The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.

中文翻译：

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银行业薪酬监管：欧盟奖金上限后的执行董事行为和银行绩效

作为 2013 年资本要求指令 IV 的一部分，限制高管可变薪酬的规定可能会影响欧盟银行业的高管流动率、薪酬设计和风险承担。目前的研究发现，平均流动率明显较高，但也发现，这种流动率是由业绩不佳的银行的首席执行官推动的。银行通过用更高的固定薪酬抵消奖金上限来补偿高管。尽管我们的证据只是提示性的，但我们并没有发现银行层面的风险承担有任何减少，而这正是监管所声称的目标之一。