A familiar anti-sceptical response (à la Sosa) to radical sceptical scenarios employs the safety of knowledge. Radical sceptical scenarios are purported to be too modally remote to really threaten knowledge of ordinary propositions. Why? Because knowledge requires safety, and safety requires the target belief to be true in all nearby possible worlds, but radical sceptical scenarios purportedly take place at distant possible worlds. Hence, the safety theorist claims that radical sceptical scenarios don’t challenge our knowledge of ordinary propositions. But it's alleged by Sosa and others that there's one radical sceptical scenario that can’t be dismissed so easily: the dream scenario. After all, unlike evil demons and brains in vats, ‘dreaming is a daily part of our lives…it is too close for comfort’. In this paper, I sketch an argument to the effect that there's good reason to think that the dream of dream scepticism describes a modally remote possibility, in which case I argue that if the safety-based anti-sceptical response is successful against the evil demon sceptical scenario, the brain in a vat sceptical scenario, and other Cartesian sceptical scenarios in this mould, then it's successful against the dream sceptical scenario as well.

中文翻译：

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为什么梦想世界不是附近的可能世界

对激进的怀疑情景的一种熟悉的反怀疑反应 (à la Sosa) 运用了知识的安全性。据称，激进的怀疑论场景太过模态遥远，无法真正威胁到普通命题的知识。为什么？因为知识需要安全，而安全需要目标信念在所有附近的可能世界中都是真实的，但激进的怀疑场景据称发生在遥远的可能世界中。因此，安全理论家声称激进的怀疑情景不会挑战我们对普通命题的了解。但 Sosa 和其他人声称，有一种激进的怀疑情景不能轻易被驳回：梦想情景。毕竟，与邪恶的恶魔和缸中之脑不同，“做梦是我们日常生活的一部分……它离我们太近了，让人无法安心”。在本文中，