The fastest growing segment of private equity deals is secondary buyouts (SBOs) sales from one private equity (PE) firm to another. We operationalize a novel FactSet database to map the network structures of secondary buyouts between PE firms. We offer three contributions. First, after controlling for economic covariates, we find that PE firms are almost three times more likely to transact if they share a partner, that is both firms belong to the same clique. Second, we find that the profitability of such transactions is unambiguously higher relative to the baseline only if these are the result of repeated interaction between firms belonging to the same cliques. In other words, a clique premium exists under repeated interaction. Third, we provide evidence that the economic incentive at the core of clique premium may be related to access to information. In fact, we show that information related to transactions diffuses through the network, with 23% and 16% of the information going one and two steps beyond transacting parties, respectively.

私募股权交易中增长最快的部分是从一家私募股权 (PE) 公司向另一家私募股权 (PE) 公司的二次收购 (SBO)。我们运行一个新的FactSet数据库来映射 PE 公司之间二次收购的网络结构。我们提供三个贡献。首先，在控制了经济协变量之后，我们发现如果私募股权公司有一个合伙人，即两家公司都属于同一个集团，那么他们进行交易的可能性几乎高出三倍。其次，我们发现，只有当这些交易是属于同一集团的公司之间反复互动的结果时，此类交易的盈利能力才会明确高于基线。换句话说，集团溢价存在于反复的交互作用下。第三，我们提供的证据表明，集团溢价的核心经济激励可能与信息获取有关。事实上，我们表明与交易相关的信息通过网络传播，分别有 23% 和 16% 的信息超出交易方一级和两级。