The impact of appropriate E-waste management practices on the environment, human health, and natural resources has made E-waste management an interesting research topic in recent decades. Research also shows that government intervention is an important factor in controlling the emission volume produced by waste management systems. This study considers a base E-waste supply chain in which a collection center is responsible for collecting E-waste and delivering it to a recycling center. The recycling center recovers valuable material and sells it to electronic device manufacturing companies using a price/sustainability-sensitive demand. E-waste material recovery generates emissions that are undesirable for manufacturing companies. Two extended cases regarding the base supply chain are studied, as well: (1) the recycling center is also active in E-waste collection. (2) There are two active recycling centers. Although the sustainability-sensitive demand is a controlling factor for material recovery emissions, government interferences through tariff and emission penalties make sure that sustainable issues are considered in the material recovery process. Each plant in this study makes a marginal profit by processing E-waste; therefore, it is important to know which plant is the primary decision-maker when it comes to price. Because of its capability in terms of solving interactive decision-making problems, game theory is used to model different scenarios in our problem. Equilibrium values are derived, and a numerical example with parameter sensitivity analysis is provided to show the applicability of the proposed models. The results show that the E-waste supply chain makes more profit and selects a higher level of material recovery sustainability if the plants work under a centralized decision-making framework. Moreover, it is more profitable for the entire E-waste supply chain if the recycling center undertakes a portion of the E-waste collection activity.

中文翻译：

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具有对价格/可持续性敏感的需求和政府干预的可持续电子废物供应链管理

适当的电子废物管理实践对环境，人类健康和自然资源的影响，使得电子废物管理成为近几十年来有趣的研究主题。研究还表明，政府干预是控制废物管理系统产生的排放量的重要因素。这项研究考虑了一个基本的电子废物供应链，其中一个收集中心负责收集电子废物并将其传送到回收中心。回收中心回收对有价值的材料，并使用对价格/可持续性敏感的需求将其出售给电子设备制造公司。电子废物材料回收产生的排放对于制造公司来说是不希望的。还研究了有关基础供应链的两个扩展案例：（1）回收中心也积极参与电子废物的收集。（2）有两个活跃的回收中心。尽管对可持续性敏感的需求是材料回收排放的控制因素，但政府通过关税和排放罚款的干预确保了在材料回收过程中考虑可持续性问题。本研究中的每家工厂都通过处理电子垃圾来获得边际利润；因此，重要的是要知道在价格方面哪个工厂是主要决策者。由于它具有解决交互式决策问题的能力，因此博弈论可用于对问题中的不同场景进行建模。导出了平衡值，并提供了带有参数敏感性分析的数值示例，以证明所提出模型的适用性。结果表明，如果工厂在集中决策框架下工作，电子废物供应链将获得更多利润并选择更高水平的材料回收可持续性。此外，如果回收中心承担一部分电子废物收集活动，那么对于整个电子废物供应链而言，这将更有利可图。