Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament.

中文翻译：

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缩小认知不公正的概念差距

米兰达·弗里克 (Miranda Fricker) 关于认知不公正的富有洞察力的著作讨论了认知不公正的两种形式——证明不公正和解释学不公正。当受害者缺乏解释资源来理解她的经历时，就会发生解释学上的不公正，而这种缺陷可以追溯到结构性不公正。在本文中，我提供了一个模型来说明如何填补解释学不公正中的概念空白。首先，我认为受害者拥有概念资源来理解他们的经历，即现象概念。其次，我展示了一个人如何在一个两步过程中从一个主观的、现象的概念上升到一个新颖的、公共的概念。最后，我讨论了要使此过程成功必须满足的条件。