In this paper I will introduce a new compatibilist account of free action: indirect conscious control compatibilism, or just indirect compatibilism for short. On this account, actions are free either when they are caused by compatibilist-friendly conscious psychological processes, or else by sub-personal level processes influenced in particular ways by compatibilist-friendly conscious psychological processes. This view is motivated by a problem faced by a certain family of compatibilist views, which I call conscious control views. These views hold that we act freely when we act in a way that is caused by certain conscious psychological processes. One problem for such views is that current neuroscience suggests that most of our actions are not caused by such processes. Instead, many of the actions we typically suppose are free are caused by sub-personal level processes and hence would count as not free according to contemporary conscious control views. I argue, contra these views, that many actions caused by these sub-personal level processes are indirectly free. Further, most of the actions we ordinarily judge to be free are free in this indirect manner.

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间接相容

在本文中，我将介绍一种新的自由行动相容论解释：间接意识控制相容论，或简称为间接相容论。因此，当行为是由亲和主义者友好的有意识心理过程引起的，或者是由亲和主义者友好的有意识心理过程以特定方式影响的亚个人水平过程引起的时，这些行为是自由的。这种观点是由某些相容论观点家族所面临的问题所激发的，我称之为有意识的控制观点. 这些观点认为，当我们以某种有意识的心理过程所导致的方式行动时，我们就是在自由行动。这种观点的一个问题是，当前的神经科学表明，我们的大部分行为不是由这种过程引起的。相反，许多我们通常认为是自由的行为是由亚个人层面的过程引起的，因此根据当代有意识的控制观点，这些行为将被视为不自由的。我认为，与这些观点相反，由这些亚个人层面的过程引起的许多行为是间接免费的。此外，我们通常判断为自由的大多数行为都是以这种间接方式自由的。