In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are in fact criteria of, or means to achieve, objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of, or means for, objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? I claim that this is not the case because they do not lower the thresholds scientifically postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of under-appreciated influences of values on science, which indeed pose a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.

在本文中，我将捍卫这样一种观点，即客观性具有抽象和普遍的核心含义，而被视为客观性的各种概念或概念实际上是客观性的标准或实现客观性的手段。然后我将讨论价值中立科学的理想及其与科学客观性的关系；它的地位充其量只能是客观性的标准或手段。鉴于此分析，我们可以转向归纳风险问题。关于归纳风险的价值判断真的对科学的客观性构成威胁吗？我声称情况并非如此，因为它们没有降低科学假设的客观性门槛。我将通过讨论价值观对科学的未被充分认识的影响来结束本文，