We investigate how capacity payments in combination with scarcity pricing of energy can ensure resource adequacy in electricity markets, defined as the ability of supply and other resources to provide enough energy and capacity to meet demand under steady-state operating conditions. This work generalizes models for determining capacity payments by deriving second-best discriminatory payments by resource type that account not only for the “missing money” market failure that arises from energy price caps, but also for market power in the capacity market and differences in risk tolerance among resource types that can arise from failures in risk and capital markets. A bi-level equilibrium-constrained optimization model is proposed to define second-best capacity payments in a static long-run setting, considering the impacts of those payments on the mix and cost of generation investment and energy outputs. The lower-level suppliers play a Nash game to determine the generation mix under a capacity payment scheme, while the upper-level regulator considers consumer welfare and resource adequacy. We introduce an equivalent formulation via a variational inequality approach, and find conditions for the solution to exist. Discriminatory payments are found to be second-best when there are market power in the investment game, price caps in energy markets and imperfections in risk markets that lead to diverse risk attitudes.

我们研究了容量支付与能源稀缺定价相结合如何确保电力市场的资源充足性，电力市场的资源充足性定义为供应和其他资源能够提供足够的能源和容量以满足稳态运行条件下的需求。这项工作通过按资源类型推导次优歧视性支付来概括确定容量支付的模型，这些支付不仅可以解释能源价格上限引起的“资金缺失”市场失灵，还可以解释容量市场中的市场力量和风险差异风险和资本市场失败可能引起的资源类型之间的容忍度。提出了一个双层均衡约束优化模型来定义静态长期设置中的次优容量支付，考虑这些支付对发电投资和能源产出的组合和成本的影响。下级供应商玩纳什博弈以确定容量支付方案下的发电组合，而上级监管机构则考虑消费者福利和资源充足性。我们通过变分不等式方法引入等价公式，并找到解存在的条件。当投资游戏中存在市场力量、能源市场存在价格上限以及风险市场不完善导致风险态度不同时，歧视性支付被认为是次优选择。而上级监管机构则考虑消费者福利和资源充足性。我们通过变分不等式方法引入等价公式，并找到解存在的条件。当投资游戏中存在市场力量、能源市场存在价格上限以及风险市场不完善导致风险态度不同时，歧视性支付被认为是次优选择。而上级监管机构则考虑消费者福利和资源充足性。我们通过变分不等式方法引入等价公式，并找到解存在的条件。当投资游戏中存在市场力量、能源市场存在价格上限以及风险市场不完善导致风险态度不同时，歧视性支付被认为是次优选择。