A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who prefers the same action regardless of his type. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent’s type at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent’s type. Transparent mechanisms are optimal: the principal’s payoff is the same as if her signal was public. A simple cutoff form is optimal: favorable signals ensure the agent’s preferred action. Signals below this cutoff lead to the nonpreferred action unless the agent appeals. An appeal always triggers type verification.

中文翻译：

---

无成本的信息和昂贵的验证：透明度的案例

校长必须做出二元决定。她依赖于一个代理人私人持有的信息，这个代理人不管他的类型如何都喜欢同样的行动。委托人不能通过转移来激励，但可以通过成本了解代理人的类型。此外，委托人私下观察与代理人类型相关的信号。透明的机制是最优的：委托人的回报与她的信号是公开的一样。一个简单的截止形式是最优的：有利的信号确保代理的首选行动。除非代理提出上诉，否则低于该截止值的信号会导致非首选操作。上诉总是会触发类型验证。