How do authoritative international bodies decide that states have complied with their orders? Compliance research has mostly focused on how states react to rulings and how interest groups mobilize for and against compliance. Less has been said about how international bodies certify compliance with their orders in contexts of conflicting interests and incomplete information. Because in theory the seal of compliance could be given to different types and volumes of state actions, we argue that when nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) monitor implementation closely, international adjudicators will be more demanding in compliance certification, resulting in more protracted compliance monitoring processes. We test our expectations in the case of the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights and find that recommendations take longer to reach status of full compliance when more NGOs act as petitioners and when they have more experience with monitoring compliance. If NGOs help that more effective implementation receives an international organization's seal of approval, large numbers of orders without full compliance might not necessarily be bad news about human rights on the ground.

中文翻译：

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关于合规的坏消息是关于人权的坏消息吗？来自美洲人权委员会的证据

权威国际机构如何判定各国遵守了他们的命令？合规研究主要集中在国家如何对裁决作出反应以及利益集团如何动员起来支持和反对合规。关于国际机构如何在利益冲突和信息不完整的情况下证明其命令得到遵守的说法较少。因为理论上合规印章可以授予不同类型和数量的国家行为，我们认为，当非政府组织 (NGO) 密切监督实施时，国际裁决者将对合规认证提出更高要求，从而导致更长期的合规监督过程。我们在美洲人权委员会的案例中测试了我们的期望，发现当更多的非政府组织作为请愿者并且当他们有更多的监督遵守情况的经验时，建议需要更长的时间才能达到完全遵守的状态。如果非政府组织帮助更有效的实施获得国际组织的批准，那么大量没有完全遵守的命令可能不一定是当地人权的坏消息。