The notion of natural kinds has been widely criticized in philosophy of science but also appears indispensable for philosophical engagement with classificatory practices. Rather than addressing this tension through a new definition of “natural kind”, this article suggests materiality as a substitute for naturalness in philosophical debates about scientific classification. It is argued that a theory of material kinds provides an alternative and more inclusive entry point for analyzing classificatory practices, which is specified through an account of “restricted malleability” of materiality and further analyzed as (1) gradual, (2) multi-dimensional, (3) scalable, (4) interactive, and (5) purpose sensitive.

自然种类的概念在科学哲学中受到广泛批评，但对于分类实践的哲学参与来说似乎也是不可或缺的。本文没有通过“自然类”的新定义来解决这种紧张关系，而是建议在关于科学分类的哲学辩论中用物质性代替自然性。有人认为，材料种类理论为分析分类实践提供了一个替代的和更具包容性的切入点，它通过对材料的“受限延展性”的说明来指定，并进一步分析为（1）渐进的，（2）多维的，（3）可扩展，（4）交互，和（5）目的敏感。