Governments often subsidise forest stands to ensure a sustainable supply of wood and environmental services. Governments need to design subsidy systems to effectively achieve policy goals with less government expenditure. This study explored effective subsidy systems for forest stands by comparing four subsidy systems using a simple forest resource model. Although a system formulated with minimal constraints required minimum government expenditure in all cases, the rotation age in a stand could change cyclically with the target supply. Assuming that forest owners cooperate with the government, the maximisation of a cost-effectiveness index in each stand could provide the second-lowest government expenditure for almost all cases. However, when we assumed that forest owners were economically rational and strived to maximise their land expectation values, the optimality of this system was disturbed. In this situation, alternate optimisations of rotation ages by forest owners and subsidy rates by the government converged on the subsidy system with the third-lowest government expenditure. The system adjusts the subsidy rate so that the maximum land expectation value is zero, which is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium between the forest owners and the government.

政府经常补贴林分以确保木材和环境服务的可持续供应。政府需要设计补贴制度，以较少的政府支出有效地实现政策目标。本研究通过使用简单的森林资源模型比较四种补贴制度，探索了有效的林分补贴制度。尽管以最小约束制定的系统在所有情况下都需要最少的政府支出，但林分的轮换年龄可能会随着目标供应而周期性变化。假设森林所有者与政府合作，每个林分的成本效益指数最大化可以为几乎所有情况提供第二低的政府支出。然而，当我们假设森林所有者在经济上是理性的并努力使他们的土地期望值最大化时，该系统的最优性就会受到干扰。在这种情况下，森林所有者轮流年龄和政府补贴率的交替优化收敛于政府支出第三低的补贴制度。系统调整补贴率使得最大土地期望值为零，这是林主与政府之间的纯策略纳什均衡。