Transparent product information is a critical factor that promotes product sales. To satisfy the consumers’ expectation of product quality information, in practice, manufacturers (e.g., Beinmate, Aptamil, and Qiao’s compound) have adopted Blockchain Technology (BT) to help consumers trace the associated product information. In addition, the governments also encourage the application of BT by implementing relevant policies. This paper proposes a stylized dual-channel supply chain model to investigate the value added from adopting BT for manufacturers. We consider a setting that a manufacturer sells its product through two channels, i.e., offline retailer and online e-tailer. Under this circumstance, we find that the manufacturer is always willing to adopt BT to disclose product information. In particular, the offline retailer and consumers can receive benefits from this innovation, while the action is a double-edged sword for the online e-tailer. Moreover, under a special scenario that the government offers a quantity/innovation subsidy, we show that there exists a win–win–win situation for the manufacturer, the both selling channels, as well as the consumers. Finally, we compare the two subsidy policies and show that innovation subsidy can always achieve a better social welfare than quantity subsidy. Numerical examples are conducted to select the optimal subsidy policies and examine the extensions of this work.

透明的产品信息是促进产品销售的关键因素。为了满足消费者对产品质量信息的期望，在实践中，制造商（如贝因美、爱他美、乔氏大药厂）已经采用区块链技术（BT）来帮助消费者追溯相关产品信息。此外，各国政府也通过相关政策鼓励BT的应用。本文提出了一个程式化的双渠道供应链模型，以研究制造商采用 BT 的附加值。我们考虑制造商通过两个渠道销售其产品的设置，即线下零售商和在线电子零售商。在这种情况下，我们发现厂商总是乐于采用BT的方式来公开产品信息。尤其，线下零售商和消费者可以从这项创新中获益，而这一举措对于在线电子零售商来说是一把双刃剑。此外，在政府提供数量/创新补贴的特殊情况下，我们表明制造商、销售渠道和消费者都存在三赢局面。最后，我们比较了两种补贴政策，表明创新补贴总能比数量补贴获得更好的社会福利。进行了数值示例以选择最佳补贴政策并检查这项工作的扩展。我们表明，制造商、销售渠道和消费者都存在三赢局面。最后，我们比较了两种补贴政策，表明创新补贴总能比数量补贴获得更好的社会福利。进行了数值示例以选择最佳补贴政策并检查这项工作的扩展。我们表明，制造商、销售渠道和消费者都存在三赢局面。最后，我们比较了两种补贴政策，表明创新补贴总能比数量补贴获得更好的社会福利。进行了数值示例以选择最佳补贴政策并检查这项工作的扩展。