How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are metaphysically objectionable. In particular, there are two general metaphysical principles that Humeans have found attractive that are incompatible with all existing versions of Non-Humeanism. My goal in this paper is to develop a novel version of Non-Humeanism that is consistent with (and even entails) both of these general metaphysical principles. By endorsing such a view, one can have the explanatory benefits of Non-Humeanism while at the same time avoiding two of the major metaphysical objections towards Non-Humeanism.

我们应该如何解释世界上非凡的规律性？Humeans 和 Non-Humeans 截然不同。根据非休谟主义者的说法，由于自然界中某些必要的联系，世界以一种非常有规律的方式运行。然而，休谟派认为非休谟派的观点在形而上学上是令人反感的。特别是，休谟主义者发现有两个一般的形而上学原则很有吸引力，它们与所有现有的非休谟主义版本都不相容。我在本文中的目标是开发一种与（甚至包含）这两个一般形而上学原则一致的非休谟主义的新版本。通过认可这样一种观点，人们可以获得非人道的解释性好处，同时避免对非人道的两个主要的形而上学反对意见。