Here is a widespread but controversial idea: those animals who represent correctly are likely to be selected over those who misrepresent. While various versions of this claim have been traditionally endorsed by the vast majority of philosophers of mind, recently, it has been argued that this is just plainly wrong. My aim in this paper is to argue for an intermediate position: that the correctness of some but not all representations is indeed selectively advantageous. It is selectively advantageous to have correct representations that are directly involved in bringing about and guiding the organism's action. I start with the standard objection to the claim that it is selectively advantageous to represent correctly, the ‘better safe than sorry’ argument gand then generalize it with the help of Peter Godfrey Smith's distinction between Cartesian and Jamesian reliability and the trade-off between them. This generalized argument rules out a positive answer to our question at least as far as the vast majority of our representational apparatus is concerned. But this argument fails to apply in the case of the correctness of a special kind of representation, one that is directly involved in bringing about, and in guiding, actions. We can still maintain that it is selectively advantageous to have a reliable mechanism for producing representations of this kind.

中文翻译：

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正确表示的选择性优势

这是一个广泛但有争议的想法：那些正确表达的动物可能会比那些错误表达的动物更容易被选择。虽然这种说法的各种版本传统上都得到了绝大多数心灵哲学家的认可，但最近，有人认为这显然是错误的。我在本文中的目的是主张一种中间立场：某些但并非全部表述的正确性确实具有选择性优势。拥有直接参与产生和指导有机体行动的正确表征是选择性有利的。我从对“正确表示有选择地有利”这一主张的标准反对开始，“安全总比遗憾更好”的论点，然后借助彼得·戈弗雷·史密斯对笛卡尔可靠性和詹姆斯可靠性之间的区别以及它们之间的权衡来概括它。至少就我们绝大多数代表机构而言，这种笼统的论点排除了对我们问题的肯定答案。但这一论点不适用于一种特殊表征的正确性，这种表征直接涉及行动的产生和指导。我们仍然可以认为，拥有一种可靠的机制来生成此类表示是有选择性的优势。