Moderate skepticism about de se thought accepts that there is a kind of mental state which is about the thinker and is psychologically indispensable for intentional action, but rejects the claim that this kind employs an indexical way of referring. Morgan (2021) has proposed an explanatory argument meant to show that the psychological kind does employ an indexical way of referring to the thinker, on the basis of the special connection between these thoughts and the use of the first-person pronoun (‘I’ in English), which does have an indexical semantics. This paper offers a clear motivation for the moderately skeptical position, shows that Morgan’s argument is based on a mistaken analysis of that special connection, and proposes a more viable alternative. However, on this alternative, the relationship between the psychological role of de se thoughts and the first person in language means Morgan’s explanatory argument cannot go through.

对de se 的适度怀疑思想承认存在一种关于思想者的心理状态，并且在心理上对于有意的行为是不可或缺的，但拒绝这种使用索引方式的说法。Morgan (2021) 提出了一个解释性论证，旨在表明心理类型确实采用索引方式来指代思想者，基于这些思想与第一人称代词（“我”）的使用之间的特殊联系在英语中），它确实具有索引语义。本文为适度怀疑的立场提供了明确的动机，表明摩根的论点是基于对这种特殊联系的错误分析，并提出了一个更可行的替代方案。然而，在这种选择上， de se的心理作用之间的关系思想和语言中的第一人称意味着摩根的解释性论证无法通过。