In this paper, I sketch a general framework for theorizing about bias and bias attributions. According to the account, paradigmatic cases of bias involve systematic departures from genuine norms. I attempt to show that the account illuminates a number of important psychological phenomena, including: the fact that accusations of bias frequently inspire not only denials but also countercharges of bias (“you only think that I'm biased because you're biased!”); the fact that we tend to see ourselves as less biased than our peers (the so-called ‘bias blind spot’); and the fact that we tend to see people who share our views as less biased than people who don't. I explore the circumstances in which we're committed to believing that those who disagree with us are not only mistaken but also biased simply because they disagree with us in the way that they do. In addition, the account also sheds light on another notorious and well-documented psychological phenomenon: the fact that introspection is an unreliable way of detecting our biases. On the account that I offer, the unreliability of introspection for this purpose isn't a contingent fact that depends on the finer details of human psychology but rather holds of necessity: even God could not have made us creatures who reliably detect our own biases by way of introspection.

中文翻译：

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偏见、规范、内省和偏见盲点1

在本文中，我勾画了一个关于偏见和偏见归因理论的一般框架。根据该说法，典型的偏见案例涉及系统性偏离真正的规范。我试图表明，这个叙述阐明了许多重要的心理现象，包括：事实上，对偏见的指控不仅经常引发否认，而且还引发对偏见的反驳（“你只是认为我有偏见，因为你有偏见！” ）；事实上，我们倾向于认为自己比同龄人更少偏见（所谓的“偏见盲点”）；事实上，我们倾向于认为与我们观点相同的人比不同意我们观点的人更少偏见。我探讨了在何种情况下，我们坚信那些不同意我们观点的人不仅是错误的，而且还带有偏见，仅仅因为他们不同意我们的做法。此外，该叙述还揭示了另一种臭名昭著且有据可查的心理现象：内省是一种不可靠的检测我们偏见的方法。根据我的说法，为此目的进行内省的不可靠性并不是一个偶然的事实，它取决于人类心理学的细节，而是必然存在的：即使是上帝也不可能让我们成为能够通过以下方式可靠地发现自己偏见的生物：内省的方式。