The automatic generation control (AGC) is one of the core control systems in power grids that regulate frequency within the permissible range. However, its dependence on communication makes it highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. An arbitrary false data injection attack (FDIA) on AGC frequency and tie-line flow measurements will likely be detectable by bad data detection methods; however, if an attack can be launched optimally, it often becomes stealthy. In this regard, we develop a framework of optimal FDIAs (OFDIAs) to demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks in the power system frequency control loop. We propose a linearized formulation of discretized power systems’ dynamics in an optimization framework to model OFDIAs that compromise the AGC system by corrupting tie-line flow and generators’ frequency measurements. Using the proposed formal modeling, we study the effects of two types of FDIAs, continuous and time-limited, on the frequency behavior in power grids. The results demonstrate that continuous OFDIAs can lead to severe consequences on a power grid’s performance, such as frequency instability. In contrast, the time-limited FDIAs can cause the frequency to fluctuate beyond the acceptable range, which may lead to the triggering of the frequency-based protection relays.

中文翻译：

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针对电力系统频率稳定性的最优虚假数据注入攻击

自动发电控制（AGC）是电网中将频率调节在允许范围内的核心控制系统之一。然而，它对通信的依赖使其极易受到网络攻击。对 AGC 频率和联络线流量测量的任意虚假数据注入攻击 (FDIA) 很可能会被不良数据检测方法检测到；但是，如果可以以最佳方式发起攻击，它通常会变得隐秘。在这方面，我们开发了一个最优 FDIAs (OFDIAs) 框架来证明这种攻击在电力系统频率控制环路中的可行性。我们在优化框架中提出离散电力系统动力学的线性化公式，以对通过破坏联络线流量和发电机频率测量来损害 AGC 系统的 OFDIA 进行建模。使用所提出的正式建模，我们研究了两种类型的 FDIA（连续的和限时的）对电网频率行为的影响。结果表明，连续的 OFDIA 会对电网性能造成严重后果，例如频率不稳定。相反，有时间限制的 FDIA 会导致频率波动超出可接受的范围，这可能会导致触发基于频率的保护继电器。