That economic integration constrains state sovereignty has been a longstanding concern and the subject of much study. We assess the validity of this concern in the context of two very particular components of contemporary economic globalization: global value chain (GVC) integration and Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). First, we document that host states have abandoned nearly 24 percent of regulations disputed by private investors in ISDS between 1987 and 2017. This behavior is puzzling because ISDS only requires host states to provide monetary compensation to investor-claimants and not the abandonment of disputed regulations. We theorize that host states are more likely to abandon a disputed regulation when the claimant has a greater potential to disrupt GVCs in the host economy. We then employ the non-parametric difference-in-differences estimator by Imai, Kim, and Wang (2021) and find that ISDS filings cause substantial decreases in GVC trade. Following this result, we provide descriptive statistics and qualitative evidence that support our core theoretical proposition that multinational corporations (MNCs) with the potential to disrupt GVC integration are more likely to see host states changing regulations in their favor. Our argument and evidence suggest that GVC integration can grow an MNC’s power to such an extent that the host state abandons a regulation that the MNC disputes.

中文翻译：

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全球价值链作为对主权的约束：来自投资者与国家争端解决的证据

经济一体化限制国家主权一直是一个长期关注的问题，也是很多研究的主题。我们在当代经济全球化的两个非常特殊的组成部分的背景下评估这种担忧的有效性：全球价值链 (GVC) 一体化和投资者与国家争端解决 (ISDS)。首先，我们记录了东道国在 1987 年至 2017 年间放弃了近 24% 的私人投资者在 ISDS 中有争议的法规。这种行为令人费解，因为 ISDS 只要求东道国向投资者索赔人提供货币补偿，而不是放弃有争议的法规. 我们的理论是，当原告更有可能破坏东道国经济中的全球价值链时，东道国更有可能放弃有争议的法规。然后，我们采用 Imai、Kim 和 Wang（2021 年）的非参数差分估计器，发现 ISDS 申请导致全球价值链贸易大幅下降。根据这一结果，我们提供了描述性统计数据和定性证据来支持我们的核心理论命题，即有可能破坏全球价值链一体化的跨国公司 (MNC) 更有可能看到东道国改变对他们有利的法规。我们的论点和证据表明，全球价值链一体化可以将跨国公司的权力扩大到东道国放弃跨国公司有争议的监管的程度。我们提供了描述性统计数据和定性证据来支持我们的核心理论命题，即有可能破坏全球价值链一体化的跨国公司 (MNC) 更有可能看到东道国改变对他们有利的法规。我们的论点和证据表明，全球价值链一体化可以将跨国公司的权力扩大到东道国放弃跨国公司有争议的监管的程度。我们提供了描述性统计数据和定性证据来支持我们的核心理论命题，即有可能破坏全球价值链一体化的跨国公司 (MNC) 更有可能看到东道国改变对他们有利的法规。我们的论点和证据表明，全球价值链一体化可以将跨国公司的权力扩大到东道国放弃跨国公司有争议的监管的程度。