Labor market institutions (LMIs) could enable new firm entry by lowering burdens to attracting and retaining human capital or restrict new firm entry by increasing concerns of additional demands on ventures facing liabilities of newness and smallness. In this study, we focus on the LMI of the right of association, and whether its relationship with new business entry depends on the vertical ordering of bargaining (represented in the centralization of collective bargaining) or the horizontal synchronization of wage-setting (represented in the coordination of wage-setting). In a panel of 44 countries covering the period 2005–2019, we find that the right of association in the market sector is positively associated with new business entry; however, with increasing centralization of collective bargaining, the association becomes negative. Coordination of wage-setting does not significantly affect the relationship between the right of association and new business entry. The results are robust to accounting for both serial correlation and cross-sectional correlation in the panel regressions and carry implications for policymakers regarding the effects of LMIs on new business creation.

劳动力市场机构 (LMI) 可以通过降低吸引和保留人力资本的负担来促进新公司进入，或者通过增加对面临新的和小的负债的企业的额外需求的担忧来限制新公司的进入。在本研究中，我们关注结社权的 LMI，以及它与新企业进入的关系取决于谈判的纵向排序（以集体谈判的集中化为代表）还是工资设定的横向同步（以工资设定的协调）。在涵盖 2005 年至 2019 年期间的 44 个国家/地区的小组中，我们发现市场部门的结社权与新企业进入呈正相关；然而，随着集体谈判越来越集中，这种联系变得消极。工资设定的协调不会显着影响结社权和新企业进入之间的关系。结果对于解释面板回归中的序列相关性和横截面相关性是稳健的，并且对政策制定者关于 LMI 对新业务创建的影响具有启示意义。