We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than nonconsumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth-signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure, and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions.

中文翻译：

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消费信念和储蓄不足的可见性偏差

我们对消费行为的社会传播中的可见性偏见进行建模。当消费比非消费更显着时，人们会认为其他人正在大量消费，并推断未来前景良好。这会增加正反馈循环中的总消耗。一个独特的含义是披露政策干预可以改善储蓄不足。与财富信号模型相反，关于财富的信息不对称减少了过度消费。该模型预测储蓄受社会联系、观察偏差和人口结构的影响，并提供了对储蓄率的新见解。这些预测不同于其他常见的消费扭曲模型。