules that ground membership. Another model (groups as social network) predicts children believe groups are based on patterns of social relationships. We tested whether and to what extent children rely on constitutive rules to attribute group membership. We found that young children can reason about constitutive rules as a means of becoming a group member, and their reasoning about constitutive rules is relatively sophisticated (Studies 1–3). But, when constitutive rules are pitted against friendship, young children (4–5) prioritize friendship and older children (6–9) prioritize constitutive rules. Therefore, both models contribute to the understanding of children's concepts of social groups across development.

The understanding that the perceptual appearance of the environment can differ in several ways from the reality underlies the ability to discriminate appearance from reality. Being able to realize when a misperception can lead us to behave in inappropriate ways confers an evolutionary advantage and may be a prerequisite to develop a Theory of Mind. Understanding that our own perception can differ from reality seems indeed necessary to attribute to others perceptions or beliefs different than ours. This appearance-reality discrimination ability has recently been demonstrated in great apes but no information is currently available regarding this ability in other nonhuman species. In a comparative study, we tested Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana), an Old World primate species, and brown capuchins (Sapajus apella), a New World primate species. We provided monkeys with two experiments using visual illusions of size and quantity to test their ability to discriminate appearance from reality, with an experimental setup similar to the one developed by Krachun et al. (2016) on chimpanzees. A large number of brown capuchins, from different ages and both sexes, as well as two Tonkean macaques succeeded in the two experiments. By ruling out all alternative explanations (i.e. visual tracking or associative learning), our study brings the first evidence that some Old World and New World monkeys are able to discriminate appearance from reality. Our results suggest moving the evolutionary apparition of this cognitive ability earlier in time. Finally, it suggests that humans could share more Theory of Mind components with more nonhuman species than we previously thought.

What are the cognitive consequences of having a name for something? Having a word for a feature makes it easier to communicate about a set of exemplars belonging to the same category (e.g., “the red things”). But might it also make it easier to learn the category itself? Here, we provide evidence that the ease of learning category distinctions based on simple visual features is predicted from the ease of naming those features. Across seven experiments, participants learned categories composed of colors or shapes that were either easy or more difficult to name in English. Holding the category structure constant, when the underlying features of the category were easy to name, participants were faster and more accurate in learning the novel category. These results suggest that compact verbal labels may facilitate hypothesis formation during learning: it is easier to pose the hypothesis “it is about redness” than “it is about that pinkish-purplish color”. Our results have consequences for understanding how developmental and cross-linguistic differences in a language's vocabulary affect category learning and conceptual development.

To what extent are links between musical pitch and space universal, and to what extent are they shaped by language? There is contradictory evidence in support of both universality and linguistic relativity presently, leaving the question open. To address this, speakers of Dutch who talk about pitch in terms of spatial height and speakers of Turkish who use a thickness metaphor were tested in simple nonlinguistic space-pitch association tasks. Both groups showed evidence of a thickness-pitch association, but differed significantly in their height-pitch associations, suggesting the latter may be more susceptible to language. When participants had to match pitches to spatial stimuli where height and thickness were opposed (i.e., a thick line high in space vs. a thin line low in space), Dutch and Turkish differed in their relative preferences. Whereas Turkish participants predominantly opted for a thickness-pitch interpretation—even if this meant a reversal of height-pitch mappings—Dutch participants favored a height-pitch interpretation more often. These findings provide new evidence that speakers of different languages vary in their space-pitch associations, while at the same time showing such associations are not equally susceptible to linguistic influences. Some space-pitch (i.e., height-pitch) associations are more malleable than others (i.e., thickness-pitch).

The idea that human languages have properties suitable for efficient communication has permeated linguistic theorizing. Indirect correlational support for this idea has come from cross-linguistic synchronic and diachronic data. However, direct causal tests have been lacking. We directly test whether biases operating during language learning can cause learners to deviate from the input they receive towards output languages that better balance production efficiency against robust message transmission. We employ miniature language learning experiments to address this question for a well-documented cross-linguistic correlation between constituent order flexibility and the presence of case marking in a language. Participants were exposed to novel miniature languages that had optional case marking and either fixed or flexible constituent order. Between participants, we manipulated the amount of time and effort associated with the production of case marking. We find that learners introduced the cross-linguistically observed trade-off between case marking and constituent order flexibility into their output languages. Critically, learners only did so when case-marked nouns required additional effort compared to non-case-marked nouns. Thus, the present study suggests that even abstract grammatical properties of languages can be shaped by a balance between production efficiency and robust message transmission.

Insightful solutions often come about by recalling a relevant prior situation—one that shares the same essential relational pattern as the current problem. Unfortunately, our memory retrievals often depend primarily on surface matches, rather than relational matches. For example, a person who is familiar with the idea of positive feedback in sound systems may fail to think of it in the context of global warming. We suggest that one reason for the failure of cross-domain relational retrieval is that relational information is typically encoded variably, in a context-dependent way. In contrast, the surface features of that context—such as objects, animals and characters—are encoded in a relatively stable way, and are therefore easier to retrieve across contexts. We propose that the use of relational language can serve to make situations' relational representations more uniform, thereby facilitating relational retrieval. In two studies, we find that providing relational labels for situations at encoding or at retrieval increased the likelihood of relational retrieval. In contrast, domain labels—labels that highlight situations' contextual features—did not reliably improve domain retrieval. We suggest that relational language allows people to retrieve knowledge that would otherwise remain inert and contributes to domain experts' insight.

Asking questions is a pervasive human activity, but little is understood about what makes them difficult to answer. An analysis of a pair of large databases, New York Times crosswords and questions from the quiz-show Jeopardy, establishes two orthogonal dimensions of question difficulty: obscurity (the rarity of the answer) and opacity (the indirectness of question cues, operationalized with word2vec). The importance of opacity, and the role of synergistic information in resolving it, suggests that accounts of difficulty in terms of prior expectations captures only a part of the question-asking process. A further regression analysis shows the presence of additional dimensions to question-asking: question complexity, the answer's local network density, cue intersection, and the presence of signal words. Our work shows how question-askers can help their interlocutors by using contextual cues, or, conversely, how a particular kind of unfamiliarity with the domain in question can make it harder for individuals to learn from others. Taken together, these results suggest how Bayesian models of question difficulty can be supplemented by process models and accounts of the heuristics individuals use to navigate conceptual spaces.

The role of associative reward learning in guiding feature-based attention and spatial attention is well established. However, no studies have looked at the extent to which reward learning can modulate the direction of saccades during visual search. Here, we introduced a novel reward learning paradigm to examine whether reward-associated directions of eye movements can modulate performance in different visual search tasks. Participants had to fixate a peripheral target before fixating one of four disks that subsequently appeared in each cardinal position. This was followed by reward feedback contingent upon the direction chosen, where one direction consistently yielded a high reward. Thus, reward was tied to the direction of saccades rather than the absolute location of the stimulus fixated. Participants selected the target in the high-value direction on the majority of trials, demonstrating robust learning of the task contingencies. In an untimed visual foraging task that followed, which was performed in extinction, initial saccades were reliably biased in the previously rewarded-associated direction. In a second experiment, following the same training procedure, eye movements in the previously high-value direction were facilitated in a saccade-to-target task. Our findings suggest that rewarding directional eye movements biases oculomotor search patterns in a manner that is robust to extinction and generalizes across stimuli and task.

We report three experiments investigating the boundaries of the Foreign Language effect in decision making (examining both risk aversion and moral dilemmas), when the foreign language is culturally influential, or when there is high linguistic similarity between the native language and the foreign language. Specifically, we found no Foreign Language effect in the Asian disease problem (Experiment 1a) or the footbridge moral dilemma (Experiment 2a) in Swedish-English bilinguals, but did find a Foreign Language effect for both these tasks in Swedish-French bilinguals (Experiments 1b and 2b). Additionally, we found no Foreign Language effect for moral dilemmas when the language pair was linguistically similar by testing Swedish-Norwegian and Norwegian-Swedish bilinguals (Experiment 3). These results indicate possible boundaries to the Foreign Language effect in decision making and propose that factors such as cultural influence and linguistic similarity diminish the Foreign Language effect.

Recent research has demonstrated that perception and reasoning vary according to the phase of internal bodily signals such as heartbeat. This has been shown by locking the presentation of sensory events to distinct phases of the cardiac cycle. However, task-relevant information is not usually encountered in such a phase-locked manner nor passively accessed, but rather actively sampled at one's own pace. Moreover, if the phase of the cardiac cycle is an important modulator of perception and cognition, as previously proposed, then the way in which we actively sample the world should be similarly modulated by the phase of the cardiac cycle. Here we tested this by coregistration of eye movements and heartbeat signals while participants freely compared differences between two visual arrays. Across three different analyses, we found a significant coupling of saccades, subsequent fixations, and blinks with the cardiac cycle. More eye movements were generated during the systolic phase of the cardiac cycle, which has been reported as the period of maximal effect of the baroreceptors' activity upon cognition. Conversely, more fixations were found during the diastole phase (quiescent baroreceptors). Lastly, more blinks were generated in the later period of the cardiac cycle. These results suggest that interoceptive and exteroceptive processing do adjust to each other; in our case, by sampling the outer environment during quiescent periods of the inner organism.

In a recent article, Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) propose that mental imagery is less vivid when evoked in a foreign than in a native language. The authors argue that reduced mental imagery could even account for moral foreign language effects, whereby moral choices become more utilitarian when made in a foreign language. Here we demonstrate that Hayakawa and Keysar's (2018) key results are better explained by reduced language comprehension in a foreign language than by less vivid imagery. We argue that the paradigm used in Hayakawa and Keysar (2018) does not provide a satisfactory test of reduced imagery and we discuss an alternative paradigm based on recent experimental developments.

Cooperative behavior is central to human societies. Human adults who reach their cooperative decisions more rapidly and independently of cognitive control display greater levels of prosocial behavior. This is taken to show that cooperation is guided by intuitive processes rather than by active control of selfish impulses. The current study investigated the emergence of intuitive cooperation in early human ontogeny. We measured helping behavior (latency and frequency) in a longitudinal sample of infants at ages 14 and 18 months. Between 14 and 18 months, the frequency of helping significantly increased and latency to help significantly decreased, suggesting advances in helping behavior during this period of development. Moreover, at 18 months and to some extent, even at 14 months, infants who helped more rapidly (as indexed by a shorter latency) acted more prosocially (as indexed by a greater frequency of helping) than infants who were slower to help. This link between latency and frequency of prosocial behavior was independent of infants' ability for inhibitory control and general sociability levels. Prosocial behavior thus begins to be governed by intuitive processes that operate independently of cognitive control early in human ontogeny. This informs our understanding of the nature and emergence of cooperative behavior by supporting accounts that assign a central role to intuition in the evolution of human cooperation.

Visual search can be guided by top-down and bottom-up processes, with either one dominating the other depending on the task (e.g., feature versus conjunction). Moreover, different search tasks bring about different expectations about the type, or frequency, of distractor stimuli. These expectations could promote top-down “task-sets” that may impact performance even when distractors are temporarily absent. Here, we characterized the role and extent of recruitment of proactive top-down processes for distractor expectation in feature and conjunction search. Participants conducted feature and conjunction search tasks for a visual target among distractors, which were either frequently presented or completely absent. The effects of the recruitment of proactive top-down processes for distractor expectation entailed slower responses, yet more accurate, on distractor-absent trials in the frequent-distractor (versus no-distractor) context of both tasks. These effects were larger in the conjunction versus feature task and were not impacted by stimulus duration and time pressure (short/present in Experiment 1, unlimited/absent in Experiment 2, respectively). Results were replicated when the presence/absence of distractors at each trial was fully predictable (Experiment 3), and when several parameters of visual search were changed (Experiment 4). Our findings indicate that top-down task-sets related to distractor expectation entail performance costs and benefits in visual search. These effects occur throughout task blocks rather than trial-to-trial, are modulated by search type, and confirm that proactive top-down processes intervene in feature search.

Several law systems punish nonactions such as failures to render assistance, although it is unknown if people spontaneously experience a sense of authorship for the consequences of their not acting. Here we provide evidence that events caused by deliberate choices not to act can indeed give rise to a vivid sense of agency. In three experiments, participants reported a sense of agency for events following nonactions and, crucially, temporal binding between nonactions and subsequent consequences suggested a sense of agency for nonactions even at an implicit level. These findings indicate that a sense of agency is not confined to overt body movements. At the same time, agency was more pronounced when the same event resulted from an action rather than being the consequence of a nonaction, highlighting the importance of ascribing different degrees of responsibility for the consequences of acting and not acting.

From a very young age, monolingual children assume their language has no synonyms, or use the principle of mutual exclusivity (only one label per object). In contrast, bilingual children often accept more novel synonyms than monolinguals. One possible explanation for this difference is the lexicon structure hypothesis: having synonyms (across languages) in the lexicon reduces adherence to mutual exclusivity. The purpose of this study is to test the lexicon structure hypothesis by comparing three- to five-year-old children who speak either Canadian French or English. Canadian French allows more synonyms than English. French-speaking children should therefore accept more novel synonyms than English-speaking children. The children did a disambiguation task, choosing whether a familiar or an unfamiliar object was the referent of a novel word (e.g., moli). Surprisingly, the French-speaking children accepted significantly fewer novel synonyms than English-speaking children. However, they accepted the most synonyms for objects that had synonyms in French but they did not know both synonyms. These results support a modified version of the lexicon structure hypothesis, one that accounts for children’s weak access to synonyms.

Some ideas that we have feel mundane, but others are imbued with a sense of profundity. We propose that Aha! moments make an idea feel more true or valuable in order to aid quick and efficient decision-making, akin to a heuristic. To demonstrate where the heuristic may incur errors, we hypothesized that facts would appear more true if they were artificially accompanied by an Aha! moment elicited using an anagram task. In a preregistered experiment, we found that participants (n = 300) provided higher truth ratings for statements accompanied by solved anagrams even if the facts were false, and the effect was particularly pronounced when participants reported an Aha! experience (d = .629). Recent work suggests that feelings of insight usually accompany correct ideas. However, here we show that feelings of insight can be overgeneralized and bias how true an idea or fact appears, simply if it occurs in the temporal ‘neighbourhood’ of an Aha! moment. We raise the possibility that feelings of insight, epiphanies, and Aha! moments have a dark side, and discuss some circumstances where they may even inspire false beliefs and delusions, with potential clinical importance.

Evans and Treisman (2010) showed systematic interactions between audition and vision when participants made speeded classifications in one modality while supposedly ignoring another. We found perceptual facilitation between high pitch and high visual position, high spatial frequency and small size, and interference between high pitch and low position, low spatial frequency and large size, while the converse was the case between low pitch and the same visual features. The present study examined the role of selective attention in these cross-modal interactions. Participants performed speeded classification or search tasks of low or high load while attempting to ignore irrelevant stimuli in a different modality. In both paradigms, congruency between the visual and the irrelevant auditory stimulus had an equal effect in the low and in the high perceptual load conditions. A third experiment tested divided attention, requiring participants to compare stimuli across modalities and respond to the visual-auditory compound. The congruency effect was as large with attention focused on one modality as when it was divided across both. These findings offer converging evidence that cross-modal interactions between corresponding basic features are independent of selective attention.

A core question in language acquisition is whether children’s syntactic processing is experience-dependent and language-specific, or whether it is governed by abstract, universal syntactic machinery. We address this question by presenting corpus and on-line processing dat a from children learning Mandarin Chinese, a language that has been important in debates about the universality of parsing processes. The corpus data revealed that two different relative clause constructions in Mandarin are differentially used to modify syntactic subjects and objects. In the experiment, 4-year-old children’s eye-movements were recorded as they listened to the two RC construction types (e.g., Can you pick up the pig that pushed the sheep?). A permutation analysis showed that children’s ease of comprehension was closely aligned with the distributional frequencies, suggesting syntactic processing preferences are shaped by the input experience of these constructions.

The sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and through them, events in the outside world. According to computational motor control models, the prediction errors from comparison between the predicted sensory feedback and actual sensory feedback determine whether people feel agency over the corresponding outcome event, or not. This mechanism requires a model of the relation between action and outcome. However, in a novel environment, where this model has not yet been learned, the sense of agency must emerge during exploratory behaviours. In the present study, we designed a novel control detection task, in which participants explored the extent to which they could control the movement of three dots with a computer mouse, and then identified the dot that they felt they could control. Pre-recorded motions were applied for two dots, and the participants’ real-time motion only influenced one dot’s motion (i.e. the target dot). We disturbed participants’ control over the motion of the target dot in one of two ways. In one case, we applied a fixed angular bias transformation between participant’s movements and dot movements. In another condition, we mixed the participant’s current movement with replay of another movement, and used the resulting hybrid signal to drive visual dot position. The former intervention changes the match between motor action and visual outcome, but maintains a regular relation between the two. In contrast, the latter alters both matching and motor-visual correlation. Crucially, we carefully selected the strength of these two perturbations so that they caused the same magnitude of impairment of motor performance in a simple reaching task, suggesting that both interventions produced comparable prediction errors. However, we found the visuomotor transformation had much less effect on the ability to detect which dot was under one’s own control than did the nonlinear disturbance. This suggests a specific role of a correlation-like mechanism that detects ongoing visual-motor regularity in the human sense of agency. These regularity-detection mechanisms would remain intact under the linear, but not the nonlinear transformation. Human sense of agency may depend on monitoring ongoing motor-visual regularities, as well as on detecting prediction errors.

The sense of agency (SoA) experienced in joint action is an essential subjective dimension of human cooperativeness, but we still know little about the specific factors that contribute to its emergence or alteration. In the present study, dyads of participants were instructed to coordinate their key presses to move a cursor up to a specific target (i.e., to achieve a common goal). We applied random deviations on the cursor’s trajectory to manipulate the motor fluency of the joint action, while the agents’ motor roles were either balanced (i.e., equivalent) or unbalanced (i.e., one agent contributed more than the other), making the agents more or less pivotal to the joint action. Then, the final outcomes were shared equally, fairly (i.e., reflecting individual motor contributions) or arbitrarily in an all-or-none fashion, between the co-agents. Self and joint SoA were measured through self-reports about feeling of control, that is, using judgment of (felt) control (JoC), and electrodermal activity was recorded during the whole motor task. We observed that self and joint JoC were reduced in the case of low motor fluency, pointing out the importance of sensorimotor cues for both I- and we-modes. Moreover, while self JoC was reduced in the low pivotality condition (i.e., low motor role), joint JoC was significantly enhanced when agents’ roles and rewards were symmetrical (i.e. equal). Skin conductance responses to rewards were impacted by the way outcomes were shared between partners (i.e., fairly, equally or arbitrarily) but not by the individual gains, which demonstrates the sensitivity of low-level physiological reactions to external signs of fairness. Skin conductance level was also reduced in the fair context, where rewards were shared according to individual motor contributions, relative to the all-or-none context, which could mirror the feeling of effective responsibility and control over actions’ outcomes.

Attention refers to the set of cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the prioritization of incoming sensory information. Existing research suggests that motivationally salient stimuli, such as those associated with reward, are prioritized by the attention system and that this prioritization occurs independently of an observer’s goals. Specifically, studies of visual search have shown that stimuli signalling the availability of monetary reward are more likely to capture eye movements, even when participants are motivated to ignore such stimuli. In the current study we ask whether reward magnitude influences only the likelihood that stimuli will capture spatial attention, or whether reward also influences the ease with which people can disengage attention from a location when they are motivated to move their attention elsewhere. Three experiments examined the time taken to disengage from a centrally presented distractor that signalled the availability of high or low reward. We found that participants took longer to move their eyes away from a high-reward distractor, even though this came at financial cost (Experiment 1), that participants were unable to suppress a high-reward distractor consistently presented at the central location (Experiment 2), that slower responding was not due to behavioural freezing in the presence of a signal of high reward (Experiment 3), and that slower responding persisted even when rewards were no longer available (Experiment 4). These results indicate that reward modulates attentional disengagement: signals of high reward hold attention for longer, even when this is counterproductive for performance of ongoing tasks. Our findings further highlight the role of reward in the conflict between automatic and goal-directed attentional processing.

Substantial research has been undertaken to understand the relationship between spelling and sound, but we know little about the relationship between spelling and meaning in alphabetic writing systems. We present a computational analysis of English writing in which we develop new constructs to describe this relationship. Diagnosticity captures the amount of meaningful information in a given spelling, whereas specificity estimates the degree of dispersion of this meaning across different spellings for a particular sound sequence. Using these two constructs, we demonstrate that particular suffix spellings tend to be reserved for particular meaningful functions. We then show across three paradigms (nonword classification, spelling, and eye tracking during sentence reading) that this form of regularity between spelling and meaning influences the behaviour of skilled readers, and that the degree of this behavioural sensitivity mirrors the strength of spelling-to-meaning regularities in the writing system. We close by arguing that English spelling may have become fractionated such that the high degree of spelling-sound inconsistency maximises the transmission of meaningful information.

The ability to discriminate the ordinal information embedded in magnitude-based sequences has been shown in 4-month-old infants, both for numerical and size-based sequences. At this early age, however, this ability is confined to increasing sequences, with infants failing to extract and represent decreasing order. Here we investigate whether the ability to represent order extends to duration-based sequences in 4-month-old infants, and whether it also shows the asymmetry signature previously observed for number and size. Infants were tested in an order discrimination task in which they were habituated to either increasing or decreasing variations in temporal duration, and were then tested with novel sequences composed of new temporal items whose durations varied following the familiar and the novel orders in alternation. Across three experiments, we manipulated the duration of the single temporal items and therefore of the whole sequences, which resulted in imposing more or less constraints on infants’ working memory, or general processing capacities. Results showed that infants failed at discriminating the ordinal direction in temporal sequences when the sequences had an overall long duration (Experiment 1), but succeeded when the duration of the sequences was shortened (Experiments 2 and 3). Moreover, there was no sign of the asymmetry signature previously reported for number and size, as successful discrimination was present for infants habituated to both increasing and decreasing sequences. These results suggest that sensitivity to temporal order is present very early in development, and that its functional properties are not shared with other magnitude dimensions, such as size and number.

A reoccurring question in cognitive science concerns the way the world is represented. Cognitive scientists quantify the contribution of a physical attribute to a sensation and try to characterize the underlying mechanism. In numerical cognition, the contribution of physical properties to quantity perception in comparison tasks was widely demonstrated albeit leaving the underlying mechanism unclear. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this contribution is related solely to comparison tasks or to a core, general ability. Here we demonstrate that the shape of the convex hull, the smallest convex polygon containing all objects in an array, plays a role in the transfer function between quantity and its mental representation. We used geometric probability to demonstrate that the shape of the convex hull is correlated with quantity in a way that resembles the behavioral enumeration curve of subitizing and estimation. Then, in two behavioral experiments we manipulated the shape of the convex hull and demonstrated its effect on enumeration. Accordingly, we suggest that humans learn the correlation between convex hull shape and numerosity and use it to enumerate.

Peripersonal Space (PPS) is the multisensory space immediately surrounding our body. Visual and tactile stimuli here are promptly processed, since their interaction gradually strengthens as the distance between visual stimulus and the body decreases. Recently, a modified version of the Temporal Order Judgment (TOJ) task was proposed to assess PPS based on the spatial congruence between somatosensory and visual stimuli. Here, we used this paradigm to explore how a temporary vs a permanent state of anxiety can alter PPS. Indeed, previous research showed that PPS boundaries are not fixed, but they can be enlarged by contingent factors (i.e. emotional features). Participants performed the TOJ paradigm twice, just before and after completing an anxiety-inducing task (experimental breathing condition) or a neutral one (control breathing condition), while their trait and state anxiety levels were repeatedly measured. We found that the pattern of visuo-tactile integration in PPS changes in the very opposite way following the two breathing tasks for participants with high levels of temporary anxiety, by strengthening and weakening its power after the experimental and control conditions, respectively. On the contrary, both the breathing tasks are capable of reducing the cross-modal interplay as compared to baseline for high trait-anxious participants, who show an overall stronger visuo-tactile integration inside the PPS than low trait anxious individuals. These results are discussed in the light of the double dissociation between orienting and alerting attentional network over-functioning, reported in state anxiety participants, and impoverished prefrontal attentional control shown by trait anxiety individuals.

How do people process and evaluate falsehood of sentences? Do people need to compare presented information with the correct answer to determine that a sentence is false, or do they rely on a mismatch between presented sentence components? To illustrate, when confronted with the false sentence ‘trains run on highways’, does one need to know that trains do not run on highways or does one need to know that trains run on tracks to reject the sentence as false? To investigate these questions, participants were asked to validate sentences that were preceded by images (Experiments 1–3) conveying a truth-congruent or a falsehood-congruent component of the sentence (e.g., an image of tracks/highway preceding the sentence ‘trains run on tracks/highways’) or by words (Experiment 4) that were either sentence-congruent, truth-congruent, or both (e.g., the word ‘train/tracks’ preceding the sentence ‘trains run on tracks/highways’). Results from four experiments showed that activating sentence-congruent concepts facilitates validation for both false and true sentences but that activating truth-congruent concepts did not aid the validation of false sentences. The present findings suggest that a detection of falsehood relies on a mismatch detection between sentence’s components, rather than on the activation of true content in the context of a particular sentence.

Languages vary in their number of color terms. A widely accepted theory proposes that languages evolve, acquiring color terms in a stereotyped sequence. This theory, by Berlin and Kay (BK), is supported by analyzing best exemplars (“focal colors”) of basic color terms in the World Color Survey (WCS) of 110 languages. But the instructions of the WCS were complex and the color chips confounded hue and saturation, which likely impacted focal-color selection. In addition, it is now known that even so-called early-stage languages nonetheless have a complete representation of color distributed across the population. These facts undermine the BK theory. Here we revisit the evolution of color terms using original color-naming data obtained with simple instructions in Tsimane’, an Amazonian culture that has limited contact with industrialized society. We also collected data in Bolivian-Spanish speakers and English speakers. We discovered that information theory analysis of color-naming data was not influenced by color-chip saturation, which motivated a new analysis of the WCS data. Embedded within a universal pattern in which warm colors (reds, oranges) are always communicated more efficiently than cool colors (blues, greens), as languages increase in overall communicative efficiency about color, some colors undergo greater increases in communication efficiency compared to others. Communication efficiency increases first for yellow, then brown, then purple. The present analyses and results provide a new framework for understanding the evolution of color terms: what varies among cultures is not whether colors are seen differently, but the extent to which color is useful.

Already in uterus the hand moves with the typical accelerated-decelerated kinematics of goal-directed actions and, from the twenty-second week of pregnancy, the unborn shows the ability to modulate the velocity of the movement depending on the nature of the target. According to the direct matching hypothesis, this motor knowledge may be sufficient to attune neonates' motion perception—like adults'—to biological kinematics. Using dots configuration motions which varied with respect to the kinematics of goal-directed actions, we observed that two-day-old human newborns did not show any spontaneous preference for either biological accelerated-decelerated motion or non-biological constant velocity motion when these were simultaneously presented in a standard preferential looking paradigm. In contrast, newborns preferred the biological kinematics after the repeated visual presentation of the different motions in a standard infant-control visual habituation paradigm. We propose that present results indicate that the relationship between perception and action does not require only action development but also the accumulation of sufficient perceptual experience. They also suggest a fast plasticity of the sensorimotor system in linking an already acquired motor knowledge with a newly experienced congruent visual stimulation.

Perhaps the main advantage of being bilingual is the capacity to communicate with interlocutors that have different language backgrounds. In the life of a bilingual, switching interlocutors hence sometimes involves switching languages. We know that the capacity to switch from one language to another is supported by control mechanisms, such as task-set reconfiguration. This study investigates whether similar neurophysiological mechanisms support bilingual switching between different listeners, within and across languages. A group of 48 unbalanced Dutch-English bilinguals named pictures for two monolingual Dutch and two monolingual English life-size virtual listeners in an immersive virtual reality environment. In terms of reaction times, switching languages came at a cost over and above the significant cost of switching from one listener to another. Analysis of event-related potentials showed similar electrophysiological correlates for switching listeners and switching languages. However, it was found that having to switch listeners and languages at the same time delays the onset of lexical processes more than a switch between listeners within the same language. Findings are interpreted in light of the interplay between proactive (sustained inhibition) and reactive (task-set reconfiguration) control in bilingual speech production. It is argued that a possible bilingual advantage in executive control may not be due to the process of switching per se. This study paves the way for the study of bilingual language switching in ecologically valid, naturalistic, experimental settings.

The Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect suggests that numbers are represented along a horizontal left-to-right oriented, mental number line, with small numbers on the left and large numbers on the right. Much less evidence exists for vertical (down-to-up) and sagittal (near-to-far) SNARC effects. This might be due to the employment of different experimental paradigms among studies and to the, sometimes, inexact definition of the vertical and sagittal axes. We investigated for the first time the SNARC effect along the horizontal, vertical, and sagittal axes, by means of a classic SNARC task. Our results suggest the presence of three equally-strong SNARC effects. Our findings can be considered as evidence in favor of a three-dimensional, mental representation of numbers, in the form of a mental number space, defined by Cartesian coordinates.

When a stimulus is repeated the memory representation for that stimulus is strengthened and performance in memory tests increases. To what extent this effect requires that each exposure elicits a fully-fledged conscious percept? In two Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) experiments we explored whether the memory representations for words would accumulate evidence trough repeated exposure when none of those presentations induced a conscious percept. Participants were instructed to identify repeated items inserted in different RSVP streams and we isolated the first instance that an item was consciously perceived as repeating. The results showed that the probability of detecting a repetition for the first time was constant across repetitions. This effect signals a limit to the evidence accumulation process through repeated exposure. We discuss whether conscious perception modulates the decay of memory representations with below-threshold items resulting in extremely fleeting memory representations.

Visual holes (cutouts in a surface) have recently intrigued vision scientists as interesting and useful stimuli in the studies of shape perception and as a perceptual conundrum regarding figure/ground organization. Adopting the Bouba/Kiki paradigm, this study addressed a controversial issue of whether the perceived shape of a closed region alters when the region changes from a solid object to an empty hole, in a more direct manner than previous studies did. Observers were presented with two doughnut-like cardboard cutouts, one with a flower-shaped hole and the other with a star-shaped hole, and then matched them with two nonsense words. The curvature profile of the hole boundary was manipulated so that the shape of the interior region (i.e., a hole) and that of the exterior region (i.e., material edges) give rise to opposite shape impressions (i.e., one rounded and the other spiky). The results of Experiment 1 revealed that shape-name matching for holed objects is based on the interior shapes of holes, but not those of materially defined inner edges. The following three experiments replicated the same pattern of results even when holes appeared like oral apertures in animal character faces (Experiments 2–3) and when they were irregular, non-symmetric, and low in semantic association with familiar real-world objects (Experiment 4). Lastly, Experiment 5 showed that shape-name matching for “C”-shaped, negative-part stimuli is also interior-shape-based if the opening of the interior region is relatively small. These findings suggest that the interior shapes of holes are automatically accessible. I conclude with a discussion of my hypothesis that the only global-level, unitary shape representation of a bounded region of a single connected surface is that of the interior region for both objects and holes, imposing an important constraint in visual shape processing.

Much evidence suggests that we first perceive the overall layout of a scene or object followed later by the details. This coarse-to-fine temporal dynamic in visual processing is also found in Navon's classical paradigm where information at the global level of compound stimuli is processed faster than information at the local level (global precedence effect), and where information at the global level has larger effects on local level responses than local level information has on global level responses (asymmetric interference effects). Traditionally, global shape primacy in Navon's paradigm has been linked with a right hemisphere preference (left visual field advantage) for global shape processing, and a left hemisphere preference (right visual field advantage) for local shape processing. This link, however, has been based on measures which confound global precedence and interference effects. Indeed, when these measures are de-confounded, we find no evidence for larger global precedence effects in the left compared with the right visual field in a large sample of participants (N = 337). In comparison, global-to-local interference effects are found to be stronger in the left than in the right visual field. We argue that these findings can be accounted for by assuming that the right hemisphere plays a special role in integrating shape information across spatial scales, that is, without assuming the existence of a right hemisphere preference for global shape processing per se.

Direct-gaze signals are known to modulate human cognition, including self-awareness. In the present study, we specifically focused on ‘bodily’ self-awareness and examined whether direct gaze would modulate one’s interoceptive accuracy (IAcc)—the ability to accurately monitor internal bodily sensations. While viewing a photograph of a frontal face with a direct gaze, an averted face or a mere white cross as a baseline, participants were required to count their heartbeats without taking their pulse. The results showed higher IAcc in the direct-gaze condition than in the averted-face or baseline condition. This was particularly the case in participants with low IAcc at baseline, indicating that direct gaze enhanced the participants’ IAcc. Importantly, their heart rate was not different while viewing the direct gaze and averted face, suggesting that sensitivity to interoceptive signals, rather than physiological arousal, is heightened by direct gaze. These findings demonstrate the role of social signals in our bodily interoceptive processing and support the notion of the social nature of self-awareness.

There is an ongoing debate concerning how numbers acquire numerical meaning. On the one hand, it has been argued that symbols acquire meaning via a mapping to external numerosities as represented by the approximate number system (ANS). On the other hand, it has been proposed that the initial mapping of small numerosities to the corresponding number words and the knowledge of the properties of counting list, especially the order relation between symbols, lead to the understanding of the exact numerical magnitude associated with numerical symbols. In the present study, we directly compared these two hypotheses in a group of preschool children who could proficiently count (most of the children were cardinal principle knowers). We used a numerosity estimation task to assess whether children have created a mapping between the ANS and the counting list (i.e., ANS-to-word mapping). Children also completed a direction task to assess their knowledge of the directional property of the counting list. That is, adding one item to a set leads to he next number word in the sequence (i.e., successor knowledge) whereas removing one item leads to the preceding number word (i.e., predecessor knowledge). Similarly, we used a visual order task to assess the knowledge that successive and preceding numbers occupy specific spatial positions on the visual number line (i.e., preceding: [?], [13], [14]; successive: [12], [13], [?]). Finally, children's performance in comparing the magnitude of number words and Arabic numbers indexed the knowledge of exact symbolic numerical magnitude. Approximately half of the children in our sample have created a mapping between the ANS and the counting list. Most of the children mastered the successor knowledge whereas few of them could master the predecessor knowledge. Children revealed a strong tendency to respond with the successive number in the counting list even when an item was removed from a set or the name of the preceding number on the number line was asked. Crucially, we found evidence that both the mastering of the predecessor knowledge and the ability to name the preceding number in the number line relate to the performance in number comparison tasks. Conversely, there was moderate/anecdotal evidence for a relation between the ANS-to-word mapping and number comparison skills. Non-rote access to the number sequence relates to knowledge of the exact magnitude associated with numerical symbols, beyond the mastering of the cardinality principle and domain-general factors.

The brain is able to extract associative regularities between stimuli and readjust the perceived timing of correlated sensory signals. In order to elucidate whether these two mechanisms interact with each other or not, we exposed participants to two different visual stimuli (a circle and a triangle) that appeared continuously and unpredictably, for 5 min. While the circle always preceded the tone for 700 ms, the triangle did not. Yet, the triangle could appear, by chance, before and after the tone, and between the circle and the tone. In two different test blocks, conducted before and after the 5-min exposure phase, participants performed simultaneity judgments regarding one of the visual stimuli (the circle or the triangle) and the exposed tone presented at different stimulus onset asynchronies. The results revealed that the precision at judging the temporal relation between the ‘associated figure’ (the circle) and the tone increased significantly after the 5-min exposure. This effect was not observed for the non-associated figure (the triangle) and occurred even when participants reported to be unaware of any association between the stimuli presented. This pattern of results indicates that the perceptual association between sensory signals can influence their subjective temporal processing.