The paper presents a comprehensive solution to the new riddle of induction. Gruesome induction is blocked because “grue” is not independent of our sampling and observation methods. Before presenting my theory, I critically survey previous versions of what I call the “independence strategy”, tracing the strategy to three different papers from 1970s by (respectively) Wilkerson, Moreland, and Jackson. Next I critically examine recent approaches by Okasha, Godfrey-Smith, Schramm, and Freitag. All of these approaches have their virtues, but none of them rules out every problem case. Nor do any of them alone explain exactly what goes wrong in all types of gruesome reasoning. My account aims to do both. Learning lessons from my criticisms of previous theories, I argue that there are several crucial types of independence. Correct characterizations of all of them are needed to rule out every problem case. I close by suggesting that the independence solution can be adopted by other approaches—Bayesians, fans of natural kinds, and pragmatists.

本文提出了新的归纳之谜的综合解决方案。可怕的感应被阻止，因为“可怕”并不独立于我们的采样和观察方法。在介绍我的理论之前，我批判性地回顾了我称之为“独立战略”的先前版本，将该战略追溯到 1970 年代（分别）威尔克森、莫兰德和杰克逊的三篇不同论文。接下来，我批判性地研究了 Okasha、Godfrey-Smith、Schramm 和 Freitag 最近的方法。所有这些方法都有其优点，但没有一种方法可以排除所有问题。他们中的任何一个也不能单独解释所有类型的可怕推理中到底出了什么问题。我的帐户旨在做到这两点。从我对以前理论的批评中吸取教训，我认为有几种重要的独立类型。需要对所有这些问题进行正确的描述以排除所有问题案例。最后，我建议独立性解决方案可以被其他方法采用——贝叶斯学派、自然类爱好者和实用主义者。