An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental.

中文翻译：

---

我们可以对基本属性有合理的信念吗？

一幅引人入胜的世界图景是，一些特征在形而上学上是基本的，而另一些特征是派生的，派生特征以基本特征为基础。但是我们如何证明哪些特征是基本的呢？什么是基本原理的认识论？我在这篇论文中勾勒出一个回应。指导思想是相同的属性会导致相同的体验。我认为，认知基础性和形而上学基础性之间的概率联系足以证明关于形而上学基础的合理信念。