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  • Knowledge before Belief.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-09-08
    Jonathan Phillips,Wesley Buckwalter,Fiery Cushman,Ori Friedman,Alia Martin,John Turri,Laurie Santos,Joshua Knobe

    Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent

    更新日期:2020-09-08
  • Origins of music in credible signaling.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-26
    Samuel A Mehr,Max M Krasnow,Gregory A Bryant,Edward H Hagen

    Music comprises a diverse category of cognitive phenomena that likely represent both the effects of psychological adaptations that are specific to music (e.g., rhythmic entrainment) and the effects of adaptations for non-musical functions (e.g., auditory scene analysis). How did music evolve? Here, we show that prevailing views on the evolution of music - that music is a byproduct of other evolved

    更新日期:2020-08-26
  • Willpower With and Without Effort.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-26
    George Ainslie

    Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations-variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost

    更新日期:2020-08-26
  • Music as a coevolved system for social bonding.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-20
    Patrick E Savage,Psyche Loui,Bronwyn Tarr,Adena Schachner,Luke Glowacki,Steven Mithen,W Tecumseh Fitch

    Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding

    更新日期:2020-08-20
  • Implications for technological reserve development in advancing age, cognitive impairment, and dementia.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Jared F Benge,Michael K Scullin

    This commentary draws connections between technological culture emergence and recent trends in using assistive technology to reduce the burden of Alzheimer's disease. By the technical-reasoning hypothesis, cognitively-impaired individuals will lack the cognitive ability to employ technologies. By the technological reserve hypothesis, social-motivational and cultural transmissibility factors can provide

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Chimpanzees' technical reasoning: Taking fieldwork and ontogeny seriously.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Christophe Boesch

    Following the tradition of comparing humans with chimpanzees placed under unfavorable conditions, the authors suggest many uniquely human technological abilities. However, chimpanzees use spontaneously tools in nature to achieve many different goals demonstrating technological skills and reasoning contradicting the authors contrast. Chimpanzees and humans develop skills through the experiences faced

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A cognitive developmental approach is essential to understanding cumulative technological culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Emily Rachel Reed Burdett,Samuel Ronfard

    Osiurak and Reynaud argue that children are not a good methodological choice to examine cumulative technological culture (CTC). However, the paper ignores other current work that suggests that young children do display some aspects of creative problem-solving. We argue that using multiple methodologies and examining how technical-reasoning develops in children will provide crucial support for a cognitive

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Taking into account the wider evolutionary context of cumulative cultural evolution.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Nicolas Claidière

    The target article reviews evidence showing that technological reasoning is crucial to cumulative technological culture but it fails to discuss the implications for the emergence of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) in general. The target article supports the social view of CCE against the more ecological alternative and suggests that CCE appears when specialised individual-learning mechanisms evolve

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • The blind men and the elephant: What is missing cognitively in the study of cumulative technological evolution.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Bernard J Crespi

    I describe and explain (1) evidence regarding a key role for autism spectrum cognition in human technology; (2) tradeoffs of autistic cognition with social skills; and (3) a model of how cumulative technological culture evolves. This model involves positive feedback whereby increased technical complexity selects for enhanced social learning of mechanistic concepts and skills, leading to further advances

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Technical reasoning alone does not take humans this far.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Maxime Derex,Robert Boyd

    Although we see much utility in Osiurak and Reynaud's in-depth discussion on the role of what they term technical reasoning in cumulative culture, we argue that they neglect the time and energy costs that individuals would have to face to acquire skills in the absence of specific socio-cognitive abilities.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A cognitive transition underlying both technological and social aspects of cumulative culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Liane Gabora,Cameron M Smith

    The argument that cumulative technological culture originates in technical-reasoning skills is not the only alternative to social accounts; another possibility is that accumulation of both technical-reasoning skills and enhanced social skills stemmed from the onset of a more basic cognitive ability such as recursive representational redescription. The paper confuses individual learning of pre-existing

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Where does the elephant come from? The evolution of causal cognition is the key.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Peter Gärdenfors,Anders Högberg,Marlize Lombard

    Osiurak and Reynaud do not explain the evolutionary emergence and development of the elephant in the room, that is, technical cognition. We first argue that there is a tight correlation between the evolution of cumulative technological culture (CTC) and the evolution of reasoning about abstract forces. Second, intentional teaching plays a greater role in CTC evolution than acknowledged in the target

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A cognitive approach to cumulative technological culture is useful and necessary but only if it also applies to other species.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Thibaud Gruber

    The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Putting social cognitive mechanisms back into cumulative technological culture: Social interactions serve as a mechanism for children's early knowledge acquisition.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Amanda S Haber,Kathleen H Corriveau

    Osiurak and Reynaud offer a unified cognitive approach to cumulative technological culture, arguing that it begins with non-social cognitive skills that allow humans to learn and develop new technical information. Drawing on research focusing on how children acquire knowledge through interactions others, we argue that social learning is essential for humans to acquire technical information.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Human tool cognition relies on teleology.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Mikołaj Hernik

    Osiurak and Reynaud's account of human tool cognition misses key element: human capacity for functional representations and teleological inferences. I argue that the teleofunctional approach accounts better for some features of human tool cognition and points to a viable candidate for the cognitive “difference-maker” behind human technological success.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • How will we find the elephant in the room?
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Wybo Houkes,Krist Vaesen

    We argue that Osirak's and Reynaud's technological-reasoning hypothesis raises conceptual and methodological challenges. Interrelations between technical potential and expertise leave it unclear exactly what the technical-reasoning hypothesis encompasses. We submit that it is compatible with a range of hypotheses that are difficult to differentiate empirically.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Tools as "petrified memes": A duality.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Carsten Korth

    Tools are generated by defined steps, fulfill distinct uses, and elicit affordances or mental representations. When the latter are recombined, they are perceived as “technical reasoning,” resulting in novel tools when executed. They can be exchanged, varied, and selected between individuals in a cumulative social process. Tools are materialized, “petrified” memes forming a duality within the framework

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Missing in action: Tool use is action based.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Jeffrey J Lockman,Catherine S Tamis-LeMonda,Karen E Adolph

    In this commentary on Osiurak and Reynaud's target article, we argue that action is largely missing in their account of the ascendance of human technological culture. We propose that an action-based developmental account can help to bridge the cognitive-sociocultural divide in explanations of the discovery, production, and cultural transmission of human tool use.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A theory limited in scope and evidence.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Elena Miu,Robert Boyd,Peter J Richerson,Thomas J H Morgan

    What promised to be a refreshing addition to cumulative cultural evolution, by moving the focus from cultural transmission to technological innovation, falls flat through a lack of thoroughness, explanatory power, and data. A comprehensive theory of cumulative cultural change must carefully integrate all existing evidence in a cohesive multi-level account. We argue that the manuscript fails to do so

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Shared intentionality shapes humans' technical know-how.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Henrike Moll,Ryan Nichols,Ellyn Pueschel

    Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • The technical reasoning hypothesis does not rule out the potential key roles of imitation and working memory for CTC.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Alba Motes-Rodrigo,Eva Reindl,Elisa Bandini

    To support their claim for technical reasoning skills rather than imitation as the key for cumulative technological culture (CTC), Osiurak and Reynaud argue that chimpanzees can imitate mechanical actions, but do not have CTC. They also state that an increase in working memory in human evolution could not have been a key driver of CTC. We discuss why we disagree with these claims.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A long view of cumulative technological culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Michael J O'Brien,R Alexander Bentley

    We agree that the emergence of cumulative technological culture was tied to nonsocial cognitive skills, namely, technical-reasoning skills, which allowed humans to constantly acquire and improve information. Our concern is with a reading of the history of cumulative technological culture that is based largely on modern experiments in simulated settings and less on phenomena crucial to the long-term

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • The social side of innovation.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Bruce Rawlings,Cristine H Legare

    Innovation is fundamental to cumulative culture, allowing progressive modification of existing technology. The authors define innovation as an asocial process, uninfluenced by social information. We argue that innovation is inherently social – innovation is frequently the product of modifying others' outputs, and successful innovations are acquired by others. Research should target examination of the

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • A little too technical: The threat of intellectualising technical reasoning.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Ian Robertson

    Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • New Caledonian crows afford invaluable comparative insights into human cumulative technological culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Christian Rutz,Gavin R Hunt

    The New Caledonian crow may be the only non-primate species exhibiting cumulative technological culture. Its foraging tools show clear signs of diversification and progressive refinement, and it seems likely that at least some tool-related information is passed across generations via social learning. Here, we explain how these remarkable birds can help us uncover the basic biological processes driving

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • The crow in the room: New Caledonian crows offer insight into the necessary and sufficient conditions for cumulative cultural evolution.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Alex H Taylor,Sarah Jelbert

    New Caledonian (NC) crow populations have developed complex tools that show suggestive evidence of cumulative change. These tool designs, therefore, appear to be the product of cumulative technological culture (CTC). We suggest that tool-using NC crows offer highly useful data for current debates over the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of CTC.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Supporting the weight of the elephant in the room: Technical intelligence propped up by social cognition and language.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Alex Thornton,Francesca Happé,Christine A Caldwell

    We consider the evolutionary plausibility of Osiurak and Reynaud's (O&R) arguments. We argue that technical reasoning is not quite the magic bullet that O&R assume, and instead propose a co-evolutionary account of the interplay between technical reasoning and social learning, with language emerging as a vital issue neglected in O&R's account.

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • What matters emotionally: The importance of pride for cumulative culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Jessica L Tracy

    Osiurak and Reynaud highlight a major omission of models of cumulative technological culture. I propose an additional problematic omission: pride. By taking this emotion into account, we can address the question of why humans seek to learn, teach, and innovate – three processes essential to cumulative technological culture (CTC). By fostering achievement, prestige, and social learning, pride provides

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Causal learning in CTC: Adaptive and collaborative.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Netanel Weinstein,Dare Baldwin

    Osiurak and Reynaud highlight the critical role of technical-reasoning skills in the emergence of human cumulative technological culture (CTC), in contrast to previous accounts foregrounding social-reasoning skills as key to CTC. We question their analysis of the available evidence, yet for other reasons applaud the emphasis on causal understanding as central to the adaptive and collaborative dynamics

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Refining our understanding of the "elephant in the room".
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    Andrew Whiten

    The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • The elephant in the China shop: When technical reasoning meets cumulative technological culture.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-08-10
    François Osiurak,Emanuelle Reynaud

    The commentaries have both revealed the implications of and challenged our approach. In this response, we reply to these concerns, discuss why the technical-reasoning hypothesis does not minimize the role of social-learning mechanisms – nor assume that technical-reasoning skills make individuals omniscient technically – and make suggestions for overcoming the classical opposition between the cultural

    更新日期:2020-08-10
  • Language as a mental travel guide-ERRATUM.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-07-14
    Charles P Davis,Gerry T M Altmann,Eiling Yee

    Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive

    更新日期:2020-07-14
  • Shared reality and abstraction: The social nature of predictive models-ERRATUM.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-07-14
    Maya Rossignac-Milon,Federica Pinelli,E Tory Higgins

    We propose that abstraction is an interpersonal process and serves a social function. Research on shared reality shows that in communication, people raise their level of abstraction in order to create a common understanding with their communication partner, which can subsequently distort their mental representation of the object of communication. This work demonstrates that, beyond building accurate

    更新日期:2020-07-14
  • Other and other waters in the river: Autism and the futility of prediction.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Matthew K Belmonte

    Autism has been described as a neural deficit in prediction, people with autism manifest low perceptual construal and are impaired at traversing psychological distances, and Gilead et al.'s hierarchy from iconic to multimodal to fully abstract, socially communicated representations is exactly the hierarchy of representational impairment in autism, making autism a natural behavioural and neurophysiological

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Touch me if you can: The intangible but grounded nature of abstract concepts.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Anna M Borghi,Luca Tummolini

    Thinking about what the senses cannot grasp is one of the hallmarks of human cognition. We argue that “intangible abstracta” are represented differently from other products of abstraction, that goal-derived categorization supports their learning, and that they are grounded also in internalized linguistic and social interaction. We conclude by suggesting different ways in which abstractness contributes

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • On the implications of object permanence: Microhistorical insights from Piaget's new theory.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Jeremy Trevelyan Burman

    The authors’ arguments reflect the dominant traditions of American Psychology. In doing so, however, they miss relevant insights omitted during the original importation (translation and popularization) of the foreign sources that informed the theories they built upon. Of particular relevance here are Piaget's last studies. These are presented to unpack the meaning of “object permanence” as a kind of

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Language as a mental travel guide.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Charles P Davis,Gerry T M Altmann,Eiling Yee

    Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Representation, abstraction, and simple-minded sophisticates.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Peter Dayan

    Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Abstracting abstraction in development and cognitive ability.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Andreas Demetriou

    We focus on the theory of abstraction proposed by the target article. We suggest that abstraction varies at different levels of learning, cognitive development, or cognitive ability. We argue that this theory does not specify how abstraction is done at each of these levels. Because of these weaknesses, the theory cannot explicate how individuals differ in mental time travel at different phases of life

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Is it always so? Unexpected visions.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Jan B Deręgowski,Benjamin W Tatler

    If we consider perceptions as arising from predictive processes, we must consider the manner in which the underlying expectations are formed and how they are applied to the sensory data. We provide examples of cases where expectations give rise to unexpected and unlikely perceptions of the world. These examples may help define bounds for the notion that perceptual hypotheses are direct derivatives

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Simulation and the predictive brain.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Daniel Dohrn

    Prediction draws on both simulation and theory. I ask how simulation is defined, and what the roles of simulation and theory are, respectively. Simulation is flexible in structure and resources. Often simulation and theory are combined in prediction. The function of simulation consists of representing a situation that is relevantly like the target situation with regards to the feature predicted.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Mind wandering as data augmentation: How mental travel supports abstraction.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Myrthe Faber

    Gilead et al. state that abstraction supports mental travel, and that mental travel critically relies on abstraction. I propose an important addition to this theoretical framework, namely that mental travel might also support abstraction. Specifically, I argue that spontaneous mental travel (mind wandering), much like data augmentation in machine learning, provides variability in mental content and

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • The productive mind: Creativity as a source of abstract mental representations.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Mark Fedyk,Fei Xu

    Explanations of how the brain makes successful predictions should refer to abstracta. But, the mind/brain system is for more than prediction alone. Creativity also plays an important role in supply the mind/brain system with abstracta that serve a number of valuable ends over and above prediction.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Cognitive representations and the predictive brain depend heavily on the environment.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Klaus Fiedler

    In their scholarly target article, Gilead et al. explain how abstract mental representations and the predictive brain enable prospection and time-traveling. However, their exclusive focus on intrapsychic capacities misses an important point, namely, the degree to which mind and brain are tuned by the environment. This neglected aspect of adaptive cognition is discussed and illustrated from a cognitive-ecological

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Scale-free architectures support representational diversity.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Chris Fields,James F Glazebrook

    Gilead et al. propose an ontology of abstract representations based on folk-psychological conceptions of cognitive architecture. There is, however, no evidence that the experience of cognition reveals the architecture of cognition. Scale-free architectural models propose that cognition has the same computational architecture from sub-cellular to whole-organism scales. This scale-free architecture supports

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Representation and agency.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Karl Friston

    Gilead et al. raise some fascinating issues about representational substrates and structures in the predictive brain. This commentary drills down on a core theme in their arguments; namely, the structure of models that generate predictions. In particular, it highlights their factorial nature – both in terms of deep hierarchies over levels of abstraction and, crucially, time – and how this underwrites

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Structured event complexes are the primary representation in the human prefrontal cortex.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Jordan Grafman

    Instead of endorsing an all-encompassing view about the influence of abstractions in predictive processing, I suggest that most deliberative thought including complex abstractions, agent actions, and/or perceived environmental sequences are stored in the human prefrontal cortex in the form of structured event complexes.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Experiences of liking versus ideas about liking.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Alison Ledgerwood,Paul W Eastwick,Bertram Gawronski

    We leverage the notion that abstraction enables prediction to generate novel insights and hypotheses for the literatures on attitudes and mate preferences. We suggest that ideas about liking (e.g., evaluations of categories or overall traits) are more abstract than experiences of liking (e.g., evaluations of particular exemplars), and that ideas about liking may facilitate mental travel beyond the

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Prospection does not imply predictive processing.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Piotr Litwin,Marcin Miłkowski

    Predictive processing models of psychopathologies are not explanatorily consistent with the present account of abstract thought. These models are based on latent variables probabilistically mapping the structure of the world. As such, they cannot be informed by representational ontology based on mental objects and states. What actually is the case is merely some terminological affinity between subjective

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Catching the intangible: a role for emotion?
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Maria Montefinese,Ettore Ambrosini,Antonino Visalli,David Vinson

    A crucial aspect of Gilead and colleagues’ ontology is the dichotomy between tangible and intangible representations, but the latter remains rather ill-defined. We propose a fundamental role for interoceptive experience and the statistical distribution of entities in language, especially for intangible representations, that we believe Gilead and colleagues’ ontology needs to incorporate.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Above and beyond the content: Feelings influence mental simulations.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Kellen Mrkva,Luca Cian,Leaf Van Boven

    Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Are all distances created equal? Insights from developmental psychology.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Bronwyn O'Brien,Joshua L Rutt,Cristina M Atance

    Gilead et al.'s theory presupposes that traversing temporal, spatial, social, and hypothetical distances are largely interchangeable acts of mental travel that co-occur in human ontogeny. Yet, this claim is at odds with recent developmental data suggesting that children's reasoning is differentially affected by the dimension which they must traverse, and that different representational abilities underlie

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Abstraction still holds its feet on the ground.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Mariella Pazzaglia,Erik Leemhuis

    In view of current scientific knowledge, it seems premature to hypothesize a qualitative distinction between processes, networks, and structures involved in abstract processes from those based on perception, episodic, or procedural memories. Predictive thought and mental travel strongly rely, at different levels of consciousness, on past and ongoing sensory input, bodily information (e.g., interoception)

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Neuronal codes for predictive processing in cortical layers.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Lucy S Petro,Lars Muckli

    Predictive processing as a computational motif of the neocortex needs to be elaborated into theories of higher cognitive functions that include simulating future behavioural outcomes. We contribute to the neuroscientific perspective of predictive processing as a foundation for the proposed representational architectures of the mind.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Dynamic hierarchical cognition: Music and language demand further types of abstracta.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Tudor Popescu,W Tecumseh Fitch

    Hierarchical structures are rapidly and flexibly built up in the domains of human language and music. These domains require a tree-building capacity – “dendrophilia” – to dynamically infer hierarchical structures from sensory input (or to hierarchically structure output), based on subunits stored in a lexicon. This dynamic process involves a crucial class of abstracta overlooked in the target article

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Abstraction: An alternative neurocognitive account of recognition, prediction, and decision making.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Valerie F Reyna,David A Broniatowski

    Gilead et al. offer a thoughtful and much-needed treatment of abstraction. However, it fails to build on an extensive literature on abstraction, representational diversity, neurocognition, and psychopathology that provides important constraints and alternative evidence-based conceptions. We draw on conceptions in software engineering, socio-technical systems engineering, and a neurocognitive theory

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Shared reality and abstraction: The social nature of predictive models.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Maya Rossignac-Milon,Federica Pinelli,E Tory Higgins

    We propose that abstraction is an interpersonal process and serves a social function. Research on shared reality shows that in communication, people raise their level of abstraction in order to create a common understanding with their communication partner, which can subsequently distort their mental representation of the object of communication. This work demonstrates that, beyond building accurate

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Abstractions, predictions, and speech sound representations.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Mathias Scharinger

    Gilead et al. provide a unified account of predictive cognition in which abstract representations play an essential role. Although acknowledging the similarity to linguistic concepts toward the higher end of the proposed abstraction gradient, Gilead et al. do not consider the potential of their account to embrace phonetic and phonological speech sound representations and their neural bases.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • Simulation across representation: The interplay of schemas and simulation-based inference on different levels of abstraction.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Malte Schilling,Nancy Chang,Katharina J Rohlfing,Michael Spranger

    Language comprehension of action verbs recruits embodied representations in the brain that are assumed to invoke a mental simulation (e.g., “grasping a peanut”). This extends to abstract concepts, as well (“grasping an idea”). We, therefore, argue that mental simulation works across levels of abstractness and involves higher-level schematic structures that subsume a generic structure of actions and

    更新日期:2020-06-19
  • A modern materialist approach to abstraction, concreteness, and explanation in cognition.
    Behav. Brain. Sci. (IF 17.333) Pub Date : 2020-06-19
    Richard Shillcock

    Although endorsing the authors’ concentration on the issue of abstraction, I critique (a) the philosophical nature of their abstract–concrete dimension, (b) their view of the brain–world barrier, and (c) their implicit positivist one-way hierarchy that has abstraction as the goal.

    更新日期:2020-06-19
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