E-commerce platforms commonly offer price discounts as a loyalty benefit for fee-based members. Some of them disclose the member-only discount, while others strategically hide the specific discount information from non-members, which can be seen as information discrimination between non-members and members. This paper constructs a stylized model to examine whether disclosing or hiding member-only discounts yields higher revenue. Our study also incorporates the two-sided reference price effects into customers’ utility formation to reveal how information discrimination works. By comparing the revenue gap between information disclosing and hiding strategies concerning exogenous and endogenous member-only discounts, we find that platforms that aim at the high-end market by charging a higher product price and membership fee and whose target customers hold higher negative but lower positive reference price effect should implement the information hiding strategy. The findings guide e-commerce platforms to improve revenue by strategically hiding or disclosing member-only discounts in fee-based membership management.

电子商务平台通常会提供价格折扣作为收费会员的忠诚度福利。有的公开会员专享优惠，有的策略性地向非会员隐瞒具体优惠信息，可以看作是非会员与会员之间的信息歧视。本文构建了一个程式化模型来检验公开或隐藏会员专享折扣是否会产生更高的收入。我们的研究还将双边参考价格效应纳入客户的效用形成，以揭示信息歧视的运作方式。通过比较关于外生和内生会员专享折扣的信息披露和隐藏策略之间的收入差距，我们发现，针对高端市场收取较高产品价格和会员费，且目标客户持有较高负参考价格效应但较低正参考价格效应的平台应实施信息隐藏策略。调查结果指导电子商务平台通过在基于收费的会员管理中战略性地隐藏或披露会员专享折扣来提高收入。