We study the observability of investors' information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure.

中文翻译：

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金融市场中的秘密和公开信息获取

我们研究了投资者在金融市场中的信息获取活动的可观察性。提高可观察性会对信息获取产生两种战略影响：(1) 定价效应，它源于投资者和做市商之间的互动，可以鼓励或阻碍信息获取，以及 (2) 竞争效应，它涉及投资者之间的互动和总是鼓励信息获取。我们将我们的理论应用于研究企业实地考察的自愿和强制披露。当竞争效应占主导地位时，投资者会自愿披露他们的访问情况。当定价效应占主导地位时，强制披露是有效的。我们的分析为监管公平披露提供了新的思路。